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5Introduction
This book constitutes a follow-up and extension of the publication of the Ministry of Economy and Labour entitled Employment in 
Poland 2005. In the pages of this report, we discuss problems which were not addressed, or which were merely touched upon, in the 
previous issue and which are of particular importance as from the beginning of the year 2007 which saw the emergence of new chal-
lenges for the Polish economy and for the Polish labour market. These challenges are brought about by the process of globalisation 
and of European integration. Hence, we have put a lot of focus on the aspect of demand in the labour market and especially so from 
the macroeconomic and regional perspectives. Moreover, we have looked at how increasing productivity and competitiveness of 
Polish companies shape various unemployment, employment and remuneration trends. We also address the issue of labour supply 
which we analyse not only from the macroeconomic and regional points of view but which we assess with an emphasis on such cur-
rent matters as migration or work in the non-observed economy. 
Similarly to preceding issue, this issue of Employment in Poland is above all a scientiﬁc paper which synthesises empirical and theore-
tical macroeconomic evidence with recent ﬁndings of relevant empirical research. It was completed thanks to the cooperation of the 
Department of Economic Analyses and Forecasts of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, on the one hand, and the Institute for 
Structural Research, on the other. It is addressed, however, not only to researchers working in the ﬁeld of macroeconomics but also 
policy-makers, who shape and implement economic policies, including the labour market policy, at national, regional and local levels. 
The authors hope that the analytical framework presented in the report as well as the conclusions relevant for the labour market, which 
were formulated on the basis of this framework, will be considered a valuable contribution to the discussion on the optimal extent and 
scope of public intervention in Poland.
This report consists of four parts. In the ﬁrst part, we look at the Polish economy from the macroeconomic point of view and analyse 
the labour markets in eight – out of ten – states which joined the European Union in May 2004. In this venture, we focus on identifying 
those aggregate disturbances which had a decisive inﬂuence on the economic ﬂuctuations within the CEE region in the period 1994-
-2005, and we assess to what extent these disturbances are responsible for diﬀerent dynamics of unemployment and employment 
trends in the examined countries and to what extent diﬀerent ﬁscal and monetary approaches adopted at that time contributed to 
remedy these disturbances. The key ﬁnding resulting from this analysis is that the relatively most signiﬁcant decrease in employment 
and increase in unemployment levels in Europe, which came about in Poland after the year 2000, are due to the idiosyncratic, i.e. limi-
ted to only one country, decrease in return on capital and total factor productivity [TFP] dynamics. We evidence in this report that other 
countries in the CEE region managed to swiftly eliminate the negative eﬀects that the ﬁnancial crises of the late 1990s exerted on their 
economies, whereas Poland was not able to overcome the economic slow-down or to improve the situation in its labour market in the 
period 2001-2002 without an earlier large-scale reallocation of resources in the entire economy. We also postulate that, although the 
policy-mix adopted in the above period was not the immediate cause for the economic decline, its role in accommodating the shock 
was probably moderately negative. One important conclusion of this part is that evolving employment and unemployment trends for 
prime-aged individuals are determined above all by economic factors whereas the participation rate for over-55-year-olds in Poland 
– the lowest in Europe – is due to the social policy model adopted in Poland. Hence, if this model is not essentially modiﬁed, Poland will 
not be able to catch up in terms of employment levels not only with the old EU member states but also with most of the new ones. 
Part II is devoted to the analysis of regional diﬀerences in the labour market in Poland in the period 2000-2005. We look at six internally 
homogeneous groups of poviats (NUTS4 regions) which we symbolically label as follows: Development Centres (Centra rozwoju), Sub-
urbs (Suburbia), Towns (Miasta), Former state farms (Byłe PGR), Low-productivity agriculture (Niskoproduktywne rolnictwo) and Agricultural 
and Industrial (Rolniczo-przemysłowe). On the one hand, we analyse aggregate data, on the other, we identify microeconomic factors 
aﬀecting trends in job creation and destruction. It ensues from our analysis that in the period 2000-2005 no signiﬁcant changes in the 
labour market indicators occurred either between particular groups or between voivodeships (NUTS2 regions). This is so because the 
direction and depth of ﬂuctuations on the regional scale were generally shaped by aggregate shocks which aﬀected the economy as 
a whole. Moreover, the above period saw a greater diﬀerentiation in terms of productivity and thus, in most parts of Poland, increasing 
employment and unemployment rates are due to the development of labour-intensive manufacturing. Development centres together 
with their surrounding Suburbs constitute one positive exemption. Poviats from the above groups not only exhibit relatively good 
the situation in the labour market but they also experience the fastest modernisation of the economic structure and the highest pro-
ductivity, and therefore also wage dynamics. We argue that, for the time being, it is only the largest urban conglomerations that have 
adopted the development model which increases the probability of maintaining fast economic growth in medium and long term. 
Therefore, the Polish labour market as a whole remains very vulnerable to economic ﬂuctuations. 
In Part III we focus on spatial mobility of population. Firstly, we discuss important – from the local and regional points of view – pheno-
mena such as internal migration and commuting, and secondly, we look at the increasingly relevant phenomenon Europe-wide, na-
mely international migration. In both cases we demonstrate that economic determinants are of key signiﬁcance when decisions about 
changing place of residence are made and that the key incentive to migrate is higher wages in the destination location and a relatively 
worse situation in the labour market in the region of origin. Part III also presents our estimates of the scale of international migration 
in Poland, which indicate that the number of people who stayed abroad for more than two months in the year 2005 was higher by 
approximately 165,000-379,000 thousand compared to the situation before the EU enlargement in 2004. However, this abrupt increase 
in the number of emigrants was to be observed only immediately after Poland’s accession to the EU. Moreover, we point out in Part III 
that irrespective of the fact that international migration is mostly seasonal and that emigrants retain strong ties with their homeland, 
for years Poland has been a country from which relatively numerous groups of young people depart for long periods to work abroad. 
The only eﬀective remedy to stop this process is a rapid increase in productivity and income levels in Poland and a dynamic moder-
nisation of the Polish economy. As for internal migration, we argue that its aggregate intensity is neither the highest in Europe nor as 
low as it is often claimed to be. Furthermore, we emphasise that although the general model of population movements from smaller 
to larger conglomerates remains valid, the limited intensity of these movements results in the process of urbanisation being slow and 
in Development Centres and Suburbs being less numerous in terms of population than in other EU member states. In the long run, this 
may constitute an obstacle for real convergence to the most developed EU countries. 
Part IV looks at the problem of work in the non-observed economy (NOE). Considering that it is de facto impossible to precisely measu-
re the non-observed economy and that various methods lead to diﬀerent outcomes, which value the NOE output at 15-30 per cent of 
the GDP, our analysis focuses on presenting factors that lead to the emergence of undeclared work and on the consequences that this 
phenomenon has on the economy and on the labour market on micro- and macro scale. We attach particular attention to the fact that 
NOE can be perceived both positively and negatively. On the one hand, undeclared work means jobs for those who want to work but 
who cannot, for various reasons, ﬁnd work in the oﬃcial market. On the other hand, however, undeclared work is a cause for high tax 
rates imposed on those legally employed. Moreover, it enhances the free-rider eﬀect and thus renders diﬃcult the implementation of 
social policy aimed at helping those who really have no source of income. The most important conclusion of Part IV is that the reasons 
for the existence of the grey economy are to be sought both in the overly burdensome ﬁscal policy of the state and in economic regu-
lations which are not only excessive but above all unsuited to social expectations. Therefore, one way to reduce the extent of the grey 
area is to eliminate these obstacles.
The phenomena identiﬁed in particular parts are juxtaposed in the ﬁnal part of this report, in the conclusions and implications for the 
labour market policy. These ﬁndings are intended to indicate possible directions of desired change in all areas, to the extent that these 
proposals are suﬃciently supported by the presented analyses. Particular emphasis is placed on demonstrating links between such se-
emingly distant areas as macroeconomics, regional development, migration policy and campaign against the black economy, as well 
as on the fact that any intervention in one area must account for consequences that it may cause in another one, which means that it 
is necessary to look at labour market policy from the angle of broader coordinated and development oriented economic policy.  
Part     I.      Labour Market in macro perspective
Autors:
Maciej Bukowski
Piotr Lewandowski
With the support by:
Dorota Pelle
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   I. 
Introduction
A number of the most signiﬁcant and socially disruptive problems of the Polish economy are directly related to the current situation in 
the labour market. This applies both to low employment and participation rates, which decrease the output that could potentially be 
generated in the economy, as well as to high unemployment which is the core reason for enduring poverty of numerous families in 
Poland. However, the last three years have brought many positive changes in this area, enabling to partly counteract the eﬀects of the 
adverse phenomena which arose in the years 1998-2003. 
Therefore, we begin this part of the report by scrutinising the latest developments in the Polish labour market, by looking at their 
causes and indicating which socio-economic groups beneﬁt most from the present economic upturn and which groups enjoyed only 
a slight improvement in their position in the labour market. A description of these trends is a point of departure for the assessment 
of how increasing employment and decreasing unemployment have improved the picture of the Polish labour market in relation to 
other European Union member states and in particular in relation to those states which joined the EU along with Poland in May 2004. 
We point out the key features common for the NMS8 as well as the crucial diﬀerences between them. Consequently, we reﬂect on the 
question of when and why the Polish labour market began to negatively distinguish itself from other CEE countries. These issues are 
discussed in the ﬁrst chapter of this part of the report.
In the second chapter, we look at labour market transformations in the NMS8 from the macroeconomic perspective. In the last two 
decades, the CEE countries have not only exhibited diﬀerent employment and unemployment rates but they have also experienced di-
vergent growth dynamics and pace of real convergence towards the EU15. In scrutinizing these phenomena, we demonstrate to what 
extent they resulted from diﬀerent labour utilization and to what extent they were due to diversiﬁed growth of labour productivity. We 
also identify interactions between economic growth and employment and unemployment in the region concerned. 
The previous issue of Employment in Poland was devoted to the analysis of institutional factors and structural features of labour supply 
which play a key role in shaping the labour market in the long-run. Therefore, in the second chapter of this part, we focus on short- and 
medium-term phenomena and we examine the impact of aggregate disturbances on the CEE labour markets in the last ten years. 
We look at aggregate shocks which are due, above all, to global economic ﬂuctuations and to external demand, as well as at country-
-speciﬁc shocks which aﬀected only some of the countries examined. In doing so, we demonstrate which of the above impulses were 
most crucial causes of the necessity of profound changes in the structure of output of the NMS8 economies, and thus triggered their 
restructuring and reallocation of capital and labour between sectors.
The analysis of economic growth dynamics in the countries concerned gives the opportunity to formulate a question on how econo-
mic ﬂuctuations were reﬂected in the adopted policies, mainly ﬁscal and monetary. We evaluate, to what extent measures undertaken 
in this area could help compensate or reinforce the economic disturbances and we give particular attention to the consequences of 
the adopted policy mix on employment ﬂuctuations. The part ends with a summary, in which we stress the impact that the economic 
upturn and labour demand shifts may have in the future on strengthening the improvement in the Polish labour market. We also exa-
mine the potential role of institutional factors which modify labour supply and its utilisation in the production process. We point to the 
key signiﬁcance – in the long perspective – of institutional solutions for closing the gap between Poland and the EU15 both in terms of 
labour market performance and general wealth and prosperity of the society.1. Labour in the NMS8 in the period 1990-2005
12
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1. Labour in the NMS8 in the period 1990-2005
1.1 Recent changes in the labour market in Poland
After a ﬁve-year long decrease in employment levels, from the second quarter of 2003, the number of people working in Poland has 
been on the rise and the employment rate has been steadily growing. This translated into a decline in unemployment and was accom-
panied by stabilisation of economic participation rate. Therefore, we can clearly observe a progressing improvement of the situation 
in the Polish labour market. In 2005, the annual average working population amounted to 14,124 thousand people, which constituted 
an increase by 4.2 and 3.8 per cent compared to 2002 and 2003 respectively. In mid-2006, the positive labour market trends, including 
an increase in employment and decrease in unemployment levels, underwent a further intensiﬁcation,1 the average number of work-
ing individuals grew to reach the level of 14,269 thousand, which was an increase by 5.2 per cent over the worst slump in the labour 
market in 2002. Consequently, the employment rate for the age group 15-64 rose from 51.0 per cent (the lowest in the last ﬁfteen years) 
at the end of 2002 to 53.4 per cent in mid-2006. Moreover, in 2003-2005, the number of economically active individuals increased at 
more or less the same rate as the number of the working age population and, as a result, the participation rate stabilised and remained 
ﬂat – at least until the beginning of 2005 when it grew slightly only to decline unexpectedly in 2006. At present, it is diﬃcult to assess 
whether this means the return of the earlier, unfavourable trend, apparent from the beginning of the transition, or whether this is
a one-oﬀ anomaly.2 The unemployment rate, which grew from 10.2 to 20.5 per cent between the second quarter of 1998 and the third 
quarter of 2002, has been declining gradually and steadily since 2003 to reach 18.5 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2004 and 17.4 per 
cent the year after. This dynamics was further ampliﬁed in 2006 and in consequence the unemployment rate went as low as 15.8 per 
cent in the second quarter of 2006.
However, irrespective of the improving situation in the labour market and the increasing number of the working population in Poland, 
two phenomena which became apparent already in mid-2004 (see Chart I.1), the participation and employment rates for individuals in 
working age have not yet reached the levels from before the year 2001, when the Polish economy underwent a temporary slow-down. 
Compared to the situation from before the Russian crisis, i.e. that in the year 1998, in the ﬁrst half of 2006, participation and employ-
ment rates were signiﬁcantly lower – by 2 and 5 percentage points respectively. The decline in the number of unemployed, which has 
been going on since the ﬁrst quarter of 2004, made it possible to reverse nearly half of the increase in the unemployment rate, which 
occurred in the period 1998-2003. This means that the increase in unemployment that lasted ﬁve years was reduced by almost a half 
in only two years. Therefore, the recent changes in the labour market seem to justify expectations that the mentioned increase in un-
employment can be entirely cancelled out during the economic upturn. However, the true challenge for the Polish labour market is 
to considerably improve the participation and employment rates to match levels typical for the EU15. A success in this area depends 
above all on structural and institutional features of the labour market and not on business cycle ﬂuctuations, although it is surely easier 
to undertake initiatives in the above respect when the economy is developing at a robust pace and when the demand for labour is 
growing (see Bukowski et al. 2005).
 
Table I.1. 
Participation, employment and unemployment rates for the age group 15-64 in the period 1999-2006 (percentages)
    1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006i
 Participation rate   66.1  65.7  65.7  65.4  64.4  64.2  64.2  64.5  64.0
 Employment rate   58.9  56.7  54.9  53.3  51.4  51.4  51.9  52.9  53.6
 Unemployment rate 10.9  13.7  16.5  18.5  20.2  20.0  19.7  18.0  16.2
i – ﬁrst two quarters 
Source: Own calculations based on BAEL data free from seasonal ﬂuctuations and methodological changes.
Charts I.1-I.2 as well as the observation that declining unemployment is accompanied by an increase in employment levels and by
a stabilisation of the percentage of the economically active working age population (subject to barely explicable ﬂuctuations around 
the turn of 2005 and 2006), suggest that the prime cause of declining unemployment levels is an increase in the number of working 
Poles. Although lower unemployment can also be due to, for instance, less numerous groups of individuals joining the labour market 
(compared with the baby boomers who entered the labour market a couple of years ago), or decreasing labour supply which indicates 
that the unemployed may be leaving the labour market, these phenomena are considerably less important than rising employment 
1 1 At the time when this report was prepared, the BAEL data (Labour Force Survey) were available only for the ﬁrst two quarters of 2006. The BAEL data used were cleared from seasonal 
ﬂuctuations and methodological changes. Data presented in the subsequent parts of this report were treated in the same manner, if they pertain to analyses limited to Poland only. All 
analyses that address international issues are based on data provided by Eurostat, unless expressly stated otherwise.
2 Quarter-to-quarter ﬂuctuations in participation levels evidence that possibly this phenomenon could be connected to seasonal migration. However, the fall in participation in 2006 could 
in fact be a statistical artefact – in accordance with the BAEL data, in 2005, the participation rate grew in all age groups, apart from the age group 15-24, and then, in 2006 – it fell in all these 
groups. Such a change seems to be highly improbable and the decline in unemployment in 2006 reported by CSO (Polish Central Statistical Oﬃce) in its quarterly update for the labour mar-
ket is mainly due to this astonishing slump in participation. This artefact can also result from new method of calculating the respondents’ age in BAEL, which aﬀected the results. Nevertheless, 
in view of CSO’s failure to comment on the above issue, it is hardly possible to resolve this problem deﬁnitively. Thus, the time series for the number of professionally active individuals has 
been corrected in order to eliminate the annual level shifts in the period 2005-2006 which deviate from the earlier trend.
13
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Their relative role can be evaluated quantitatively, as suggested by Bukowski et al. (2005), by decomposing unemployment changes 
into its net inﬂow components, that is changes that occur in three dimensions – demographic dimension (which results from the fact 
that, in principle, various age groups diﬀer in terms of their typical participation, employment and unemployment rates),3 participation 
dimension (because rising/falling per cent share of individuals who are economically active translates into rising/falling working and 
unemployed populations) and employment dimension, which indicates that variations in the number of working people contribute 
to the evolution of unemployment.
Remarks: Decomposition is based on quarterly changes in the number of unemployed in the age group 15–64 which result from demographic, partici-
pation and employment factors (in thousands of unemployed) in the period 2002-2006 (until the second quarter) – factors that lower the unemploy-
ment rate are below the OX axis, and those that increase it – above the OX axis.
Source: own calculation based on the BAEL data cleared from seasonal ﬂuctuations and methodological changes.
In this respect nothing much has changed in the last three years. Chart I.2 conﬁrms that, as from the beginning of the year 2004, the 
soaring number of working population had an increasing inﬂuence on the decline in unemployment rate, and especially so from the 
third quarter of 2005 when the employment dynamics reached levels unknown since the economic boom of the late 1990s.4 In this 
context, the input of gradually progressing demographic processes as well as of labour supply variations was of lesser signiﬁcance. 
However, until the end of 2003 (and generally a couple of years before), demographic factors and participation trends were pulling in 
opposite directions, whereas after this date the signiﬁcance of participation variations became marginal, as the processes of decreas-
ing labour supply in Poland has been halted but not reversed. However, a couple of rare exceptions stand out from this picture. At the 
beginning of 2005, the increase in participation rate (subject to earlier reservations) contributed to the rise of employment and unem-
ployment and because this was the case especially for people of 55 years and above, the mentioned increase in participation rate could 
be attributed to lower inﬂow of beneﬁciaries to the pre-retirement beneﬁt system, which is probably one of the positive consequences 
of the partial reform of this system in 2004. Even so, there are two apparent exceptions and it is especially the decline in participation, 
which occurred at the beginning of 2006 and which was exhibited by individuals younger than 45 years, that is somewhat awkward. 
It can be assumed that (to the extent that it is not a statistical artefact) a certain role may be attributed to migration processes which 
seemingly lower the participation levels in Poland but which are in fact due to the labour migration abroad. This conjecture is further 
examined in the third part of this report. The demographic factor became less and less signiﬁcant mainly due to the fact that the most 
numerous groups of the 1980s demographic boom had already entered the labour market.
Although the impact of demographic processes on changes in the labour market, i.e. on improvement gradually becoming apparent 
in the aftermath of the economic upturn of 2003, was rather moderate, it should be emphasised that it is an enduring feature of the 
Polish labour market that young people as well as people in pre-retirement age have a relatively large share in the total working age 
3 In particular, young people participate in education and those who enter the labour market become unemployed nearly by deﬁnition (before they ﬁnd jobs). As a result, the age group 
15-24 generally exhibits higher average unemployment and lower participation and employment rates than individuals aged 25-45. Older people, especially those who are more than 55 
years old and who approach the statutory retirement age, typically have greater problems with adapting to the changes in the economy. If they lose their jobs, they are more likely to leave 
the market than to become unemployed. Changes in the share of particular age groups in the working age population can thus somewhat automatically aﬀect the average participation, 
employment and unemployment levels.
4 The weakening impact of growing employment rates on the number of unemployed population, seen at the turn of 2004 and 2005, as well as the accompanying positive and then, a year 
later, negative inﬂuence of participation changes, have to do exactly with the previously discussed, barely explicable shifts in the level of economic participation visible in the BAEL data. 
At the time when this report was prepared, due to the lack of BAEL data covering the entire year 2006, it was impossible to assess whether this is only a statistical artefact or whether there 
have actually been certain variations in participation rates. However, as labour supply is in principle subject to considerable inertia, it seems doubtful that such distinct ﬂuctuations of non-
-seasonal nature could occur across 6 quarters. The decline in the number of professionally active individuals in the age group 25-44, i.e. a group that is typically characterised by stable 
participation levels,  amounting to 200,000 people in the ﬁrst quarter of 2006 – compared with the fourth quarter of 2005 (raw BAEL data) – is only comparable to the fall in participation 
level for this group between the fourth quarter of 2002 and the ﬁrst quarter of 2003, when, as a result of the change in the demographic structure of the population (as evidenced by the 
National Census), the system of weights was modiﬁed. Therefore, it can be assumed that if the BAEL data did not reﬂect such structural change of the statistical characteristics of the time 
series, decompositions of unemployment variations presented in charts I.2 and I.6 would be free from violent changes in the contribution of employment and participation rates at the turn 
of 2004 and 2005 and then of 2005 and 2006.
Chart I.2.
Decomposition of sources of quarterly unemployment change
in the period 2002-2006 (until the second quarter)
Employment rate Participation rate Unemployment rate Demography Participation Employment
(right axis)
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population. However, the diﬀerent nature of setbacks that attach to these groups – lack of working experience for the young and risk of 
health and working skills deterioration for the elderly – aﬀected the relative changes of situation of these groups in the labour market 
vis-à-vis other age groups in the last three years. 
In the period 2003-2005, the population ageing phenomenon, i.e. the increase in the share of adults of 55 years and above in the popu-
lation, gained momentum, whereas the size of the age group 15-24 as well as its share in the working age population were declining. 
As from mid-2002, the increasing number of the elderly spurred the labour supply of individuals of 55 years and above – nevertheless, 
the participation rate for this group remained unchanged until 2005, when it ﬁnally rose by 1 percentage point and reached the still 
low – in the international context – level of 32.8 per cent. The fall in youth participation, which started oﬀ in 2001 and which contrib-
uted most to the lowering of the participation rate for this age group in 2002-2003, continued incessantly until mid-2006. Even so, as 
from 2003, the employment rate for young people has been on the rise, above all, thanks to rapidly declining unemployment.
As for the pre-retirement age group, it could be observed that the number of economically active people was growing – although 
from a very low level and in close reliance to the demographic factor – and that the increase in the number of working individuals was 
relatively most dynamic for this group. However, regardless of this fact, the declining trend in employment rates for the elderly (see 
Chart I.4), which was distinctive for the Polish labour market throughout the last decade, has been continuing as long as to beginning 
of 2005. It is worth noting that since 1999 these rates have failed to exceed 30 per cent and that at present they are 15 percentage 
points lower than the average rates for all EU member states. A number of workers in the ever-more numerous group of over-55-year-
oldshave probably found it diﬃcult to remain in employment, however, only in the case of very few of them it led to unemployment, 
whereas in the overwhelming majority of instances – to withdrawal from the labour market. Indeed, between the end of 2003 and 
mid-2006, the population aged 55-64 rose by 437,000 people, with 67 per cent due to the increasing population of inactive individu-
als and only 7 per cent to the increasing number of unemployed. Consequently, the unemployment rate for elderly adults grew (see 
Chart I.5), but nonetheless unemployment aﬀects only a minor percentage of people of this age. Therefore, although some positive 
tendencies in labour market participation of the elderly came to light, and they can be linked with a certain limitation of social transfers 
addressed to the elderly (pre-retirement beneﬁts), two thirds of this age group still end / terminate economic activity before reaching 
the statutory retirement age. 
The situation of individuals aged 45-54 in the labour market has been changing in a similar manner. As from 2004, the participation 
and employment rates of this group have been showing steady though slow rise, and even though some people from this growing 
number of economically active population have been becoming unemployed, the increase in employment still largely contributed 
to the fall of unemployment (see Chart I.6). According to Bukowski et al. (2005), one distinct feature of the Polish labour market at the 
end of 1990s was that, as a result of a general deterioration of the economic conditions, the inactivity rate in these groups noticeably 
grew. Furthermore, the economic upturn of 2003-2005 caused a relatively lower – compared with other age groups – employment 
dynamics for the age group 45-54 (see Chart I.4). In the recent years, the unemployment rate for this group only began to diminish in 
the second quarter of 2005 – that is nearly 2 years later than in the case of younger people. The above deliberations conﬁrm earlier 
observations (Bukowski et al., 2005), namely that deterioration on the labour market which occurred towards the end of the previous 
decade have had more enduring eﬀects for the age group 45-54 than for people in the so-called prime-age, i.e. between 25 and 44 
years. This is a telling illustration of diﬃculties that individuals over the age of 45 years – less mobile in terms of occupation and space 
(see the third part of this report) than younger people – often encounter when entering/re-entering the labour market. Because this 
problem concerns people already at the age of 45 and aggravates with age, it can be said that when it comes to labour market partici-
pation, this vulnerable stage in life for Poles commences 5-10 years earlier than in most developed countries, where it typically occurs 
around the age of 55, or possibly 50. 
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Chart I.3.
 Dynamics of the number of economically active persons (left chart) and of the participation rate (right chart) by age in Poland in the 
period 2003–2006 (until the second quarter)
   
Chart I.4. 
Dynamics of the number of persons employed (left chart) and of the employment rate (right graph) by age in Poland in the period 
2003–2006 (until the second quarter)   
   
Chart I.5. 
Dynamics of the number of unemployed persons (left chart) and of the unemployment rate (right chart) by age in Poland in the period 
2003–2006 (until the second quarter) 
   
Remarks: In view of abrupt changes in the number of economically active individuals in the age groups 45-54 and 55-64, the presented series for these 
groups from the BAEL data between the fourth quarter 2005 and the ﬁrst quarter of 2006 have been additionally cleared in order to bring it closer to 
the general trend.
Source: Own calculations based on BAEL data cleared from seasonal ﬂuctuations and methodological changes.
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Chart I.6. 
Decomposition of sources of quarterly unemployment changes by age groups in the period 2002-2006 (until the second quarter)
Remarks: The above decomposition is based on quarterly changes in the number of unemployed individuals of 15–64 years which result from the 
inﬂuence of demographic factors, variations in participation and employment (in thousands of unemployed) in the period 2002-2006 (until the second 
quarter) – factors which decrease the unemployment rate are below the OX axis and those which increase it – above the axis.
Source: Own calculations based on the BAEL data cleared from seasonal ﬂuctuations and methodological changes.
Thus, the economic upturn resulted in a much faster and more intense improvement of the situation in the labour market for indi-
viduals below the age of 45 years than for the older ones. Accordingly, the decline of 741,000 in the number of unemployed between 
the end of 2002 and the middle of 2006 was in 35 per cent due to the fall in the number of unemployed individuals in the age group 
15-24 and in 58 per cent to the decreasing number of unemployed in prime-age. On the other hand, group over 55 years contributed 
positively to the total number of unemployed in Poland The number of unemployed below the age of 25 decreased in 2003-2006 by 
262,000 people, of which 111,000 was due to the increase in the working population, and the remaining part – to the fall in the number 
of the people participating in the labour market. Thus, the slump in unemployment rates for this group is mainly a result of the increase 
in employment levels, although, compared with the other age groups, it was the diminishing labour supply of the youths that was of 
relatively greater importance (see Chart I.6). Hence, the evidence that the trend of declining participation of young people, continuing 
since the beginning of the 1990s, still persists. The last three years, however, saw an improvement of the relative position of individuals 
in the age group 15-24, which enjoyed the highest dynamics in employment rates, and for which the reduction of the unemployment 
level was comparable with the changes that concerned people in the prime-age, who in general are the ones best-oﬀ on labour mar-
ket (see Chart I.5). Thus, it seems that although young people were more adversely aﬀected by the negative developments, which oc-
curred in the labour market at the beginning of the decade, than those aged 25-44 years (Bukowski et al., 2005), the current economic 
boom has a similar impact on the improvement of the situation of both groups.
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Table I. 2. 
Employment changes by sector of the economy in the period 2002-2005 (2000=100) 
 Agriculture Industry  Construction Market services Public services           Total
2002 100  100  100  100  100            100
2003 96  102  96  101  104            101
2004 95  105  94  104  103            102
2005 94  108  101  107  106            104
Source: Own elaboration based on BAEL data.
The fact that the economy entered the booming period also resulted in increasing labour demand in sectors characterised by substan-
tial elasticity of demand for their output to the general level of economic activity. Table I.2 indicates that although the total number 
of working population has been steadily growing since 2003, initially this growth was only due to the rising employment in public 
services (i.e. administration, education and healthcare) and in industry. In the case of public services, which mainly consist of the pub-
lic sector, the increase in employment levels was to some extent a consequence of rising employment in this sector concurrently to 
general deterioration on the labour market. At the same time, working individuals might have been then more prone to opt for stable 
employment in the public sector.5 However, as far as industry is concerned, good labour performance was mainly due to notable 
results achieved by Polish exporters at that time, which we further discuss in the second chapter. Hence, the increase in employment 
in industry preceded the rise in labour demand in those areas of the economy which rely on domestic demand, that is in market serv-
ices and above all in construction – which is a branch that depends on investments undertaken in the economy and which saw, after
a prolonged slump of labour demand, an increase in employment of 7 per cent between 2004 and 2005. The gradual decline in em-
ployment in agriculture has been subject to a slowdown in the last two years, which can be attributed to Poland’s accession to the EU 
and a considerable rise in external demand for Polish agricultural products. Sectoral analysis is presented in greater detail in the second 
part of this report, however, it should be concluded at this stage that the evident cyclical acceleration of economic growth was fol-
lowed – with a greater or lesser delay – by increasing labour demand and falling unemployment. These two trends have been gaining 
pace since mid-2005, especially in those sectors of the economy that are vulnerable to domestic demand ﬂuctuations.
1.2. Poland of 2005 in international context
Positive changes that have occurred in the labour market in the last three years, have not, however, substantially altered the position 
of Poland vis-à-vis other European countries, and especially in relation to countries which, similarly to Poland, joined the EU in 2004. 
In 2005, out of all EU member states and its associated candidate states participation rate in Poland was only higher than those of 
Hungary and Italy, and the unemployment level in Poland has consequently been the highest. Although it can be expected that the 
economic upturn and the resulting acceleration of positive changes in the labour market will cause that, at the end of 2006, the rela-
tive position of Poland in relation to other EU member states will improve slightly in terms of labour market indicators, but even if this 
positive scenario comes about, the general picture of Poland’s labour market is not likely to change much also because the cyclical 
economic upturn and the structural reforms simultaneously improve the situation in the labour markets of other EU member states.
Chart I.7. 
Participation, employment and unemployment rates in the EU member states for the age group 15–64 in 2005  
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data.
5 Public services were the only sector which saw an increase in employment in 2002 compared with 2001.
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Indeed, in the last three years, the gap between the Polish labour market – in terms of employment and unemployment – and EU15 
and the NMS7 labour markers, was reduced only marginally and mainly so because of a relative improvement in the situation of the 
young people. Unfortunately, when total participation and employment levels are considered, this gap has became even larger. Such 
phenomenon was especially noticeable for elderly people, because, when inﬂuence of demographic factors is removed, labour sup-
ply and employment rates for over-55-year-olds in Poland are at best stable or even falling, whereas participation and employment 
levels in this age group in the other CEE countries generally converge to the rapidly growing EU average. This means that Poland 
stands out from the other countries in the region as a country with highest unemployment rate, low participation and employment 
rates as well as considerably stronger inertia in the latter two rates – especially for the oldest age groups. In fact, in the period 2002-
2005, participation rate for individuals in pre-retirement age increased in the EU15 and in the NMS7 by an average of respectively 4.8 
and 6.5 percentage points, whereas Poland reached an increase by only 1.4 percentage points. In case of employment rate, this gap 
has broadened even stronger and made Poland distinct from the EU15 especially due to the participation and employment levels for 
people aged 55-64 (see Table I.3). Consequently, because of this marginal increase in participation of the elderly in the labour market, 
rising employment of young and prime-age people was not enough to ﬁll the gap between the Polish labour market and the labour 
markets of other EU member states. 
 
Table I.3. 
Participation, employment and unemployment rates for Poland, the NMS7 and the EU15 in 2005 by age groups (percentages)
   15-64    15-24    55-64
 
Poland       64.4           52.8                19.0          35.7                  22.5    36.9                 30.5     27.2         10.8
NMS7       67.3           61.1                  9.1          33.7                  27.4    18.5i                 44.8     41.9           6.6i
EU15       71.0           65.2                  7.9          47.8                  39.8    16.6                 47.1      44.1           6.4
Remarks: NMS7 – Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia Lithuania, , Slovakia, Slovenia. 
i – unweighted average
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data. 
Thus, the improved situation on the Polish labour market is part of the Europe-wide trend triggered by the cyclical upswing expe-
rienced by the world economy, from which the other countries in the CEE region beneﬁt on average slightly more than Poland, 
although with some exceptions. Indeed, in the last couple of years, especially the Baltic states, Slovakia and Slovenia improved their 
relative position with respect to the EU15, whereas the gap between Poland and the EU15 remained fairly stable and the situation in 
Czech Republic and Hungary got worse. However, it is worth stressing that, although in the period 2002-2005 the absolute decrease in 
unemployment rate expressed in percentage points in Poland proved greater than in any of EU15 countries, the relative reduction of 
unemployment rate was much higher in Baltic states as well as Slovakia and Bulgaria, which at the same time exhibited visibly stronger 
increase in employment and labour supply of individuals in working age. 
As proposed by Bukowski et al. (2005), the international diﬀerences in employment rate can be decomposed into diﬀerences arising 
from labour force characteristics and the intensity of their utilisation. Table I.4 and Charts I.8-I.9 demonstrate the decomposition of the 
gap between the employment rate in particular NMS8 country vis-à-vis the EU15 average into components related to demographic 
factors, human capital6 and disparities in the intensity of utilisation of labour force. The last component may result from such factors like 
institutional background of the labour market, product market competition, as well as from the general economic situation. However, 
because we only analyse data for the years 2002 and 2005, it can be assumed that the eﬀect of the last above-mentioned factor is 
more or less similar in the group of countries concerned, for which the business cycle is mutually synchronised. Hence the conclusion 
that dissimilarities in the dynamics of positive changes in the economy and on the labour market should be attributed above all to 
structural factors. This issue in further discussed in section 1.2. 
Table I.4 shows that the CEE countries can be divided into three groups, depending on the size of the gap between their employment 
rates and that of the EU15 and on the factors causing it. The ﬁrst group includes the Czech Republic and Slovenia, where the total 
employment rate is comparable to the average of EU15 and where the intensity of labour force utilisation decreases the size of the 
employment gap, which means that the employment levels in these countries are in general higher than those for the UE15, especially 
for prime-aged individuals (see Charts I.8-I.9). However, these countries diﬀer from each other in terms of the direction of changes 
that occurred in the period 2002-2005 – in Slovenia the employment grew and at the moment Slovenia is a country with the highest 
employment rate in the NMS8, but the employment rate in the Czech Republic fell below the average of the EU15.
Employ-
ment rate
6 Human capital is measured by the nominal level of education which has two major drawbacks. Firstly, diﬀerent educational systems in various countries do not allow for full comparability 
of successive levels of education. Secondly, diﬀerences in quality of education and appropriateness of acquired skills for labour market requirements, which are very hard to quantify, are 
omitted. The impact of human capital should therefore be analysed with the above caveats in mind.
Employ-
ment rate
Employ-
ment rate
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Table I.4. 
Decomposition of the employment gap between the NMS8 and the EU15 in the years 2002 and 2005
          Czech Republic      Poland        Slovakia          Hungary        Slovenia         Estoniai       Lithuania         Latvia
               2002
Intensity
Quality
Demographic factor
Total
               2005
Intensity
Quality
Demographic factor
Total
Remarks: i – Eurostat does not provide employment to education rates for Estonia. It is impossible to evaluate the labour force resources quality eﬀect 
and therefore the results for this country are not fully comparable.
ii – 2001. 
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data.
The second group consists of Poland and Hungary and to a lesser extent their features are also shared by Slovakia. They lag behind 
the EU15 with their low employment levels and their position towards the EU15 has not changed in last three years. This gap is in 80 
per cent due to the intensity component (lower participation and/or higher unemployment), whereas the demographic factor and 
diﬀerences in the level of education of the labour force are much less important. It is worth stressing also that the improving quality 
of the labour force has led to the gradual closure of the gap in employment as the next groups that enter labour markets in the CEE 
countries are better educated that the previous generations and therefore become more comparable, with respect to nominal edu-
cation level attained, with their peers in Western Europe. Although the second group of countries exhibit similar employment rates, 
Hungary stands out with lower unemployment, which is accompanied by the lowest participation rate among all NMS8 countries. As 
for Poland and Slovakia, their low employment rates, lower than in the UE15 and the other countries in the region, are rather due to the 
highest unemployment rates out of all NMS8.  
Finally, the third group is composed of the Baltic states, which have employment levels that rank exactly in the middle of the spectrum. 
However, in the period 2002-2005, these countries achieved the largest progress in the process of convergence of their employment 
rates with EU15. In comparison to Poland, relatively more people in the Baltic states are now at the peak of activity in the labour market. 
Please note, however, that increasingly numerous groups enter now these labour market, and they are younger by a couple of years 
than the baby boom generation in Poland. Hence, the signiﬁcance of the demographic factor increased between 2002 and 2005 and, 
more importantly, it is exactly the demographic factor that explains nearly entirely Baltic states’ gap towards the EU15 in 2005 (see Table 
I.4). In other words, in the third group countries – as opposed to Poland, Hungary and Slovakia – low participation and high unemploy-
ment do not enlarge the employment gap vis-à-vis the Western European countries. Positive changes of increasing labour supply and 
decreasing unemployment have occurred in the Baltic states in the recent years. In 2002, the contribution of lower intensity in the 
utilisation of labour force to total employment gap was still apparent, however, since then, the rapidly growing employment, falling 
unemployment and increasing participation rates, especially among the older age groups, helped to fully reduce the impact of the 
intensity of labour force utilisation on the size of the employment gap vis-à-vis the EU15 and consequently to reduce the remaining 
gap considerably (see Chart I.9).
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Chart I.8. 
Decomposition of the employment gap between the NMS8 and the EU15 in the period 2002 and 2005
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data.
Hungary 2002 Hungary 2005
Poland 2002 Poland 2005
Czech Republic 2002 Czech Republic 2005
Slovakia 2002 Slovakia 2005
Intensity Quality Demographic eﬀect Total Total excluding demography
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Chart I.9. 
Decomposition of the employment gap between the NMS8 and the EU15 in the years 2002 and 2005
  
Remarks: i – Eurostat does not provide employment rates by education level attained for Estonia. 
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data.
Intensty Quality Demographic eﬀect Total Total excluding demography
Estonia 2001 Estonia 2005
Slovenia 2002 Slovenia 2005
Lithuania 2001 Lithuania 2005
Latvia 2001 Latvia 2005
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1.3. Basic characteristics of the NMS8 labour markets in the period 1990-2005
A further question that should be raised when analysing the causes for the employment gap between Poland and the EU15 and NMS8 
is that about the moment when the performance of the Polish labour market started to diverge from the experiences of the other 
countries in the region. According to Bukowski et al. (2005) and in line with a number of arguments which we present in the second 
chapter, the present situation in the Polish labour market is a consequence of the abrupt fall in employment levels in 1998, due to the 
Russian crisis, which was later further intensiﬁed by the cyclical slump in the period 2001-2002. Indeed, in 1997, which we treat as the 
starting point of our analysis,7 diﬀerences between the Polish labour market and those in other countries in the region were of a slightly 
diﬀerent nature than at present. By elucidating the diﬀerences between them, both in terms of labour market indicators and their dy-
namics, it will be possible to look from this particular perspective at the evolution of the macroeconomic situation of the NMS8 and the 
inﬂuence that external and internal factors had upon it. Although this topic is discussed in detail in the second chapter of this part of 
report, for the purpose of demonstrating the developments that took place in the labour markets of the NMS8 in the last ﬁfteen years, 
it is necessary to refer to certain economic disturbances and to key institutional features of these labour markets that are reﬂected in 
the diverse developments presented in this section. 
The early transition period (period 1990-1994) was characterised by a fall in the level of economic activity, output and employment in 
all CEE countries, although diﬀerences between them pertained to the depth of the output slump directly resulting from the direct 
transition shock, as well as to the scale of employment changes and labour supply adjustments (Nesporova, 2002). Even though the 
initial fall in the number of employed in Poland was the largest out of all the examined economies, it was of short duration and already 
in 1993 employment rose year-to-year (Chart I.10). Such rapid reversal of the falling trend was to be seen only in the Czech Republic, 
where the reduction of the number of working individuals in the period 1990-1994 was much less severe. In all other economies in the 
region, the fall in employment lasted noticeably longer.
Chart I.10. 
Dynamics of the number of persons employed in the NMS8 in the period 1989–2005.
   
Source: Own elaboration based on GGDC data.
Employment generally increased in the period 1993-1996, i.e. since the moment when the impact of immediate eﬀects of the adjust-
ment at the early transition stages weakened in particular countries and when they set on the path of rapid growth. The employment 
rise in Poland and in the Czech Republic was followed in Slovakia from 1995 on, however the much lower output growth in Hungary 
was accompanied by the stable number of working individuals. The Slovenian labour market evolved in a speciﬁc manner. The initial 
decline in employment was even greater – in relative terms – that the adjustment that took place in Poland and in the Czech Republic, 
however, later, the number of employed stabilized – just like it did in Hungary – although the rate of economic growth ranked some-
where in the middle between that of Hungary and that of Poland (Vodopivec et al., 1997). The Baltic states experienced a diﬀerent 
trend during the early transformation period. The employment went down a little bit later and less than in the remaining NMS8 coun-
tries, and changes in the number of working population were largely related to the decrease in total population. In the case of Estonia 
and Latvia, the number of inhabitants shrinked by approximately 10 per cent till 1997, which reﬂected the considerable emigration of 
people of Russian descent. Therefore, developments in the share of working individuals in the total population of the Baltic states were 
less visible than changes in the number of working population and comparable to these observed in the other NMS8.8 Nevertheless, 
both GDP and employment in these countries only started to increase in 1996, and then this economic upturn and the improving 
situation in the labour market were halted by the economic recession resulting from the Russian crisis.
7 This is largely determined by the availability of data which, in the early 1990s, was rather scarce and imperfect, subject to international incomparability and methodological incoherencies. 
Moreover, the year 1997 was the last year that preceded major macroeconomic changes and developments in the labour markets, which are discussed in this part of the report.
8 One exception was Estonia where the number of working population was declining continuously throughout the 1990s (see Chart  I.10) however the rate of employment remained higher 
that in the other countries in the region.
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Poland Slovakia Hungary Estonia Lithuania Latvia Slovenia
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Table I.5 
Participation, employment and unemployment rates for the NMS8 and EU15 in 1997 by age groups (percentages).
            15-64                   15-24                                       55-64
Czech 
Republic
Estonia
Lithuania
Latvia
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Hungary
UE15
i – data for 1998
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat, OECD (Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia for 1997) and ILO data (Lithuania and Latvia for 1997).
The drop in employment, typical for the early transformation period, translated diﬀerently into changes of numbers of economically 
inactive and unemployed. The participation rates were generally declining from high levels which characterised the previous eco-
nomic system, and although it was the decrease of women’s labour supply (Nesporova, 2002) and the leaving the labour market by 
increasingly numerous groups of elderly people that played the key role in shaping such a phenomenon. However, there were clear 
diﬀerences between countries in the region. Consequently, in 1997, the NMS8 could be divided into economies which retained high 
participation and suﬀered from relatively high unemployment – as the latter absorbed outﬂows from employment – and economies 
where lay-outs were buﬀered by social security system and the outﬂow of individuals in working age out of the labour market (see 
Fortuny et al., 2003).
The group of countries where job reductions were largely absorbed by the fall in participation (especially among the people in pre-re-
tirement age) included above all countries from the ﬁrst two groups presented above, that is Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia and to 
some extent Poland. Decrease in labour supply occurred to large extent in the initial years of the transformation and thus, in 1997, the 
labour supply of over-55-year-olds in these countries was evidently lower than the EU15 average (see I.13). In particular, low unemploy-
ment in Hungary in the 1990s was accompanied by the lowest participation and employment rates in the region, especially among the 
elderly. Female participation in Hungary also declined rather quickly –from the levels greater than the average for all OECD countries at 
the beginning of the 1990s it fell below 50 per cent in 1997 (OECD, 1997hu). The situation in Slovenia was similar in that the relatively 
low unemployment and decent total employment were accompanied by very low participation in the age group 55-64. As for the 
Czech Republic, the beginning of the transformation brought a noticeable slump in labour supply, t large extent due to the decrease in 
the number of retirees who received beneﬁts and worked simultaneously (Boeri, 1995). However, total participation and employment 
rates remained high until 1997. In Poland, the employment rate, even after the period of growth in the number of working individuals 
during the economic boom of 1994-1997, was only higher than the employment rate in Hungary (see Table I.5), and the participation 
rate was declining regardless of the output evolution, mainly because of the falling labour supply of people over 50 (Bukowski et al., 
2005). Therefore, it can be said that in the 1990s the Polish labour market was characterised by steadily decreasing participation and by 
unemployment ﬂuctuations which were quasi-cyclical, that is related to the changes in output dynamics. 
The Baltic states, which belong to the third group referred to in the previous section, had very diﬀerent experiences in the above re-
spect. Labour supply rates remained in these countries at a high level, mainly due to lesser emphasis of governments on transferring 
income from working prime-age persons to non-working individuals at pre-retirement age than in the Visegrad Group countries at 
that time (OECD, 2003a). In fact, diﬀerences in labour supply in working age population between these groups of countries largely 
reﬂected diﬀerent participation of over-55-year-olds. In 1997, only in the Baltic states participation rate of older people was close to the 
level found in Western Europe, whereas in the other cases it fell below the average for the EU15 (see Table I.5). Moreover, although it 
can be claimed (see Chapter Two) that during the ﬁrst stage of transformation ﬁrms in the Baltic states were hoarding the labour force 
(because labour productivity in these countries was falling), delayed adjustment of excessive employment took place in the mid-1990s 
and those who lost work were more likely than in other countries in the region to become unemployed rather than to withdraw from 
the labour market. Consequently, in the mid-1990s, unemployment rates in the Baltic states were higher than in the other NMS8, al-
though their employment rates were comparable.
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On the other hand, in the second half of the 1990s, participation rates of young people in the NMS8 were rather homogeneous and 
only slightly lower than the average of the EU15. Greater diﬀerences were to be observed in employment and unemployment of 
young people and because of the correlation of these measures with their counterparts for total working age population, reﬂected 
diﬀerences in the general situation in the NMS8 labour markets.
Chart I.11. 
Employment rate for persons in the age group 15-64 in the NMS8 and the UE15 in the period 1997–2005 
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data.
Chart I.12. 
Unemployment rate for persons in the age group 15-64 in the NMS8 and the UE15 in the period 1997–2005.
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data
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In 1998, macroeconomic factors triggered another wave of changes. In the Czech Republic, the second half of 1997 brought a ﬁnancial 
crisis, which led to a two-year decline in output. Employment in this country was on a decrease until 2000, unemployment doubled 
to reach the level of 8.8 per cent and then remained at more or less this level. Consequently, low unemployment which characterised 
the Czech labour market prior to the negative shock of the ﬁnancial crisis, and which was initially interpreted as either a mark of a lesser 
need than in other transforming countries to reallocate and reduce employment or as a sign of restructuring which proved smoother 
than, for instance, in Poland and in the Baltic states, turned out to reﬂect smaller scale of structural adjustments that occurred at the be-
ginning of transformation. Poor labour productivity growth and enduring unemployment since 1997, combined with high incidence 
of long-term unemployment, which aﬀected above all former employees of sectors with decreasing share in output and employment 
(such as mining and certain branches of industry) and/or unskilled workers, along with considerable and persistent regional diﬀerenc-
es in labour market indicators (OECD, 2004cz), (OECD, 2005eo), indicate that the Czech labour market has been aﬀected by structural 
mismatches of supply and demand which became apparent later than in the neighbouring countries.  
Chart I.13. 
Participation rate in the NMS8 in the period 1989–2005.
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data.
In the Baltic states, Slovakia and Poland, a similar role of an external shock was played by the Russian crisis (see Chapter Two) which 
entailed a comparable decline in employment amounting to 4 per cent, with the exception of only Latvia where it was 3 per cent. In 
Poland and in Slovakia, workers made redundant mainly became unemployed, whereas in the Baltic states they rather withdrew from 
the labour market, leading to a decrease in participation, which was not earlier observed in these countries to the extent seen in Poland 
of Hungary (Eamets, 2004). Although the immediate reaction of employment to the negative demand shock, that is the Russian crisis, 
was very similar for all countries in this group, with only some diﬀerences in adjustments of unemployment and participation, some 
diﬀerences arose regarding the persistence of this disturbance. 
These diﬀerences became above all in the evolution of the labour markets in the period 2001-2003, when the Baltic states took much 
less time to mitigate the eﬀects of the earlier crisis – employment in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania increased during this period by 3, 5 
and 7 per cent respectively.9 In Slovakia, the fall in employment was more prolonged, however, it began to slowly grow as from 2001, 
although deﬁnitely not as dynamically as in the Baltic states. In Poland the number of employed people decreased further by another 3 
per cent between 2001 and 2003. Consequently, the situation in the Polish labour market after the developments that occurred during 
the ﬁve-year period between the Russian crisis and the beginning of the cyclical economic upswing in 2003 was evidently worse than 
in the neighbouring countries (see Charts I.11 and I.12).
Estonia             Lithuania             Latvia             Slovenia             EU15 Czech Republic             Poland              Slovakia             Hungary             EU15 
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After 1998, compared to the remaining NMS8, the situation in the Hungarian and Slovenian labour markets evolved diﬀerently because 
these two countries did not suﬀered the consequences of the crisis in 1998-1999, mainly due to their modest economic links with 
Russia (see Chapter Two). On the contrary, for Hungary, the period 1998-1999 marked the largest increase in employment across the 
entire period 1990-2005 (see Chart I.10). Although it was on the increase for six consecutive years, the employment rate remained at
a relatively low level (see Chart I.11). It should be emphasised that between 1997 and 2000 and then from 2002 onwards, Hungary saw 
an increase in the participation rate, which was , however, not enough to fully reverse the considerable decline in labour supply which 
occurred earlier. Hence, Hungary still has the lowest labour supply out of all the NMS8. 
It is worth mentioning that it is the increase in participation of over-55-year-olds, which nearly doubled from 18.8 per cent in 1998 to 
34.4 in 2005, that was of key importance for the recent expansion of labour supply in Hungary. As presented in Box I.1, the example of 
Hungary perfectly illustrates the inﬂuence of institutional factors on participation and employment rates for groups with high labour 
supply elasticity, such as the elderly (Fortuny et al., 2003), the young entering the labour market, and – to some extent – women (see 
Bukowski et al., 2006). This example demonstrates that even in the face of a general stagnation in the labour market, limitation of pos-
sibilities and incentives to withdraw from the labour market leads to increased employment among the people in pre-retirement age 
and thus to the improvement of the general picture of the labour market. It should be noted that in 2001-2002 the decrease in output 
growth to 3 per cent annually and the stabilisation of the employment level were accompanied by a decrease in unemployment, 
caused by the outﬂow of the unemployed from the labour market (see Charts I.11 and I.12). This indicates that ﬂuctuations of participa-
tion in Hungary constituted an important channel of absorption of labour demand changes and that the policy aimed at increasing 
participation was not consistent. Consequently, in 2005, the Hungarian labour market was characterised by low unemployment (in the 
NMS8, higher only than that in Slovenia) and at the same time by the lowest participation rate among the working age individuals. 
Out of all new EU member states, Slovenia stood out due to its relatively high rate of economic growth from 1994 until a slight slow-
down in 2001, which was again followed by relatively high growth. The downturn which took place at the beginning of this decade 
brought a reversal of the increasing trend in the number of the working population observed since 1998 (see Chart I.10) both in abso-
lute terms and with respect to the employment rate. As presented in Charts I.11 and I.12, employment and unemployment ﬂuctuations 
in Slovenia can be perceived as ﬂuctuations around some medium-term average rates, accordingly amounting to 64/65 and approxi-
mately 6.5 per cent. The economic upturn of 2004-2005 entailed a faster increase in the number of employed than it had been the 
case a couple of years before. As a result, in 2005, the employment rate in Slovenia reached the highest level out of all NMS8. It should 
be noted that in the period 2004-2005 the participation rate in Slovenia grew by 3.6 percentage points which was almost completely 
absorbed by an increase in employment. To a large extent, the increased labour supply and employment in the age group 55-64 (by 8 
percentage points in the period 2000-2005) contributed to such labour supply and employment expansion, which enabled a decrease 
in unemployment of the elderly, although the rates of participation and employment are still rather low in Slovenia – their levels are 
similar to those in Slovakia and in Hungary, i.e. countries which have clearly lower overall participation and employment rates. Slovenia 
also introduced institutional reforms, which were of signiﬁcance and which consisted above all in the limitation of availability of un-
employment beneﬁts granted to elderly persons virtually for open-ended periods and which played the role of veiled early retirement 
arrangements (see Vodopivec et al., (2003), Bukowski et al. (2006)). 
The developments that occurred in the Polish labour market in the last three years (described in section 1.1) were generally typical for 
the NMS8 and therefore the fact that at present Poland distinguishes itself negatively from these countries should be attributed, above 
all, to the events of the period 1998-2002. A decade ago, Poland was characterised by unemployment rate close to the NMS8 average 
and by fast-growing employment during the economic upturn. These trends were curbed in 1998, when, similarly to Slovakia and the 
Baltic states, Poland experienced a deep decrease in employment and increase in unemployment, which continued as dominating de-
velopments in the labour markets of the above countries for about two years. The period 2001-2003 constituted another crucial stage 
because the developments in the Polish labour market diverged from those in all other countries in the region where the number of 
the working population started to increase gradually, whereas in Poland the decrease in employment and increase in unemployment 
deepened. Consequently, in 2002, the unemployment rate in Poland rocketed above 20 per cent, thus exceeding twice the average for 
the NMS7 (excluding Poland). There is one aspect of the recent evolution of the NMS8 labour markets which evidently distinguishes 
Poland – unfortunately in the negative sense –namely the participation rate of over-55-year-olds. As indicated in section 1.1, the stag-
nation in participation rates for the elderly in Poland can be explicitly attributed to institutional factors in the form of social expenditure 
system which creates (probably) the strongest incentives to withdrawal from the labour market before reaching the statutory retire-
ment age , and which, as opposed to other new EU member states, has not been subjected to considerable reform. 
9 The aggregate employment growth rates in the period 2000-2005 in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania amounted to 5, 7 and 10 per cent respectively.
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Box I.1. Retirement system and labour supply of the elderly in Hungary
One element of the social security system which has been operating in Hungary since the early 1990s was, similarly to other countries 
in the CEE region, the early retirement scheme. This scheme made it possible for the Hungarians to withdraw from the labour market 
a couple of years before reaching the statutory retirement age, which was at that time the lowest in Europe with 55 years for women 
and 60 years for men. According to Bukowski et al. (2006), earlier retirement is an element of social security which de facto is a tool of 
passive labour market policy as it allows people in pre-retirement age to withdraw from the labour market. This is perceived as one of 
methods to limit the level of unemployment and to ease its social consequences. By introducing broadly accessible early retirement 
options, or other benefits of similar economic characteristics (such as, for example in Poland, disability pensions due to a continuing 
inability to work), the CEE countries resorted to the same policy as the OECD countries in the 1970s and 1980s to remedy the negative 
shocks in their labour markets. 
The consequences of this policy – for the CEE recently and the OECD countries in the past – proved grave and negative as they led to 
a considerable decline in labour supply of elderly people, thus adding to the pressure on the working population charged with the 
cost of financing transfers by increased taxation. In the case of Hungary, easy access to these benefits led to slump in the participation 
rate of the age group 55-64 to only 18.3 per cent in 1998 and to the lowering of the average age of withdrawal from the labour market 
to 56.9 years. However, high costs of this policy were related to the relatively high tax wedge imposed on working persons and they 
contributed to deficits in public finance.
Table I.6. 
Participation and employment rates for the age group 55-64 and the average age of withdrawal from the labour market in 
Hungary in the period 1997-2005
     1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Participation rate
Employment rate
Average age of withdrawal
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat and OECD data.
In most Western European countries, a number of measures were undertaken to limit the detrimental influence of the social security 
system, which made it possible to reverse the decreasing trend in participation of the elderly. High rate of withdrawal made the Hun-
garians reform their retirement system and one element of this reform was the limitation of availability of transfers which induced 
elderly persons to withdraw from the labour market. The reforms initiated in 1998 included, among others, levelling and gradual in-
crease of the statutory retirement age for women and men to 62 years (for men, this target was achieved in 2001, whereas for women 
the expected date of implementation is 2009) and replacement of early retirement options with special unemployment benefits for 
persons in pre-retirement age. These benefits are available to people who are aged not more than 5 years below the retirement age, 
however, the criteria for granting the benefit are much more restrictive than in the case of early retirement and their amount is limited 
to 80 per cent of minimum retirement pension.
The increase of the statutory retirement age as well as the limitation of access to pre-retirement benefits effectively limited the scale of 
early withdrawal from the labour market, led to a significant increase in labour supply of the elderly and consequently in the employ-
ment rate for this age group and the increase in the average age of withdrawal from the labour market. After a couple of years from 
the implementation of these changes, participation and employment rates from persons in the pre-retirement age nearly doubled 
and the average retirement age exceeded 60 years. 
 
In view of the fact that in the previous issue of this report the focus was placed on institutional factors aﬀecting the Polish labour mar-
ket, including above all the disincentives created by social transfers, in the subsequent part of this issue, we focus on the analysis of 
macroeconomic factors, which, as it seems, were of decisive importance for diﬀerent developments in the NMS8 labour markets in the 
period 1998-2005. Although institutional and structural features of the labour market play a key role in shaping the average, medium-
term levels of labour market aggregates and indicators, as well as the trends that arise within this market, especially in case of labour 
supply, they are not in themselves the cause for employment and unemployment variations, particularly in case of developments that 
are as abrupt as those observed in the NMS8 over the last decade. Therefore, in the next Chapter, we make an attempt at identifying the 
nature and magnitude of demand and supply shocks that aﬀected particular economies and their labour markets, but we also analyse 
how successful these economies were in absorbing the disturbances we pinpoint. Moreover, we try to identify impulses commonly af-
fecting NMS8 economies as well as country-speciﬁc shocks, and to assess to what extent diﬀerent developments in the labour market 
in last 15 years could be explained by diﬀerent economic growth performance and government policy reactions to economic ﬂuctua-
tions. One example of such response are measures undertaken in the area of labour market institutions, which can have an inﬂuence 
on the fact that the common shocks inﬂuence the various labour markets with diﬀerent magnitude or persistence.
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2. Macroeconomic and institutional environments of the labour markets in the NMS8 in the period 
1994-2005
2.1 Introduction
The evolution of labour market aggregates should be perceived as a combination of gradual changes in their relatively stable equi-
librium values and of absorption of eﬀects resulting from unexpected external disturbances. In other words, the experiences of the 
OECD countries indicate that generally periods of high unemployment result from severe adverse shocks, and that the situation in the 
labour market aﬀected by such disturbance is determined in a medium-term by the speed with which the given labour market is able 
to absorb the eﬀects of the disturbance. Moreover, these experiences indicate that repercussions that occur at the level of individual 
employed / unemployed persons often intensify and prolong the consequences of transitory shocks, and that modiﬁcations of labour 
market institutions, reﬂect the government policy, implemented in response to external disturbances, may contribute to changes 
natural unemployment rate and equilibrium unemployment (see Blanchard, Landier (2002), Nickell et al., (2005)).
In this Chapter, we scrutinise how the macroeconomic factors aﬀecting the NMS8 labour markets have evolved since the early nine-
ties, with the main focus on technological shocks, external demand ﬂuctuations and demand – ﬁscal and monetary – policies. These 
deliberations will allow us to assess to what extent diﬀerent evolutions in the labour markets of particular countries can be attributed 
to diﬀerent shocks aﬀecting these countries. We also look into the inﬂuence that the implemented of demand-side policies, i.e. 
ﬁscal and monetary policies, exerted in the examined period on output evolution and in particular how these policies inﬂuence the 
accommodation of disturbances in various countries in the region. The initial years of the transformation brought a decline in GDP 
of the post-communist countries which reﬂected adjustments in the supply structure of their economies to the requirements of the 
market, and the decline of sectors overdeveloped under the centrally planned economy.10 This process unfolded at diﬀerent speeds 
(e.g. the GDP slump in the Czech Republic is said to be smaller than in Poland or Hungary) and in speciﬁc cases it occurred at diﬀer-
ent points during the period 1989-1995 (in Poland and in the Czech Republic, GDP was on the rise as early as 1992, whereas in the 
Baltic states, growth rates were still negative in 1994). However, after 1994, general real convergence of GDP per capita levels could be 
observed in the NMS8 (see Chart I.14). Countries with the highest GDP per capita in 1994, namely Slovenia and the Czech Republic, 
were characterised by lower than average growth rates later on. As for the period 1994-2005, the highest growth rate was observed in 
the Baltic states – initially the poorest. Nevertheless, the gap was so large that the diﬀerence between their GDP per capita levels and 
those of other countries was not fully cancelled out in the above period. Poland distinguishes itself from this general picture. In the ﬁrst 
half of the 1990s it experienced strong growth performance and already in 1996 was the ﬁrst and the only country in the region which 
reached the GDP per capita level recorded before 1989.11 However, a considerably less favourable evolution of the economic situation 
in the following years made Poland the only country with evidently lower medium- and long-term growth rate than the theoretical 
rate that ensures convergence to the level comparable with the other NMS8 countries. In other words, considering Poland’s initial level 
of GDP, if Poland was to catch up with other NMS8 economies, especially with the Baltic states which in the mid-1990s had lower GDP 
per capita than Poland but at present have reached higher per capita income , it should grow at the average annual rate of approxi-
mately 6.0 per cent rather than at actual annual rate of 4.2 per cent on average. During the period 1994-2006, Slovakia and Lithuania 
also distinguished themselves negatively as they did not reach the expected growth and convergence rates, however, in their case, this 
gap was clearly smaller than in the case of Poland. At the other extreme, there were Estonia and Slovenia which exhibited exceptionally 
high growth rates (considering their initial per capita income levels).
Chart I.14. 
Average growth rate of real GDP per capita in the period 1994-2005 versus a logarithm of initial GDP per capita (in purchasing power 
parity USD) in 1994 in the NMS8. 
Source: Own elaboration based on GGDC data
10 Account should be taken of considerable methodological diﬃculties in measuring the GDP in CEE transition economies at the beginning of the nineties. For example, in Poland, where the 
international statistical standards were adopted relatively early, the Central Statistical Oﬃce has been calculating GDP in accordance with the Eurostat methodology only starting in 1995. 
Hence, any earlier comparisons of output levels or GDP growth in the NMS8 should be treated with caution.
11 Expressed in purchasing power parity USD (GGDC data). In case of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary, this happened in 2000, in Latvia in 2003 and in Lithuania 
as late as in 2004. 
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Simultaneously to the process of convergence occurring within NMS8 group, the countries in the region gradually reduced the income 
gap towards the EU15. As presented in Chart I.15,12 in particular cases, this process began between 1991 and 1994, after these countries 
overcame the direct repercussions of the so-called transformation shock, i.e. after they adapted their production volume and structure, 
previously determined by the rules of the centrally planned economy, to the requirements of the free market. Moreover, almost all 
examined countries experienced, prior to the year 2000, temporary slowdown in the rate of convergence towards the EU15,13 how-
ever, certain diﬀerences can be observed as to the timing and, above all, the depth of this slowdown. At the beginning of the century, 
the NMS8, excluding Poland and Slovenia, again began reducing the gap between them and Western Europe. Diﬀerent growth rates 
throughout the period resulted in reshuﬄing in the ranking of relative wealth in these countries compared with the EU15. In 1994, 
Latvia, with her GDP per capita amounting to ¼ of per capita GDP of France, was the poorest country in the region, whereas the Czech 
Republic with income per capita equal to 56 per cent of that of France, was the richest. In 2005, Poland moved to the lowest rank (42 
per cent) and Slovenia headed the league with 69 per cent of the per capita income of France. 
Labour productivity, evidently lower but growing faster in the NMS8 than in the EU15, was of key signiﬁcance both for the existence 
of the described income gap and also for its gradual reduction. Therefore, the distance between the NMS8 and the EU15 in terms of 
income per capita was being bridged above all thanks to the increase in output per worker (see Chart I.15). This was so because the 
legacy of the previous economic system included very high utilisation of labour force (measured as a share of the working population 
in the total population), which was in fact greater than in the EU15, as well as low labour productivity. According to Bukowski et al. 
(2006b), throughout the post-war period, the increase in productivity in Poland was slower than in France and to some degree – in 
terms of total output and output per capita – this failure was compensated by increased labour input. It can be assumed that the situ-
ation was analogous in the other post-communist economies.14 Consequently, at the beginning of the 1990s, in all of the countries in 
the region labour productivity was below half of the level seen in Western European economies, in 1994, it varied between 23 per cent 
of French labour productivity (used as a point of reference) achieved in Estonia, 33 per cent in Poland and 48 per cent in Hungary. In 
2005, these values amounted to 39 per cent in Latvia, 47 per cent in Poland and 63 per cent in Slovenia.
Finally, the clearly greater – in relation to France – labour input observed at the beginning of the transition was a sign of overemploy-
ment in the centrally planned economies and, although it has considerably decreased concurrently to the progress of the market 
reforms, it remained above the French labour input rate in all countries in the region, excluding Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. In the 
latter three countries, the share of employed in total population is smaller than it is in France and only recently relative labour input 
has started to contribute to the closing of the development gap towards the EU15, however, this impact is still lesser than in the Baltic 
states. 
Although in the ﬁrst years of the transition the increase in productivity could be perceived as a mechanical phenomenon, which re-
ﬂected somewhat automatically the adjustment of overemployment which became apparent in the market economy, in the later pe-
riod it had a key inﬂuence on real convergence of the NMS8 towards the EU15. Chart I.16 indicates that a inverse relationship between 
the initial productivity level and its subsequent growth rate is as evident as in the case of per capita output (see Chart I.14). As opposed 
to the GDP per capita dynamics, the growth rate of labour productivity in the Polish economy in 1994-2005 was, in fact, fairly in line 
with convergence rule, however, with the caveat that economies with the highest initial labour productivity (Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Slovenia) distinguished themselves positively due to high labour productivity dynamics in comparison with the other countries in 
the region.15 This means that insuﬃcient – from the intra-NMS8 convergence perspective – income per capita growth rate in Poland 
can be considered a consequence, above all, of a the labour input shrinking relatively stronger than in the other countries. The labour 
productivity growth rate was not high enough to counterbalance this gap.
It is worth emphasising that evolutions of labour productivity and employment in medium-term, such as the period studied in this 
report, can be largely independent from one another and indeed the NMS8 provides a full spectrum of possible developments of these 
two variables. Consequently, as illustrated in Chart I.17, the increase in labour productivity does not indicate a systematic relationship 
with labour input changes. Although in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia the decline in the labour input was accompanied by 
rising labour productivity, Slovenia enjoyed a higher increase in productivity than the Czech Republic alongside increasing utilisation 
of this production factor. The Baltic states were not homogeneous in the above respect either – higher real convergence in Latvia than 
in Lithuania resulted from positive labour productivity dynamics as well as from the expanding labour input, whereas Estonia, which 
distinguished itself in 1994-2005 by the highest per capita GDP growth rate out of all NMS8, achieved this result due to a boost in 
labour productivity. 
12 France constitutes a point of reference as its GDP per capita during the examined period was basically equal to the EU15 average (see Caselli, Teneyro, 2005).
13 Except for Hungary (see Chart I.15), which, however, developed at a slower average rate than the rate resulting from the convergence hypothesis for the NMS8 (see Chart I.16).
14 Evident shortage of data makes it impossible to verify this proposition for the Baltic states, Slovenia and the Czech Republic and Slovakia separately. However, in Czechoslovakia and in 
Hungary, the above-mentioned process did occur.
15 In particular, this “excessively” high growth rate of per capita output in Slovenia was mainly due to a fast increase in labour productivity, which also exceeded the value of absolute real 
convergence within the NMS8, irrespective of steadily decreasing relative labour input.
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Chart I.15. 
Decomposition of diﬀerences in GDP per capita levels (in purchasing power parity USD) between the NMS8 and France into productivity 
and labour utilization in the period 1989–2005
   
   
   
   
Remarks: Variables are expressed as percentages of relevant values for France in particular years.
Source: Own elaboration based on GGDC data
Remarks: Labour productivity – GDP per worker in purchasing power parity USD.
Labour input –share of employed in the total population.
Source: Own elaboration based on GGDC data.
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Chart I.16. 
Average growth rate of labour productivity in the period 
1994-2005 versus the logarithm of its initial level in the NMS8
Chart I.17.
Average growth rate of labour productivity and changes in per 
capita labour input in the period 1994-2005 in the NMS8
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Moreover, the recent increased intensity of labour utilisation in the Baltic states was accompanied by invariably high rate of productiv-
ity growth, whereas in Poland, after the year 2004, the negative labour input trend was reversed but concurrently the labour produc-
tivity dynamics decreased. The above remarks indicate that any robust generalisations about the correlation between productivity 
growth and employment changes in NMS8 should not be made.
The progress in convergence of particular countries is determined, above all, by their potential to increase labour productivity which 
results from the ability to improve total factor productivity (TFP)16 and, to a lesser extent, from the net accumulation of physical capital, 
which also boosts labour productivity thanks to the higher capital endowment of employed. Indeed, the growth in labour productiv-
ity resulting from rising TFP explains the real convergence that occurred within the EU15 (Caselli, Teneyro (2005)), as well as the rapid 
growth of the so-called Asian tigers, although in this case the importance of capital accumulation was greater than for the European 
countries (Young (1995), Hsieh (2002)). However, the halt to catching up of EU15 in income per capita with the United States, which 
happened after 1975, was due to the slowdown of GDP per worker growth in Europe in relation to the United States, further reinforced 
by negative developments in labour supply in the European countries (see Blanchard (2004)). 
This means that, although short-term ﬂuctuations of output growth generally imply changes in the labour market, in the medium term 
economic growth and labour market developments (understood as changes in employment and unemployment) are not directly 
related. Technical progress and the ability of economies to introduction of innovations, determine, above all, the rate at which output 
per capita grows in particular countries and thus decide about the wealth of nations. Technical progress necessarily triggers a number 
of changes in the labour market, in particular it inﬂuences the structure of labour demand and wage levels. These adjustments apply 
both to intersectoral reallocation of labour, human capital and skill requirements.
Due to the fact that business cycle ﬂuctuations cause employment, unemployment and sometimes also labour supply oscillations 
in the short run, the present diﬀerences in labour market performance within the NMS8 group can be perceived as a combination 
of medium-term trends and consequences of macroeconomic disturbances that have occurred in the last couple of years. In fact, 
Charts I.14 and I.15, which illustrate a general (subject to the above caveats on Poland) convergence among NMS8 countries and the 
group as a whole towards the EU15, do not inform about changes in time of the level and dynamics of economic activity in the exam-
ined countries. As these changes were evident (see Chart I.18), we look at the last decade dividing it into two subsequent sub-periods 
– from 1996 to 2000, and following the year 2000. The analyzed period begins in 1996 because suﬃciently detailed data for the entire 
group of countries are only available for the period from this year on. 
Box I.2. Aggregate shocks in the economy
The output evolution is a composite of trends shaping long-term economic growth as well as of a number of disturbances which are 
apparent as deviations from these trends. Short-term output fluctuations, i.e. within the an approx. eight-year business cycle span, 
are caused by aggregate shocks. These are usually divided into supply and demand shocks. Both types of disturbances can differ in 
terms of duration – economies are affected by transitory shocks, lasting a coupe of quarters at the most and dissipating gradually 
throughout the cycle, as well as permanent shocks.
Aggregate demand shocks are often transitory in nature. This type of shocks can be triggered, for instance, by periods of expansive 
fiscal or monetary policy. This is so because increases in public finance deficit and changes in real interest rates – before they are inter-
nalised by households through adjusted savings or investment rates – can temporarily lead to an increase or decrease in aggregated 
demand. nevertheless, shifts of external demand for domestic goods resulting from change in preferences of foreign consumers, are 
usually considered as permanent shocks. In this Chapter, we look at the occurrence and intensity of these shifts in the NMS8 coun-
tries.
Supply shocks can also differ significantly in terms of durability. Price shocks, which consist in exogenous – from the perspective of
a given economy – changes in prices of production factors (e.g. raw materials or fuels) as a result of their increased/decreased supply 
in global markets, are in general transitory. On the other hand, technological shocks, or factor productivity disturbances, are often 
perceived as permanent when they result from technical progress in the strict meaning, lastingly moving the production possibilities 
frontier of a given economy. It is possible, however, that transitory productivity disturbances occur, for instance, as the necessity to 
reallocate resources between sectors of the economy, when investment in previously popular types of business activity become less 
profitable, for example because of overinvestment. Due to the fact that the search for new, profit-making types of business is time-
consuming, costly and risky, before capital and labour force can be shifted to new forms of business, a transitory slowdown in the dy-
namics of capital accumulation, labour productivity and economic growth occurs. Supply shocks of this type (permanent or transitory) 
can also come about as a consequence of changes in regulations which affect the product market and business freedom.
A heterogeneous evolution of the CEE labour markets from1997 on can be attributed to diﬀerent sequence and intensity of macroeco-
nomic disturbances in the groups of countries speciﬁed earlier. Furthermore, to some extent it can be associated with diﬀerences in 
implemented ﬁscal and monetary policy-mix. Therefore, after presenting the general picture of the macroeconomic conditions during 
each sub-period, we make an attempt at assessing the inﬂuence that ﬁscal and monetary policy of that time could have exerted on 
macroeconomic situation, and we focus, above all, on the question about the extent to which demand-side policy aﬀected the labour 
markets in NMS8 countries. The key issues that we scrutinise are:
16 The increase in TFP is above all due to technological progress, however, in speciﬁc countries it may also depend on institutional and structural features of their economies, such as compe-
titiveness of product markets, “quality” of legislation and institutional incentives or barriers for entrepreneurship.
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For ﬁscal policy:
• assessment whether ﬁscal policy was anti- or procyclical,
• assessment of the relative share of structural and cyclical components of total public ﬁnance balance,
• identiﬁcation of ﬁscal impulses, i.e. ﬁscal expansions and contractions, 
• analysis of the type of expenditures/revenues constituting a given impulse, 
• assessment of the inﬂuence of a given ﬁscal impulse on the labour market.
For monetary policy:
• analysis of reasons behind the interest rate policy in individual countries,
• assessment whether monetary policy was anti- or procyclical,
• assessment of the inﬂuence of monetary policy on the economy and the labour market.
It should be emphasised that apart from aggregate shocks and macroeconomic policy responses to them, various evolutions of exam-
ined labour markets – especially in the aftermath of a common shock – could also be a consequence of diﬀerent abilities of particular 
countries to accommodate such shock (see Blanchard, Wolfers, 1999). This ability is determined, to a large extent, by structural features 
of the economy (of the supply and demand on the labour market in particular) and by the institutional structure of the labour market 
(such as social security system, educational system , retraining and life-long learning facilities, employment protection regulation and 
degree of economic freedom which determines the conditions for setting up and running business) (see Bassanini, Duval, 2006). As 
the role of the above factors was discussed in Part IV of the previous issue of this report (see Bukowski et al. 2005), we only touch on 
the related problems in a brief end note.
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Box I.3. Types of shocks in the labour market
Disturbances affecting output imply shocks in labour demand, irrespective of their product market nature, i.e. whether they are 
supply- or demand-determined. Such impulse may involve labour demand changes in almost all sectors of the economy, if it is trig-
gered by an aggregate shock in the product market, or only in certain part of the economy, because technological progress affects 
the productivity of production factors in particular sectors in an unequal manner, thus implying the need for intersectoral shifts and 
employment restructuring – such shocks are commonly referred to as reallocation shocks. They do not necessarily have to involve 
changes in total labour demand or fluctuations in employment levels, however, if they are “sufficiently” deep, they can lead to the 
deterioration of the situation in the labour market for a couple of years, especially if the ability of the economy to reallocate produc-
tion factors is limited.
Supply shocks in the labour market are connected with fluctuations in labour supply which result from changes in wage expecta-
tions of workers and unemployed, distorting the relation between wages and labour productivity. Negative / positive labour supply 
shocks consist in an increase / decrease in real wages claimed by employees relative to the dynamics of labour productivity, which 
increases / decreases the real cost of labour. Negative labour supply shocks may be due to an increase in potential income that can 
be received from sources other than work, or to a relative increase in the bargaining power of employees in wage negotiations with 
employers. Demographic and migration processes constitute a special case of supply shock as they lead to changes in the total po-
tential labour force in the economy.
Transitory shocks only affect the economy in a short term. However, contrary to the long-lasting impact on output, permanent tech-
nological shocks (i.e. persistent increase in production factors productivity) do not imply permanent changes of employment and 
unemployment rates, although they do influence wage levels. The consequences of such impulses are connected with the elasticity of 
labour supply and real wages. Although in a short term wages can be – and usually are to some extent – sticky, in a long term they are 
flexible but elasticity of labour supply is rather low. Therefore, price adjustments allow the return of employment and unemployment 
to equilibrium and shocks are entirely absorbed by real wage changes.
The experiences of the OECD countries and findings of labour economics indicate that the short-term performance of the labour 
market is largely determined by fluctuations in labour demand, which are characterised by different depth and persistence in par-
ticular economies. In fact, in the OECD countries, unemployment rose in the 1970s and 1980s as a consequence of (supply) oil shocks 
universally and to similar extent. However, after a couple of years, the crucial difference concerning the durability of the primary dis-
turbance became apparent – countries such as France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Spain recorded only a slight decline 
in unemployment after the oil shock ceased, whereas in the United States, the Scandinavian countries and in Japan, this disturbance 
was clearly less persistent. Furthermore, the Scandinavian countries experienced low unemployment until the first half of the 1990s 
when it soared as a result of a crisis, which combined global recession and a slump in external demand from the former USSR repub-
lics. Thus, international differences in labour market performance reflect various levels of the so-called natural unemployment rate in 
particular countries, as well as differences in the depth of macroeconomic shocks that affect these countries and their ability to absorb 
such shocks (see Bukowski et al. 2006).
Both long-term equilibrium in the labour market and its potential to deal with aggregate and reallocation shocks are related to 
structural aspects of the economy and the design of labour market intuitions. These factors modify labour supply and demand as well 
as the scale of frictions and mismatches which are responsible for the effectiveness of the price mechanism which clears the market 
after disturbances occur. The following are of prime importance:
• structural features of labour supply – of which human capital is the most crucial – which determine the degree of complementarity 
 of capital and labour, as well as the pace of labour supply adjustments to developments in structure of demand for labour,
• product market competition, as its higher level leads to higher total labour demand and greater ability of the economy to 
 reallocate production factors, and thus to shorter periods of propagation of negative reallocation shocks,
• institutional background of the labour market (social security and taxation, collective bargaining model, effectiveness of the 
 active labour market policy, labour law rigidity, etc.), influencing in what time perspective and relative scope, labour demand 
 fluctuations are absorbed by changes in employment or real wages.
 
 
2.2 Period before and directly after the Russian crisis (1994-2000)
2.2.1 Output and external disturbances before the year 2000
After the initial decline in output, from the year 1995 on the NMS8 economies entered a phase of growth, and the period 1996-1997 
saw a particularly dynamic economic upturn (see Chart I.18). One consequence of the economic upsurge, which began in the coun-
tries in the region at diﬀerent points in time during the period 1994-1996 (GDP growth in Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia accelerated 
as early as 1994, whereas in the Czech Republic and in the Baltic states – in 1995), was the increasing employment. Economic growth 
in Hungary was clearly lower at that time, which was reﬂected in merely stabilisation of employment after a considerable decline at 
the beginning of the decade. Employment ﬂuctuated in the above period in dependence on changes in business activity, especially 
so in Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia. However, this feature does not appear in the case of Slovenia, which was growing in the 
period 1994-1998 at the average annual rate of 4 per cent – a little more slowly than Poland or Slovakia but faster than the Czech 
Republic and, above all, Hungary – and nonetheless, employment remained stable or even declined, like it did in Hungary. The Baltic 
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states followed a slightly diﬀerent scenario of the early transition period: the initial decrease in GDP was more signiﬁcant, reductions in 
employment came later and their scale was relatively shallower than in Poland, Hungary and Slovenia (see Nesporova (2002), Eamets 
(2004)). Moreover, the increase in employment that occurred in the mid-1990s was relatively smaller and delayed, as these economies 
improved signiﬁcantly their growth rates only from 1996 on. Thus, in the period 1996-1999, the average growth rate for the countries 
in the region was relatively high and exceeded 5 per cent per year, compared with the average of 2.8 per cent in the EU15 and even 
lower – by 1 percentage point – growth in Germany. Out of all examined countries, it was only the Czech Republic that experienced 
a considerable slowdown during this period. 
Chart I.18. 
GDP dynamics in the NMS8 in the period 1994–2005
   
Source: Own elaboration based on GGDC data. 
The period of dynamic economic upturn in the middle of the decade largely resulted from extensive accumulation and modernisa-
tion of capital, which enabled a rapid increase in labour productivity. As presented in Chart I.19, in the period 1996-1998, output in 
the NMS8 grew mainly due to ﬂourishing internal demand, which, in turn, was a consequence – to the similar extent – of increasing 
private consumption and investment. In fact, in the period 1996-1998, contributions of consumption and investment to GDP growth 
in the NMS8 amounted to an average of 3.7 and 3 percentage points respectively.17 On the other hand, the contribution of net exports 
to GDP growth in the NMS8 was generally negative in that period, with the exception of the Czech Republic, where exports’ contribu-
tion was of comparable importance for growth as consumption.18 This contrast between the Czech Republic and the other countries 
in the region was due to the currency crisis which originated in the former in 1997, thus causing a 15 per cent depreciation of the 
Czech crown and resulting in a two-year long decrease in GDP, internal demand, investment and employment, as well as an increase 
in unemployment. The ﬁrst symptoms of upswing could be observed as late as mid-1999.
Chart I.19. 
Contribution of ﬁnal demand components to GDP growth in the NMS8 in the years 1997 (left graph) and 1998 (right graph)
   
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data and on Economic Survey of Europe
17 Apart from the Czech Republic, which, as from 1997, experienced a negative contribution of investment dynamics to GDP growth due to a ﬁnancial crisis. In the remaining seven countries, 
in the period 1996-1998, consumption and investment contributed to GDP growth an annual average of 4 and 3.4 percentage points respectively.
18 In 1996, these remarks were also valid, apart from negative contribution of net exports in Slovakia – explained by considerable decrease in external demand from the EU member states, 
including the Czech Republic (OECD, 1998sk) –and apart from decline of consumption in Hungary, reﬂecting the ﬁscal contraction initiated in 1995.
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19 In the period 1996–1997, the share of current account deﬁcit in GDP declined only in Hungary and Slovakia, and in the period 1997–1998, only in the Czech Republic and Estonia.
20 For instance, in Poland, in 1996, imports grew by 33.8 per cent compared with the previous year, whereas exports rose by as little as 6.7 per cent. As a result, for the ﬁrst time since1991, 
in 1996, net exports were negative. The problem of current account imbalance became apparent earliest in Hungary, where, in 1995, the so-called Stablisation Plan was implemented, thus 
putting into practice ﬁscal and monetary measures with the objective of reducing the risk of a ﬁnancial crisis.
21 Eurostat does not provide FDI data for Hungary prior to 1999, however, in accordance with the OECD data, in 1999, accumulated FDI stock per capita in Hungary exceeded twice the 
corresponding value in the Czech Republic and nine times in Poland (OECD, 1999hu).
22 Prior to 1999, none of the NMS8 adopted the ﬂoating nominal exchange rate regime and diﬀerent forms of managed exchange rates were adopted instead (see Box I.6). This means that 
the nominal depreciation of the Polish and Hungarian currencies resulted exactly from the deliberate policy of these countries’ central banks. Similarly, the appreciation (prior to 1997) of 
the eﬀective nominal exchange rate of the Czech crown reﬂected ﬁxing of the exchange rate against the German mark, and the appreciation of the Lithuanian currency – the adoption of 
the currency board.
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The remaining countries in the region were characterised, throughout the period 1995-1999, by high internal demand growth rates ac-
companied by worsening balances of trade. One reason for such tendencies was the progressing integration of the NMS8 economies 
in global trade, which translated into a dynamic increase in foreign trade volume. The economic upsurge and high internal demand 
dynamics were accompanied by a decrease in aggregate domestic savings in relation to output,19 thus leading to considerable current 
account balance deﬁcits.20 In the majority of countries the expansion of foreign debt was a consequence of negative savings of both 
private and public sector, and only Hungary and Poland exhibited positive net private savings in the period 1996-1998. 
Moreover, exports and imports diﬀered with respect to goods capital output ratios and degree of product processing. Exports of the 
NMS8 , constituted of mainly low-processed goods, including consumption goods. On the imports side, capital goods, necessary for 
maintaining high investment rates, played an important role. Consequently, capital accumulation in the NMS8 depended largely on 
foreign direct investment (FDI), the inﬂow of which helped to improve the capital account balances in the NMS8, thus counterbalanc-
ing the current account deﬁcits. Initially, in absolute terms, Poland was the largest recipient of foreign direct investment, receiving 40 
per cent of the total FDI inﬂow to the NMS8 in 1997. However, in relative terms, the Baltic states and Hungary21 should be regarded as 
the main beneﬁciaries of foreign investment in the above period, as illustrated in Table I.7.
 
Table I.7. 
Investment in the NMS8 in the period 1997-2000 (percentage share in GDP)
 
   Total investment                              Foreign direct investment
Czech Republic
Estonia
Lithuania
Latvia
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Hungary
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data.
The balance of foreign trade in the NMS8 – shaped, above all, by their increasing participation in the international division of labour and 
rigid demand for tradable goods not produced locally – could have also been aﬀected by the evolution of real exchange rates, which 
determined the relative international competitiveness of tradables manufactured by these countries.
Real appreciation was a widespread tendency which in general occurred regardless of nominal exchange rates developments (see 
Chart I.20). In other words, it took place even in those countries where nominal currencies were weakening, such as Poland, Hungary 
and Slovenia. This means that higher average inﬂation recorded in the NMS8 (see Chart I.31) than in the European Economic Area 
(EEA) member countries did not fully translate into nominal exchange rate depreciation.22 We look at factors aﬀecting the evolution of 
nominal exchange rates in the examined countries in the subsequent part devoted to monetary policy, whereas at this point we focus 
on real exchange rates.
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Chart I.20. 
Eﬀective real (left graph) and nominal (right graph) exchange rate of the NMS8 in the period 1996-1999 (1Apr1996=100) 
   
   
Remarks: CPI deﬂated real exchange rate. Eﬀective exchange rate is a weighted mean of exchange rates relative to 34 major trading partners of every 
country. Exchange rates have been calculated in accordance with the European method, meaning that index increases represent depreciation, whereas 
index decreases – appreciation.
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data
Box I.4. Reasons for real exchange rate developments 
 
Real exchange rate is defined as:  
 
where λ
t
 represents real exchange rate, e
t
 – nominal exchange rate calculated in accordance with the European method, p
t
*– foreign 
price level, and p
t
– domestic price level, at moment t. Variables are expressed in logarithms. Nominal price index can be expressed as 
a weighted mean of traded pt and non-traded goods pN, namely:
Realny kurs walutowy można więc zdekomponować następująco:
 
The first component of the above sum represents relative price of foreign and domestic tradable goods, whereas the second – rela-
tive price of foreign and domestic non-tradable goods expressed in units of domestic tradable goods. Therefore, real exchange rate 
developments, especially real exchange rate appreciation, i.e. decrease in λ
t
, can result from changes in prices of tradable goods (i.e. 
from nominal exchange rate appreciation or more dynamic increase in prices of domestic than foreign tradables), or from changes in 
relative prices of domestic and foreign non- tradable goods (i.e. from convergence of price levels of domestic to foreign non- tradable 
goods). 
If the so-called the law of one price (stating that prices of tradable goods expressed in the same currency are equal) applies, the first 
component of the sum will be zero and constant in time. However, in practice, the law of one price is not valid because domestic and 
foreign tradable goods are not perfect substitutes and international trade is hindered by certain barriers. Consequently, relative prices 
of tradables also fluctuate, for instance, if productivity of their manufacturing grows faster domestically than abroad.
Changes in relative prices of non-tradable goods can be caused by higher productivity growth in the domestic sector producing 
tradables. Rapid productivity increases imply real wage increases in the tradables sector, which translates into rising prices of non-
tradables – due to, firstly the one hand, demand factors, and on the other, changes in nominal wages also in the sector of non-tradable 
goods. This phenomenon is known as the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
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Real exchange rate appreciation may be connected with either the strengthening of the real exchange rate limited to tradable goods 
(hence, with a relative decline in exports competitiveness), or changes in relative prices between tradable and non-tradable goods, 
on foreign and domestic market (see Box I.4). In both cases, the probable reason for the strengthening of the real exchange rate was 
the productivity convergence between the NMS8 and the EU15 (see Chart I.15). It can be reasonably assumed that the increase in 
productivity proceeded faster in the tradables rather than non-tradables sector, thus lowering the relative production cost of tradables 
and leading to real appreciation.23 Moreover, rising labour productivity translated (though not entirely) into the increase in real wages, 
and consequently into changes in relative prices of tradable and non-tradable goods.24 As the result, the real exchange rate gradually 
appreciated.
It is worth noting that, using real GDP per worker as a measure of in the period 1996-1999, real appreciation exceeded the dynam-
ics of productivity only in the Czech Republic,25 Lithuania and Latvia,26 whereas in the remaining countries in the region productivity 
grew faster than relative prices of domestic to foreign goods, and thus their international competitiveness de facto improved. Such 
conclusion is valid for real exchange rates deﬂated by both the consumer price index and unit labour costs. This means that the pro-
ductivity growth was accompanied by a relative decrease in real – from the foreign perspective – cost of labour in examined countries, 
because the labour productivity increase surpassed the real appreciation. Moreover, the relative price of output of these economies 
was decreasing.27 Both features indicate that the attractiveness of the countries in the region as investment location was generally 
improving. It can therefore be surmised that their foreign trade balances were determined predominantly by the distinct structures of 
their imports and exports – in terms of degree of product processing, capital and labour intensity and technological level of imported 
and exported goods – rather than by real exchange rate developments.
Labour productivity generally grew in all countries in the region and the inverse relation between the initial level of labour productivity 
and its growth dynamics (see Chart I.16) was visible also in the period 1996-1999. However, as far as labour demand is concerned, as 
well as the possibilities of occurrence of appreciation pressure (see Box I.4), the evolution of the relationship between labour produc-
tivity and real wages is of crucial importance, as it determines the changes in unit labour cost in the economy. In fact, in the period of 
rapid growth of 1996-1999, in a couple of countries real wages grew faster than labour productivity (see Chart I.21), which can be ex-
plained by the non-competitive nature of wage negotiations (see Lindbeck, Snower, 2002) in some sectors of the economy (especially 
in the public sector and in highly unionised branches). Nevertheless, from the foreign perspective, this was of no particular signiﬁcance. 
Real appreciation was generally smaller than labour productivity growth in general, and hence even more so than productivity growth 
in the tradables sector, which attracts the majority of foreign direct investment.
 
Chart I.21. 
Labour productivity increase in relation to real wage increase in the NMS8 in the period 1996-2005
   
Remarks: Labour productivity – GDP per worker in purchasing power parity USD (GGDC data). 
Real wages – average nominal wage adjusted by the GDP deﬂator (Eurostat data).
Source: Own elaboration based on GGDC and Eurostat data.
Estonia             Lithuania              Latvia             PolandCzech Republic            Slovakia              Slovenia             Hungary 
23 For instance, Jazbec (2002) estimates for Slovenia that, in the period 1993-2001, 1 per cent faster labour productivity growth in industry (being a proxy for the productivity increase in the 
tradable goods sector) than in services (which constitute a majority of non-tradable goods) implied an appreciation of real exchange rate by 1.5 per cent.
24 Egert et al. (2003) attribute a large part of the real appreciation which occurred in the transition countries in the period 1995-2000 to the trend price increase of tradable goods.
25 In the Czech Republic, the real appreciation exceeded the productivity increase even after the currency crisis leading to nominal depreciation. It results from the fact that, at the time of 
the crisis, the decrease in output was relatively deeper than employment reductions, and therefore labour productivity actually decreased in 1997.
26 Sharp appreciation in case of these two Baltic states occurred simultaneously with the Russian crisis and is connected with the improvement of terms-of-trade with Russia, their main 
trading partner.
27 Only in Hungary was the productivity dynamics in the period 1996-1999 virtually equal to the dynamics of the real exchange rate deﬂated by unit cost of labour, thus indicating to the 
relative stability of the real labour cost in Hungary from the foreign perspective, and the relatively decreasing relative price of the Hungarian goods.
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Openness to international trade gradually unfolded to the extent that, in the second half of the 1990s, the CEE economies distin-
guished themselves by their relatively high vulnerability to external demand disturbances. Furthermore, their trade structures – in 
terms of degree of processing of goods and export destinations, largely limited the possibility of re-directing supply of exported goods 
to domestic markets, for instance in the aftermath of an external demand breakdown. This was so mainly due to low substitutability 
of exported and imported goods. These factors led to situation where a decrease in external demand could turn into a real negative 
demand shock. This is exactly the type of disturbance that occurred in Russia in the form of a ﬁnancial crisis,28 resulting in collapse of 
foreign trade, especially aﬀecting the countries neighbouring with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Table I.8.
 Current account balances (percentage share in GDP) of the NMS8 in the period 1995-2000
 
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Source: Ministry of Economy 2006
As a result of this disturbance, the rapid economic growth lasting since 1996, slowed down in mid-1998, and was followed by eco-
nomic stagnation, lasting in from two to six quarters in various countries. This shock was particularly severe and earliest to be noticed 
in the Baltic states where, in 1999, the decrease in GDP growth rate amounted to approximately 5 percentage points compared to the 
previous year, and on the other hand was relatively weakest in the Czech Republic,29 Hungary and Slovenia. In Poland, the immediate ef-
fects were moderate, GDP growth remained relatively high (around 4 per cent annually), and the slowdown lasted only three quarters. 
Such diﬀerences in vulnerability of the countries in the region to the Russian shock is reﬂected in the changes in their current account 
balances (see Table I.8) – the Baltic states registered a deterioration in trade balances as early as 1998, whereas Poland followed with
a slight delay.
The consequences of a ﬁnancial crisis occurring in one country can spill over onto other economies via two main channels – through 
international trade and through the ﬁnancial channel. The ﬁnancial channel, which means devaluation pressure on currencies of 
other countries that suﬀer from capital outﬂows as a result of the ﬁnancial crisis, turned out to be of little importance. As far as interna-
tional trade is concerned, the eﬀects of the crisis became apparent as early as the third and fourth quarter of 1998, above all in the Baltic 
states, for which Russia had been the main exports destination. In 1999, Russia’s share in total exports of the Baltic states decreased on 
average by one third compared with the situation before the crisis.
In the case of the other NMS8, impact of the shock was smaller (see Chart I.22) due to both lower initial trade integration with Russia 
(exports from the Czech Republic and Poland to Russia amounted to 3.4 and 8.4 per cent of these countries’ GDP respectively) and 
smaller slump in foreign trade. It should be emphasised, however, that, contrary to the other examined countries, Poland and Slovakia 
had been closely connected via trade with Ukraine and Belarus (jointly accounting for respectively 6 and 10 per cent of total exports in 
1997-1998), which – due to high level of integration of these countries with the Russian economy – acted as an additional transmission 
channel of the demand disturbance. Moreover, in case of Poland, cross-border trade was of especially great importance and its balance 
deteriorated greatly as a result of the crisis (Becke, Fidrmuc (2000)). Thus, the spill-over eﬀect of the shock could have been stronger for 
Poland (and Slovakia) than for the Czech Republic and Hungary.
The consequences of the Russian crisis in the second half of the year 1998 were further reinforced by a temporary decrease in import 
demand in Western Europe, particularly in Germany, which was the main trade partner of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia 
(see Chart I.22). The increase of UE15 demand from 1999 on was on the other hand an important factor in the recovery of the CEE 
economies and allowed for a ongoing increase in the role of the EU member states as trade partners of the NMS8. Notwithstanding the 
above, in 1999, the GDP dynamics in the NMS8 was on average by lower 2 percentage points than in the previous year.
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28 The Russian crisis was a consequence of Russia’s swelling foreign debt (of the public and private sectors alike), which, alongside ﬁxed exchange rate, led to an abrupt devaluation of the 
rouble, declaration of partial insolvency by the Federation authorities, increase of indebtedness of companies and a banking crisis. The resulting decline in disposable income as well as 
worsening of terms-of-trade translated into a slump of demand for imported goods.
29 In the period 1997-1998, GDP declined in the Czech Republic because of a currency crisis. In 1999, for the ﬁrst time in two years, the Czech Republic registered GDP growth of 1.2 per 
cent.
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Chart I.22. 
Dynamics of exports from the NMS8 to Russia, Germany and the EU (1Apr1996=100) in the period 1996–1998
   
   
   
 
Source: Own elaboration based on IMF deseasonalised data.
Hence, the Russian shock led to a number of signiﬁcant changes in the trade structure of the countries in the region. However, as far 
as in the period 1996-1998 the contribution of net exports to the increase in GDP was generally negative in NMS8, in 1999-2000, this 
contribution was already positive and amounted to 1.5 percentage points on average. It resulted from modiﬁcations in the structure of 
exported goods as well as in export directions of the CEE economies. In all countries in the region aﬀected by the crisis, the export ﬂows 
were redirected to the EU15, and in particular to Germany (in case of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia), Finland and Sweden 
(in case of Estonia). Another repercussion of the Russian crisis was the 1999 decline in domestic demand, particularly in investment, 
in the Baltic states. This was so mainly because of the considerable (though transitory) deterioration of the situation on their labour 
markets and the simultaneous decrease in disposable income. As presented in Chart I.18, the consequences of the crisis in terms of 
GDP dynamics were for the Baltic states severe but also of short duration – as early as 2000 these countries re-entered the path of rapid 
growth, stimulated to similar extent by domestic and external demand (see Chart I.23).
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The economic situation in Hungary and Slovenia was diﬀerent because these economies were only modestly linked (directly and indi-
rectly) with Russia and as a result they did not experience a negative demand shock in 1998.30 In Hungary, between 1997 and 2001, the 
average annual growth rate exceeded 4 per cent, mainly due to high domestic demand dynamics. Slovenia, in turn, had been grow-
ing fairly fast since 1994 – initially, thanks to its exports,31 and as from 1997 – domestic consumption and investment, including state 
investment. The clearly negative contribution of net exports to GDP growth in Slovenia in 1999 stemmed from the decline in EU15 
demand. Nevertheless, it was only temporary and already in 2000, external demand was the main demand contribution to positive 
GDP dynamics in this country.32 
 
Chart I.23. 
Contribution of ﬁnal demand components to GDP in the NMS8 in the years 1999 (left graph) and 2000 (right graph)   
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat and OECD data and Economic Survey of Europe.
The Russian crisis triggered oﬀ major developments in the labour markets of most NMS8. In the period 1998-2000, the employment 
rate declined by 2-4 percentage points in those countries in the region that had been particularly highly integrated, whether indirectly 
or directly, with the Russian economy (see Bukowski et al. 2005 and Chart I.10). The increase in unemployment rates was comparable,33 
and the Baltic states also experienced a decrease in participation. Therefore, the shock, which was transmitted above all through the 
trade channel, aﬀected especially badly the labour markets of Russia’s neighbours, namely Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Slovakia 
and Poland. As mentioned above, it was not only the breakdown of aggregate demand dynamics and ensuing decline of GDP dy-
namics that was of importance, but also the necessity, forced by the crisis, to modify the structure and directions of export ﬂows, thus 
consequently the production proﬁles in a number of sectors of the economy. As explained in the subsequent part of this chapter, 
devoted to the period after the year 2000, the above adjustment was particularly severe in Poland, which not only experienced a col-
lapse of exports to Russia in 1998, but also had to cope with a prolonged decline in return on capital and in the dynamics of total factor 
productivity.
On the other hand, the Russian crisis did not aﬀect the labour markets of those countries which had scarce trade links with the CIS 
countries, for instance, Hungary and Slovenia, which, in the period 1998-2000, actually exhibited increasing employment and decreas-
ing unemployment rates (in both cases by approximately 2 percentage points – see Charts I.10 and I.11). The impact of the Russian 
crisis on the Czech labour market was relatively small because this country had already at that time stronger trade links with the Euro-
pean Union than Poland, Slovakia or the Baltic states. Therefore, the Czech Republic was only aﬀected by the limited spill-overs coming 
from Slovakia, the economic situation of which was worsening. At the same time, however, the Czech Republic was still struggling 
in 1998-1999 with the consequences of its own ﬁnancial crisis, forcing enterprises to undergo far-reaching adjustments of labour de-
mand. Consequently, this country also registered a decrease in employment and an increase in unemployment, though visibly smaller 
than in Poland and Slovakia.
 
30 As presented in Chart I.22, although the trade links between Hungary and Russia had been on constant rise prior to 1998, in comparison with the trade links with the EU member states, 
and in particular with Germany which accounted for half of Hungarian exports, they were of little importance.
31 Directed above all to Western Europe – as early as 1995, Germany – Slovenia’s main trade partner – received 30 per cent of exports, and the OECD countries accounted for 80 per cent of 
total exports in Slovenia.
32 Slovenia distinguished itself with “best” current account balance out of all examined countries and indeed only in 1999-2001 experienced deﬁcit on this account (see Table I.8).
33 Apart from Latvia, where the labour market situation was worse than in the remaining countries even before the Russian crisis, particularly with respect to unemployment rate. Moreover, 
Latvia, to a greater extent than other countries, absorbed the shock in the labour market through decreasing participation.
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2.2.2 Fiscal policy before the year 2000 
In the second half of the 1990s, ﬁscal policies of the NMS8 focused mainly on maintaining stable budget deﬁcit levels in relation to 
GDP in medium-term.34 This task was easier, among others, thanks to proceeds from privatisation. This strategy was implemented, for 
instance, in Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia. At the same time, prior to the year 2000, the countries in the region made 
attempts at decreasing the share of the public ﬁnance sector in their GDPs, above all, by reducing consumption and (to a lesser extent) 
public investment. Generally, it can be said that in the second half of the 1990s, the CEE countries were characterised by similar shares 
of public expenditure in their GDPs, however, their levels of government consumption and social expenditure were largely diﬀerent 
– Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary allocated greater shares of GDP to social transfers than the Baltic states and Slovakia, which 
was compensated with relatively lower expenditure on public consumption (see Charts I.28-I.30). After 2000, the share of the public 
sector in GDPs of the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia and Hungary reached approximately 45 per cent, whereas in the Baltic states 
and Slovakia, the decline in the share of public expenditure in GDP continued until the average level of 35 per cent was reached in 
2005 (see Chart I.25).
Evolution of public ﬁnance deﬁcits in the NMS8 in the period 1996-2005, juxtaposed with cyclical GDP ﬂuctuations in that period, ex-
poses three phenomena that become apparent in the area of demand-side policy. Firstly, in some of the countries (Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary) a very clear tendency could be observed, namely more or less stable deﬁcits in medium-term were maintained, 
with certain deviations caused, above all, by ﬂuctuations of budget expenditure.35 Secondly, in the remaining countries (i.e. the Baltic 
states and Slovakia), a period of strong ﬂuctuations in 1997-2000 was followed by an visible tendency to gradually reduce total deﬁcit 
until the primary surplus was reached (see Chart I.24). Thirdly, although in a majority of countries (except for Hungary) minor anti-cycli-
cal ﬂuctuations in total and primary deﬁcit could be observed, meaning that deﬁcit was generally increasing during periods of slower 
growth and declining when the economy was booming, it can be reasonably assumed that most of these ﬂuctuations were due to 
the automatic stabilisers. Thus, the fact that these deﬁcits were evolved (with some exceptions) in direction reverse to GDP ﬂuctuations 
does not mean that the authorities were implementing an anti-cyclical demand-side policy. In fact, it seems that only Estonia pursued 
a strictly anti-cyclical policy, which consisted in increasing primary deﬁcit during periods of recession and reducing it during expan-
sions, and ultimately, in maintaining a balanced budget in medium term. Other Baltic states strove to follow the Estonian model but 
only towards the end of the analysed period they managed to attain balance. The remaining countries generally preserved expendi-
ture over the revenues but at a stable level, allowing only for ﬂuctuations which reﬂected developments in the economic situation and 
occasionally pushing ahead for ﬁscal consolidations or expansions (see Chart I.40). 
Box I.5. Fiscal policy and fiscal impulses – definitions and measurement
An abrupt increase of the public finance deficit resulting from discretionary decrease of tax burden or expansion of public expenditure 
has traditionally been regarded as a symptom of expansive fiscal policy or fiscal expansion. If the actions of the government consist 
in reducing the deficit as a result of increased taxation or reduced expenditure, they lead to the so-called restrictive policy or fiscal 
contraction.
The most appropriate measure of the fiscal situation when analyzing fiscal impulses is primary deficit, i.e. total public finance deficit 
less cost of public debt servicing. Interest payable on government debt is not directly related with neither phase of the business cycle, 
nor with the discretionary changes in fiscal policy, and as such, they should not influence the assessment how expansive the policy is.
Because fiscal policy is by definition of discretionary nature, when judging the extent of its expansiveness, one has to also take into 
consideration the impact that economic fluctuations have on public revenues and expenditures, by dividing total deficit into two 
components. Firstly, primary cyclical deficit can be distinguished because there exist certain categories of revenues (e.g. indirect 
taxes) that evolve in a procyclical manner, as well as certain categories of expenditures (e.g. unemployment-related) that evolve anti-
cyclically. Thus, primary cyclical deficit should, as a rule, be ignored when identifying fiscal impulses. The remaining part of primary 
deficit – the so-called structural deficit – reflects persistent imbalance of revenues and expenditures, occurring both during recession 
and expansion periods, and is a much more reliable basis for the measurement of fiscal policy expansiveness. 
34 Data on public ﬁnance balance in particular countries are not fully comparable because of diﬀerent calculation methodologies used. From the macroeconomic point of view, the most 
reliable methodologies are ESA95 used by Eurostat and the OECD methodology, which account for the broadest categories of revenues and expenditures. Nevertheless, such countries as 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, have been using – as from the beginning of this decade – the GFS methodology of the IMF, which provides lower deﬁcit levels. Another important 
diﬀerence between these  methodologies is the method of recording revenues/expenses in time: for ESA95, it is the moment when accounts payable or receivable are incurred (accrual 
basis), for GFS – when a ﬁnancial transfer is executed (cash basis). As a result, it is very diﬃcult to gather methodologically homogeneous and comparable data for the period 1996-2005.
35 Slovenia stands out from this group because in the period 1996-2000 it pursued a policy of balanced budget and its deﬁcit never exceeded 1.4 per cent of GDP (Mrak, Stanovnik, Stiblar, 
2004). Eurostat does not provide data for Slovenia for this period and therefore it is diﬃcult to assess the extent of coherence between the methodologies used by local institutions and that 
of Eurostat, upon which the analysis of ﬁscal policies of the remaining countries is based.
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In order to precisely denote ﬁscal impulses, one should refer to primary structural deﬁcit (see Box I.5),36 which is most suitable when as-
sessing the scale of discretionary measures in ﬁscal policy. This is so because this indicator of public ﬁnance balance does not account 
for the impact of automatic stabilisers. Unfortunately, limited availability of the data on structural deﬁcit in the NMS837 does not allow 
for such a straightforward analysis. It can be assumed that in the countries where total deﬁcit was relatively large (Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary),38 the scope for pursuing a discretionary anticyclical ﬁscal policy in response to shocks aﬀecting the economy was 
limited. The ﬁscal reaction to the crisis of 1997 in the Czech Republic illustrates well such conjecture. Throughout the period of rapid 
growth prior to the crisis, primary deﬁcit had been considerable and even though it grew further in 1998, the change in deﬁcit re-
ﬂected mainly the decline in revenues. The increase in social spending in response to the decline in household incomes was ﬁnanced 
by the decrease in expenditures on public sector wages and public investment (see Charts I.28-I.30), and public consumption actually 
declined in real terms (OECD, 2000cz). It can be assumed that the increase in social expenditures and the decrease in revenues, as a 
result of deteriorating economic situation, must have been balanced with the reduction of all other expenditures, due to diﬃculties 
with ﬁnancing the government borrowing needs in the midst of a ﬁnancial crisis.
Box I.6. Fiscal policy and ﬁscal impulses – impact on the economy and labour market
The composition of a fiscal disturbance, i.e. its expenditures forming an impulse and/or methods of its financing, is of crucial im-
portance when it comes to assessing the impact of fiscal policy on the economy and the labour market. An increase in one category 
of expenditures may entail a decrease in another, or an increase in deficit or tax burden. The Keynesian economics, which emphasises 
the role of aggregate demand in the determining the level of output, argues for the positive impact of any kind of fiscal impulse on 
output, i.e. of increased expenditures as well as decreased taxes. Modern macroeconomics, however, does not provide such straight-
forward answers because it takes into account the channels of fiscal policy transmission. Among these channels, household income 
and the related substitution and income effects of labour supply are fundamental. The substitution effect implies positive elasticity of 
labour supply to wages, which means that households increase labour supply at the cost of their leisure in response to rising wages. 
The income effect arises because an increase in expected permanent income enables individuals to work less because they are able to 
maintain consumption at the same level with lower labour input. A decline in permanent income may result from a decrease in hourly 
wage but also from a decrease in income from sources other than work, especially from social transfers. Due to the fact that the latter 
constitute a significant component of public expenditures, fiscal impulses may affect labour supply in different ways depending on 
the expenditures that compose them. Investment is another transmission mechanism, as it generally grows in response to increase 
in labour supply and contracts when labour supply decreases. However, potential changes in the taxation of enterprises are of high 
importance in this respect. Response of macroeconomic variables (e.g. output, investment, consumption, employment) to particular 
adjustments in fiscal policy are reflected by the so-called fiscal multipliers.
When considering the impact of fiscal policy on the labour market and economic activity, one should distinguish between long- and 
short-term impacts. In the long term, the budget constraint of government is binding and therefore adjustments in fiscal policy must 
take the form of shifts between expenditure categories – with their total size constant – or of changes in total expenditures accom-
panied by an according increase/decrease in taxation. In such perspective, the importance of transmission mechanisms becomes 
fully evident. According to Bukowski et al. (2006a), the financing of additional transfer spending by an increase in taxes or decrease 
in consumption and public investment affects the economy in an unambiguously negative way, leading to lower consumption, 
investment, output and employment. On the other hand, reduction of social transfers triggers an increase in labour supply due to the 
significant income effects, which, in turn, raise capital productivity and prompts its accumulation – and so consequently to further 
increase of output, employment and income. Largest positive influence on the economy is exerted by increase in public investment 
financed with lower transfers, because public capital, which is complementary to private capital, increases the return on private 
sector investment. Relatively strong effects are produced also by cuts in distorting taxes levied on capital and labour, financed with 
reduction in transfers, whereas positive implications of increased public consumption – balanced out by a decrease in transfers – are 
definitely smaller. However, if transfers remain unchanged, an increase in public consumption financed by increased taxation in the 
long term also negatively influences the economy. It should be emphasised that such implications, known in the literature under the 
rather inadequate notion of non-keynesian fiscal policy effects (see Alesina and Perotti (1997)), result from both modern classical and 
neo-keynesian models.
Due to the fact that in the short term output is determined greatly by the demand side, it can happen that short-term output and em-
ployment responses to an increase in government expenditure are different that the long-term consequences. This does not, however, 
apply to social transfers, as their increase exerts an negative influence on employment and output also in the short term.
Concerning transitory shocks, which usually take form of discretionary adjustments of fiscal policy, or impulses in response to output 
fluctuations, financing of an increase in public consumption by debt exerts a positive, though temporary, influence on output and 
employment, whereas financing of an increase in transfers by debt leads to a decline in output and employment, because of a de-
clining labour supply. These conclusions are further supported by a number of empirical studies (see Gali, Lopez-Salido, Valles (2004), 
Perotti (2004)). Therefore, , we analyse which categories of expenditures constituted cyclical and discretionary developments in fiscal 
policy in the NMS8, as this knowledge is of key importance when assessing the impact of the above changes on the labour market.
 
36 In the literature also referred to as the so-called cyclically adjusted deﬁcit (see Giavazzi, Pagano (1990), Alesina, Perrotti (1997), Alesina, Ardagna (1998)).
37 OECD, which calculates both the structural and cyclical deﬁcit component for its member states, does not make such calculations for its CEE member states.
38 Leaving aside the debt service cost, deﬁcit which persists irrespective of the economic situation, must contain a substantial structural component, which is very well exempliﬁed by the 
evolution of large primary and total deﬁcit in the Czech Republic. The structural nature of deﬁcit often entails high expenditures on social transfers, which in the above-mentioned countries 
were relatively high. According to Bukowski et al. (2006), speciﬁc feature of the CEE countries is that although the average share of the public ﬁnance in GDP is smaller than in the EU15 
on average, share of social expenditure is similar, and therefore relatively higher than that observed in Western Europe at the time when the level of its socio-economic development was 
comparable.
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Seemingly, at that time, Poland followed the similar path. In 1999, in the aftermath of rapid increase in unemployment and a temporary 
slowdown of the GDP dynamics, Poland slightly increased social transfers and public consumption; however, to preserve the balance, 
the government also had to decrease investment accordingly. However, on the basis of statements of the Ministry of Finance, it can 
be assessed that the above policy was rather a part of a discretionary ﬁscal tightening, at that time aiming on reducing the deﬁcit, 
than a decision resulting from choice between the necessity to ﬁnance higher government borrowing needs in the environment of 
a considerable structural deﬁcit, confronted with balancing of increases in some categories of expenditure by cuts in other areas. This 
interpretation is further supported by the fact that the only case of primary surplus in the period 1996-2005 occurred immediately after 
the Russian shock, thus making Poland’s ﬁscal policy of that time procyclical.
As opposed to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, the countries in the region with relatively low total public ﬁnance shares in 
GDP, were better equipped for anticyclical policy in response to external demand disturbance. The above applies ﬁrst of all to the Baltic 
states which, in 1998-1999, could substantially increase social transfers and public consumption in real terms in response to the reper-
cussions of the Russian crisis (see Charts I.28-I.30). In line with the medium-term trend of decreasing share of budgetary revenues in 
GDP (see Charts I.25-I.27), these higher expenditures were entirely ﬁnanced by debt. Moreover, apart from the Baltic states, none of the 
NMS8 experienced an evident and lasting amelioration of public ﬁnance balance during the economic upturn of 1995-1998. Therefore, 
it can be claimed that prior to the year 2000, the Baltic states, and in particular Estonia, to greatest extent pursued anticyclical ﬁscal 
policy and at the same time a exhibited simultaneous tendency towards the reduction of total size of government. 
Chart I.24. 
Primary public ﬁnance balance in the NMS8 in the period 1996-2005
   
Remarks: The presented values have been calculated in accordance with the ESA95 methodology.
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data
When scrutinizing the ﬁscal impulses in the CEE region before 2000, it should be noted that, in 1995-1998, Poland and Hungary 
achieved rapidly decreasing public debt servicing cost,39 which translated into a signiﬁcant decrease in the share of public expenditure 
in GDP. Moreover, during the period of rapid growth and evident improvement on the labour market, expenditures on social transfers 
were on the decline. This allowed Poland and Hungary to reduce the scope of ﬁscalism and, at the same time, to lower the tax burden, 
reduce budget deﬁcits and even attain a primary surplus. It can be assessed that the such decrease in taxation and in the government’s 
borrowing demand generated a positive impulse in both economies, thus increasing labour and capital supply and contributing to 
dynamic growth at that time. However, because the ﬁscal multipliers, representing the elasticity of output and investment to changes 
in ﬁscal policy, are moderate in such scenarios, especially when the certainty of the permanent character of ﬁscal changes is rather 
small (see Hemming, Kell, Mahfouz, 2002), this eﬀect was not likely to be very signiﬁcant.
Fiscal stance of Slovakia in period 1997-2000 is another notable example of ﬁscal loosening during the examined period. Initially, Slo-
vakia ﬁnanced with deﬁcit the temporarily increased public investment (see Table I.7), in particular on infrastructure, along with public 
consumption, and later also subsidies for enterprises (in the form of capital expenditures and uncollected taxes) and direct capital 
transfers to banks adversely aﬀected by the ﬁnancial crises in the Czech Republic and Russia. However, ignoring the above exceptional 
capital expenditures, it could be said that in 1999, i.e. directly after the Russian crisis, Slovakia tightened ﬁscal policy by reducing invest-
ment and public consumption, which should have aﬀected the Slovak labour market in rather negatively.40 
Estonia             Lithuania              Latvia             SlovakiaCzech Republic            Poland              Slovenia             Hungary 
39 As a result of both reduction of debt and of its conversion to commercial papers with more favourable interest rates, decrease in capital transfers to enterprises and increase in reliability 
of the two countries in the eyes of potential creditors.
40 Subsidies for banks, although important to the extent that they could have prevented the bankruptcies, could not have had any direct impact on the Slovak economy or labour market. 
However, reductions in public investment and consumption, which were accompanied by an increase in transfers and in deﬁcit, could have caused moderately negative multiplier eﬀects 
(see Box I.6)
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A similar situation could be observed a little earlier in Lithuania, where a one-oﬀ, large increase in capital transfers to enterprises and 
banks in 1997 did not disturb the general trend of reducing the share of budget expenditures and revenues in GDP. Lithuania, aﬀected 
by the Russian crisis to a similar extent as Estonia and Latvia, reacted to the crisis in a similar way, namely by increasing public consump-
tion and social transfers. As explained in Box I.6, indeed, a transitory increase in transfers lowers labour supply, but it also reduces ﬂuc-
tuations of disposable income of individuals loosing jobs. Moreover, a temporary increase in public consumption leads to a temporary 
increase in employment and output.
Generally speaking, it can be assessed that the Baltic states were the only countries in the region that were able to loosen ﬁscal policy 
as a response to the Russian crisis, without abandoning at the same time the medium-term consolidation strategy. It can be assumed 
that the temporary increase in deﬁcits used to ﬁnance higher expenditures, alongside a consistent policy of reducing the total govern-
ment size, induced positive multiplier eﬀects in these economies. According to Bukowski et al. (2006), such conduct of ﬁscal policy 
aﬀects the economy in the medium and long term in an unambiguously positive manner – by increasing capital and labour supply as 
well as labour demand, as the conditions necessary for the occurrence of so-called non-keynesian ﬁscal policy eﬀects are met (see Box 
I.6 and Hemming, Kell, Mahfouz, (2002), Alesina and Perotti (1997)). Moreover, in the short term, this policy allows the ﬁscal instruments 
to be applied in an antycyclical fashion. It also provides monetary authorities with a setting suitable for implementation a relatively 
loose monetary policy.
Table I.9. 
Fiscal impulses in the NMS8 in the period 1996-2000.
Source: Own elaboration.
Country
Hungary
and Poland
Poland
Lithuania 
and Slovakia
Lithuania, Latvia,  
      Estonia
Slovakia
Period
1996-1998
1999-2000
1997 i 1999
1998-1999
1997-1998
Fiscal impulse
Decrease
in taxes 
Increase in transfers
and decrease in public 
investment
Temporary increase
in capital transfers
to enterprises
Temporary increase
in consumption, public 
investment and transfers
Decrease in consumption 
and public investment
Financing method
Decrease in debt 
servicing cost and
decrease in deﬁcit 
Decrease in deﬁcit
Increase in deﬁcit
Increase in deﬁcit
Decrease in deﬁcit
Expected impact on labour
market and output
Positive impact on employment
and output
Negative impact
on output and employment
Prevention of a banking crisis
and potentially of its negative
consequences, no direct impact
on labour market
Smoother absorption of the
Russian shock, some decrease
in labour supply 
 
Neutral or moderately negative
on output and employment
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Chart I.25.
 Public expenditure in the NMS8 (percentage share in GDP) in the period 1996-2005
   
Chart I.26.
 Budgetary revenues in the NMS8 (percentage share in GDP) in the period 1996-2005
   
Chart I.27. 
General budgetary balances in the NMS8 (percentage share in GDP) in the period 1996-2005
   
Remarks: The presented values have been calculated in accordance with the ESA95 methodology.
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data
Estonia             Lithuania              Latvia             SlovakiaCzech Republic            Poland              Slovenia             Hungary 
Estonia             Lithuania              Latvia             SlovakiaCzech Republic            Poland              Slovenia             Hungary 
Estonia             Lithuania              Latvia             SlovakiaCzech Republic            Poland              Slovenia             Hungary 
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Chart I.28. 
Public consumption in the NMS8 (percenta share in GDP) in the period 1996-2005 
Chart I.29. 
Social transfers in the NMS8 (percentage share in GDP) in the period 1996-2005 
Chart I.30. 
Public investment in the NMS8 (percentage share in GDP) in the period 1996-2005
   
Remark: The presented values have been calculated in accordance with the ESA95 methodology.
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data.
Estonia             Lithuania              Latvia             SlovakiaCzech Republic            Poland              Slovenia             Hungary 
Estonia             Lithuania              Latvia             SlovakiaCzech Republic            Poland              Slovenia             Hungary 
Estonia             Lithuania              Latvia             SlovakiaCzech Republic            Poland              Slovenia             Hungary 
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2.2.3 Monetary policy before the year 2000
The key objective of monetary policy in the NMS8 was disinﬂation and, in the later period, stabilisation of price levels within the 
adopted ﬂuctuation margins. Although the formally stated goal of the monetary authorities in some of the above countries was either 
“the stability of the national currency” (Estonia, Slovenia, Hungary) or “the stability of prices” (Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, 
Slovakia), parallel to achieving a number of secondary goals (related to supporting the development of banking and ﬁnance system), 
ultimately, curbing inﬂation was a predominant objective of all monetary authorities. Particular exchange rate regimes were to great 
extent a means to that end. So although ﬁscal policy, as discussed in the previous section, was conducted in a number of cases with 
the intention to inﬂuence level of output and income, the impact of monetary policy on economic situation was only a by-product of 
measures undertaken to ensure currency and price stability.
As early as the second half of the 1990s, benchmark interest rates of central bank became the most commonly used monetary policy 
tool in all NMS8. It should be emphasised at this point that due to low, compared with the EU15, development and depth of ﬁnancial 
markets in Eastern and Central Europe, the transmission mechanism of from benchmark to market interest rates could have been 
limited. This means that the monetary authorities in NMS8 could have been forced to take stronger measures than would be suf-
ﬁcient in EU 15 economies, for example, relatively higher increase in interest rates needed for lowering inﬂation to a certain level or 
at accommodating pressures currency depreciation (see Ganev et al. (2002). On the same grounds, the monetary authorities in the 
CEE countries regarded eﬃcient exchange rate management as a prerequisite for curbing inﬂation, which was reﬂected at that time 
in the adoption of diﬀerent forms of managed exchange rates. However, only Estonia and Lithuania decided to completely relinquish 
autonomous monetary policies and to introduce currency boards, whereas Slovenia was the only CEE country with ﬂoating, though 
managed, exchange rate (see Box I.7). Moreover, the transmission of changes of benchmark interest rate to market rates and inﬂuence 
on volume of credit was subject to considerable uncertainty, but was probably smaller than in the EU15, because of shallow CEE ﬁnan-
cial markets.. The above factors indicate, that monetary policy in transition economies was not conducted with objective to inﬂuence 
aggregate demand.
Monetary decisions were being made during subsequent economic up- and downturns, which implied diﬀerent priorities in monetary 
policy. Initially, the context was dictated by the dynamic inﬂow of foreign capital and by the symptoms of overheating of the rapidly 
growing NMS8 economies. In mid-1998, in turn, an opposite problem came to light, namely a slowdown caused by the Czech and 
Russian crises, which were followed by a reduction in capital transfers from abroad and the a threat of a large-scale capital outﬂow from 
Central and Eastern Europe.
Thus, disinﬂation occurred with various intensity, depending on the pace and scope of price deregulation. However, as early as mid-
1990s, the rate of inﬂation in the NMS8 decreased to moderate levels. Higher price dynamics during that period distinguished Poland 
and Hungary from the other NMS8, however, it was curbed in the above two countries in 1997-1998, so at the end of the decade the 
NMS8 constituted a homogeneous group in terms of their inﬂation rates (see Chart I.31). The process of stabilising prices allowed 
gradual lowering of nominal interest rates, although, due to the substantial risk premium expected by ﬁnancial markets from transition 
economies, signiﬁcant diﬀerence persisted between real interest rates in the NMS8 and the EU15. The above situation gave rise to a 
threat of excessive – from the point of view of monetary authorities obliged to accommodate pressures on nominal exchange rates 
– inﬂow of short-term capital, prompted possibly soon interest rates’ reduction in order to avoid pressures towards a nominal apprecia-
tion of currencies.
 
Chart I.31. 
Inﬂation rates in the NMS8 in the period 1997-2000
   
Remarks: Inﬂation rates on HCPI basis in accordance with the Eurostat methodology.
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data..
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It should be borne in mind that during economic upturn, low interest rates could have led to a decrease in savings and increase in lend-
ing, and consequently to inﬂationary pressures, which indeed took place in 1996-1997. The development of the banking sector was 
also important as it blurred the relationship between narrow money aggregates and wide measures of its supply. Increasing demand 
for money, which accompanied the rapid economic growth of 1996-1998, , absorbed the increase in money supply, so the falling inﬂa-
tion trend was not reversed until the end of 1997 (see Chart I.31). Thus, the impact of monetary policies of that time on real economy 
should be assessed as minor – on the one hand, there was a certain restrictiveness prompted by disinﬂation, and on the other hand, 
there was a gradual decline in nominal and real interest rates – enabled exactly by the decreasing price dynamics, which reinforced by 
expanding secondary creation of money contributed to greater money supply in the NMS8. Therefore, the impact of monetary policies 
on output, and even more so on the labour markets, was probably negligible.
However, during the boom of 1996-1998, the declining savings of the private sector as well as the persisting public ﬁnance deﬁcit in 
several countries (see Chart I.17) led to a deterioration of current account balances (see Table I.8). This gave rise to a threat of an abrupt 
reversal of capital ﬂows and of a drastic slump in nominal exchange rates. Poorly developed transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy impulses and high vulnerability to disturbances on global currency markets enhanced such risks. The currency crisis in the Czech 
Republic turned out to be such an impulse. It brought about a considerable weakening of the Czech crown as well as abandoning of 
ﬁxed exchange rate regime which was replaced by managed ﬂoating exchange rate. The crisis was accompanied by speculative attacks 
on other currencies in the region (e.g. the Slovak crown), which contributed to tightening these countries’ monetary policies. In 1997 
interest rates were increased, obviously to greatest extent in the Czech Republic, where the authorities counteracted the intensiﬁcation 
of capital outﬂows and further depreciation. The Slovak monetary policy was tightened in a similar way. However, other countries in the 
region did not pursue restrictive monetary policies, which focused on exchange rate developments and was simply cautious.41 It can 
be assumed that such policy helped to prevent the turbulence, related to capital outﬂows triggered by the Czech crisis, from spreading 
over the region and thus enabling other CEE economies to grow at a rapid rate alongside increasing employment. 
Chart I.32. 
Expected short-term ex ante real interest rates in the NMS8 in the period 1997-2000
   
Remarks: Adaptive expectations have been assumed – the rate of price changes expected over the forthcoming 12 months is equal to the average 12 
month inﬂation recorded in the last two quarters preceding the moment of prediction.
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data
The situation of Slovenia was rather unique in the above context. As early as 1996, the inﬂation rate fell below 10 per cent, and inter-
est rates were declining in the successive years simultaneously to the declining inﬂation expectations (Mrak, Stanovnik, Stiblar, 2004), 
which allows to recognize the Slovenian monetary policy as consistently neutral until the year 1999. The conduct of this policy was 
facilitated by the limitation of capital ﬂows which, on the one hand, reduced Slovakia’s vulnerability to potential consequences of ex-
ternal ﬁnancial crises, and on the other hand, allowed for diﬀerences in interest rates vis-à-vis the EU15 without provoking exchange 
rate oscillations. Slovenia embarked on this strategy, untypical in comparison with the rest of Europe, because the economy directed 
towards exports and ﬁscal policy of balanced budget, supported balanced current account and moreover, , Slovenia was less depend-
ent on foreign investment than the other NMS8.
The environment in which monetary policies were conducted changed in 1998. Following the Czech, Asian and Russian crises, the 
vulnerability of the NMS8 ﬁnancial markets increased as well as the expected risk premium, which provoked a temporary outﬂow of 
foreign capital thus meriting a tightening of monetary policy. However, at the same time, global demand shrunk alongside increasing 
supply of tradable goods, which translated into a decrease in tradables’ prices. As a result, in 1998, inﬂation, GDP growth and aggregate 
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41 In case of Estonia and Latvia, expected real interest rates had in fact been negative until 1998. However, due to the currency board regime, they had been exogenous from the point of 
view of national economies.
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demand in NMS8 countries turned out lower than expected, thus prompting a loosening of monetary policy. World-wide decrease in 
interest rates was another factor in favour of such decision. Moreover, the Russian crisis aﬀected monetary stance in a slightly diﬀerent 
way than the earlier Czech crisis. Firstly, the band of exchange rate ﬂuctuations was commonly widened, whereas the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia had already adopted the ﬂoating exchange rate regime, and therefore they were less vulnerable to speculative attacks. 
Secondly, monetary policy in Poland was used to send a message to the global markets, via cuts in interest rates, that Polish economy 
is resistant to the threat of a currency crisis. The loosening of monetary policy from the second half of 1998 was most visible in the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland.
In the Czech Republic and in Slovakia this tendency to monetary easing was an attempt to reverse the “excessive” tightening adopted 
immediately after the Czech crisis. Particularly in the Czech Republic the monetary response contributed to an abrupt decline in price 
dynamics, alongside a persisting slump in GDP growth. Considerable softening of monetary policy maintained until 2000 followed, 
and the real market interest rates in Slovakia actually turned negative. Nevertheless, even such substantial measures did not led to the 
expansion of broader money aggregates –surprisingly weak secondary money creation in Slovakia at that time make it being regarded 
as an example of a country where the elasticity of volume of credit with respect to changes in central bank instruments was very low 
and where the standard mechanism of monetary impulse transmission did not work. Bearing in mind the negative external price shock 
of 1998, it should be acknowledged that indeed Poland’s monetary policy was softened, however, real interest rates decreased to
a lesser degree than in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. A similar evolution of monetary policy was observed in Hungary. In case of Bal-
tic states, the relinquishment of autonomous monetary policy led to the situation where, after the Russian crisis, interest rates soared, 
whereas the price dynamics slowed down – therefore, the monetary conditions “toughened” somewhat automatically.
At the end of the year 1999, a certain divergence in the degree of restrictiveness of monetary policy in Poland and in other countries 
in the region emerged.42 An abrupt acceleration of price dynamics warranted an increase in interest rates (actual inﬂation exceeded 
the target of National Bank of Poland – NBP – which did not happen in other countries, namely in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary, implementing at that time the direct inﬂation target strategy), which was perceived as caused by a decrease in central bank’s 
interest rates introduced in the preceding year. The direct inﬂation target strategy required that the monetary authorities inﬂuence 
appropriately inﬂation expectations of economic agents so that their forecasts would be more forward looking and based on the 
declarations of monetary authorities rather than on past experience.43 However, due to the fact that inﬂation expectations were at that 
time formed adaptively (see Łyziak (2003)), a higher price dynamics, accompanied by a large increase in nominal wages, paved the 
way for the central bank to tighten the policy. The shift to the ﬂoating exchange rate regime was also important as under this regime 
an increase in interest rates could have been a prevention measure against considerable depreciation of the nominal exchange rate 
in the aftermath of ﬂoating.
The tightening of monetary policy led to an increase in both nominal and real interest rates, however the latter remained at the level 
comparable to that of 1998 until the end of 2000 (see Chart I.32). Furthermore, output growth and the share of investment in GDP 
remained practically constant throughout the period 1998-2000 (see Chart I.18 and Table I.7). In the other countries of the region 
monetary policies were consistently neutral because, as opposed to the National Bank of Poland, their central banks shared the view 
that the a external shock aﬀecting all countries was a key determinant behind higher price dynamics. Consequently, in comparison 
with the other countries in the region, Poland was at that time characterised by a relatively more restrictive monetary policy, although 
to the extent comparable to that from two years before. Except for Poland, only Slovakia experienced a monetary tightening in 2000, 
after a two-year-long softening trend.
In the period 1996-2000, the NMS8 central banks successfully achieved gradual disinﬂation, in the meantime modifying strategies con-
cerning exchange rate, where a polarisation became apparent. Untypical, transitory mechanisms were country-by-country replaced 
with either a ﬁxed exchange rate regime/currency board, or a ﬂoating exchange rate (see Box I.7). The interaction of complex chal-
lenges emerging for the monetary authorities because of attempts to simultaneously manage exchange rates and inﬂation, subjected 
to considerable vulnerability of the CEE countries to external factors,44 and the outbreak of the Czech and Russian crises, suggest that 
any assessment of monetary policies should be made above all from the perspective of the achievement of their fundamental targets 
in the context of the above-mentioned obstacles.
This instability of the environment and broad range of the policy instruments applied prevents also generalisations about the pro- or 
anticyclical conduct of monetary policy. The Czech Republic is a good example here, with monetary policy which seemed to be pro-
cyclical in 1997 and anticyclical in the following two years. It appears, however, that two episodes of restrictive policy can be distin-
guished – the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1997 and Poland and Slovenia in 1999-2000 – as well as one episode of expansive policy 
– in the Czech Republic in 1998-2000. Nevertheless, it can be reasonably assumed that these impulses did not caused the economic 
42 Interest rates were also increased in Slovenia, where the symptoms of overheating of the economy became visible, and the central bank reacted to the increase in prices reﬂecting the 
anticipated introduction of VAT. Moreover, at that time Slovenia abolished restrictions on capital ﬂows, which resulted in the necessity to adjust the spread in interest rates vis-à-vis the EU15 
in line with the expected risk premium, i.e. to increase the interest rates. However, the change in the expected real interest rates was minor (see Chart I.32), indicates rather a change  in 
monetary stance than its contracting impact on the economy.
43 In fact, as indicated by Levin, Natalucci, Piger (2004)), in euro zone countries implementing a strategy of direct inﬂation target, inﬂation expectations exhibit a much lower correlation with 
past inﬂation levels than in the countries where diﬀerent monetary policy models are pursued. In the latter, these expectations are far more adaptive.
44 For instance, according to Maćkowiak (2005), from 20 to 50 per cent of short-term variability of the price level in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary in the period 1992-2004 should 
be attributed to external shocks. In the long term, this value, according to that estimations, is even greater and amounts to approximately 60-85 per cent.
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ﬂuctuations of that period and that they did not have a signiﬁcant impact on the real economy, possibly with the exception of the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1997, when the monetary tightening reinforced the direct consequences of the currency crisis. Due to 
a relatively long time required for the results of a monetary impulse in the real economy to emerge (it is generally accepted that they 
appear after at least 4 quarters) and poorly developed transmission mechanisms , monetary policy was of little importance as determi-
nant of output level, and even more so in inﬂuencing the situation in the labour market.
Box I.7. Exchange rate and monetary regimes in the NMS8 in the period 1996-2005
At the beginning of transition, following two monetary regimes were adopted in the CEE countries: currency board (in Estonia and 
Lithuania) or fixed exchange rate to one currency (USD – in Latvia, or DEM – in the Czech Republic) or a basket of currencies (all 
other countries). The above choice was determined by low level of currency reserves, necessity to curb high inflation and the need to 
establish a sound macroeconomic policy. However, with time, maintaining fixed exchange rates became too costly and too difficult 
for these economies, which was particularly apparent in the second half of the 1990s. Speculative attacks on the Czech and Slovak 
currencies and the later spill-over of the Russian crisis were grounds for CEE countries to abandon the fixed exchange rate regime. 
Most commonly the transition from fixed to floating exchange rate was preceded by the widening of fluctuation band around the 
central parity or the adoption of crawling peg
Chart I.33. 
Evolution of exchange rate and monetary regimes in the NMS8
   
Explanatory note:
1 – currency board (1a) quasi-currency board (1b)
2 – ﬁxed rate (2a) or crawling peg (2b) with ﬂuctuation margins of up to 2.25 per cent around the central parity
3 – managed ﬂoating rate
4 – ﬁxe rate (4a) or crawling peg (4b) with ﬂuctuation margins of more than 2.25 per cent around the central parity
5 – ﬂoating rate with intervention
6 – ﬂoating rate
            Source: Own elaboration
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2.3 Period after the year 2000
2.3.1 Output and external disturbances after the year 2000
The beginning of the current decade, i.e. the years 2001-2002, brought a slowdown in growth of world economy, which, from the 
perspective of the NMS8, translated above all into slump of external demand dynamics, which had constituted the main demand 
component of output growth in the two preceding years. Although this was a common process, its signiﬁcance was particularly visible 
in the countries closely integrated with the EU in external trade, such as Hungary, Slovenia and the Czech Republic, which were not 
severely aﬀected by the Russian crisis and which directed more than 80 per cent of all their exports to the European Economic Area. 
The EU economy downturn had an comparably visible impact on the Latvian, and even more so on Estonian economy, which at that 
time had the highest ratio of exports to output out of all NMS8 (see Box I.10). At the same time, the convergence among the NMS8 
countries intensiﬁed, due to the higher growth of the relatively poorer countries, namely the Baltic states and Slovakia, whereas Poland 
– which at that time ranked between the Baltic states and Slovakia in terms of per capita income – began to negatively distinguish 
itself from the NMS8 with its mediocre growth. However, although in Estonia and Latvia the acceleration in growth soon translated into 
higher employment ( employment rates in 2002 were higher by respectively 1.6 and 3.0 percentage points than in 2000) and lower 
unemployment (in parallel, by 2.5 and 1.5 percentage points), in Lithuania and Slovakia, the inertia in the labour market was greater. It 
can be surmised that in the initial period of recovery companies in these two countries beneﬁted above all from productivity growth 
reserves, making the labour demand increasing only slowly and leaving employment levels unchanged.45 Finally, more profound slow-
down in Poland than in other countries was accompanied by a progressing deterioration of the situation in the labour market, reﬂected 
in the decline of the employment rate by 3.5 percentage points and an increase in the unemployment rate by almost 4 percentage 
points in the period 2000-2002.
Chart I.34. 
GDP growth rate in the NMS8 in the period 2001–2005
   
Source: Own elaboration based on GGDC data.
It should be noted at this point that Poland, although trade-connected with the EU15 to similar extent like other countries in the 
region (in 2000, 81 per cent of Polish exports was directed to the EU15, whereas the NMS8 average amounted to 80 per cent), as an 
economy with a clearly larger domestic market, was less vulnerable to the negative consequences of the slowdown in the EU than 
smaller countries. Indeed, in 2000, exports accounted for only 27 per cent of Polish GDP, whereas the average share of exports in GDP 
of the other countries in the region amounted to 63 per cent. Notwithstanding the above, the economic downturn of the period 
2001-2002 was more pronounced in Poland (see Chart I.34) and out of all economies aﬀected by the crises of 1997-1999, only Poland 
failed to achieve even a temporary recovery after their immediate eﬀects disappeared. As for the other countries recovering from the 
earlier crises, i.e. the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Baltic states, the gradual pick up of growth rates was halted in 2000-2001. In the 
Czech Republic and Estonia, this meant a decrease in GDP dynamics, whereas in the rest of the above-mentioned economies – into a 
temporary stabilisation of the growth rate and its acceleration after the year 2003. This revival can be linked with a rebound of world 
economy – the output of the EU15 was growing in real terms throughout the period 2003-2005 by an annual average of 2.5 per cent, 
compared to 1.3 per cent in 2001-2002,46 whereas that of the United States of America by 5.3 per cent, compared with 1.4 per cent in 
the earlier period.
Similarly to the Russian crisis, the 2001-2002 slowdown spread, above all, through the international trade channel. The downturn of 
2001 caused a decline of exports in the absolute terms in the CEE countries, however, in some of them imports slumped so signiﬁcantly 
that net exports contributed positively to GDP growth. This concerned Poland, Hungary and Slovenia. In the face of lower external 
45 It should be noted that in Lithuania unemployment fell during the examined period, however, it did so at the cost of a decrease in participation and not because of a major increase in 
employment.
46 This relatively low growth rate in the EU15 was connected with the persisting economic slowdown in Germany, France and Italy.
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demand, in 2001-2002, GDP growth in the examined countries depended mostly on domestic absorption. Therefore, although the 
growth rates in these countries were generally lower than in 2000, the contribution of the two main domestic demand components, 
namely of consumption and investment, was larger. This phenomenon can be perceived as a result of the earlier increase in disposable 
incomes which could be explained in two ways: as a consequence of the improved labour market situation which could be observed 
– as the negative repercussions of the Russian crisis were gradually absorbed – above all in the Baltic states, whereas in countries such 
as the Czech Republic and Hungary, where the labour market situation did not improve much before 2002, this boost in consumption 
could be associated to some extent with rising public consumption (see Chart I.28).
On the other hand. Poland and Slovenia experienced an opposite phenomenon – the contribution of consumption and capital ac-
cumulation to output growth declined after the year 2000, and in Poland, the contribution of investment actually became evidently 
negative (see Chart I.35).47 Consequently, the labour demand declined further, unemployment rose and employment fell. The situation 
in the Czech Republic unfolded in a similar way – a decline in capital accumulation was accompanied by a growth slowdown (growth 
depended almost entirely on consumption dynamics) and stagnation on the labour market. Slovenia, where the overall decrease of 
the share of investment in output was at that time relatively smaller then in Poland (see Table I.12), the increasing, though only slightly, 
trends in participation and employment continued, and consumption remained at relatively high level.
Thus, it appears that diﬀerent evolution of the examined labour markets at that time, i.e. relatively fast absorption of consequences of 
the Russian crisis in the Baltic states, and stagnation in Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, was shaped not so much in diﬀerent 
dynamics of output growth but rather by contrasting intensity of capital accumulation which determined developments of labour 
productivity and labour demand. The above claim is supported by an observation that the factor distinguishing Slovakia from the Baltic 
states was the considerably smaller contribution of investment to growth in 2001-2002 (see Chart I.35). To some extent, Lithuania also 
performed poorer in the above respect only than Estonia and Latvia (see Table I.12). On the other hand, in the remaining countries 
signiﬁcantly lower dynamics of investment was accompanied by stagnation, or even deterioration in Poland, of the situation on the 
labour market.
Table I.10.
Share of exports in the GDP in the NMS8 in the period 2000-2005 (percentages)
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Source: Ministry of Economy 2006
Chart I.35. 
Contribution of ﬁnal demand components to GDP growth in the NMS8 in the years 2001 (left graph) and 2002 (right graph)
  
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data and Economic Survey of Europe.
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47 Consequently, the share of investment in Poland’s GDP, which increased from 16 to 25 per cent between 1993 and 1999, decreased by 4 percentage points in the 
following two years.
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Table I.11 
Share of exports directed to EU15, Germany and Russia from the NMS8 countries in the period 2000-2005 (percentage share in total 
exports)
European Union
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Including: Germany
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Russia
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Source: Own elaboration based on IMF data
External factors, such as changes of demand connected to business cycle of the world economy, aﬀected all countries in the CEE re-
gion in a undoubtedly similar manner, although the above-mentioned arguments indicate that, compared with smaller neighbouring 
countries, the Polish economy was less vulnerable to volatility of external demand. The reasons why in 2001-2002 Poland distinguished 
itself not only in terms of labour market developments (see Charts I.11 and I.12) but also in terms of macroeconomic performance 
should therefore be sought in external processes. One potential explanation could be the restrictive ﬁscal and monetary policy-mix 
which could compress consumption as well as aggregate investment. However, as argued in the subsequent part of this chapter, such 
an explanation is rather unlikely, above all, due to the opposite conduct of these policies in 2001, and length of period necessary for the 
investment to react to a transitory increase of real interest rates. Bukowski et al. (2005) put forward a hypothesis that primary reasons for 
this slowdown should be sought, above all, in the negative technological shock which led to a temporary decrease in capital produc-
tivity, which, in turn, resulted in investment breakdown (see Table I.12), growth slowdown as well as further employment contractions, 
and consequently also to a slump in consumption.
The above conjecture is supported by an analysis of total factor productivity (TFP). In 2001, only in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slov-
enia the TFP dynamics declined below its medium-term average trend, and only the above countries experienced a visible economic 
growth slowdown (see Chart I.36). Moreover, only in Poland the above resulted in a further decline in investment and labour demand 
as well as in an increase in unemployment. Hence, the economic breakdown in Poland was deeper than in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. It is worth noting that a considerable decrease in the TFP dynamics that occurred in Poland in 2001, apart from a similar one 
in Czech economy four years earlier and Latvian in 1999, was the only instance of TFP dynamics slump not accompanied by a decrease 
in labour productivity on a comparable scale. It was so because the capital productivity was declining at similar pace and its nega-
tive dynamics had been observed even two years earlier (see Chart I.37). Therefore, it seems that the main reason for the investment 
slowdown was the gradually decreasing proﬁtability of the actual investment rather than the unfavourable policy-mix (more on this in 
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the section on monetary policy). Furthermore, the shrinking, from 1998 on, capital productivity indicates that the scope of necessary 
restructuring of Polish companies was at that time greater than in Slovenia, and therefore the structure of employment and output 
required more extensive improvement. Thus, the Russian crisis initiated the second wave of restructuring, the eﬀects of which became 
visible at the aggregate level only in 2003, when GDP and returns on capital started to rise evidently.
Chart I.36 
Labour productivity and total factor productivity (TFP) dynamics in the NMS8 in the period 1994-2006
   
   
   
   
Remarks: The dotted line represents the TFP growth trend. Alpha stands for the share of capital in output.
Source: Own elaboration based on GGDC data. Data for 2006 are preliminary.
Total factor productivity growth  Labour productivity growth* (1-      )
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Chart I.37. 
Capital productivity dynamics in the NMS8 in the period 1994-2006
   
Source: Own elaboration based on GGDC data. Data for2006 are preliminary.
The year 2003, ﬁrst of Polish economy recovery, triggered on the demand side by a dynamic increase in exports, brought greater than 
ever diﬀerences in growth rates among NMS8 – on the one hand, countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Latvia and particularly 
Lithuania experienced a considerable acceleration, but on the other hand, in the remaining countries, growth rates were comparable 
to those in 2001-2002 or even slightly lower. This slowdown was, however, only relative and temporary because, for instance, Estonia’s 
growth in 2003, though lower than in 2002 by 1 percentage point, was still very high and amounted to 7 per cent. In Slovenia and 
Hungary, the decline growth rate to approximately 3 percentage points was negligible. Hence, the impact on the labour markets was 
very small – only in Slovenia employment declined slightly and temporarily, alongside a modest increase in unemployment (see Charts 
I.11 and I.12). In the Baltic states, the rising employment and decreasing unemployment were maintained, whereas in Slovakia and 
Hungary, the year 2003 brought – for the ﬁrst time since 2000 – an increase in employment rates (by 1 percentage point).
Table I.12. 
Total and foreign direct investment in the NMS8 in the period 2000-2005 (percentage share in GDP)
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 2005
Total investment
Czech Republic 28.0  28.0  27.5  26.7  26.2 24.9
Estonia  26.0  26.7  29.8  29.3  31.5 31.1
Lithuania  18.8  20.1  20.3  21.2  22.3 22.4
Latvia  24.2  24.9  23.8  24.4  27.5 29.8
Poland  23.7  20.7  18.7  18.3  18.1 18.2
Slovakia  25.7  28.5  27.3  25.0  24.1 26.8
Slovenia  25.6  24.1  22.6  23.3  24.5 24.4
Hungary  22.9  22.9  22.9  21.9  22.4 22.7
Foreign direct investment
Czech Republic 8.9  9.1  11.3  2.3  4.6 8.9
Estonia  7.0  8.7  4.0  9.7  8.3 21.2
Lithuania  3.3  3.7  5.1  1.0  3.4 4.0
Latvia  5.3  1.6  2.7  2.7  4.6 4.6
Poland  5.5  3.0  2.1  2.2  4.9 3.1
Slovakia  10.5  7.0  15.5  2.2  2.0 4.4
Slovenia  na  1.4  4.0  3.8  2.1 1.7
Hungary  3.4  7.4  4.5  2.5  4.4 6.3
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data.
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Fast-growing productivity in the Baltic states and optimistic expectations of their development prospects, particularly after the suc-
cessfully completed negotiations on EU accession, resulted in the investment potential of these countries exceeding their capabil-
ity to ﬁnance investment entirely with domestic savings, especially in view of considerable consumption aspirations of households. 
Considering the decreasing governmental borrowing needs, foreign capital inﬂows ﬁnanced foreign direct investment which allowed 
these economies to maintain the total investment rates at a high level. At the same time, however, the price that the Baltic states had 
to pay for rapid growth of investment, output per capita and consumption were the international imbalances in the form of consider-
able deﬁcits on their current account balances. In Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, current account deﬁcits were climbing steadily until 
they exceeded substantially their counterparts in the other countries in the region (see Table I.13). This phenomenon, symptomatic 
for fast-growing small open economies, had the speciﬁc feature in case of the Baltic states – although at the beginning of this decade, 
FDI constituted the main source of external ﬁnancing, in the later period (as from 2003-2004) this role was taken over by foreign loans 
drawn by the domestic banking sector. This was due to the fact that a substantial part of foreign investment was invested in the ﬁnan-
cial brokerage and that the expansion of investment and consumption credit in the Baltic states was covered by loans raised by banks 
from parent companies.ie. from foreign banks.48 Although this mechanism resulted in a negative net exports contribution to growth 
(see Chart I.38 and I.39), it also led to a situation where high deﬁcits on the current account balance were to a lesser degree than usually 
in such cases a consequence of foreign trade imbalances. Moreover, even in the face of negative net exports contribution to growth in 
the Baltic states, it should be acknowledged that their development was largely based on international trade – in the period 2000-2005, 
the cumulated growth in exports (expressed in euro) was highest in Lithuania out of all NMS8, and in Estonia and Latvia it was close to 
the average for the NMS8. Moreover, apart from Latvia, the Baltic states saw a clear shift in exports structure in favour of technologically 
advanced goods. The above factors allowed for a rapid growth in output, consumption and capital accumulation, which entailed high 
imports dynamics. The latter is an explanation for the negative contribution of foreign trade to growth in particular years, alongside 
increasing competitiveness of these economies..
Table I.13.
Current account balance (percentage share in GDP) of the NMS8 in the period 2000-2005.
 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
 
Source: Ministry of Economy 2006
In the remaining countries, in the face of moderate dynamics in domestic consumption component of demand, diverse evolutions 
of economic situation were governed by diﬀerent net exports performance. In 2003, global economic recovery was only started in 
the United States, whereas in the EU member states the output and internal demand dynamics were relatively low. Thus, the crucial 
role played by net exports for growth in Poland and Slovakia (see Chart I.39) resulted from the increased share of these economies in 
volume of global trade, thanks to gaining comparative advantage in the European markets. This applies especially to Slovakia, where 
high net exports dynamics was accompanied by real exchange rate appreciation.49 In case of Poland, the producers’ search for new 
foreign markets, triggered by idiosyncratic slowdown of 2001-2002 and meagre domestic demand, was facilitated by nominal and 
real depreciation. Economic growth reliant almost entirely on exports allowed to barely halt the negative developments in the labour 
market, which in both countries were reversed only later on.
Strengthening integration with the global markets as well as increasing international competitiveness were of fundamental impor-
tance for the CEE countries in the period 2001-2005. The tendencies towards real exchange rate appreciation, which in the 1990s oc-
curred independently from the evolution of nominal exchange rates (at that time, usually managed by the monetary authorities) as a 
result of rapid convergence of labour productivity to the EU15 levels, advanced after the year 2000. The only exceptions were the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Latvia in 2002-2004, although in their case temporary real depreciation resulted from nominal depreciation, 
reinforced by the fact that disinﬂation reduced price dynamics in these countries to levels similar to observed in EU15 economies (see 
Chart I.43). Alongside gradual real appreciation, the NMS8 (except for Slovenia and Latvia) commonly increased their shares in global 
international trade. Between 2000 and 2005, Poland and Slovakia achieved highest relative growth of their share in global international 
trade, which increased by half. However, it was of similar importance that exports structure shifted towards highly processed goods, 
more capital intensive and technologically advanced. According to Fabrizio, Igan and Mody (2006), Hungary, the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia were the countries with the highest share of high technology goods in total exports, whereas the Baltic states, excluding 
Estonia, were mainly exporting goods of a low degree of processing and high labour intensity.50 
Czech Republic
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Estonia
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Latvia
-4.7
-7.5
-6.7
-8.1
-12.9
-12.6
Poland
-5.8
-2.8
-2.5
-2.1
-4.1
-1.6
Slovakia
-3.4
-7.4
-8.4
-0.9
-3.4
-4.9
Slovenia
-2.8
0.2
1.5
-0.3
-2.1
-0.8
Hungary
-8.5
-6.1
-7.0
-8.7
-8.6
-7.3
48 Based on country proﬁles of the Baltic states prepared by the IMF.
49 Real appreciation in Slovakia was driven by the productivity growth resulting from the intensiﬁcation of FDI inﬂows which contributed to nominal appreciation. The FDI ﬂows in Slovakia 
were on the rise throughout this period irrespective of a global decrease in FDI ﬂows (OECD, 2004sk). At this point, it should be noted, however, that the FDI evolution in Slovakia was closely 
related to the privatisation processes. In particular, the less intense privatisation explains the decline in FDI in 2002.
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However, after 2000, the largest shifts in the above respect occurred in Poland, Estonia and Slovakia, which indicates that the economic 
slowdown of 2001-2002 gave rise not only to the necessity to increase the competitiveness and ﬁnd new markets and for already 
produced goods, but also played a role of reallocation shock, leading to considerable change of output structures in the above econo-
mies. In Estonia, the resulting temporary mismatch of demand and supply in the labour market could be assimilated faster thanks to 
high investment rate (including foreign investment), a factor that was absent in Poland and Slovakia. As presented in Charts I.36 and 
I.37, investment slowdown was followed the temporary decrease in the return on invested capital, which was visible since the ﬁrst 
adverse shock that aﬀected the CEE countries in 1998 and became visibly more intense from 2000 on. The observation that the Polish 
economy rebounded from recession thanks to a dynamic increase in exports, which evidently diﬀered in terms of directions of ﬂows 
and the goods structure from the situation preceding the shock, constitutes an argument in favour of the claim that indeed the so-
called reallocation shock (see Davis, Haltiwanger, 1996) occurred in Poland. Surely in other countries in the region such impulse could 
have emerged, however, they were much l smaller economies which should have facilitated the absorption of this type of disturbance. 
In particular, in countries with relatively small population, such as Estonia, a change in production structure as well as a resulting shift 
in labour supply could have emerged easier and faster to eﬀect than in nearly three-times larger Slovakia and incomparably faster than 
in Poland. The above factor played an signiﬁcant role in much more prolonged absorption of the adverse labour market consequences 
of the economic slowdown of 2000-2002 in Poland and Slovakia, than in the small Baltic states.
Market expectations of maintaining relatively high and stable economic growth in the region contributed the appreciation of nominal 
exchange rates. However, the relative dynamics of real exchange rates and labour productivity evolved in a diﬀerent manner than in 
the period 1996-1999. Productivity was growing at a faster pace than the real exchange rates appreciated Ein the Baltic states, Poland 
and Slovenia.51 In Hungary, these changes were almost identical throughout the period 2000-2006, whereas in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, real appreciation exceeded the labour productivity growth. Moreover, after 2000, labour productivity was generally grow-
ing faster than average wages, especially so in the Baltic states and in Poland. Slovakia and the Czech Republic were exceptions in 
the above respect. In Slovakia, the dynamics of the two variables were similar, and in the Czech Republic, the increase in real wages 
exceeded the productivity growth, which could be a manifestation of certain rigidity of real wages, thus contributing to employment 
stagnation in the period 2000-2004 (see Chart I.21).
Chart I.38. 
Eﬀective real (left graph) and nominal (right graph) exchange rates of the NMS8 in the period 2000–2006 (1Apr2000=100)
   
 
  
Remarks: CPI deﬂated real exchange rate. Eﬀective exchange rate is a weighted mean of exchange rates relative to 34 major trading partners of every 
country. Exchange rates have been calculated in accordance with the European method, meaning that index increases represent depreciation, 
whereas index decreases – appreciation.
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data
50 The main category of exports in Latvia are timber and cork.
51 The largest diﬀerence in the dynamics of these two variables occurred in Latvia, where, at the beginning of 2006, because transitory real depreciation, real exchange rate was basically 
identical to that from 2001, whereas labour productivity grew during this period by 36 per cent.
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Negative correlation (of about -2/3) between dynamics of real wage relatively to labour productivity and the dynamics of real ex-
change rate relatively to productivity emerged in the period 2000-2006 among NMS8 countries, which means that the greater degree 
of spillover of the productivity increases to real wages growth was accompanied by higher relative appreciation in relation to increas-
ing productivity. This trade-oﬀ indicates that the changes in relative prices of non-tradable goods constituted primary channel of real 
appreciation in the NMS8. In other words, the productivity gains in the tradables sector resulted in real wage increases across the econ-
omy, and consequently led to rising prices of non-tradable goods, i.e. real appreciation. Generally, it can be concluded that, throughout 
the examined period, international competitiveness of the CEE economies as well as their investment attractiveness, measured by the 
ratio of wage, productivity and real exchange dynamics, were on the rise. The rising international competitiveness of the countries in 
the region is conﬁrmed by the fact that their share in the global volume of trade grew largely due to changes in the structure of exports 
in favour of technologically more advanced goods, as well as due to the considerable decline in relative, adjusted for quality, prices of 
exports (Fabrizio, Igan and Mody (2006)).
At the turn of 2003-2004, the acceleration in economic growth became widespread in the region. Moreover, even though in 2003 
only the Baltic states and Slovenia were characterised by a substantially positive contribution of investment to GDP growth,52 in the 
following years it became a common characteristic of all NMS8 economies. The improvement in the economic situation was partly 
due to boost in external demand. Slovakia should at that time be considered as a country where growth depended on exports to the 
greatest extent among NMS8 – in fact, the volume of Slovak exports in real terms exhibited the highest dynamics and its share in GDP 
had been on the rise since 2003 (see Table I.10). After 2004, the Czech Republic followed a similar path and its net exports became the 
main component of growth, which in 2005 reached the highest rate in ten years (see Chart I.18). 
Chart I.39.
 Contribution of ﬁnal demand components to GDP growth in the NMS8 in the years 2003 (left graph) and 2004 (right graph)   
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data and Economic Survey of Europe.
In 2005, the rising GDP dynamics was sustained in the Baltic states, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, whereas in Poland, Slovenia and 
Hungary, growth rates were lower than the year before. The nature of this slowdown is well-illustrated by the case of Poland, where the 
decline in GDP dynamics by 2 percentage points compared with the previous year was nearly entirely due to an parallel decrease in 
private consumption dynamics, which accelerated in the year of EU accession, alongside stable growth of investment and public con-
sumption. It can be assumed that the slightly lower growth rate in 2005 was above all a “technical” slowdown below the business cycle 
evolution driven by real economy factors, and this slowdown resulted from moving some of planned consumption and investment ex-
penditures to 2004. Nevertheless, despite this temporary adjustment, the consolidation of growth translated into a clear improvement 
in the labour market situation across the region. In the Baltic states and Slovakia, employment and the employment rate increased 
further. Slovenia was characterised by an increase in both participation and employment rates as well as a decrease in unemployment 
already in 2004. However, the intensiﬁcation of positive developments in the Polish labour market and the ﬁrst case – since 2002 – of 
employment growth in Czech Republic are above all worth attention. This clear-cut picture of cyclical recovery in the labour markets is 
only distorted by stagnating employment and the increase in the unemployment rate in Hungary, where however, at the same time, 
participation grew although probably due to institutional rather than macroeconomic factors.
In this context, it is worth mentioning that economic growth rate in the Baltic states – much higher than in the remaining countries 
in the region – was consistently based on external (consumption and investment) demand, alongside growing deﬁcit on the current 
account (see Table I.13), ﬁnanced by large direct investment inﬂows. This applies especially to Estonia, which was characterised by the 
highest share of FDI in GDP and by the highest gross capital accumulation rate among all the NMS8 (see Table I.12). Comparably to 
52 It is worth noting that, apart from Estonia, these countries experienced from 2001 on an increasing share of public investment in GDP, irrespective of a decreasing share of total public 
expenditure in GDP (see Charts I.25 and I.30), and thus contributing to the accumulation of total capital stock.
Consumption         Investment          Net exports           Increase in stocks
C z e c h
R e p u b l i c
E s t o n i a    L i t h u a n i a     L a t v i a     P o l a n d    S l o v a k i a   S l o v e n i a    H u n g a r y  C z e c h
R e p u b l i c
E s t o n i a    L i t h u a n i a     L a t v i a     P o l a n d    S l o v a k i a   S l o v e n i a    H u n g a r y  
59
Employment in Poland 2006                       Labour market in macro perspective
   I. 
Slovakia, a considerable fraction of exports of the Baltic states compounded of movements of goods within integrated cooperation 
chains of foreign companies investing the these countries. From the macroeconomic point of view, such phenomenon lowered the 
foreign debt of these countries and alleviated the pressures on exchange rate depreciation, in comparison to the economy where such 
considerable current account deﬁcits would result from an excess of imports over exports, as it was actually the case in the second half 
of the 1990s. The possibility of ﬁnancing domestic credit with seemingly foreign loans, which in fact constituted transfers within the 
same ﬁnancial institutions, played equally important role in the Baltic states.
In other words, the Baltic states, thanks to their capability to attract substantial foreign investment and their clearly pro-export, or 
even re-export,53 industry orientation54 were able to – shortly after the Russian crisis – achieve high growth levels, which translated 
also into rapid improvement in their labour markets, increase in wages and in private consumption, and at the same time enabled 
this economies to avoid the negative consequences of the current account imbalances. These countries also pursued the best mix of 
macroeconomic policies – ﬁscal and monetary – out of all CEE countries.
2.3.2 Fiscal policy after the year 2000
After the year 2000, the contrast between the ﬁscal policy implemented in three groups of countries – the Czech Republic and Hun-
gary constituting the ﬁrst, Poland and Slovenia the second, and the Baltic states and Slovakia belonging to the third group – earlier 
merely detectable, was becoming more intense. The ﬁrst group of countries was characterised by a clearly higher, stable or even in-
creasing scope of income redistribution eﬀected via public ﬁnance sector, alongside the higher average budgetary deﬁcit. The second 
group conducted an unstable ﬁscal policy with episodes of rising and shrinking deﬁcit, and exhibited generally stable and rather high 
share of public expenditures and revenues in GDP. However, the Baltic states and Slovakia had been pursuing from the beginning of 
the current decade a decrease in scope of government, measured by the share of public ﬁnance sector in GDP. Another fundamental 
diﬀerence was that in the ﬁrst and second groups of countries, the ﬁscal consolidations were achieved by increasing revenues, which 
means increased taxation, whereas the third group was generally implemented simultaneous reductions in public revenues and ex-
penditures, leading consistently to gradual reduction of deﬁcits in the medium term (see Charts I.25-I.27). Due to the fact that in the 
ﬁrst and second group ﬁscal policy played more active role, we describe it more extensively and pinpoint important diﬀerences above 
all between the four large-size countries.
The loosening of ﬁscal policy in the ﬁrst group, which occurred towards the end of the 1990s, was at the beginning rather cautious 
and of cyclical character. However, it transformed into a lasting increase of public expenditures and of structural component of deﬁcit. 
This was particularly visible in Hungary and the Czech Republic, where, as from the year 2001, expansive ﬁscal policy encompassing all 
major categories of expenditures can be detected. Both public consumption and investment were on the rise, as well as expenditures 
on wages in the public sector and social transfers spending. In both countries, the expenditure dynamics exceeded the scale that could 
be attributed to the functioning of automatic stabilisers, thus creating a positive demand-side impulse. The above is further evidenced 
by the fact that the increase in expenditures preceded the slowdown in global economy of 2001, and was intensiﬁed in both countries 
at the time of elections in 2002. In other words, ﬁscal policy conduct of these countries were not typically anticyclical but discretionally 
expansive and unconnected to the current economic situation.
The loosening of the budgetary discipline, which followed until 2005 and was disrupted by a one-oﬀ improvement in the public 
ﬁnance balance in 2004, was associated in both countries with considerably higher levels of total and primary deﬁcit than in the re-
maining countries in the region (see Charts I.24 and I.27). However, in the Czech Republic this meant an intensiﬁcation of tendencies 
initiated at the end of the last decade and revealed the structural nature of deﬁcit, the rapid deterioration of Hungarian public ﬁnance 
balance that began in 2002, when both total and primary deﬁcit rose by 4 percentage points of GDP, allows the judgement that, in 
the period 2000-2006, Hungary conducted the most expansive ﬁscal policy among all NMS8. The initial spending impulse of 2002 was 
based on increasing public consumption and investment, but in the next years it was followed by a rapid increase in social transfers, ir-
respective of the fact that Hungary’s output dynamics was relatively advantageous (see Chart I.34). The expansion of expenditures was 
accompanied by a decrease in revenues, thus leading to mounting public debt which amounted to 57.7 per cent of GDP in 2005.
It is worth emphasising that the Czech Republic, which built its ﬁscal expansion primarily on the increase in consumption and public 
investment and only to a small extent on a temporary increment in transfers, contrarily to Hungary, did not suﬀer the consequences of 
expansion in the form of lower labour supply. The above happened irrespective of the fact that the Czech GDP in 2002 (i.e. in the ﬁrst 
year of ﬁscal expansion) was below the medium-term trend and reached only 1.5 per cent, whereas in Hungary, it did not deviate con-
siderably from the average for the entire examined period and amounted to almost 4 per cent. This remark is in line with the hypothesis 
stating that the structure of ﬁscal impulses inﬂuences their impact on the economy and the labour market, and that the impulse based 
on increasing transfers results in decreasing labour supply and employment, whereas impulse made up of higher public investment 
and consumption – if ﬁnanced by rising deﬁcit or taxes –are rather neutral for equilibrium level of output (see Bukowski et al., 2006). 
53 It seems particularly probable in the case of Lithuania, where out of the main ten categories of exported goods, diﬀerence of share in total exports and imports greater than 2 percentage 
points is only observable in textiles (mainly exported), machines and electronic equipment (mainly imported). For instance, cars and other vehicles – which are the second largest category 
in terms of share in Lithuania’s exports, constitute a virtually identical share of exports and imports of this country.
54 The share of Estonia in global exports in 2004 amounted to 2.5 per cent and was higher than that of Poland (1.3 per cent) and equal to that of Lithuania (UN Comtrade data).
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In Poland, due to a smaller share of public consumption and investment in GDP, and above all due to their lower dynamics,55 in 2001-
2002 the increase of public expenditure’s share in GDP was smaller, and thus deﬁcit also remained lower than in the Czech Republic 
and Hungary. Nevertheless, after a period of restrictive ﬁscal policy at the turn of decades, which resulted in primary surplus in 2001, 
primary and total deﬁcit grew by as much as 2 percentage points of GDP. The inability to reform the public ﬁnance during the period 
of rapid economic growth in the second half of the 1990s led to a situation, where the measures introduced during the period 1998-
2000 proved insuﬃcient, and public ﬁnance balance deteriorated in the aftermath of economic breakdown in 2001, mainly due to 
lower revenues and higher social transfer expenditures than expected.56 Thus, it can be reckoned that the deﬁcit increase of 2001 was 
above all of cyclical nature.
Chart I.40.
GDP deviation from its long-term trend versus primary and general public ﬁnance deﬁcit and government net borrowing in the NMS8 
in the period 1996-2005
   
   
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data.
The next episode of growing deﬁcit, which occurred in 2002-2003, i.e. when the economic recovery started in Poland, seem to be of 
diﬀerent nature. An increase in total and primary deﬁcits by 1.5 percentage points of GDP, which can in two thirds be attributed to the 
increase in structural deﬁcit, was above all a consequence of lower tax revenues because all major categories of expenditure essentially 
remained unchanged (see Charts I.28-I.30). The above evidences that the government implemented then a ﬁscal expansion based on 
55 Only in 2001 public investment, expressed as percentage of GDP, increased substantially, which, however, meant only return to medium-term average level and the reverse of public 
investment reduction in 2001, introduced to curtail the deﬁcit.
56 In years 2000-2001 certain “technical” displacement of deﬁcit occurred, caused by underestimated inﬂation rate in 2000, which translated into lower spending on social transfer indexed 
with inﬂation rate. Decline of transfer incomes in real terms implied the necessity of their recompensating increase the following year. That way the fraction of deﬁcit was transferred from 
2000 to 2001 budget.
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tax cuts.57 This episode of expansive policy distorted the potentially anticyclical character of ﬁscal policy, which – if it had been pursued 
in accordance with such approach – after a period of slowdown and rising of deﬁcit and public debt in 2001-2002 – would have been 
followed by an improvement of the balance during economic upturn. Nevertheless, compared with Hungary and the Czech Republic, 
ﬁscal policy in Poland should be considered moderately expansive due to considerably lower primary deﬁcit increases. However, from 
today’s perspective, it is diﬃcult to assess the macroeconomic signiﬁcance of the reductions of deﬁcit in 2004 and 2005, because they 
were prompted by diﬀerent factors – in 2004, public expenditures were curtailed (thanks to reduced transfers and public consump-
tion), and in 2005, tax revenues rose (probably entirely due to cyclical factors).58 It seems, however, that this policy could have contrib-
uted slightly to the improvement in the labour market, and in particular to the increase in labour supply. This was so because social 
transfers were curtailed and the revenue increases were predominantly due to increasing reliance on indirect taxes with a very broad 
tax base, which should not be expected to create any signiﬁcant distortions in the allocation of resources in the economy.
In Slovenia, a country with the highest per capita income but, at the same time, with a lower growth rate than the remaining NMS8, 
from 2000 on public expenditures (at that time the highest in the region) were decreasing, alongside rising tax revenues, which ul-
timately resulted in shrinking deﬁcit. It can be assessed that because the economic growth was gaining momentum, Slovenia was 
pursuing an anticyclical ﬁscal policy. Slovenia, which among countries denoted as countries with “large” governments,, is characterised 
by the highest share of public ﬁnance revenues and social expenditures in GDP (see Charts I.25 and I.26), stands out also due to larger 
budgetary discipline and a generally neutral ﬁscal policy.
Slovenia shares the above features with the Baltic states and Slovakia, which did not engage in expansive ﬁscal policy either, however, 
the scale of income redistribution via public ﬁnance in these countries is considerably lower. Moreover, from 2000 these countries man-
aged a regular reduction in the share of budgetary expenditures and revenues in GDP, implying an improvement in the public ﬁnance 
balance . Consequently, by 2004 the Baltic states achieved the lowest scale of income redistribution through budget as well as the 
most advantageous budget balances out of all the NMS8. Moreover, they carried a certain change in the structure of expenditures, be-
cause the reduction of public ﬁnance share in GDP consisted mainly in declining public consumption and to a lesser extent decreasing 
social transfers (except for Estonia where the share of social expenditures in GDP was stable), and on the other hand public investment 
grew at the beginning of the decade only to fall again later on. It should be emphasised that even in the mid-1990s social transfer 
spending in the Baltic states were much lower than in the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia. Although they increased at 
the turn of decades, as opposed to the Czech Republic and Hungary, this increase was only temporary. Consequently, distortions cre-
ated on the labour market by this sector of public ﬁnance were considerably smaller already at the point of departure.
The general tendency of curtailing the size of the public sector and to simultaneously implement ﬁscal consolidation could also be 
observed in Slovakia in the period 2001-2005, with the exception of one expansive impulse in 2001-2002, which involved tax cuts but 
no extraordinary spending. It can be assessed that the government intended to level out the external demand slump, which at that 
time translated into large negative contribution of net exports to GDP growth (see Chart I.35). This episode constitutes the only positive 
ﬁscal impulse observed in the NMS8 after the year 2000. Thus, as much as in the 1990s Slovakia was a country with a loose and unsta-
ble ﬁscal policy, in the current decade it conducted prudent ﬁscal policy aiming at the reduction of taxation and public expenditures. 
Comparably to the Baltic states, this translated into a gradual improvement of the public ﬁnance balance, a process that was further 
prompted by rapid economic growth driven by exports (Slovakia) or private consumption and investment (Baltic states).
57 In the current decade the public consumption grew faster than private consumption. Although initially it could be perceived as automatic stabilisers response to slowdown in 2001, from 
2003 evidences for loosening of ﬁscal policy.
58 To some extent it was connected to redirecting the VAT revenues from 2004 to 2005 because of uniﬁcation of tax rules with UE legislation.
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Table I.14. 
Fiscal impulses in the NMS8 in the period 2001-2005
Source: Own elaboration.
 
2.3.3 Monetary policy after the year 2000
The monetary policy in the CEE countries after 2000 was conducted in a speciﬁc context linked with European integration. Therefore, 
when examining monetary policy of that period, it is necessary to consider long- and medium-term objectives of macroeconomic 
policy (ﬁscal and monetary), implied by the approaching accession to the European Union as well as by the declared intention to join 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Countries planning to accede to the EMU must fulﬁl the criteria presented in the Maas-
tricht Treaty, out of which three refer directly to monetary policy. They are: price stability , interest rates convergence and stability of 
exchange rate criterion (see Box I.8).
Bearing in mind the above, countries can be divided into two groups depending on the exchange rate regime. The ﬁrst group includes 
the Baltic states which applied either the currency board or the ﬁxed exchange rate. Their main objective was to maintain the above 
regimes until the adoption of the common currency under the EMU. It should be emphasised that in case of these countries monetary 
policy could not be either expansive or restrictive in precise sense of these terms because ﬁxing of exchange rates implies the exogene-
ity of money supply, inﬂation and interest rates. Because these countries at the same time have been conducting prudent ﬁscal policy, 
it can be acknowledged that the monetary conditions in these economies were largely independent from the measures undertaken 
by the governments and related to monetary policy in the euro zone. The second group, relatively diversiﬁed in terms of not only level 
Country
Czech
Republic
Hungary
Hungary
Poland
Poland
Poland
Slovenia
Lithuania
Latvia
Estonia
Slovakia
Period
2001-2003
2001-2002
2003-2005
2001-2002
2002-2003
2003-2005
2001-2005
2001-2005
2001-2005
2002-2005
2001-2004
Fiscal impulse
Increase in public investment
and consumption
Increase in public investment, 
consumption and transfers
Increase in transfers and public 
investment
Increase in transfers
Decrease in income
Decrease in transfers
Decrease in public consumption and 
transfers
Decrease in public consumption, 
increase in investment
Decrease in transfers, increase in 
public investment, temporary increase 
followed by a decrease in consumption
Decrease in public consumption, 
transfers and investment
Decrease in public consumption, 
transfers and investment
Financing method
Increase in taxes
and deﬁcit
Increase in taxes and 
deﬁcit
Increase in taxes
and deﬁcit
Increase in deﬁcit
Increase in deﬁcit
Decrease in deﬁcit
Decrease in deﬁcit
Decrease in deﬁcit
Decrease in deﬁcit
Increase
in budgetary
surplus
Decrease in deﬁcit
Expected impact on labour market
      and output
Neutral on labour market, moderately 
positive on output
Negative on participation and employ-
ment, neutral on output
Negative on participation and employ-
ment, neutral on output
Negative on perticipation
and employment
Neutral or slightly positive on capital and 
labour supply
Positive on participation and employment
Positive on participation and output
Positive on employment and output
Positive on participation, employment 
and output
Positive on participation and employment, 
neutral or positive on output
Positive on participation and employment, 
neutral or positive on output
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and growth of GDP but also of the ﬁscal policy conducted, includes all remaining countries, with ﬂoating exchange rate regime. The 
monetary authorities in these countries aimed for greater ﬂexibility of exchange rate regime in the pre-accession period so that the 
adjustments related to the prospective adoption of the so-called Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) would gradually occur. Slovenia 
is to some extent speciﬁc in this respect because, since regaining independence, it had been applying (in practice, signiﬁcantly) man-
aged ﬂoating exchange rate in order to join the ERM II in mid-2004 and replace the Slovenian tolar with the euro in 2007. Because of 
the above factors, when analysing the restrictiveness of monetary policy we focus on the countries with ﬂoating exchange rates.
Similarly to evolution of economic situation and GDP which, in the period 2000-2005, were closely related to unfolding of global 
economic situation, the evolution of nominal variables in the NMS8 was related to the developments in price dynamics in the world 
markets. Thus, modiﬁcations of tradables’ prices were of primary importance for the price movements in the CEE region. Two periods 
of homogeneous increase of the CPI dynamics across the region merit particular attention (see Chart I.41). The ﬁrst period, covering the 
years 2000-2001, was connected above all to a considerable increase in oil prices, as a result of which relative prices of fuels and other 
categories of goods grew, thus leading to higher dynamics of the average price index. The second episode of common acceleration 
in price growth accompanied the EU accession in 2004. It was therefore speciﬁc for the NMS8 and applied to all of them except for 
Slovenia.
In 2000, the earlier widespread disinﬂation processes were halted or even reversed (see Chart I.41). However, both factors that stood 
behind the above development proved transitory – as from 2001 the global economy, and thus also the CEE countries, slowed down, 
and the oil prices were adjusted downwards. Consequently, the economic downturn, caused by a decline in global demand, was ac-
companied by a decrease of price dynamics, which was then followed by a gradual reductions of nominal interest rates. As a result 
consequence, as presented in Chart I.42, the stable expected real market interest rates were common feature of NMS8 economies in 
the period 2000-2001.
Chart I.41.
Inﬂation rates in the NMS8 in the period 2000-2005
   
Remarks: Inﬂation rates on HCPI in accordance with the Eurostat methodology.
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data.
Poland distinguished itself in this context with interest rates that were increasing for a longer period, in fact as long as until mid-2001. 
Consequently, the tightening of monetary policy in 1999 – prompted above all by the fact that actual inﬂation rate equalled almost 
double the target of the National Bank of Poland almost – and introduced concurrently to still high GDP growth, lasted so long that 
the global economic slowdown as well as the internal deterioration of productivity growth rate hit Poland when it had signiﬁcantly 
higher real interest rates than the other countries in the region. Therefore, it can be claimed that the policy of the National Bank of 
Poland was then clearly restrictive and it markedly diﬀered from the neutral attitude of the central banks of the other CEE countries. 
Hence, it seems that, for the ﬁrst time as from the beginning of transition, monetary policy could – due to cautious and delayed cuts 
in interest rates – adversely aﬀect real economy by contributing to the strengthening of the adverse shock that aﬀected Poland at the 
turn of 2000-2001.
Czech Republic             Poland              Slovakia             Hungary Estonia            Lithuania             Latvia             Slovenia 
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Chart I.42. 
Expected short-term ex ante real interest rates in the NMS8 in the period 2000-2005
   
Remarks: Adaptive expectations have been assumed – the rate of price changes expected over the forthcoming 12 months is equal to the average 12 
month inﬂation recorded in the last two quarters preceding the moment of prediction.
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data.
Box I.8. Euro zone convergence criteria
The European Union member states that aspire to join the Economic and Monetary Union and to adopt the common currency are 
obliged to first join the European Monetary System, the so-called Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II). Hence, prior to their accession 
to the euro zone, these countries must fulfil the following monetary criteria provided for in the Maastricht Treaty:
• the rate of inflation must not exceed by more than 1.5 percentage points the average of the three best-performing EU member 
 states in terms of price stability;
• the nominal long-term interest rate must not exceed by more than 2 percentage points the average of the three best-performing 
 EU member states in terms of price stability,
• for at least two years the currency of given candidate country must remain within the so-called normal fluctuation margin 
 established by the ERM II, which currently amounts to ±15 per cent. In addition, during the same period, currency must not be 
 devalued against the currency of any other EU member state.
The fourth criterion concerns the condition of public finance – budget deficit must not exceed 3 per cent of GDP and public debt 
must not exceed 60 per cent of GDP.
Chart I.43. 
Inﬂation rates in the NMS8 versus the convergence criteria in the period 2000-2005
   
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data.
Chart I.44. 
Diﬀerences between nominal short-term interest rates in the NMS8 and the euro zone in the period 2000-2005.
   
Source: Own elaboration based on Eurostat data.
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A gradual improvement in the economic situation from 2003 on implied a shift in the priorities of the macroeconomic policy towards 
maintaining the equilibrium and counteracting the overheating of economies. The conduct of a monetary policy with direct inﬂa-
tion target strategy, in view of the past disinﬂation trends, enabled the monetary authorities to inﬂuence the inﬂation expectations 
of economic agents more eﬀectively than in the 1990s, which made it possible to lower benchmark nominal interest rates, alongside 
decreasing expected (ex-ante) real market interest rates and stable dynamics of prices (see Charts I.41 and I.43). Thus, monetary policies 
implemented in the countries in the region after the year 2003 were in fact neutral and focused on gradual convergence of inﬂation 
and nominal interest rates to the ﬂuctuation margins established in the Maastricht Treaty.
Achieving the inﬂation targets was facilitated by the ongoing appreciation of exchange rates, which resulted from real appreciation 
caused by a productivity convergence (see Chart I.38). In the countries which with ﬁxed exchange rate or currency board regime, the 
appreciation tendencies were absorbed by domestic prices. The above aspect was particularly important in the conduct of monetary 
policy in Hungary and Slovakia, where the monetary authorities strove to prevent “excessive” nominal appreciation by interest rate 
cuts and direct interventions in the market. In both countries, the nominal variables were at that time inﬂuenced by certain speciﬁc 
factors, nevertheless, Slovakia did not deviated from the above-mentioned neutral policy stance, whereas the Hungarian policy was 
motivated by exchange rate considerations59 for a longer period, thus obscuring the interactions of monetary conditions with changes 
in macroeconomic situation.
The consolidation of economic growth after the year 2004 and the decreasing risk premium facilitated interest rate convergence with 
euro zone, whereas nominal appreciation – re-emerged in the NMS8 in 2004 – supported low price dynamics. On the other hand, 
the demand shock related to the EU accession brought about a temporary increase in price dynamics in 2004 (see Chart I.41). The 
monetary authorities in the NMS8 perceived diﬀerently the impact of this episode on inﬂation expectations. In particular, in the Czech 
Republic and Poland, the risk of a prolonged increase in expectations was considered enough signiﬁcant to prompt a slight tightening 
of monetary policy. The fact that the private sector interpreted and anticipated this tightening to be only transitory prevented it from 
exerting any signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the real economy. In the other NMS8 countries, monetary policies remained neutral and a one-oﬀ 
price impulse of 2004 was absorbed by fast-growing labour productivity.
The above considerations allow the claim that in the period 2000-2005 monetary policies were focused prominently on extending 
the disinﬂation tendencies, which, in the environment of ﬂoating exchange rates and real appreciation leading to a decline in prices 
of imported goods, was possible to achieve by adopting a neutral stance and inﬂuencing the inﬂation expectations of private sector. 
Moreover, due to more accurate inﬂation expectations, the anticipated policy measures manifested themselves in the real sphere to
a very limited extent.
Thus, it can be argued that the only episode that stood out from the general tendencies, was the restrictive monetary policy pursued 
in Poland at the turn of 2000-2001. The evident slowdown in Poland’s economic growth at that time entailed two disinﬂation factors 
which caused an abrupt decline in inﬂation and then, though relatively cautiously, also in benchmark interest rates of the central bank. 
Such restrictive character of monetary policy very probably intensiﬁed the investment slump but it was by no means its cause. Indeed, 
the reason behind this slowdown consisted, above all, in lower external demand and decreasing capital productivity, which both 
emerged much earlier.
59 In 2003, Hungary experienced three speculation attacks on its currency and both the upper and the lower margin of ﬂuctuation band was attacked. These attacks led to a loosening of 
monetary policy in the ﬁrst half of 2003 and then to its tightening in the second half of 2003. One year later, the consequences of the crisis were still perceptible, however, gradual softening 
of monetary policy followed.
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 Summary
The last dozen or so years bring rapid bridging of the gap between the economies of the post-communist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and the Western European countries. The initial transition shock, i.e. the adjustment of the size and structure of produc-
tion – previously centrally planned– to the requirements of the free market, was fading away throughout the region in 1994, even in 
the most aﬀected Baltic republics. Since then, in all CEE countries, GDP per capita was steadily growing so at the time of EU accession 
in May 2004, all these countries were considerably more aﬄuend than ten years earlier.
The labour productivity growth, much faster in the NMS8 than in the EU15 was of key importance in levelling out the initial de-
velopment handicap. The legacy of the previous economic regime included both excessively high deployment of labour force in the 
production process and low eﬃciency of utilising the existing resources. Convergence to the EU15 was accompanied by internal con-
vergence within the NMS8, which means that the countries relatively poorer at the beginning of the transition were developing faster 
than the initially relatively richer countries. Poland was one exception as its average growth rate was much below the value enabling 
to keep up with the other countries in the region.
Apart from long-term convergence, each of the NMS8 experienced in the period 1994-2006 episodes of transitory economic slow-
down resulting from large aggregate disturbances, out of which some were common for a number of countries and some were 
idiosyncratic. The sequence of common negative shocks, which aﬀected the growth dynamics as well as labour markets, was generally 
similar throughout the last decade. However, the most considerable demand shock, which hit almost the entire region apart from the 
Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary, occurred in mid-1998 and was directly connected with the so-called Russian crisis.
The above shock fundamentally aﬀected the situation in the CEE labour markets as, in most of them, it led to – whether directly or as 
a result of the so-called spill-over eﬀects which propagated through the international trade channel – an abrupt slump in output and 
labour demand. The other common shocks included: a signiﬁcant increase in oil prices in 2001, the global slowdown of 2001-2002 
and subsequent recovery after 2003 as well as the demand shock connected with the accession of the examined group of countries 
to the EU in May 2004. The direct impact of these impulses on the trajectory the growth, and in particular on labour market develop-
ments, was smaller than in the case of the Russian crisis, although they both entailed evident changes in the evolution of the economic 
situation.
Apart from disturbances that aﬀected the region uniformely, some countries experienced idiosyncratic shocks (country-speciﬁc) 
which altered their relative labour market situation vis-à-vis the remaining NMS8. Poland experienced exactly that kind of shock in 
form of the slowdown in mid-2000, which considerably aﬀected the economy and the labour market. It was probably triggered by the 
internal negative technological shock spread over the period 1999-2002 which took the form of a lasting decline in capital productivity 
and a slump of the TFP dynamics much below the general trend. In the Czech Republic, the crisis of 1997 was of great importance as it 
slowed down the growth for about two years and adversely aﬀected unemployment and employment rates.
The pace of absorption of shocks in the labour market was to some extent inﬂuenced by ﬁscal policies of particular countries 
– those countries (such as Poland throughout the examined period and Hungary until 1999) that reacted to shocks with a prolonged 
increase in social transfers for the working-age population, experienced declining in participation and employment rates, whereas 
those (such as the Baltic republics) that increased public consumption and investment, and where transfers only played the role of 
automatic stabilisers, and exhibited medium-term declining tendency, were much more successful in accommodating labour market 
shocks.
Initially, i.e. until the year 2000, monetary policies in the NMS8 focused on disinﬂation and currency stabilisation, whereas in the later 
period their main objective was to fulﬁl the nominal convergence criteria deﬁned in the accession treaties and obligatory for joining 
the euro zone. At the same time, these policies did not exert important inﬂuence on the economic and labour market situation in the 
region. The only evident episode of restrictive monetary policy was observed in Poland at the turn of 2000-2001, however, it was 
accompanied by a counteracting expansive ﬁscal policy. Although this episode could not be the reason for the economic slowdown 
of 2001-2002 because it emerged after the decline in capital productivity and the investment slowdown, however, it could slightly 
prolong the investment downturn. On the other hand, however, Poland was most successful out of all NMS8 in curbing inﬂation and 
in this respect managed to catch up with the mature and stable economies of the EU15.
In 2003, after a ﬁve-year period of continuous decline in employment, the situation in the Polish labour market begun to improve. The 
employment entered a steady increase period and the acceleration in employment growth – from the second quarter of 2005 – led to 
a decline in unemployment to 15.8 per cent in mid-2006 and to 13.0 towards the end of 2006, reaching the lowest level in seven years. 
These positive tendencies initially translated into the increase of employment of prime-age individuals, and then also of other age 
groups on the labour market, including youths. Moreover, the decline in labour supply was halted. Nevertheless, although increasing 
employment and the resulting decreasing unemployment slowly gained pace, the participation rate of among people over 55 has 
not improved yet. 
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The current improvement of the situation in the Polish labour market is above all of a cyclical nature, and Poland failed to bridge 
the gap in employment and participation rates with respect to the EU15, although the remaining countries in the region proved suc-
cessful in achieving this goal. Consequently, the Polish labour market of 2006 distinguishes itself negatively from the NMS8 just as it did 
in 2002. In all age groups employment rates in Poland are smaller than the respective shares in the EU15 and NMS8, and the size 
of this gap is due also to lower employment of prime-age people, unknown in the remaining NMS8. A part of this distance vis-à-vis the 
EU15 could be levelled out, if the favourable economic situation is maintained for a couple of years. The example of the Baltic states 
evidences that an economic upsurge may lead to a considerable increase in employment and a decrease in unemployment of people 
aged 25-45. In the above respect, a particular challenge of improving adjustment of labour supply to labour demand emerges, and 
thus to lower structural unemployment which limits the scope of employment growth resulting from increasing labour demand.
Secondly, increasing the, currently extremely low, labour supply of individuals at the start or end of their professional careers 
seems to be of crucial importance for rising overall employment rate. However, the contribution of youths to the “Polish” employ-
ment gap is largely comparable with the contributions of their counterparts in the other countries in the region. The relative distance 
between Poland and the NMS8 results above all from low employment rates of the elderly. Therefore, there exists a scope for general 
employment growth in Poland which can be achieved with increasing the participation of older age groups, presently one of the low-
est in Europe.
It will not be possible, however, to utilise the above-mentioned potential, if the currently operating excessive system of institutional 
incentives to withdraw early from the labour market, which consists above all of numerous social transfers available to individuals over 
prime-age, is maintained. Failure to introduce structural reforms addressing the above problem will make Poland constantly ranking 
as a country with one of the lowest employment rates in Europe. Moreover, at the same time employed would have to be burdened 
with high taxes necessary to ﬁnance such an expanded social beneﬁts system. The experiences of the European countries indicate 
that, even in the face of a general stagnation in the labour market, by limiting the possibilities and incentives to withdraw from the 
labour market, employment rates for the elderly as well as the general picture of the labour market can be improved. However, 
favourable economic situation makes it considerably easier to implement the necessary reforms and their positive consequences for 
the labour market to emerge fast.
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Introduction
One of the most fundamental empirical regularities concerning labour market are considerable regional disparities of relevant basic 
statistics within a given country. In almost all developed countries, it can be observed that next to regions where unemployment is 
substantially lower and employment much higher than the national average, there are areas where the labour market situation is 
exactly opposite. What is more, in most cases, diﬀerences between regions are typically very persistent and they do not vanish even 
after a long time (OECD 2005). 
Labour markets are speciﬁc markets because employee mobility is much lower than capital or product mobility. Therefore, one way 
of levelling out diﬀerences between regions is to increase the interregional mobility of production factors, including labour. Higher 
mobility enhances a more eﬀective utilisation of existing resources and increase in productivity and wages. However, at the end of the 
day, as much as the intensiﬁcation of migration ﬂows between lower-developed and higher-developed regions contributed to a gra-
dual increase in social well-being at the national level, it is only job creation in the disadvantaged regions that can lead to interregional 
convergence in employment, unemployment and output per capita levels. In order, however, to prevent convergence from levelling 
down standards and to encourage poorer regions to catch up, national social and economic policies, including regional and labour 
market policies, must be formulated accordingly. For the purpose of determining development priorities and selecting relevant tools, 
it is necessary to provide a detailed analysis of regional disparities in the national labour market and to assess their causes from micro- 
and macro-perspectives. We attempt at providing such analysis in this part of the report.
Poland, which on the scale of the EU is a relatively large country, distinguishes herself by considerable disparities between the situ-
ation both in regional and local labour markets. These markets see a number of phenomena typical for other countries, for instance, 
the most pre-eminent standing – in terms of employment rate and productivity level – of the largest metropolises, the emergence of 
areas around them that beneﬁt from their proximity, and a much worse situation of the peripheries. On the other hand, however, some 
of the observed phenomena are typical for Poland as they stem from her history – for example, very high employment in the frag-
mented small-scale farming in the eastern and south-eastern parts of the country, alongside very low output per capita; continuing 
pathologically high unemployment, including long-term unemployment in the western and north-western Poland, and in particular 
in rural areas where state farms used to operate in the past; or the unfavourable evolution of the situation in the Silesian labour market, 
alongside relatively high output per capita and productivity levels.
The ﬁrst chapter is devoted to the analysis of disparities among voivodeship, subregional and poviat labour markets, as well as to 
output and productivity developments. This analysis, together with the taxonomy (in the form of a cluster analysis) of poviat labour 
markets, constitutes a point of departure for a more detailed overview of enterprise and job creation and destruction in Poland, which 
we present in the second chapter. The key objective of chapter two is to describe and explain reasons for regional disparities in terms 
of new enterprises and their development. This part of the report ends with a summary in which we draw particular attention to the 
impact of the dynamically developing urban conglomerations on regional labour markets. Moreover, in the summary, we also empha-
sise the importance of high-productivity enterprises and of general economic activity levels in a given region not only for the pace but 
above all for the sustainability of the process of improvement of local labour market performance.
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1. Situation in regional labour markets  
This chapter aims at providing an illustration of disparities between particular regional and local labour markets. We present their evo-
lution in the recent years and attempt at answering the question of what are the fundamental causes for the emergence of the key dif-
ferences as well as for the relative changes in labour market indicators between regions. One important element of this analysis is the 
clustering of poviat labour markets, which we use to divide poviat labour markets into six categories and analyse the above-mentioned 
changes within particular group categories. For the sake of complementing the resulting illustration of regional disparities, we provide 
an analysis of productivity and employment developments in industry and services sector performed at the subregional level.
1.1. Basic differences in the development of Polish regions
The most fundamental tool for measuring the level of social and economic development of a given country or region is the level of 
generated output per capita. This measure strongly correlates with other important variables (such as levels of wages, consumption, 
unemployment, economic activity, etc.) and can be used in both international and interregional comparative studies.
In accordance with data for 2004, Poland’s GDP amounted to PLN 923 billion – or approximately PLN 24,000 per inhabitant. Large 
cities ranked far beyond this average, and particularly so Warszawa (with its output per capita three times higher than the average) 
and Poznań (twice the average), but also the Gdańsk-Sopot-Gdynia Tricity, Wrocław and Kraków which GDPs per capita higher by 
approximately 50 per cent than the average for Poland. It is worth noting that in terms of population the above ﬁve conglomerations 
account for 12 per cent of the population of Poland. There are also other relatively densely populated areas such as the centralny śląski 
and łódzki subregions, where GDPs per capita are much higher than the average. However, a vast majority of subregions (34 out of 45) 
generate output which, after its calculation in per-capita terms, does reach the average rate for Poland. In other words, the distribution 
of subregions by GDP per capital levels is strongly right-skewed. In the above context, it is worth stressing that there is no correlation 
between size (measured in populations) of a given region and its output per capita, whereas there is one between population density 
and output per capita. What is more, it is the more urbanised regions that are more developed, which points to the advantages derived 
from the existence of a metropolis and a regional development centre in a given region.
Map II.1.
GDP per capita and correlation between unemployment rate and GDP per capita by subregions (2004)
   
GDP data for subregions and thus the map is to be interpreted accordingly (when preparing the map, the authors adopted GDP per capita levels for 
subregions to which particular poviats belong). 
Source: Own calculations based on BDR data.
Data presented in Map II.1 are to some extent incomparable – due to diﬀerent approaches to particular regional centres. And thus, 
for instance, the szczeciński subregion, including the city of Szczecin, is not fully comparable with, say, the gdański subregion, which 
does not include the Tricity (separates as a separate subregion). Notwithstanding the above, the backwardness of the eastern and 
south-eastern parts of Poland is clearly visible – the nowosądecki, chełmsko-zamojski, krośnieńsko-przemyski, bialskopodlaski, ełcki 
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and łomżyński subregions are among the lowest-developed areas in Poland with their GDP per capita rates of less than 70 per cent of 
the national average.
It is worth noting that regardless of signiﬁcant, negative and rather strong correlation between GDP and unemployment rate, GDP 
level itself explains the variation of unemployment rates only to a small degree – this concerns above all the low-GDP per capita 
subregions. As much as the subregions which are at the same time Poland’s largest cities combine high output levels with low unem-
ployment, in eastern Poland very low output levels are not connected with high unemployment (which should be largely explained 
by high employment in low-productivity agriculture) and, for instance, in the szczeciński subregion, high unemployment coincides with 
above-average GDP per capita. Interestingly enough, these diﬀerences cannot be explained in terms of diﬀerent long-term unemploy-
ment levels (which, to some extent, can be regarded as a reﬂection of structural unemployment).
The statement that the GDP level is not the only factor determining the extent of diﬀerentiation in the situation of regional labour mar-
kets is rather obvious – in fact, this situation depends on a vast range of causes, such as the quality of the locally available labour force, 
extent of investment opportunities, and number of newly-established companies (and hence, of newly-created work places), existing 
history-bound social and economic tissue1 and natural conditions. At this point, we must content ourselves with the statement that 
output levels do not necessarily have to reﬂect the situation in local labour markets. Therefore, before we move on to further analysis 
of causes for the regional disparities, we present a clear-cut description of the fundamental features of these markets.
1.2. Differentiation in labour market situation 
Most studies concerning the Polish labour market in territorial perspective focus on relevant analysis at the voivodeship level. The abo-
ve is probably due to greater availability and better quality of data at the aggregate level,2 as well as to the ease of their presentation. 
Irrespective of the advantages of such analysis and the possibility of capturing the main diﬀerences between voivodeships (see, for 
instance, Bukowski et al. 2005), it has one great disadvantage, namely that it completely passes over the diﬀerences within the voivo-
deship labour markets. A straightforward analysis of the coeﬃcient of variation3 of unemployment and participation rates based on 
the data extracted from the National Population Census, as well as of registered unemployment, indicates that the disparities among 
local labour markets within voivodeships are much wider than that between voivodeships. For instance, in accordance with the NPC 
data, in the case of only one voivodeship was the variation of employment rates between poviats lower than total variation for Poland, 
and for unemployment rates – there were four such voivodeships. In the case of diﬀerentiation measured by the registered unem-
ployment rate, the situation was similar – however, it is worth noting that, in accordance with this measure, although diﬀerentiation in 
unemployment between voivodeships decreased slightly in the period 2000-2005, it remained unchanged within most of them (and 
in the period 2003-2005 it even increased), i.e. at the poviat level. Of course, coeﬃcients for Poland and for particular voivodeships are 
not fully comparable (the average number of poviats in a voivodeship amounts to approximately 24 and is greater than the number of 
voivodeships), nevertheless, they demonstrate that analyses limited to inter-voivodeship diﬀerences not only pass over material and 
much greater internal diﬀerences, but they can also gave rise to completely opposite conclusions.
Chart II.1.
Coeﬃcients of variation of labour market indicators
             
Registered unemployment – 2002 is not fully comparable with 2003 due to the fact that CSO re-calculated unemployment rates following the NPC.
Source: Own calculations.
1 No doubt such historical events as partitions, border changes after the Second World War and selective industrialisation of some regions have left lasting marks on the economic map of 
Poland, which we demonstrate in the subsequent paragraphs of this part.
2 BAEL data are not representative at the poviat level and thus all indicators calculated for this level of disaggregation and based on them are characterised by unacceptably high estimation 
error. The above drawback can be remedied to some extent by applying the statistical methods of small area estimation (SAE) – see Lewandowski et al. (2007). 
3 The coeﬃcient of variation used in this report with geographical analysis is calculated in accordance with the Eurostat methodology, i.e. the standard deviation for a set of unit indicators 
within a given area is referred to relevant indicators for the entire area (rather than to the unweighted mean of all unit indicators – as it is usually done with the classical coeﬃcient of varia-
tion). 
Poland - poviats                      Poland - voivodenships Employment
rate
Unemployment
rate (right axe)
Participation
rate
Registered unemployment rate
 – poviat and voivodeship level
LFS indicators – voivodeship level
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An analysis of coeﬃcients of variation of the Polish labour market for poviats in the recent years (see Chart II.1.), though imperfect 
due to limited availability of data on registered unemployment rates as well as of the NPC data, points to a slight decrease – as from 
2003, i.e. the year when the situation in the Polish labour market started to improve alongside the improving economic situation – in 
disparities between voivodeships. At the same time, in the period 2003-2005, diﬀerences between registered unemployment rates 
between poviats grew slightly at the national level, although there were voivodeships which saw a very signiﬁcant increase in the 
internal diﬀerentiation of the above rate.
The group of voivodeships with the lowest disparities in labour market performance includes the kujawsko-pomorskie, lubelskie, war-
mińsko-mazurskie and łódzkie voivodeships; whereas the highest disparities occur in the świętokrzyskie, mazowieckie and pomorskie 
voivodeships. However, it is worth noting that, due to the diﬀerences in participation levels, it is not always that higher diﬀerentiation in 
unemployment is connected with higher diﬀerentiation in employment. In accordance with records data and the NPC data alike, there 
is no correlation between dispersion within a given voivodeship and the general situation in the regional labour market. This remark is, 
of course, coherent with the observable, relatively higher diﬀerentiation within voivodeships, and it boils down to the statement that 
deep crises (as well as exceptionally good performance) in a given local labour market are levelled out at the voivodeship level by other 
local markets which are in a relatively better (or worse) situation.
The increased disparities, in accordance with LFS, in employment and participation indicators at the regional level in the period 1999-
-2003 was due to the fact that in the better-performing voivodeships the employment rate was declining relatively slower than in the 
voivodeships where its initial value was lower. It is worth noting at this point that the above concerned not only relatively higher-de-
veloped voivodeships but above all the typically agricultural voivodeships, such as the lubelskie and podkarpackie voivodeships (where 
the pace of declining employment was surely lower because of a high share of employment in agriculture, in accordance with LFS). 
The decreased diﬀerentiation in the period 2002-2005 was, in turn, a consequence of an opposite process.
It is noteworthy that, compared with international developments in the above respect, the diﬀerentiation between labour markets at 
the voivodeship level in Poland is relatively insigniﬁcant in terms of both unemployment and employment rates. Moreover, it should be 
emphasised that such data is obtained by applying the coeﬃcient of variation in accordance with the Eurostat measure, i.e. unweighted 
for population sizes of particular regions. In the case of the coeﬃcient which accounts for diﬀerences in population sizes of particular 
regions, as used by OECD (2005), the above picture becomes less straightforward. Although Poland still distinguishes herself, compared 
with other countries, by her low regional diﬀerentiation in unemployment, when it comes to the diﬀerentiation in employment, she 
ranks above the average of the OECD countries. It is worth noting that the coeﬃcients for Poland obtained under two methodologies 
are very similar and the diﬀerences in the ranking performance result from diﬀerent results obtained for other countries.
Table II.1.
Coeﬃcient of variation (percentage) for the employment rate and unemployment rate (inter-poviat variation for voivodeships and
inter-poviat and inter-voivodeship for Poland)
                 National Population Census 2002  Registered unemployment rate  in December
                     Employment rate          Unemployment rate   2003               2005
dolnośląskie
kujawsko-pomorskie
lubelskie
lubuskie
łódzkie
małopolskie
mazowieckie
opolskie
podkarpackie
podlaskie
pomorskie
śląskie
świętokrzyskie
warmińsko-mazurskie
wielkopolskie
zachodniopomorskie
Poland – voivodeships
Poland – poviats
The above table uses data for registered unemployment for the year 2003 because of the incomparability of data for 2005 and 2002 due to the fact that 
CSO re-calculated unemployment rates following the NPC. 
Source: Own calculations based on the NPC and BDR data.
9.7
4.6
6.5
7.9
8.3
9.1
8.1
6.8
7.3
7.0
8.0
7.8
13.9
7.3
7.0
10.0
6.2
11.0
16.1
12.3
18.1
16.4
18.0
18.0
27.7
24.4
18.0
22.6
26.0
13.5
31.7
15.5
20.3
18.4
16.1
27.1
24.7
22.8
17.0
26.1
18.8
30.6
45.6
36.3
26.0
29.5
42.8
30.3
32.4
21.8
31.9
27.7
22.7
38.8
30,6
25,5
16,8
31,9
21,6
32,9
49,3
35,5
26,5
28,6
47,3
29,9
31,6
25,9
36,8
29,9
23,4
42,1
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1.3. Basic labour market indicators in voivodeships and poviats
An analysis of changes in disparities in the last ﬁve years suggests – although the results are not completely unambiguous – that as 
the situation in the labour market was deteriorating, diﬀerentiation between voivodeships and poviats was increasing, whereas as of 
the 2002-2003 economic upturn in the macro perspective, the above diﬀerences have been gradually bridged, at least in between 
voivodeships.4
In view of the supreme signiﬁcance of the employment rate on the assessment of labour market performance, it is worthwhile to exa-
mine how, in the recent years, this indicator deviated in particular voivodeships from the national average. For that purpose, we have 
adopted the following time landmarks: 1999 (beginning of a considerable increase in unemployment and decrease in employment), 
2002 (the worst slump in the labour market) and 2005 (most recent data). In the period 1999-2002, the situation in all voivodeship 
labour markets was deteriorating, whereas the period 2002-2005 saw a slight improvement – nevertheless, in the former and in the 
latter period alike, these processes were irregular.
As demonstrated in Chart II.2., in 2005, the employment rate for the lubelskie, małopolskie, mazowieckie, podlaskie and wielkopolskie 
voivodeships was evidently higher than the national average, whereas it was considerably lower for the dolnośląskie, śląskie, warmiń-
sko-mazurskie and zachodniopomorskie voivodeships. In relation to the employment decrease-increase sequence, in the ﬁrst period 
(1999-2002), the decrease in employment was particularly high in the dolnośląskie, lubuskie, świętokrzyskie and zachodniopomorskie 
voivodeships, and not so high in the lubelskie, mazowieckie and podkarpackie voivodeships. In the second period (2002-2005), a par-
ticularly rapid increase in employment was to be observed in the lubuskie, dolnośląskie, śląskie, świętokrzyskie, warmińsko-mazurskie 
and zachodniopomorskie voivodeships, whereas it was visibly slower than the average in the lubelskie, małopolskie, mazowieckie and 
podkarpackie voivodeships.
Based on the above observations, it can be acknowledged that:
• the decrease in employment of 1999-2002 was highest in those areas which had had the worst initial labour market 
 performance (irrespective of their initial output levels);
• the relatively smallest deterioration in labour market performance was observed in the highest- (mazowieckie,
 wielkopolskie) and lowest-developed regions (lubelskie, podkarpackie). The above may indicate that two factors played 
 a role, on the one hand, the “modern” regions adapted relatively easiest to the changing situation, on the other hand, the 
 “traditional” regions – largely dependent on agriculture – were scarcely vulnerable to these changes (at least in terms of 
 employment levels);
• during the period of employment increase, changes constituted an almost mirror reﬂection of the processes from 
 the previous period, i.e. the regions with the worst initial situation experienced the most rapid improvement in performance
 what is more, employment rate convergence could be observed in almost all voivodeships (apart from the pomorskie and 
 łódzkie voivodeships).
Chart II.2. 
Employment rate changes
Source: Own calculations based on LFS data.  
Similar relations occur at the voivodeship level when unemployment rates are analysed in accordance with LFS data. Due to the fact 
that, as indicated in the analysis presented in the previous sub-chapter, diﬀerentiation at the local level is far greater than at the regional 
4 Again, when assessing the situation in the poviat labour markets – and particularly when looking at changes in time – there appears a drawback in the form of imperfect data pertaining 
to the situation at the poviat level. See also remarks in the box presenting labour market statistics.
Percentage deviation of employment rates from
the national average for Poland in 1999 and 2002
Percentage deviation of employment rates from
the national average for Poland in 2002 and 2005
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level (also within particular voivodeships), it is worth noting how the situation evolves in the local, namely poviat, labour markets. In 
this endeavour, we limit ourselves – out of necessity – to the rate and indicator of unemployment (see Box II.1.), and we do not look at 
changes in time (with 379 poviats such comparative studies would be unclear – they are presented in the next sub-chapter devoted 
to clusters of poviats).
Map II.2. presents the registered unemployment rate as well as an estimate of the unemployment share5 at the local level based on 
regional unemployment shares calculated in accordance with LFS (using the Small Area Estimation method, see Lewandowski et al. 
(2007)). These measures, although diﬀerent exhibit a clearly very similar spatial diﬀerentiation (although LFS data estimated using the 
SAE method are more reliable – see Lewandowski et al. (2007) and Box II.1.). In line with our previous observations, highest unemploy-
ment can be observed in the northern and western parts of Poland, as well as a part of the świętokrzyskie voivodeship and the region 
of Bieszczady, whereas unemployment is low in cities, especially so in large cities and their surrounding areas, as well as in the eastern 
and central parts of Poland. It should be noted again that low unemployment levels do not necessarily correlate with a generally good 
social and economic situation or with the welfare of a given poviat.
Another ﬁnding that merits emphasis is that data obtained from two completely diﬀerent sources and calculated with the use of dif-
ferent methods provide a similar picture in local labour markets. Thus, their reliance, irrespective of the reservation presented in Box 
II.1., should be considered high.
Map II.2. 
Unemployment in 2005 by poviats
Source: Right graph – Lewandowski et al. (2007), left graph – own calculations based on BDR data.
When analysing the above maps, it is worth noting that they present shares of the unemployed population (in the economically active 
population and in the total population) and not their number – the territorial distribution of the unemployed is diﬀerent and much 
more regular. In particular, almost 50 per cent of the unemployed population live in poviats with registered unemployment rates be-
low 20 per cent (i.e. poviats with low and average unemployment), approximately 20 per cent – in poviats with unemployment rates 
between 20 and 25 per cent (i.e. poviats with high unemployment), and the remaining 30 per cent live in poviats with unemployment 
rates above 25 per cent (i.e. poviats with very high unemployment). The fact that the unemployed do not necessarily group in poviats 
with the highest unemployment ensues from the fact that normally poviats with higher unemployment rates have smaller popula-
tions (unemployment is lowest in large cities which are inhabited by a large share of the unemployed). A similar correlation, although 
weaker, occurs for long-term unemployment. Approximately 56 per cent of the unemployed population live in poviats with an above-
-average – i.e. exceeding 50 per cent – share of the long-term unemployed, whereas only 18 per cent live in poviats with a share of the 
long-term unemployed exceeding 55 per cent.
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Registered unemployment rate in December 2005 Unemployment share for 2005 estimated by applying
the SAE method to LFS data
5 We deﬁne here the unemployment share as a ratio of unemployed persons in the total population and the unemployment rate as a ratio of unemployed in the labour force. The unem-
ployment share is used here due to the speciﬁcity of estimation using the SAE method. Later we use it also for the registry data due to the problems with estimating economically active 
population on the local level.
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Box II.1. Data sources for local labour market analysis
The following data sources can be used when assessing performance in the labour markets at poviat and voivodeship levels:
1. Data on registered unemployment
These data come from the registers of poviat labour oﬃces and they cover individuals registered in the oﬃces at a given time (most analyses 
use the number of unemployed registered towards the end of the analysed period). Based on the data provided by labour oﬃces as well as 
on its own estimations as to the number of the working population (unpublished), CSO makes an estimation of the unemployment rate. One 
advantage of data concerning registered unemployment is that they are easily accessible at the poviat level (at least in their basic aggrega-
tions) and that they form long time series (including monthly). Unfortunately, these data are subject to severe drawbacks.
Firstly, it is often stressed that a large share of registered individuals do not fall within the widely accepted deﬁnition of an unemployed 
person (that is, according to LFS, a person who does not have employment but who is actively seeking employment and who is ready to 
accept it). Although the numbers of the registered unemployed and unemployed according to LFS are similar, they refer to diﬀerent popu-
lations.
Secondly, upon closer examination, unemployment rate estimates at the poviat level prove to be hardly reliant. This is probably due to the 
drawbacks associated with estimating the number of the working population by CSO, which constitutes a basis for calculating the number 
of the economically active (i.e. the denominator of the unemployment rate). 
Thirdly, both the number of the unemployed and the unemployment rate are sensitive to methodology changes as well as other factors 
unrelated with the labour market situation. For instance, the number of the unemployed is aﬀected by changes in the statutory deﬁnition 
of an unemployed person, and other regulations (e.g. registration requirement to qualify for healthcare coverage). As for the rate of unem-
ployment, following the National Population Census of 2002, CSO modiﬁed its unemployment rate estimates by 2 percentage point – at 
the same time, there is no data which would make it possible to adjust accordingly the available time series for the unemployment rate on 
poviat level.
In view of the above, in this report, we use data on unemployment, above all, to illustrate changes in regional diﬀerentiation and we refer to 
the unemployment share (i.e. the share of the unemployed in the total population) rather than the unemployment rate. The former has also 
been used in the data clustering procedure.
2. LFS data
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) provides reliable data on the numbers of the working population and of the unemployed, as well as on the 
unemployment rate. These data are available in diﬀerent proﬁles and they enable a very thorough analysis of the labour market, and in par-
ticular of its supply side. LFS data for Poland are available as from 1992 and regardless of some methodological changes, they emerge as one 
of the fundamental data sources concerning labour market performance.
However, LFS is a survey and it provides satisfactory representativeness only at the level of voivodeships, and it does not enable a direct ana-
lysis at poviat level. LFS data can be used in estimating poviat indicators with the SAE method and in fact we present some poviat indicators 
calculated in this way (Lewandowski et al. (2007)). In the subsequent parts of this report, we also use LFS data to illustrate the situation in 
poviat labour markets having previously grouped them into clusters, which is admissible because for the selected six clusters LFS data are 
fully representative. Moreover, comparative assessments of the results of our cluster analysis based on LFS data and data obtained using the 
SAE method indicate that the LFS system of weights does not constitute an obstacle for applying LFS in cluster analysis.
3. Statistical reporting system for the employed (CSO)
Data on the number of the working population at the poviat level are available from CSO as part of its statistical reporting system, and in 
particular from the Regional Data Bank (Bank Danych Regionalnych; BDR). Despite the no doubt high utility of this data source, there are 
obstacles for their use, namely methodological changes (in particular, with respect to agriculture) and the fact that data are available for 
a relatively short period. Moreover, data on employment at the poviat level only include information from enterprises that employ more 
than 9 employees, which also limits their research potential. These data have been used in the process of clustering and to illustrate some 
changes in the sector structure.
4. Results of the National Population Census of 2002
The National Population Census (NPC) provided full and reliable labour market data at all levels of aggregation. However, there are two draw-
backs of this data gathering method – ﬁrstly, for obvious reasons, they do not provide a time series, and secondly, they are only available in 
the form of basic data sheets (CSO does not make available any microdata in any form whatsoever). We have used some NPC data to illustrate 
disparities and in the clustering procedure.
1.4. Poviat labour markets – cluster analysis 
As noted in the previous sub-chapter, in order to get a full picture of regional disparities in labour market in Poland, it is advisable to 
perform an analysis at the poviat level. As there are currently 379 poviats, it is necessary to group them based on certain fundamental 
characteristics for the purpose of capturing some empirical regularities. Therefore, we have made an attempt at classifying poviats 
in accordance with local labour market features (share of the registered unemployed in the population aged 15+, share of persons 
working in agriculture in the population aged 15+, average wages, number of vacancies per one unemployed person), as well as with 
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other variables material for this market (population index illustrating population size of the given poviat and its neighbours, share of 
higher education graduates in the population aged 15+ in accordance with the NPC, own proceeds of administrative districts per 
capita). The above variables have been taken into account because:
• unemployment share – is the only measure that allows for a precise and objective assessment of labour market develop-
 ments at the poviat level (see Box II.1.);
• share of persons working in agriculture in the population – there is no doubt that the speciﬁcity of the Polish agriculture 
 greatly aﬀects local labour markets; it was impossible to use the share of persons working in agriculture in the total working 
 population because of low reliability of data on the total working population;
• average wages – constitutes an approximation of productivity and welfare;
• number of vacancies per one unemployed person – is, next to the unemployment share, an approximation of local labour 
 market performance – and particularly of its dynamics;
• population index, is a ratio of the “available” population – i.e. poviat population and the population of neighbouring poviats 
 adjusted for distance between poviat central cities, related to the population of Poland;
• share of higher education graduates – constitutes an approximation of human capital;
• poviat’s own revenues per capita – constitutes an approximation of poviat welfare and of the infrastructure available within 
 a given poviat.
Despite the fact that between some of the above-mentioned variable there are certain (though not strong) correlations, we have re-
cognised that taken together they convey suﬃciently the basic and largely distinct dimensions of local development and as such are 
suitable variables for the clustering procedure. As a result we have distinguished six clusters, or poviat groups. Of course, poviats that 
belong to particular clusters are not identical, however, variation of indicators used during data clustering is much smaller than for all 
poviats, alongside – even more importantly – very diﬀerent distributions and average values. The histograms presented in Chart II.3. 
illustrate the above variables typical for particular clusters.
 
Map II.3.
Aﬃliation of poviats in clusters and population by voivodeships depending of cluster aﬃliation
 Aﬃliation of poviats in clusters                                                 Population in clusters by voivodeships   
Source: Own calculations based on BDR data.
For greater clarity, clusters – apart from numbers – have been given names depending on their characteristics, namely: 1. Development 
centres, 2. Suburbs, 3. Towns, 4. Former state farms, 5. Low-productivity agriculture and 6. Agricultural and industrial. These names, although 
symbolic and descriptive, generally convey well the speciﬁcity of particular groups.
Table II.8. contains basic statistical data – derived from the Regional Data Bank – for particular clusters. Map II.3., in turn, presents 
a territorial distribution of particular clusters as well as population structures in voivodeships depending on cluster aﬃliation. Thanks 
to clustering poviats by certain features, we analyse six segments of the labour market which are more internally cohesive (although, 
obviously, not territorially) than voivodeships which, as demonstrated in the map, in most cases are a mosaic of poviats belonging to 
diﬀerent groups.
1 .  D e v e l o p m e n t  c e n t r e s
2 .  S u b u r b s
3 .  T o w n s
( 1 7 )
( 4 6 )
( 4 1 )
4 .  F o r m e r  s t a t e  f a r m s
5 .  L o w - p r o d u c t i v i t y     a g r i c u l t u r e
6 .  A g r i c u l t u r a l  a n d  i n d u s t r i a l
( 1 7 )
( 4 6 )
( 4 1 )
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In the subsequent part of this sub-chapter, we present characteristics of clusters using LFS data for 2005. One great advantage of shi-
fting from the analysis of particular poviats to the analysis of groups of poviats is that it enables us to use this research. With six groups, 
results are even more representative and reliable than in the case of LFS analysis at the voivodeship level.
Chart II.3.
Selected feature histograms by clusters in 2004 or in accordance with the National Population Census (NPC)
   
Source: Own calculations based on BDR data.
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Table II.2.
Selected statistics for clusters, data for the year 2004 unless indicated otherwise
Features deciding about cluster aﬃliation (unweighted mean of indicators)
Other indicators (weighted mean)
* Population index is a percentage share of the population that forms the labour market in a given poviat as well as in the neighbouring poviats in the 
total population of the country. 
** Not fully comparable with 2000 and 2002.
*** Only enterprises with more than 9 employees..
Source: Own calculations based on BDR data.
1
6.9
2 878
2.8
1.4
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3.6
2 619
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15.3
1.9
1 008
6.2
9.5
9.1
52.2
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96.3
0.6
11.4
29.2
-13.2
-5.6
-0.4
3.6
44.3
53.1
16.6
52.4
2
7.8
2 189
5.0
2.9
8.1
4.4
1 780
46
14.9
7.4
247
14.1
17.7
18.4
27.5
-5.9
64.1
3.0
10.2
11.6
-9.5
-5.7
-0.1
2.0
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51.8
20.0
23.7
3
9.0
2 170
3.4
0.6
14.8
1.3
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41
15.8
1.4
1 421
13.6
17.0
16.3
21.9
-7.4
99.6
0.5
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-13.3
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1.9
41.1
52.9
22.3
27.0
4
14.7
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4.6
6.2
6.4
0.9
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17.4
32.9
65
26.2
29.7
31.2
15.0
-5.0
53.5
5.7
7.7
10.1
-12.7
3.1
-4.5
1.4
37.7
53.4
29.3
16.6
5
11.0
1 938
6.0
20.3
5.5
1.0
1 523
93
17.8
32.6
67
16.3
17.5
21.5
9.0
-6.1
25.5
19.2
5.2
9.0
-8.4
1.7
-3.8
9.3
45.4
56.0
18.9
24.5
6
9.1
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3.5
10.1
6.6
1.4
1 516
85
18.8
24.0
96
15.5
17.6
19.2
16.0
-8.3
40.4
9.7
9.0
10.4
-6.7
7.8
-2.2
6.6
43.5
54.3
19.8
26.2
Poland
10.7
2 028
4.5
9.3
7.8
1.6
1 716
379
100.0
100.0
122
15.2
18.0
19.0
19.0
-6.3
61.5
6.7
8.9
15.2
-11.0
-1.2
-2.2
3.7
42.3
53.6
21.2
37.6
employment share (number of the unemployed
in the population aged 15+)
average wages
number of the unemployed per one job oﬀer
share of farmers in the population aged 15+
share of higher education graduates
according to the NPC
population index*
own proceeds of administrative districts per capita
number of poviats in a given cluster
share in the total population of Poland
share in the total area of Poland (km²)
number of persons per km2 
registered unemployment rate in 2000
registered unemployment rate in 2002
registered unemployment rate in 2004**
percentage change in the number 
of the unemployed 2002-2000
percentage change in the number 
of the unemployed 2004-2002
percentage share of urban population
share of persons working in agriculture
in the population aged 15+
share of persons working in industry
in the population aged 15+***
share of persons working in services
in the population aged 15+
percentage change in the number of persons 
working in industry 2002-2000***
percentage change in the number of persons 
working in industry 2004-2002***
percentage change in the number of persons 
working in services 2002-2000***
percentage change in the number of persons 
working in services 2004-2002***
employment rate according to the NPC
activity rate according to the NPC
unemployment rate according to the NPC
coeﬃcient of variation of the unemployment rate
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1.4.1. Development centres
Development centres is a small group of 17 poviats – including, above all, the largest dynamically developing cities (city poviats), but 
also some smaller (in terms of population) poviats (also land poviats), where large and potent enterprises operate thus determining 
high living standards and favourable labour market indicators (we are talking here about the bełchatowski and lubiński poviats as 
well as about the city of Płock). Development centres occur in seven voivodeships and one third of their population is concentrated 
in the Warsaw conglomeration. More than 90 per cent of the population of Development centres live in cities with more than 100,000 
inhabitants. The poviats that belong to this group do not exhibit a tendency to concentrate (apart from the conglomeration areas – i.e. 
the warszawska and śląska conglomerations as well as the Tricity), and therefore they appear as islands on the map of Poland, usually 
surrounded by Suburbs. They are located in the central and south-western parts of the country. To the north of the Warsaw-Płock-Po-
znań line, only the Tricity belongs to the examined cluster. Development centres do not include any cities from eastern Poland. The only 
large city (with more than 500,000 inhabitants) that does not belong to this cluster is Łódź. The sector structure of Development centres 
reﬂects that of developed countries, with the share of industry (and construction) and services amounting to approximately 24.5 and 
74 per cent respectively. What is more, employment levels in market services (the highest share out of all clusters) as well as public 
services (slightly lower that in the case of Towns) are also very high.6 
The employment rate is high, although it is not the highest – it reaches higher values in Low-productivity agriculture. High employment 
is accompanied by high wages and the lowest unemployment, alongside average participation. This barely average participation – in 
view of the good labour market situation – can be explained by the fact that the population is slightly older (average age in the age 
group 15+ amounts to 45.7 years whereas the average for Poland is 44.2 years). In the age group 15-64 participation is above-average, 
although it is still lower that in Low-productivity agriculture. Higher participation and employment in agriculture are presented in greater 
detail together with the description of clusters 5 and 6.7
As for the clustering variables, Development centres are characterised by highest wages, lowest (together with Towns) employment in 
agriculture, lowest unemployment, highest share of higher education graduates and lowest number of unemployed persons per job 
oﬀer.
Table II.3.
Basic characteristics of the cluster Development Centres in 2005 based on LFS data
Population structure (Ps) and basic labour market indicators   Employment structure in the cluster
(Poland=100) by size of place of residence in the cluster 
size of place  Ps LFPR ER UNR 
of residence
>100 000  92 100 106 72 
<100 000  8 104 101 110 
total  100 100 106 76 
Source: Own elaboration based on LFS data.
 
1.4.2. Suburbs
This category includes, above all, poviats from the śląska conglomeration which do not belong to cluster 1. Suburbs also comprise land 
poviats located in the vicinity of large cities which are Development centres (plus Łódź and Opole), as well as some borderland poviats, 
where the positive impact of a nearby metropolis is replaced by the possibility of economic cooperation with foreign partners and 
of foreign investment. Suburbs can be found in eight voivodeships – the same as Development centres plus the opolskie voivodeship, 
with the only diﬀerence that 50 per cent of the population of this cluster live in the śląskie voivodeship (within the conglomeration as 
well as in the borderland poviats). The population of this cluster is evenly distributed between location classes, with one third living in 
rural areas.
 
p u b l i c  s e r v i c e s ;  2 9 . 8
a g r i c u l t u r e ;  1 . 2
i n d u s t r y ;  1 7 . 9
c o n s t r u c t i o n ;  6 . 6
m a r k e t  s e r v i c e s ;  4 4 . 5
6 We deﬁne public services to include public administration (including such areas as obligatory social security, security and army), healthcare and education – and we identify the remaining 
services as market services.
7 It is worth emphasising at this point that in Development Centres too agriculture has a considerable impact on participation – as presented in Table II.2, in towns with less than 100,000 
inhabitants, approximately half of the population originates from rural backgrounds, which aﬀects the observed level of participation. The inclusion of rural areas in Development centres 
results from the fact that they take land poviats (powiaty ziemskie) into account – the analysis is performed at the poviat level, and not at size of place of residence level.
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The signiﬁcance of agriculture in this cluster is marginal, whereas the share of industry is (the highest out of all examined clusters and 
share of services higher than in clusters 4-6 but lower than in clusters 1 and 3. Labour market indicators for Suburbs are close to the 
average for Poland, however, the employment rate is evidently lower in larger cities from this cluster (they include nearly exclusively 
cities from the śląska conglomeration).
As for the clustering variables, Suburbs are characterised by lower than average unemployment,8 relatively high average wages, low 
share of farmers in the population aged 15+ – although the share of rural population is not low. Moreover, the share of higher edu-
cation graduates in the age groups 15+ is only slightly higher than in clusters 4-6 (the nature of which is mainly agricultural or post-
-agricultural – see below). The number of unemployed persons per vacancy is actually rather high, however, it should be borne in 
mind that this indicator is much lower in the often neighbouring Development centres. Moreover, employment levels are rather low in 
Suburbs, most probably due to employment sought in Development centres.9 Generally, Suburbs are regions where the labour market 
situation is relatively goods thanks to the proximity of dynamic Development centres. Suburbs, mainly thanks to poviats from the śląska 
conglomeration, have the highest – higher even than Development centres – average value of the population index.
Table II.4.
Basic characteristics of the cluster Suburbs in 2005 based on LFS data
Population structure (Ps) and basic labour market indicators   Employment structure in the cluster
(Poland=100) by size of place of residence in the cluster 
size of place  Ps LFPR ER UNR 
of residence
>100 000   20 97  93 118 
50-100 000  17 98  96 109 
20-50 000  15 98  97 106 
<20 000   12 97  99  89 
wieś   35 98 102  85 
razem  100 98  98  99 
Source: Own elaboration based on LFS data.
 
1.4.3. Towns
Towns are town poviats (towns with the status of poviats) which do not qualify as either Development centres or Suburbs.10 However, in 
terms of their spatial structure, Towns generally do not generate Suburbs around themselves (apart from Opole and Łódź, which is the 
only large city that does not belong to Development centres – above all due to its high – as for a city of this size – unemployment rate) 
and they are typically surrounded by lower-developed regions. Towns can be found in all voivodeships, although in some of them the 
share of the population of this cluster is not high – due to shifts of some city poviats to Development centres or Suburbs. Despite the 
fact that poviats from this cluster do not belong to the largest conglomerations, a majority of its population live in towns with more 
than 100,000 inhabitants.
For Towns, services are of primary importance (the second highest share after Development centres), whereas the share of industry can 
be assessed as medium. For obvious reasons, the signiﬁcance of agriculture is marginal. Labour market indicators are generally close 
to the average for Poland, alongside slightly lower employment and considerably higher unemployment. What is particularly striking, 
however, is the high unemployment rate in small towns (50,000-100,000 inhabitants), whereas the situation in labour markets of the 
largest and smallest towns is better.
As for the clustering variables, Towns are characterised by almost near absence of agriculture, unemployment lower that the average 
for Poland (although higher than in Development centres), considerable share of higher education graduates, relatively high wages and 
a not very high number of unemployed persons per vacancy.
p u b l i c  s e r v i c e s ;  2 2 . 8
a g r i c u l t u r e ;  7 . 3
i n d u s t r y ;  2 9 . 1
c o n s t r u c t i o n ;  6 . 5
m a r k e t  s e r v i c e s ;  3 4 . 3
8 The registered unemployment rate is surprisingly high for these poviats compared with the unemployment share (share of the unemployed in the age group 15+), which most probably 
results from methodological shortcomings of the process of estimating the unemployment rate. When making such estimation, working populations by work place and unemployed by 
place of residence are taken into account, which – in conglomeration areas – may lead to considerable inconsistencies. In particular, it seems that the unemployment rate is actually higher 
in Development Centres and lower in Suburbs. The above observations are further supported by the NPC data.
9 In accordance with the methodology adopted by CSO, these persons are counted among the working by work place and not by place of residence.
10 This group includes also – due to its characteristics – the policki poviat, which is a land poviat.
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Table II.5.
Basic characteristics of the cluster Towns in 2005 based on LFS data
Population structure (Ps) and basic labour market indicators   Employment structure in the cluster
(Poland=100) by size of place of residence in the cluster 
size of place  Ps LFPR ER UNR 
of residence
>100 000  80  99  98 104 
50-100 000 17  97  92 125 
20-50 000 3 103 103 103 
total  100  99  97 108 
Source: Own elaboration based on LFS data.
1.4.4. Former state farms
It should be emphasises that the label Former state farms does not mean that all poviats from this cluster housed state farms (Państwo-
we Gospodarstwa Rolne) in the past – although most of them did, and the remaining poviats have very similar labour market characteri-
stics, not necessarily due to the operation of state farms in the past. Similarly, not all poviats where state farms used to operate belong 
to this cluster.11
Former state farms consist of land poviats which are characterised by very high unemployment rates (the highest out of all clusters), 
relatively high employment in agriculture, although much lower than in Low-productivity agriculture and Agricultural and industrial, 
alongside the lowest total employment out of all clusters. One distinguishing feature of this cluster is that employment in rural areas is 
below and unemployment above the national average – it is the only cluster where such situation occurs.
Poviats from this cluster can be found in twelve voivodeships, however, 75 per cent of their population is concentrated in the dolno-
śląskie, lubuskie, pomorskie, warmińsko-mazurskie and zachodniopomorskie voivodeships. In the lubuskie, warmińsko-mazurskie and 
zachodniopomorskie voivodeships, persons living in poviats grouped in this cluster account for more than 60 per cent of population.
Wages are comparable to those in clusters 5 and 6 and much lower than in the remaining clusters. It is worth noting that the diﬀerence 
between this cluster and Towns is much greater in terms of own proceeds of administrative districts per capita than in terms of wages. 
The above indicates that – alongside lower employment and higher unemployment – the economic activity dynamics are much lower 
in these areas (similarly to clusters 5 and 6). Interestingly enough, poviats belonging to this group are characterised by the lowest po-
pulation density, irrespective of the relatively large (compared with clusters 5 and 6) share of urban population in the total population. 
This is a consequence of high concentration of people in small towns and low concentration in villages.
Table II.6.
Basic characteristics of the cluster Former state farms in 2005 based on LFS data
Population structure (Ps) and basic labour market indicators   Employment structure in the cluster
(Poland=100) by size of place of residence in the cluster 
size of place  Ps LFPR ER UNR 
of residence
>100 000  2 87 77 152 
50-100 000 7 99 89 148 
20-50 000 19 94 87 135 
10-20 000 15 98 91 133 
<10 000  13 96 88 142 
rural  45 96 88 142 
total  100 96 88 140 
Source: Own elaboration based on LFS data.
11 We have not managed to get hold of data which would allow us to precisely determine in which poviats state farms were located and what was the share of people working in such farms 
in the total number of employees.
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1.4.5. Low-productivity agriculture
The cluster labelled Low-productivity agriculture includes land poviats characterised by very high employment in agriculture and, at the 
same time, by relatively high unemployment levels and the largest number of unemployed persons per vacancy. Aﬃliation of poviats 
results not only from the indicator of employment in agriculture, but also from the generally worse labour market situation than in 
poviats belonging to Agricultural and industrial (and hence, this cluster also consists of poviats which have the share of persons working 
in agriculture close to the average in cluster 6).
The disadvantage of labour market in the cluster (in comparing to the sixth cluster) is visible not only in the unemployment statistics 
but also in the share of persons working in industry and – to a lesser degree – also in services in the population. Poviats from Low-pro-
ductivity agriculture are also characterised by the lowest share of urban population, very low population index and the lowest share of 
higher education graduates. It should be emphasised that, according to the NPC, this cluster has the highest employment and partici-
pation indicators. The above results from the fact that the number of persons working in agriculture is barely vulnerable to economic 
cycle12 (the overall labour market situation was very bad at the time of the NPC) and therefore, to some extent, it does not reﬂect the 
tough situation in the labour markets of poviats belonging to this cluster. It should be assumed that a considerable part of people 
employed in agriculture generate in fact hidden unemployment (hence the name of the cluster). Poviats belonging to this cluster can 
be found in nine voivodeships, and in the świętokrzyskie and lubelskie voivodeships, they are inhabited by more than 50 percent of 
the total populations of these voivodeships. In terms of population numbers, most people from this cluster live in the mazowieckie 
voivodeship (almost 1.5 million people). 
Table II.7.
Basic characteristics of the cluster Low-productivity agriculture in 2005 based on LFS data
Population structure (Ps) and basic labour market indicators   Employment structure in the cluster
(Poland=100) by size of place of residence in the cluster 
size of place  Ps LFPR ER UNR 
of residence
50-100 000 1 94 84 146 
20-50 000 9 103 99 118 
10-20 000 9 100 95 123 
<10 000  7 100 95 125 
rural  75 106 112 73 
total  100 105 108 86 
Source: Own elaboration based on LFS data.
 1.4.6. Agricultural and industrial 
This cluster only consists of land poviats. In many ways they are similar to Low-productivity agriculture, however, the level of employ-
ment in agriculture is in their case twice lower and the share of employment in industry is high (the second highest after Suburbs). The 
labour market situation – in terms of unemployment rates and the number of unemployed persons per vacancy – is visibly better. What 
is more, the share of urban population is also higher, alongside similar average wages and barely higher share of higher education 
graduates.
It can be assumed that this cluster groups poviats which either historically have had a less dispersed ownership structure of arable 
lands, or which saw certain progress thanks to the development of the neighbouring Development centres and – to a lesser extent 
– Towns. Poviats belonging to Agricultural and industrial can be found in all voivodeships apart from the świętokrzyskie, warmińsko-
-mazurskie and zachodniopomorskie voivodeships, and they are particularly numerous in the wielkopolskie and podkarpackie voivo-
deship, where they are inhabited by more than 50 per cent of the total populations of these voivodeships.
The role of industry in Agricultural and industrial is striking. On the one hand, it illustrates the higher level of urbanisation of these (land) 
poviats, and on the other hand, it evidences a more dynamic development of industry in this cluster in the recent years (see the next 
sub-chapter).
p u b l i c  s e r v i c e s ;  1 6 . 4
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Table II.8. 
Basic characteristics of the cluster Agricultural and industrial in 2005 based on LFS data
Population structure (Ps) and basic labour market indicators   Employment structure in the cluster
(Poland=100) by size of place of residence in the cluster 
size of place  Ps LFPR ER UNR 
of residence
50-100 000 7 100 98 109 
20-50 000 16 101 98 114 
10-20 000 10 100 97 112 
<10 000  9 102 104 89 
rural  58 103 107 82 
total  100 102 103 93 
Source: Own elaboration based on LFS data.
1.5. Recent developments within particular clusters
One drawback of research studies conducted at the poviat level is the impossibility of analysing longer time series. In fact, reliable data 
are available as from the year 2000 (only in some cases). Earlier administrative and methodological changes make it eﬀectively impos-
sible to compare data concerning larger groups of poviats. In view of the above, in this analysis, we focus on time series for particular 
clusters derived from LFS. As regards the employment rate and the number of the working population, relevant data seem to support 
– to some extent at least – the observations resulting from earlier analyses at the voivodeship level. What is particularly striking, howe-
ver, is the weak reaction of the employment rate in Low-productivity agriculture to the economic slowdown of 2001-2002 (poviats from 
this cluster saw even an increase in the number of the working population in 2001 compared with 2000). Interestingly enough, in this 
cluster, as well as in the Development centres, the decline in the employment rate lasted one year longer than in the other clusters (and 
generally in Poland), and in the following years its increase was smaller than average. Consequently, towards the end of the examined 
period, the standing of Low-productivity agriculture, compared with the rest of the country, was similar – in terms of the employment 
rate and the number of the working population – to that in 2000 (in 2000, the employment rate amounted to 107.6 per cent of em-
ployment rate for Poland, and in 2005 – 107.9 per cent). Notwithstanding the above, in 2005, the employment rate in this cluster was 
the highest in Poland.
Irrespective of the decline – though slightly lower than average – in employment in the period 2000-2002, in the following years, 
Development centres failed to create as many new work places as the other clusters. In particular, the above is clearly visible for the 
number of the working population which, throughout the entire period, was characterised by greatest stability. Consequently, the 
relation between the employment rate for this cluster and the employment rate for Poland deteriorated from 106.8 per cent in 2000 
to 105.6 per cent in 2005. Nevertheless, Development centres retained its second best rank in terms of the employment rate after Low-
-productivity agriculture. 
The greatest improvement – in terms of the employment rate – in comparison with the remaining clusters was experienced by Sub-
urbs. The initial decrease in the employment rate was levelled out by its considerable increase in the period 2002-2005, whereas the 
increase in the number of the working population was even greater. Consequently, the relation of the employment rate in Suburbs and 
in Poland grew from 94.7 per cent in 2000 to 97.8 in 2005.
As for Former state farms, the results are somewhat surprising and to some extent incompliant with the expectations based on earlier 
analysis conducted at the voivodeship level. According to the earlier analysis, the initial strong divergence of the employment rate was 
followed by its considerable convergence. Notwithstanding the above, as demonstrated in Chart II.4., changes in the employment rate 
for the above cluster reached similar levels as changes in this indicator for Poland, and therefore their relation was relatively stable (87.7 
per cent in 2000 and 87.8 in 2005).13
12 As we argue in the subsequent part of this analysis, it seems that the process of restructuring of Polish agriculture has been taking place, however, in the period 2001-2002, it slowed down 
due to the unfavourable situation in the labour market. At the moment the number of people working in agriculture diminishes especially rapidly in the cluster Low-productivity agriculture, 
although not in all voivodeships.
13 This was the lowest indicator in all groups throughout the examined period.
p u b l i c  s e r v i c e s ;  1 9 . 0
a g r i c u l t u r e ;  2 4 . 4
i n d u s t r y ;  2 7 . 2
c o n s t r u c t i o n ;  6 . 0
m a r k e t  s e r v i c e s ;  2 3 . 4
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Box II.2. Advantages of proximity – Suburbs and subregions around cities versus development 
opportunities
It clearly ensues from analyses of both changes in and levels of employment and productivity that subregions surrounding larger cities 
(i.e. the warszawski, poznański, wrocławski, and, to a lesser extent, gdański and łódzki regions), as well as poviats belonging to Suburbs 
benefit from the proximity of larger dynamically developing metropolises.
This positive impact of a large and rich neighbour results from a range of factors. Among the key benefits, there are human flows (i.e. 
work available in the metropolis for the inhabitants of the surrounding areas) as well as greater investment attractiveness, which relies 
on the proximity of a large market and usually better-developed infrastructure. One obvious example is the tendency to build large 
shopping centres and warehouses in the suburban areas, however the development of the manufacturing was also of importance.
Another particularly interesting phenomenon, which can currently be observed in Poland, is the so-called suburbanisation of large 
cities – meaning that the economic significance of the surrounding areas increases in relation to the city itself. The above trend mani-
fests itself in the improving labour market situation, but also in a considerable increase in the population of Suburbs.
Some of the data that we have obtained indicate that the largest cities may in fact encounter certain development obstacles, which 
also enhances the partial transfer of economic activity to the neighbouring areas. Among factors that encourage such transfers, there 
are, above all real property prices (of both accommodation as well as land and facilities for business use), limitations imposed by the 
existing transport infrastructure, labour cost and labour force availability.
However, the proximity of a large centre does not automatically guarantee success, which is well exemplified in the central śląski sub-
region. Although it constitutes the largest conglomeration in Poland (and, for that matter, one of the largest in the CEE region), it lags 
behind the other Development Centres and their Suburbs. The share of the declining industries is surely of importance. Nevertheless, it 
is worth noting that the śląska conglomeration, irrespective of its barely impressive labour market indicators and unfavourable dyna-
mics of such GDP per capita or productivity, is still a subregion which has one of the highest population income levels.
Poviats belonging to Towns saw the highest decline in employment and participation, alongside the unemployment rate comparable 
to the average trend for Poland. Moreover, there was a considerable reduction in population levels and its scale suggests extensive 
migrations from Towns to other clusters (see part on migrations). In Agricultural and industrial, changes in the employment rate were 
in line with the general trend throughout the entire period, which resulted in levels marginally higher than the employment rate for 
Poland. The evolution of participation and unemployment rates (as well as the numbers of the economically active and of the unem-
ployed), as presented in Chart II.4., unfolded accordingly to changes in employment. An opposite relationship of unemployment is 
obvious, whereas the correlation between participation and employment rates – self-explanatory in the long term – has also been 
proven empirically to be a short-term relationship. In view of the previously presented data, the decrease of the participation rate for 
Towns cannot be explained by the changes of the labour market situation. Neither can this decrease be explained by reference to de-
mographic factors because a similar decrease in participation was observed in the examined period in the age group 15-64. Moreover, 
the evolution of the unemployment rate for Development centres and Suburbs is also somewhat puzzling. 
To sum up, it seems that diﬀerences in the initial (in 2000) employment, participation and unemployment levels did not aﬀect the 
evolution of the labour market situation too much and that this evolution followed a similar path in all clusters. In particular, the good 
initial performance in Development centres did not improve later on but it deteriorated slightly. Towns was the cluster that saw the 
highest decrease in employment and participation, irrespective of its relatively stable unemployment and a considerable decrease in 
population. Urban centres in this group not only failed to exert a positive inﬂuence on the surrounding poviats but they also were not 
attractive enough for some inhabitants (in terms of living and working conditions), thus leading to population outﬂows from Towns 
– probably above all to Development centres and Suburbs. Almost certainly the reason for this migration tendency was that with the 
human capital comparable to that in Development centres, average wage in Towns was lower by an average of about 25 per cent.
In some clusters there occurred a curious evolution of the unemployment rate. What is most striking, in Development centres and Sub-
urbs this indicator increased most in relation to the average for Poland. As for Development centres, this can be explained by the base 
eﬀect, i.e. the lowest unemployment rate at the beginning of the examined period (and despite a considerable increase – also at the 
end of it) out of all clusters. In Suburbs, the relative increase in unemployment was accompanied (in 2002-2005) with the highest incre-
ase in the employment rate. Suburbs was the only cluster where, during the examined period, there was an increase in participation 
and in total population (especially in Suburbs within the śląskie voivodeship). The scale of this phenomenon indicates clearly that it 
occurred as a result of migration and not demographic processes. An evident increase in population, although not as considerable as 
in Suburbs, could be observed in Development centres. These observations are in line with the analysis of internal migration discussed 
in Part III of this report.
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Chart II.4.
Index of basic labour market indicators and numbers of the working, economically active and unemployed populations in particular 
clusters (age group 15+)
  Employment rate, 2000=100        Employment, 2000=100
 
  
  Labour force participation rate, 2000=100        Labour force, 2000=100
 
  
  Unemployment rate, 2000=100                      Unemployed, 2000=100
 
  
  Population aged 15+, 2000=100                     Basic indicators, 2005
Source: Own calculations based on LFS data.
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Table II.9. 
Basic labour market indicators for the age group 15+ by clusters
Source: Own calculations based on LFS data.
Another important element of the analysis of changes in employment is the observation of its structure from the perspective of sectors 
of the economy. During the examined period, there occurred certain material reallocations of labour resources in all clusters. We have 
divided our analysis into two periods, namely 2000-2003 and 2003-2005 (the years 2002-2003 constituted a period of stabilisation in 
labour markets and a beginning of an era of growth in employment in all clusters) and we measure the changes as a ratio of employ-
ment change in the sector to the population aged 15+ (hence, Chart II.5. illustrates contributions of speciﬁc sectors to changes in the 
overall employment rate in percentage points).
In the ﬁrst of the above-mentioned periods, there occurred a nation-wide decline in employment in all sections, with the largest 
contribution of industry, then agriculture and construction and smallest in market services and public services. The total decline in 
employment amounted to approximately 3.5 percentage points and was highest in Towns, and lowest – in Suburbs. Due to the fact 
that we are looking at net changes in particular sectors, one can hardly talk about reallocation in the situation where employment was 
on the decline in nearly all sections. Private services (in Development centres and Suburbs) and public services (in Development centres 
and Low-productivity agriculture) constituted a certain exception here; an increase in employment was also observed in agriculture in 
Former state farms.
It is also striking that, despite the previously illustrated relative stability of employment in Low-productivity agriculture, this cluster – as 
well as Agricultural and industrial – saw a considerable decrease in employment exactly in agriculture. The above ﬁnding undermines 
the opinion that agriculture behaves – at least at the national level – countercyclical and constitutes a kind of “buﬀer”. This sort of 
phenomenon was probably also perceptible to some extent in the period 2000-2001, however, it seems that in the later period restruc-
turing processes in agriculture were getting more intense, although these changes were not even across particular voivodeships (see 
Box II.4.). It is particularly noteworthy that in Low-productivity agriculture the decline in employment in agriculture extended also into 
the period 2003-2005. As for the relative stability of employment in 2000-2003 in this cluster, it resulted above all from the marginal 
contribution of sections other than agriculture in the said employment decline.
employment rate
Development centres
Suburbs
Towns
Former state farms
Low-productivity agriculture
Agricultural and industrial
Poland
labour force participation rate
Development centres
Suburbs
Towns
Former state farms
Low-productivity agriculture
Agricultural and industrial
Poland
unemployment rate
Development centres
Suburbs
Towns
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Poland
PL 2000=100
106.8
94.7
99.6
87.7
107.6
102.4
100.0
101.2
93.4
100.9
96.9
104.6
101.0
100.0
71.2
93.2
106.8
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85.0
92.9
100.0
2000
50.7
44.9
47.3
41.6
51.1
48.6
47.5
57.3
52.9
57.1
54.8
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57.2
56.6
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15.0
17.2
24.1
13.7
14.9
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54.0
59.8
56.7
56.3
13.6
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38.3
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55.0
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21.5
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17.0
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44.0
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17.2
18.4
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46.8
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43.2
38.7
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56.9
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18.3
20.3
26.6
16.2
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47.7
44.2
43.8
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48.7
46.7
45.2
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57.5
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Chart II.5. 
Changes in the employment by sections as percentage points of overall employment rate
   2003 do 2000                                           2005 do 2003
   
Source: Own calculations based on LFS data.
In Development centres and Suburbs, the largest contribution to the employment decrease was due to industry – which is to some 
extent in line with expectations concerning the transition to modern economy based essentially on employment in services. As for the 
period 2000-2003, the problem was that the job destruction in industry was not matched by their suﬃcient job creation in services. It 
should also be emphasised that in the case of Suburbs the general picture of the situation in industry was essentially aﬀected by the 
high contribution of the śląska conglomeration and its high employment in mining. The manufacturing in this cluster was only a minor 
decrease in employment in 2000-2003, whereas in 2003-2005, the number of the working population already went up by 6 per cent.
Table II.10. 
Employment in clusters by sections in 2005 (2000=100)
* – these data are not fully reliable due to small sample size
Source: Own calculations based on LFS data.
The situation changed radically in 2003-2005, when – particularly in Suburbs and Towns but also in Development centres – there was 
an employment increase driven by market services. Their development, however, was uneven, and, what is more, it seems that the 
more rapid increase of employment in Suburbs suggests that this is where activity was transferred from Development centres. In Sub-
urbs, sections that saw the most dynamic development were transport services, ﬁnancial brokerage (in both sections, the working 
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populations grew by almost 30 per cent in 2000-2005) and trade (20 per cent increase), whereas the number of persons working in 
these same sections in Development centres were diminishing (with the exception of a slight increase in transport). Similar tendencies 
were apparent in public services (apart from a comparable increase in administration). It is noteworthy that in 2005 employment in 
the above-mentioned sections accounted in Development centres for a highest share of total employment comparing to other cluster 
(except for trade in Suburbs).
The section hotels and restaurants saw an employment increase above all in Development centres and Low-productivity agriculture. In the 
latter case, this increase could be linked with, for instance, the development of tourism in some rural areas, however, it should be noted 
that the share of this section in total employment in cluster 5 remains marginal. Similarly, the employment dynamics in real estate and 
company management in Low-productivity agriculture and Agricultural and industrial should be linked, above all, with very low initial 
employment in these sections. As for Low-productivity agriculture, increased total employment in market services was largely due to 
the employment increase in transport.
 
Box II.3. Special Economic Zones
Special Economic Zones are administratively separated areas within the territory of Poland created to enhance business activity on 
preferential terms. The main idea behind them was to attract new investment to areas with particularly harsh labour market situation 
by using a variety of business incentives. The rules and procedure of establishing SEZs were provided for in the Act dated 20 October 
1994 on special economic zones. At that time, the statutory incentives provided a strong impulse for investors to set up their compa-
nies within SEZs:
Entrepreneurs holding relevant licences were entitled to:
• total exemption from corporate income tax for the initial period of 10 years of business,
• 50 per cent exemption from corporation income tax in the following years as long as a given SEZ exists,
• exemption from real estate tax.
Total exemption from tax – under the conditions dictated by extensive tax burden – was a powerful tool for luring new investment. 
However, the investment support system used in SEZs was not in line with the rules of public aid in the European Union. Hence, after 
accession to the EU, Poland was compelled to harmonise the rules of public aid in SEZs, which largely diminished their attractiveness. 
At present, the rules governing public aid granted to entrepreneurs operating in SEZs are varied and they depend above all on the 
date of issue of a licence.
Presently, there are 14 SEZs in Poland: three in the dolnośląskie voivodeship (Legnica, Kamienna Góra, Wałbrzych), one in the lubuskie 
voivodeship (Kostrzyn), two in the pomorskie voivodeship (Słupsk, Sopot), two in the warmińsko-mazurskie voivodeship (Olsztyn, 
Suwałki), one in the łódzkie voivodeship (Łódź), one in the śląskie voivodeship (Katowice), one in the małopolskie voivodeship (Kra-
ków), one in the świętokrzyskie voivodeship (Starachowice) and two in the podkarpackie voivodeship (Mielec and Tarnobrzeg). Some 
SEZs operate in the territory of more than one voivodeship (e.g. the Tarnobrzeska Economic Zone, which also covers the lubelskie, 
mazowieckie and świętokrzyskie voivodeships). In total, SEZs cover 99 poviats, out of which 45 belong to Former state farms, whereas 
in the other clusters the number of poviats covered by SEZ oscillates between 8 and 13. From the spatial perspective, there is a near 
absence of SEZs in eastern Poland (in the podlaskie and lubelskie voivodeships) and a remarkable over-representation in the northern 
and north-western Poland.
At the end of 2005, the overall SEZ area of 8,000 hectares attracted investment which amounted to more than PLN 25 billion with 
employment of more than 110,000 people. Public aid amounted to approx. 11 per cent of all investment outlays (in 2004). The share 
of the automobile sector in total investment was the greatest (especially in the katowicka, wałbrzyska and legnicka zones), whereas 
timber processing was crucial in the mielecka zone, electronics – in the pomorska zone, paper, stationary and information carriers in 
the krakowska and kostrzyńsko-słubicka zones.
The emergence of new investment in SEZs entailed a development in related production and services – above all, geodetic, design, 
construction, hotel and transport services, but also in real estate agency and IT services. For instance, in the mielecka SEZ, the number 
of providers in the market for IT, photocopy, facsimile, switchboard and cash register equipment increased five-fold. There was also 
excessive investment in infrastructure which served not only investors but also local communities.
As for changes in employment in industry, it is worth noting that in the recent years there has been a considerable expansion in em-
ployment in lower-developed clusters, i.e. above all in Agricultural and industrial, but also in Low-productivity agriculture and Former state 
farms. Based on the analysed data, it is diﬃcult to ﬁrmly establish causes of the above phenomenon. It probably ensues from the fact 
that – alongside lower labour cost and reservation wages in these regions – industry can be relatively more competitive, especially 
labour-intensive industry. On the other hand, however, due to low wages and large shares of rural population involved in agriculture, 
there is hardly any place now for an expansion of market services. It should also be emphasised that the decline in the number of 
people working in industry in Suburbs should be totally attributed to the restructuring of mining (as previously mentioned, Suburbs 
cover a considerable part of the śląska conglomeration). In the manufacturing alone operating within Suburbs, there occurred an em-
ployment increase. As for Former state farms, the increase in employment was surely due to the fact that SEZ were often established in 
poviats belonging to this cluster (see Box II.3.).
93
Employment in Poland 2006                       Regional Labour Markets 
    II. 
Box II.4. Employment in agriculture and the situation in local labour markets
In the last years, there has been a continuing decreasing trend in the number of people working in agriculture. Between 1992 and 
2005, employment in this sector decreased from 3.5 million people to less than 2.5 million. However, in the particularly harsh period 
for the Polish labour market, namely the years 1999-2002, the outflows form agriculture were smaller, which suggests that employ-
ment in agriculture was a kind of “buffer” in periods of deteriorating labour market performance. Despite this considerable decline 
in labour input in agriculture, people involved in this sector still account for approx. 17 per cent of the working population, which is 
a share several times greater than in the developed countries. In addition, Polish agriculture still distinguishes itself because of its low 
productivity which accounts for as little as approx.  4 per cent of GDP.
Employment in agriculture and its productivity are subject to strong regional disparities. Generally, Low-productivity agriculture, which 
is characterised by small farm sizes and high employment, is largely concentrated in eastern and south-eastern Poland. The western 
and north-western Poland cover areas where numerous state farms used to operate in the past, which results in lower (at least for the 
time being) employment in agriculture and much greater average farm sizes. Leaving aside historical reasons of the territorial diversi-
fication of Polish agriculture, it should be noted that this diversification entailed different employment evolution patterns in particular 
voivodeship, whereas these changes have not always been overlapping with the processes unfolding within particular clusters. In the 
period 2000-2005, there occurred a decrease in the employment in agriculture by almost 10 per cent, with an even greater decrease 
in Agricultural and industrial and Low-productivity agriculture, and a minor increase in Former state farms. The above indicates that the 
process of modernisation in agriculture as well as the levelling out of differences between regions in this respect are to some extent 
a consequence of demographic and migration processes (aging of people working in agriculture, outflow of younger people to other 
sections). Moreover, in some of the traditionally agricultural voivodeships – such as the podlaskie, podkarpackie and małopolskie 
voivodeships – there were poviats which saw a rather considerable increase in employment in agriculture, including low-productivity 
agriculture, and where the general decrease in employment in agriculture was lower than average (in the małopolskie voivodeship 
there even occurred an increase due to the increased number of people working in agriculture in Low-productivity agriculture). The 
increase in the number of people working in agriculture was also significant in some poviats belonging to Former state farms – parti-
cularly in the zachodniopomorskie, lubuskie and pomorskie voivodeships.
 
Table II.11. 
People working in agriculture in 2005 (2000=100) based on LFS data 
 
Due to the fact that clusters 3-6 are inhabited by more than 90 per cent of people working in agriculture, clusters 1-3 were omitted.
x – no poviats belonging to a given cluster can be found in a particular voivodeship
* – data are not fully reliable due to small sample size; 
. – data are unreliable due to small sample size.
Source: Own calculations based on LFS data.
To sum up, the processes of restructuring and modernisation in agriculture unfold unevenly. As much as in Former state farms, the 
increased role of agriculture ensues from the development of modern, productive farming, only some poviats in clusters 5 and 6 have 
seen a remarkable decrease in employment in agriculture. The above may indicate serious problems with job creation outside agricul-
ture in such voivodeships as the małopolskie (excluding Kraków), podkarpackie and podlaskie voivodeships.
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Towns had the lowest employment dynamics in most sections. This ﬁnding is understandable considering that this cluster had seen 
a decrease in the number of its population, and thus in the working population. Nevertheless, it is the structure of changes that is 
astonishing – alongside stable or increasing employment in education and administration as well as real estate and company mana-
gement, there were considerable falls in the remaining service sections. What is more, the above changes were often much deeper 
than in the processing industry. Although these developments unfolded above all in the period 2000-2003, followed by a period of 
increasing employment in market services, the changes in the employment structure point to a labour market stagnation in Towns. 
Table II.12. 
Summary on labour market developments by clusters 
*Based on the employment structure and its changes.
Source: Own elaboration.
General
labour market
situation (2005)
Relative change 
in situation 
2000-2005
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High, increasing
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the average, 
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improvement
Marginal, rapidly 
decreasing
High, rapidly 
decreasing
Average, rapidly 
increasing
Average, rapidly 
increasing
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and
participation 
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the average, 
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above-average
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None
Average, 
decreasing
High,
increasing
High,
increasing
Low-productivity 
agriculture
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employment
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low unemployment
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Crucial, rapidly 
decreasing
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Marginal, rapidly 
increasing
Marginal, rapidly 
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farms
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employment 
and 
participation, 
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decreasing
Average, 
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unemployment
Slight 
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Map II.4. 
Poviats with Special Economic Zones (2005)
 
Source: Own elaboration based on information provided on websites of particular SEZs.
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In order to complement the analysis of changes in particular clusters, we make an attempt at tracing these changes with one additional 
element in mind, namely the division into voivodeships. In a number of cases, aﬃliation to a given cluster is not as important – when 
it comes to changes in employment – as aﬃliation to a given voivodeship. In other words, by additionally introducing a division into 
voivodeships to the analysis of clusters, we wish to better grasp the diﬀerences within clusters.
Out of all clusters, changes in Development centres and Towns were most homogeneous – in the period 2000-2005, nearly all voivo-
deships registered a decline in the number of the working population similar to the total decline for the above clusters. Development 
centres and Towns in the śląskie voivodeship departed from this trend and experienced an increase in the number of the working 
population, which was particularly considerable for Development centres.14 
As for Suburbs, which registered the largest total percentage increase in employment, it seems that the said increase occurred in all 
voivodeships where poviats from this cluster can be found. Nevertheless, all conclusions in this respect should be cautious because in 
most cases LFS data for this cluster – taking into account the division into voivodeships – fall short of being fully representative.
In the remaining three clusters, the diﬀerentiation of changes in the number of the working population by voivodeships was much 
greater. The above concerns above all Former state farms, which recorded an overall increase in employment. However, this increase 
was concentrated mainly in the lubuskie voivodeship and – to a much lesser extent – in the zachodniopomorskie and opolskie voivo-
deships, alongside a signiﬁcant decline in poviats belonging to this cluster found in other voivodeships. As for Low-productivity agricul-
ture, the increase in the number of the working population occurred above all in the małopolskie voivodeship (and to a lesser extent 
in the podkarpackie and łódzkie voivodeships). In Agricultural and industrial, employment increased mainly in the śląskie, pomorskie 
and lubelskie voivodeships.
In general, in the period 2000-2005, there occurred moderate convergence at the level of clusters as well as at the level of voivodeships. 
Our previous considerations pertaining to changes in the employment rate presented in Chart II.6. As can be seen, four clusters (1, 
4, 5 and 6) eﬀectively did not change their relative positions.15 One cluster – Suburbia – converged by catching up with the average, 
whereas another – Towns – diverged by increasing the distance from the average. Convergence is a little bit better visible at the voivo-
deship level (also because of their greater number) and so three voivodeships did not change their relative employment rates, eight 
converged (out of which four by decreasing the advantage and four by decreasing the advantage), ﬁve diverged (out of which one by 
increasing the advantage and four by increasing the disadvantage). 
 
Chart II.6
Employment rate (Poland=100) in 2000 and 2005 in clusters and voivodeships
 
Source: Own calculations based on LFS data.
14 However, the observation concerning the increasing number of the working population in the śląskie voivodeship seems doubtful to the extent that it is not supported by any of the 
other data sources. In particular, data on employment, presented in the decomposition of productivity (see sub-chapter 1.6.2), exhibit an opposite direction of changes. What is more, data 
on the number of the registered unemployed do not imply an improvement in the labour market situation which is advocated by BAEL. On the other hand, however, the improvement 
resulting from BAEL is evident, spread out in time, and it is also apparent in the case of the employment indicator. To sum up, the nature of changes in the labour market in the śląskie 
voivodeship in ambiguous.
15 Although in Development centres there was marginal convergence by decreasing the advantage, and in Agricultural and industrial – a marginal divergence by increasing the advantage.
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1.6. Developments in regional labour markets versus GDP and productivity
We begin our analysis of recent changes in regional GDP disparities by looking at them from the perspective of voivodeships. In 2004, 
the only voivodeship with decidedly higher-than-average GDP per capita levels was the mazowieckie voivodeship, and three other 
voivodeships had GDPs per capita levels marginally above the average, namely the dolnośląskie, śląskie and wielkopolskie voivode-
ships. The outstanding weight of the mazowieckie voivodeship results from the fact that it is the most densely populated and at the 
same time the richest out of all voivodeships. It is worth noting, however, that it is the Warsaw city subregion that determines this high 
standing. In 2004, the remaining subregions of the mazowieckie voivodeship (including the Warsaw subregion, i.e. the surroundings 
of Warsaw) had GDPs per capita below the average for Poland, and the ostrołęcko-siedlecki and radomski subregions were among the 
lowest-developed areas in the country. The lowest output (less than 80 per cent of the average) was recorded in the lubelskie, opolskie, 
podkarpackie, podlaskie, świętokrzyskie and warmińsko-mazurskie voivodeships. 
As demonstrated in Chart II.7., in the period 1995-2004, there was a considerable increase in the GDP per capita inequalities between 
voivodeships. As much as in 1995, the lowest-developed voivodeship at that time, i.e. the podlaskie voivodeship (meaning the areas 
which now belong to this voivodeship) was characterised by GDP per capita of 76 per cent of Poland’s average, compared with 126 
per cent recorded by the mazowieckie voivodeship, in 2004, these ﬁgures amounted to 69 per cent (for the lubelskie voivodeship) and 
152 per cent (for the mazowieckie voivodeship). In relation to the national average, the situation got relatively better only in the łódzkie, 
wielkopolskie and obviously in the mazowieckie voivodeships. Surely it must be emphasised that in absolute terms all voivodeships 
saw a considerable increase in output (total and per capita), notwithstanding the above, in he mazowieckie voivodeship it was much 
faster than in the rest of the country, whereas in the kujawsko-pomorskie, lubuskie, opolskie, śląskie and zachodniopomorskie, it was 
much slower than the national average for Poland.
The study of changes in value added per capita at the subregional level (see Table II.13.) demonstrates an even greater disparities – and 
a considerable growth thereof. As much as in 2004, value added per capita in Warsaw was almost three times higher than the average 
for Poland, in 1995, it was twice as high. What is more, none of the subregions developed as dynamically as Warsaw, and only Poznań 
developed much faster than average. The remaining large cities only managed to slightly improve their situation in relation to the 
average for Poland (Kraków, Łódź, Wrocław), whereas some of them lost slightly (Tricity). In the remaining regions it was more common 
that their distance to the average increased – this concerned in particular regions considered lower-developed as early as 1995.
Chart II.7. 
GDP per capita by voivodeships in 1995 and 2004
  GDP per capita, Poland = 100  GDP per capital deviation (percentage) 
                                                                                                              from the national average
   
Source: Own elaboration based on BDR data.
It should be emphasised again that the situation for particular regions deteriorated only relatively because all of them recorded an 
increase in output and value added per capita. At the same time, however, there occurred – at the level of voivodeships as well as 
of subregions – an excessive real divergence which stemmed from the fact that lower-developed regions had been lagging behind 
better-developed regions.
It should be noted, however, that the above observations are distorted by the rapid development of the largest metropolises – above 
all, Warsaw but also Poznań and Kraków. Changes unfolding in these cities had a considerable impact on the level of output per capita 
for Poland and thus they make the national average an imperfect measure of diﬀerentiation.
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In view of the above, in order to examine the relative changes in the situation of particular regions in the period 1995-2004, we have 
conducted an analysis of deviations from the adjusted national average for Poland – calculated without large cities.16 We present our 
ﬁndings in Chart II.8. which is divided into four parts. Subregions in the upmost and bottom quarters exhibited an increase in deviation 
from the average (and thus these subregions contributed to divergence) due to faster-than-average growth rates for subregions from 
the upmost quarter, and slower-than-average for subregions in the bottom quarter. Subregions in the left and right quarters contri-
buted to the decrease in diﬀerentiation – and so subregions from the left quarter recorded faster-than-average growth rates in the 
examined period, whereas those from the right quarter – slower-than-average.
Thanks to their higher-than-average development rate, the increase in divergence was due to subregions surrounding the largest 
cities and to the ciechanowsko-płocki subregion, which increased the distance from the adjusted national average by more than 20 
percentage points – most probably this increase can be attributed to the development of the largest enterprise in Poland which is 
seated in Płock.17 
Chart II.8.
GDP per capita by voivodeships in 1995 and 2004 
The above chart does not present the following subregions: legnicki, Wrocław, Tricity, Kraków, Poznań and Warsaw – they all belong to the upmost qu-
arter which means that they develop at a rate higher than the adjusted national average and that the deviation from this average is so great that their 
inclusion in the chart would confound the clarity of results.
Divergence / Convergence – means greater / smaller distance from the national average in the period 2000-2005.
Decrease / Increase – mean that convergence or divergence occurred thanks to the relatively slower or faster growth comparing to the growth of 
adjusted averagee.
Source: Own calculations based on CSO data (2006).
However, some subregions in the eastern and south-eastern part of Poland – in particular the bielsko-podlaski, chełmsko-zamojski 
and krośnieńsko-przemyski subregions – were developing slower than average, thus increasing the negative deviation from the ad-
justed average. There where no diverging subregions in central and western Poland, although in some cases these subregions were 
developing at a slower-than-average rate, irrespective of their above-average initial GDP per capita levels. This concerned in particular 
the szczeciński, jeleniogórsko-wałbrzyski, gorzowski, bydgoski and toruńsko-włocławski subregions, and the słupski subregion in the 
north of Poland.
The exclusion of the largest cities from the average and the coeﬃcient of variation provides a less clear-cut picture of changes in the 
relative situation of particular subregions. It seems that – with the coeﬃcient of variation of GDP per capita at the level of 16.1 in 1995 
and 17.8 in 2004 – divergence between regions was small. Chart II.8. also indicates that in terms of the GDP per capita dynamics there 
are no “losers” – apart from the above-mentioned exceptions – among the Polish subregions. It is possible, however, to identify subre-
gions where the results are decidedly above-average.
Irrespective of the fact that the GDP per capita analysis is conducted at the level of subregions, whereas clustering – at the level of 
poviats, it should be noted that in the case of the largest cities, subregions overlap with poviats and thus best-performing subregions 
in terms of GDP per capita belong to Development centres. The issue of aﬃliation is not so straightforward in the case of subregions with 
worse results – nevertheless, there is no doubt as to the fact that these subregions are inhabited above all by the populations of Low-
-productivity agriculture and Agricultural and industrial (with the exception of the słupski subregion dominated by Former state farms). 
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16 This category includes the following subregions: centralny śląski, Tricity, Kraków, Łódź, Poznań, Warsaw and Wrocław.
17 Out of regions not presented in the chart, Wrocław, Tricity and the legnicki subregion retained deviations from the adjusted average at almost the same levels and thus did not contribute 
much to the increase in convergence / divergence.
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1.6.1. Developments in productivity and employment
Diﬀerences in the level of development – measured in GDP per capita and in the closely-related value added per capita – are conside-
red a factor that is inherent to the labour market to the extent that more attention should be paid to the analysis of causes of interre-
gional diﬀerentiation and its evolution. Developments in average productivity at the national level are dictated by its increasing values 
in particular sectors as well as by the reallocation of labour resources between sectors having diﬀerent productivity levels. As follows 
from the analyses conducted by Bukowski et al. (2006b), in Poland, similarly to other countries, convergence of labour productivity 
results from its increasing values in particular sections of industry and services, and not from the reallocation of employment between 
sections.18 Unfortunately, we do not have suﬃciently detailed data on value added at the level of subregions to be able to conduct the 
above-mentioned analysis because some of its elements are only possible at the level of companies (see chapter 2 of this part). 
As for labour productivity and employment level (analysed upon the exclusion of agriculture, i.e. for industry and services only19), the 
processes unfolding in the period 1995-2004 were not even and the relative positions of particular regions were subject to material 
shifts in time. In order to emphasise the changes, we have divided this analysis into three subperiods, namely 1995-1998 (increase in 
employment and productivity), 1998-2002 (decrease in employment, increase in productivity) and 2002-2004 (another increase in 
employment and productivity).
During the period 1995-1998, there was a striking diﬀerence in performance of “urban” subregions which overlapped to some extent 
with Development centres. Although in Warsaw, Poznań and Kraków (and in the surrounding subregions), there occurred a concurrent 
dynamics increase in productivity and employment, in the Tricity, Silesia and Łódź, the increase in productivity was lower and it was 
accompanied by a decrease in employment. In the second group – similarly to all other subregions where there had been a decrease 
in employment – the above resulted from decreased employment in industry and decreased – or only marginally increased – employ-
ment in services.
In the subsequent period, namely in the years 1998-2002, all subregions experienced a decrease in employment, which means that 
not all subregions that had done well in 1995-1998 managed to maintain their relative advantage in the later period. In particular, 
subregions that in the earlier period had registered an above-average increase in employment and only a slight increase in produc-
tivity, were more likely to experience a faster-than-average slump in employment in the second period. This phenomenon could be 
observed above all in lower-developed subregions, such as the bialskopodlaski, białostocko-suwalski, elbląski, ełcki, gorzowski, kosza-
liński, słupski and toruńsko-włocławski subregions. As far as Warsaw and Poznań are concerned, their advantage persisted regardless 
of a decreasing trend in employment, mainly because the decrease was considerably lower than the average. Notwithstanding the 
above, this deterioration in the labour market situation generally concerned all subregions and it is diﬃcult to ﬁrmly establish the 
causes for some minor diﬀerences in this respect – although it seems that subregions with lower labour productivity dynamics were 
characterised by greater vulnerability.
The picture of the period 2002-2004 is most confusing (partly because it is the shortest out of the examined periods). The reversal of 
trends in the labour market and the revival of the economy brought an increase in both the number of the working population and 
productivity in most subregions. However, for the ﬁrst time it was possible to identify subregions where an increase in employment 
coincided with a decrease in productivity. What is more, they were the subregions which were characterised by the highest increase 
in employment and which saw a decrease in productivity in services and industry alike (although it was more obvious in services than 
in industry). As for the group of subregions where the decreasing trend in the number of the working population continued (with 
diﬀerent developments in productivity), it was rather numerous. Moreover, in a number of cases this continuation concerned negative 
(compared to other subregions) trends from earlier period.
One fundamental observation is that the disparities in productivity between subregions increased throughout the examined period, 
however, only due to the productivity increase in industry (see Chart II.9.).20 The exclusion of Warsaw and Poznań from the study lowers 
the increase in disparities only marginally – these cities are untypical because of their concurrent increasing trends in productivity and 
employment (and thus their highly above-average output per capita growth), whereas their productivity dynamics was similar to that 
of a number of other regions (see Chart II.9.).
Throughout the examined period, the situation was best in Warsaw, Poznań and in the subregions that surround them (plus in the 
wrocławski subregion). The other cities too recorded some increase in productivity, however, at the expense of lower employment. The 
subregions where the slump in the employment was highest, also experienced a large increase in productivity (although not larger 
than, for instance, in Warsaw which saw an increase in employment).21 
18 By no means does this imply, however, that no reallocation occurs because it does so on a huge scale at the level of companies, see charter 2 devoted to analysis at the company level.
19 This approach is dictated by serious diﬃculties with estimating the number of people working in agriculture in particular subregions.
20 Productivity and employment changes by subregions in 2004 compared with 1995 are presented in Table II.18. in the Appendix.
21 A ﬁrm assessment is diﬃcult due to modiﬁcations in the borders of particular subregions because these modiﬁcations exerted a great inﬂuence of the process of shaping of the discussed 
indicators. During the examined period, the above-mentioned modiﬁcations concerned the following subregions: centralny śląski, rybnicko-jastrzębski, bielsko-bialski, częstochowski, 
krakowsko-tarnowski and krośnieńsko-przemyski – thus, the results for the above subregions should be approached with particular caution.
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Chart II.9
Productivity and employment changes (for industry and services only) in subregions
   1998 versus 1995 2002 versus 1998
   2004 versus 2002 2004 versus 1995
   
Source: Own calculations based on BDR data.
. 
Chart II.10. 
Changes in coeﬃcient of variation of value added per employee by regions
Source: Own calculations based on BDR data.
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1.6.2. Decomposition of factors determining different levels of value added per capita
Diﬀerent levels of output per capita depend on both the share of people who have work (employment rate) and on the productivity 
of the labour force (which is, in turn, linked with the sector structure). In order to capture the causes for diﬀerences in the level of 
output per capita, we present a decomposition of the percentage deviation of value added per capita of a given subregion from the 
national average for Poland. Moreover, we have divided them into factors relating to labour input (share of the working population 
in total population – higher or lower than average) and labour productivity (value added per employee). We have also accounted for 
diﬀerences in the sector structure of the economy and taken into consideration value added and employment in industry and services 
only, excluding agriculture.
Table II.13. demonstrates how particular factors in industry and services contributed (in percentage points) to the change of percen-
tage deviation from the average between 1995 and 2004 (in the Appendix, we present decomposition of levels for both these years). 
We have selected these two years due to high data availability (they constitute the ﬁrst and last years of the available time series for 
subregions). Positive (negative) contribution means that that there was an increase (decrease) in a given factor (i.e. employment or 
productivity in industry or services) in relation to the national average for Poland. The methodology used is presented in detail in the 
Appendix.
Both in 1995 and in 2004, most diﬀerences between subregions could be explained by referring to diﬀerent labour input in services, 
then to input in industry and to productivity in industry and services. In particular, it was higher employment in large cities that played 
a crucial role. For instance, in 20004, more than two thirds of the (positive) deviation from the average of Warsaw and Poznań could be 
attributed to higher employment in services. The importance of the latter was equally extensive in explaining low levels of GDP per 
capita in lower-developed regions. The decomposition of changes in the deviation from average labour productivity is of particular 
signiﬁcance when it comes to understanding the phenomenon of changes in regional disparities. Increased diﬀerentiation was ma-
inly aﬀected by the services sector – in almost equal measures by labour input and productivity developments – whereas the role of 
industry was minor, although it is worth noting that in the case of industry changes in labour input were of greater signiﬁcance. Par-
ticularly, increases in regional dispersion were dictated by the productivity and labour input dynamics in services in lower-developed 
subregions – much lower than in higher-developed subregions.
Curiously enough, it is viable to distinguish subregions (mainly those linked to large cities) where it was the increase in labour input it 
industry that largely contributed to the increase in diﬀerentiation – this was the case, for instance, in the warszawski, poznański, gdań-
ski, wrocławski and łódzki subregions. What is more, in nearly all large cities, the contribution of employment in industry was negative, 
alongside the generally positive contribution of productivity in industry, however, these changes were marginal compared with the 
positive contribution of services. In the largest urban areas only the katowicka conglomeration (centralny śląski subregion) and the 
Tricity (Gdańsk-Sopot-Gdynia subregion) saw a deterioration in relation to the national average (although in 2004 these regions still 
generated above-average outputs per capita). It seems that the above is due to the intense restructuring processes in industry which 
were not accompanied by – as opposed to Warsaw, Kraków and Poznań – a considerable increase in employment in services. In the 
case of the Tricity, what mattered was the relative decrease in industrial productivity.
Summing up the conclusions from the above decomposition, it can be stated that:
• subregions which were most successful included above all large cities, where there occurred a rapid expansions of services, 
 mainly due to the increase in labour input, and to a lesser degree – and not in all cases – to the above-average increase in 
 productivity in services;
• profound restructuring of industry, which manifested itself in the considerable decrease in labour input, did not necessarily 
 have to bring about a deterioration in relation to other regions, if it was accompanied by a development in services and an 
 increase in industry productivity – this process could be observed, for instance, in Kraków, Łódź, Wrocław and the radomski 
 subregion (in the latter case, no increased role of services was observed but a very high increase in productivity alongside 
 a marginal decline in labour input in industry), whereas it failed in the centralny śląski and rybnicko-jastrzębski subregions as 
 well as in the Tricity;
• positive contribution of industry in terms of employment was also considerable in some lower-developed, peripheral 
 subregions (namely in the kaliski, pilski, olsztyński, ełcki, białostocko-suwalski, chełmsko-zamojski, elbląski and słupski 
 subregions), however, it was not accompanied by an increase in productivity, and the contribution of services was negative 
 (in terms of both employment and – in most cases – productivity), 
• in thirty-three subregions which saw a deterioration in the value added per working person comparing to the national 
 average, the reasons for this were low increase in productivity in services as well as lack of reallocation of labour resources 
 to services; moreover, irrespective of an unimpressive performance in industry, the above group of subregions was more 
 likely to make a positive rather than negative contribution to changes in deviation – however, mainly because of the relative 
 (to the average) increase in labour input (in 21 subregions) rather than in productivity (in twelve subregions); the above 
 results are in line with the total employment changes in industry and in services in the period 2000-2005 in clusters 4-6 (and 
 in particular in Agricultural and industrial). 
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Table II.13.
Decomposition of sources of changes in value added per inhabitant - 2004 to 1995 (Total includes percentage changes representing 
deviations from Poland’s national average in the examined period)
Source: Own calculation based on regional calculations by CSO.
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Poznań
ciechanowsko-płocki
poznański
wrocławski
warszawski
Kraków
rzeszowsko-tarnobrzeski
kaliski
radomski
gdański
częstochowski
pilski
piotrkowsko-skierniewicki
łomżyński
olsztyński
lubelski
koszaliński
Łódź
łódzki
świętokrzyski
ełcki
białostocko-suwalski
krakowsko-tarnowski
elbląski
legnicki
ostrołęcko-siedlecki
jeleniogórsko-wałbrzyski
rybnicko-jastrzębski
Gdańsk-Gdynia-Sopot
Wrocław
zielonogórski
koniński
nowosądecki
opolski
chełmsko-zamojski
centralny śląski
bydgoski
szczeciński
toruńsko-włocławski
słupski
gorzowski
krośnieńsko-przemyski
bielsko-bialski
bialskopodlaski
total
53.8
29.4
17.7
15.4
12.6
10.5
6.6
5.6
4.7
3.2
2.2
1.9
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
0.8
0.6
0.5
-1.6
-1.7
-2.0
-2.6
-2.8
-2.8
-3.5
-3.8
-5.7
-6.4
-6.5
-6.7
-6.8
-6.9
-8.6
-8.8
-10.1
-11.0
-11.1
-11.6
-12.8
-14.3
-14.9
-15.7
-15.8
-16.3
employment
-5.6
-0.9
4.1
12.4
10.1
0.7
-12.1
2.6
9.3
-0.3
7.5
5.8
11.6
0.7
4.4
6.1
3.4
3.6
-6.7
4.6
-1.5
7.4
7.9
-0.6
7.3
0.2
3.9
-0.3
-11.2
-7.8
-8.8
2.2
4.4
4.2
-3.3
8.7
-15.5
2.1
-1.1
4.0
6.3
1.5
1.5
-10.8
5.5
productivity
-1.7
-3.2
13.8
-1.0
3.7
-1.8
4.9
1.9
0.0
8.7
-1.7
2.7
0.3
1.1
5.8
-3.5
-3.7
-1.6
3.9
4.9
3.9
-4.1
-5.2
1.5
-6.9
1.0
8.4
-1.1
8.4
-1.2
1.3
6.6
-6.6
-6.9
3.6
-11.2
4.0
-7.8
-3.2
-6.1
-0.9
0.5
-7.1
3.6
-6.4
  employment
30.3
23.9
5.8
-0.2
-3.1
8.8
10.6
-0.1
-5.2
9.9
-6.5
-3.0
-8.4
-4.5
-6.7
-1.9
1.9
-11.8
1.1
1.5
-10.6
-5.9
0.8
-4.0
-6.3
-3.4
-5.1
-5.3
-2.9
-1.3
7.7
-3.6
-5.1
-7.1
-4.6
-5.2
1.2
1.4
-3.4
-3.7
-5.0
-6.2
-3.9
-8.8
-9.4
productivity
10.4
5.3
-6.4
8.1
5.0
3.1
1.7
1.9
4.1
-14.8
3.3
-3.6
0.5
5.6
0.7
0.2
-0.8
12.2
1.2
-14.3
5.2
-0.8
-6.0
0.7
2.9
-3.0
-10.1
1.8
-4.5
3.3
-3.8
-12.3
1.3
-2.4
-4.9
-9.2
-2.2
-6.8
-5.3
-8.6
-15.2
-10.6
-10.3
2.2
-11.3
residual
20.3
4.3
0.5
-3.8
-3.0
-0.4
1.6
-0.8
-3.4
-0.3
-0.4
0.1
-2.2
-1.4
-2.8
0.3
0.1
-1.8
1.0
1.9
1.2
1.4
-0.1
-0.3
0.2
1.7
-0.9
-0.9
3.7
0.5
-3.2
0.3
-0.9
3.5
0.5
6.8
1.5
0.0
1.3
1.6
0.5
-0.1
4.1
-2.0
5.5
industry               services
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2. Entrepreneurship and job creation at the regional level
Although in the previous chapter, we analysed only the basic indicators which thus provided us with aggregates of various phenome-
na at the level of poviats, subregions and voivodeships, it should be emphasised that their evolution is an outcome of developments 
that take place within particular economic entities. In view of the above, in order to present a complete picture of changes in the 
regional labour markets, it is necessary to take closer look at the situation within enterprises – namely, at how and where they are 
established, how they increase employment and productivity and what are the determinants of these changes.
New ﬁrms play a key role in the creation of jobs and in increasing employment. Hence, we look at them in subchapter 2.1. as we make 
an attempt at explaining where companies are set up and at determining what factors decide about their location. In subchapter 2.2., 
we look at existing companies and we analyse, among others, how and why they aﬀect (increase or decrease) employment also on 
the regional scale.
In the subsequent part of this chapter, we investigate the question of productivity and its growth at the regional level. From a micro-
economic perspective, we analyse recent developments in labour productivity in recent years , linking it to developments in employ-
ment and wages. Throughout this part, we use micro data on enterprises drawn from the ﬁnancial statement database TEGIEL,22 which 
covers approx. 30,000 companies registered within the territory of Poland, operating in all sectors apart from banking and insurance. 
The above-mentioned data covers the period 1995-2004. Due to largely incomplete and imperfect data, the ﬁnal number of compa-
nies included in this analysis amounts to approx. 10,300.23
 
2.1. Entrepreneurship, creation and development of new firms 
In the 1990s, a considerable expansion of entrepreneurship could be observed in Poland. In the period 1993-2005, the number of 
enterprises grew by more than 1.5 million.24 The greatest increase in the number of newly-registered enterprises was recorded during 
the period of rapid economic growth in 1995-1998. A vast majority (around 98 per cent) of the newly-registered enterprises had a si-
milar proﬁle – they were small entities with up to 9 employees (the so-called microenterprises). In 2004, out of the oﬃcially existing 3.4 
million microenterprises, around 1.65 million were actually operating and they employed approx. 3,400,000 people.25 The number of 
large enterprises amounted to more than 40,000 units, employing in total 4.4 million people.
The expansion of entrepreneurship was not, however, homogeneous across the country. The largest number of new economic units 
(per capita) emerged in the mazowiecki region and – surprisingly enough – in the zachodniopomorski region. The least enterprises 
operate in the lower-developed, rural areas in eastern Poland (for instance, the number of microenterprises per capita in the podkar-
packie voivodeship is nearly twice smaller than in the zachodniopomorskie voivodeship).26 Moreover, the share of entrepreneurs in the 
total employment excluding agriculture is strongly diversiﬁed depending on the size of place of residence – it is lowest in rural areas 
and highest in towns of up to 2,000 inhabitants, where most probably scarce employment opportunities encourage people to set up 
their own businesses (80 per cent of them do not employ anyone, compared with the 62 per cent average for Poland) oﬀering simple 
services. On the other hand, larger cities normally house enterprises that oﬀer “high-productivity” services. Map II.5. presents a geogra-
phic distribution of enterprises in Poland.
Map II.5. 
Number of registered economic units per 100 inhabitants by poviats in 2004 
 
Source: Own calculation based on REGON data.  
22 This database has been made available to IBS by the company Infocredit, which cooperates with the leading European database producer – the Belgian company Bureau Van Dijk on 
establishing a standardised base of ﬁnancial statements of companies from all around Europe, called AMADEUS.
23 They are companies employing at least 20 persons. More than 75 per cent (i.e. 7,500) of companies included in the database employ at least 50 persons, which constitutes a substantial 
part (approx. 25 per cent) of the total number of enterprises employing 50 employees or more registered with REGON (National Oﬃcial Business Register).
24 These data derive from REGON where all newly-established enterprises are registered. Unfortunately, liquidated enterprises had not been removed from the register on a regular basis (as 
it is a time-consuming process) and it is estimated that even as many as half of the entries in REGON may be outdated.
25 For more than 75 per cent of them, this was the main work place.
26 Regardless of the imperfect nature of data derived from REGON, these observations are conﬁrmed in LFS data (share of people working on their own account in the total number of the 
working population excluding agriculture).
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It is worth noting that the correlation between the number of economic units operating within a given poviat and the indicators 
characterising the labour market situation is weak, although statistically signiﬁcant. By excluding poviats with an above-average share 
of agriculture considerably increases the correlation between the above-mentioned variables (according to data for 2004, it amounts 
to 0.6). The level of economic activity of a given region is very closely related to the level of entrepreneurship within such region and it 
results in better labour market performance.
Box II.5. Entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship, in its broad meaning, is one of the key elements of economic growth. The role of enterprises in stimulating social 
and economic development was emphasised, among others, by Joseph Schumpeter, who presented – in his creative destruction 
theory, how the emergence of new enterprises affects productivity and market efficiency by introducing competitive pressure.
The creation of new enterprises is determined by both pull factors, such as rising demand in particular sections or regions, decreased 
competition from other companies) and push factor:. for instance, limited alternative employment opportunities, but also tax system 
solutions, product market regulations, access to financing, etc.
2.1.1. Regional disparities in economic activity in Poland
A vast majority of the analysed enterprises are located in Development centres. This is due to relatively high levels of entrepreneurship 
in these poviats as well as to the nature of database used for the purposes of this study.
Development centres attract above all service providing enterprises. Their share in employment is higher by almost half than the na-
tional average, alongside a low share of employment in industry. Moreover, more frequently than in other regions, these enterprises 
operate in the high-productivity services sector (ﬁnancial intermediation, real estate management), and therefore they require highly 
qualiﬁed staﬀ. The highest share of higher education graduates in the country is no doubt one of the factors that determine the lo-
calisation of enterprises in poviats belonging to this cluster. Warsaw and its surrounding areas have a special position in Development 
centres because this is where an extensive share of foreign direct investment has been channelled (Wiśniewski 2005), thus enhancing 
the creation and development of numerous high-productivity enterprises which dispose of advanced technologies and know-how. 
Other research (see Cieślik, Kaniewska 2004) demonstrated that the localisation of enterprises with foreign capital had been largely 
aﬀected by the conglomeration eﬀect and the available telecommunications infrastructure, which also constituted an incentive to 
invest and set up companies in Development centres. 
In the remaining clusters, industrial enterprises dominate. In particular, in poviats belonging to Former state farms, more than 64 per 
cent of the employees work in the manufacturing.27 In Towns, it is also services that are of importance, however, they are above all 
simple services. 
2.1.2. Where are new jobs created?
During the last decade, Development centres have been most successful in terms of entrepreneurship. Both the number of companies 
and employment have been growing faster than the average rate in the country.28 Their structure has also been changing for the better 
– the share of people working in industry has declined in favour of the service sector. The scale of entrepreneurship in Development 
centres is also reﬂected in the REGON data, according to which, in 2005, the number of economic units registered in Development cen-
tres per capita was higher by half than the national average.
In Suburbs, in 1996-2004, employment in enterprises grew at a marginally higher rate than in the other regions of Poland (apart from 
Development centres). In these areas enterprises were relatively most rare to be set up, however, they were also the largest. Economic 
units operating in Suburbs in mid-1990s were gradually decreasing employment, whereas employment in newly-established enterpri-
ses was on the rise. The job reallocation occurred both within particular industries and between sectors.29
 
27 The enterprises are, on the one hand, involved in unmodernized industry, and on the other – new companies operating in manufacturing set up in SEZs.
28 Please note that we are talking here about diﬀerent data than these analysed in the previous chapter. We are now looking at a diﬀerent group (previously – entire working population, 
now – only enterprises entered in the database), but above all the database used in these calculations presents the working population by work place, whereas the previously used LFS 
data presents them by place of residence. Therefore, the increase in employment in enterprises from Development centres that can be observed in Table II.14. is in line with the observations 
pertaining to the positive impact of this cluster on Suburbs – and in particular on the employment of the inhabitants of Suburbs in Development centres.
29 The share of employment in simple services grew, similarly to employment in enterprises oﬀering public services, such as education, healthcare, waste management, sport and leisure.
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Table II.14. 
Employment in enterprises by clusters in the period 1996-2004
Source: Infocredit data.
The situation in Towns, compared with other clusters, was very unfavourable; the increase in the number of enterprises was much lower 
than Poland’s average, and the same applied to the increase in employment. Moreover, these regions were characterised by the lowest 
job creation rate and the lowest survival of jobs (see Box II.7.). However, this gloomy picture based on data from individual enterprises 
is negated by the relatively good labour market performance. It seems that the above phenomenon can to some extent be explained 
by scarce data on the smallest companies in the database that we refer to in our analysis. This assumption is supported by the relatively 
high number of newly-registered enterprises (based on REGON data) out of which the share of microenterprises was pre-eminent. 
Thus, it can be acknowledged that Towns was largely a market ﬁlled with microenterprises which stimulate their economic activity and 
thus aﬀect the labour market situation in a positive manner. What is more, large employer activity, including high-productivity foreign 
investment, in these regions is rather unimpressive. The above is coherent with the observation that although the situation in Towns is 
relatively good in terms of labour market indicators, it has deteriorated in the recent years in relation to the remaining clusters.
Large share of employment in industry was typical for poviats belonging to Former state farms, although the reallocation of employ-
ment from industry to services in 1995-2004 was evident. This group is strongly heterogeneous. Regardless of a relatively low overall 
indicator of the number of ﬁrms per capita, it includes poviats where the level of entrepreneurship is high. Importantly enough, 
compared with other clusters, Former state farms have the largest share of enterprises from poviats where Special Economic Zones are 
located. It can be assumed that investment generated by SEZs contributed to the substantial development of local enterprise in these 
regions.
In the period 1996 – 2004, the number of enterprises grew most in poviats from Low-productivity agriculture, although, at the same 
time, the increase in total employment in enterprises in this region was the lowest. The above resulted from a substantial decline in 
average employment in ﬁrms – much to a surprise, in the mid-1990s, the average number of employees in enterprises in this cluster 
was the highest in Poland. This was largely due to very low initial level of small entrepreneurship. These poviats accommodated above 
all large enterprises operating in the declining sections of industry. A vast majority of them have substantially lowered employment in 
the course of the last decade (in total, it declined by more than 40 per cent), which implies large-scale restructuring. In the examined 
period, in Low-productivity agriculture, there occurred a diversiﬁcation of activity as new enterprises started to operate – in manufac-
turing as well as in trade and services, although on a smaller scale than in the other parts of the country. REGON data conﬁrm that 
irrespective of a signiﬁcant increase in the number of enterprises, the level of entrepreneurship (measured by the number of ﬁrms 
per capita) in these regions is still the lowest in the country. It can be observed that the creation of enterprises in Low-productivity 
agriculture is not followed by their resulting development or by an increase in employment. As opposed to the tendencies observed 
in Former state farms and in Agricultural and industrial, where both the number of enterprises and employment were of the rise, in 
Low-productivity agriculture, there exist certain structural obstacles to the development of entrepreneurship and the improvement of 
the economic situation. These obstacles include large share of employment in agriculture and low incomes of population, as well as 
limited professional qualiﬁcations of the labour force.
Interestingly enough, in poviats belonging to Development centres, Former state farms and Low-productivity agriculture, the numbers 
of newly-established ﬁrms (and in the case of the ﬁrst two groups – also of the existing ones) vary substantially depending on the 
existence of SEZs within a given poviat (see Box II.3). Barak (2001), in his research on foreign investment in Poland, noted that foreign 
investment was partly channelled to “old industrial areas” in order to renew the physical capital. Hence, SEZs were frequently establi-
shed in these regions – at least at the beginning, however, these initiatives resulted above all in an increased productivity and not 
employment.
1 - Development centres
2 - Suburbs
3 - Towns
4 - Formers state farms
5 - Low-productivity agriculture
6 - Agricultural and industrial
Total
Average employment 
1996
Poland=100
114
85
95
84
130
84
100
Average employment, 
2004
Poland=100
115
97
97
82
87
83
100
Change in
the number of ﬁrms 
1996 – 2004
Poland=100
108
87
88
98
123
109
100
Overall change
in employment 
1996 – 2004
Poland=100
112
102
87
94
71
109
100
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Box II.6. One-person enterprises
The survey of one-person enterprises conducted in 2004 at the request of the European Commission made it possible to compare the 
situation and specificity of the self-employed in Poland with results from eighteen other European countries. One-person enterprises 
in Poland distinguish themselves in terms of their experiences in the scope of their own development – half of the respondents dec-
lared that they had been employing an employee under a regular contract in the past, compared with 28 per cent in Europe. It can 
be assumed that the reduction of size of microenterprises to their owners only was connected with the economic slowdown in the 
period preceding the survey. What is more, the expectations [in Poland] as to the hiring of employees in the future were also higher.
One-person enterprises in Poland also distinguish themselves when it comes to their answers to the question about the number of 
institutions that they would have to deal with when hiring an additional employee. More than 40 per cent of entrepreneurs in Poland 
reckon that they would have to deal with three or more institutions, which is by far the highest result out of all examined countries. 
Moreover, relatively many Polish companies regard recruitment procedures as time-consuming (40 per cent of the respondents poin-
ted out that administrative procedures enabling the hiring of the first employee would last more than one week, compared with 31 
per cent in the rest of the EU).
In comparison with the other examined countries, Polish entrepreneurs were least likely to confirm that there was a possibility that 
the hired employee begins his work immediately (23 per cent of responses, compared with the average of 28 per cent in the EU, and 
39 per cent in Estonia which scores highest in the above respect).
Source: European Commission, Flash barometer, Hiring and employment procedures for one-person-enterprises, 2004.  
2.1.3. Existing jobs 
The situation in local labour market depends not only on whether and on what scale new enterprises are set up, but also on their 
development potential. The process of increasing employment by existing ﬁrms is determined by a range of factors at micro- (above 
all, by productivity and management eﬃciency within companies, access to capital and technologies) and macro-levels (economic 
situation in the country, in global and local markets). Research on changes in employment in enterprises, covering the period of econo-
mic transformation (early 1990s), mostly conﬁrmed the opinion that state companies – sustained by soft budgetary constraints – were 
characterised by inertia in employment restructuring processes. This means that excessive labour resources, inherited from the socialist 
era, were not shed (? were retained?). Relevant adjustments on the part of enterprises started to show in the second half of the 1990s, 
although available research point to a substantial heterogeneity of companies in this respect and an assymetry in adjustments– com-
panies which saw decreasing revenues would lower employment, however, increasing revenues were necessarily resulted in increased 
number of staﬀ. The scale of adjustments depended, above all, on the size of a given company, its ownership structure, and the condi-
tions in the local labour market (Grosfeld, Nivet, 1997). Mickiewicz, Gerry, Bishop (2004), who studied a panel of large Polish companies 
in the later period (in 1996-2002), proved that in fact increased employment was a consequence of changes in revenues, in both new 
private-owned companies and in privatised companies, but not in state companies. What is more, employment response to negative 
demand shocks (decrease in revenues) was much lower in the state sector. The local labour market situation proved unimportant in the 
analysed model. Moreover, the authors demonstrated that increasing employment was associated with better regional infrastructure.
Survival of new jobs in Poland varies considerably across regions. Companies that increase employment tend to preserve them for a re-
latively long time in Development centres, Suburbs and in Agricultural and industrial. Chances of preserving increased employment are 
slimmest in the case of companies that operate in poviats belonging to Towns and Former state farms. Box II.7. presents hazard functions 
(of declining employment) using Cox regression model for enterprises that increased employment in 1998. Greater survival rates of 
jobs created in Development centres result, to some extent, from the sector structure of enterprises operating in these poviats and from 
the relatively low share of employment in companies operating in industries characterised by higher risk of employment loss.
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Box II.7. Survival analysis
Survival analysis allows for examination of time (interval) until a specific event occurs (e.g. company close-down, employment reduc-
tion). This interval is commonly referred to as survival time. Its goal is to assess the probability of survival past a certain time t and the 
cumulative survival function provides a total proportion of cases surviving until a given point in time (assuming that the probabilities 
of survival are independent across intervals). The cumulative hazard (risk) function is a non-survival function which models the proba-
bilityof the given event occurring in that time period, given survival through all prior time intervals (for instance, the probability that 
a company which has been operating for 5 years closes down in the sixth year of operation). 
One of the most general and popular regression models used in survival analysis is the Cox proportional hazards model. It does not 
specify any baseline hazard rate.. This model identifies the incidence of risk in time t for the analysed combination of independent 
variables. It can be expressed as the following formula:  
 
where h(t: x
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, x
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,..., x
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) is the resulting hazard function with given n explicatory variables x
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,..., x
n
 In the Cox model formula, the hazard 
is calculated as a product of two values: h
0
(t) is n unspecified baseline hazard or zero line hazard (i.e. hazard where the values of all in-
dependent variables are equal to zero); the second component, after taking the logarithm, gives a „simple” linear model, which makes 
the model easy to estimate. For two units with identical explanatory variables the estimated hazard rate will be constant in time, hence 
the name of the model (proportional hazard model).
Using the Cox hazard model, we have studied changes in employment in firms. We have included the following dependent variables: 
time until the loss of the first of the new jobs in the company and average duration of the new jobs. It ensues from our analysis that 
age of the company impacts the survival of jobs (every year increases the probability of employment reduction by approx. 1.5 per 
cent) as well as its size (it marginally increases the probability of decline in the number of employees). Moreover, sector coefficients 
– although insignificant – indicate that companies operating in industry face higher, and those operating in simple services, lower 
probability of employment reductions than enterprises from the high-productivity services section (I – K). 
Chart II.11. presents hazard functions for time until the loss of the first new job in a given company and for the average duration of 
new jobs, in accordance with the methodology of Boheim et al. (2005). Jobs created in 1998 constitute a point of reference in our 
analysis. In both analysed cases, hazard function curves for jobs created in companies operating in Towns and Former state farms reach 
highest, and thus the probability of employment reduction at any time is higher. The lowest risk of new jobs loss is typical for regions 
in Agricultural and industrial and Suburbs. 
Chart II.11. 
Hazard functions for time until first new-created job is lost (left graph) and average duration of new jobs (right graph)
   
Source: Own calculations based on Infocredit data. 
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2.2. Creation, destruction and reallocation of jobs s in regional perspective 
Creation and destruction of jobs is a lasting element of every market economy. Turnover of workers is to some degree natural and is 
connected with retirement decisions or voluntary resignations as well as dismissals. The intensity of such ﬂows on the labour market 
determines its ﬂexibility which allows for a rapid reallocation of resources to more productive ﬁrms and thus for a more eﬀective utili-
sation of labour resources. In the United States, one in ten employees quits his/her job every quarter (Davis et al. 2006). What is more, 
it is also workers’ ﬂows between companies that are important. According to research presented by Hamermesh et al. (1996), in Dutch 
enterprises a substantial share of successful recruitments occurs in companies which actually limit employment.
Box II.8. Job creation and destruction
Thanks to firm level data, the analysis of job flows on the labour market allows to investigate a very interesting part of the labour 
market, namely job creation and destruction at the company level. This analysis uses the following indicators: job creation, destruction 
and reallocation rates, as well as net employment growth and excessive reallocation.
Job creation rate is calculated as the total employment gains in companies expanding in the period (t-1, t) in relation to employment 
in all companies at time t-1. Job destruction rate is the total of destroyed jobs (i.e. difference between employment at t-1 and t in 
companies which have reduced employment) in relation to employment in all existing companies. The sum of the above two rates is 
referred to as gross reallocation rate, whereas the difference between them as net employment growth. The difference between the 
gross reallocation rate and the absolute value of net employment growth provides the “excess reallocation” rate.
By referring to the above-mentioned indicators, we can characterise the flexibility of a given labour market. A net decrease (increase) 
in the number of jobs can result from a range of events – liquidation of an according number of jobs without creating new ones – or 
from a much higher job destruction rate alongside a positive job creation rate. Higher job creation and destruction rates indicate that 
a given market is dynamic and that it experiences an unending relocation of labour resources.
The excess reallocation rate is treated in the literature as an approximation of the restructuring index which reflects its intensity. If 
a given company wishes to survive (prevail over other competitors operating in the market), it is compelled to modify the production 
structure, dismiss ineffective employees and hire performing ones. If indeed there is a reallocation of resources from exiting firms to 
the ones entering the market, as well as between sectors and regions, one might reasonably expect that the excess reallocation rate 
and level of restructuring are positively correlated. 
In our analysis, we have employed the methodology proposed by Davis and Haltiwanger (1990), and used also by Faggio and Konings 
(2001). We have decomposed the excess reallocation rate between- and within components, in accordance with the following formula:
where GJR is the gross reallocation rate, Z is the size of employment, NEG – net employment growth rate, EJR – excess job reallocation 
and p stands for a regional unit (this analysis has been conducted for both clusters and poviats). In 1997, approximately 34 per cent 
of “excess job reallocation” in enterprises was still occurring between clusters (employment decreased mainly if firms operating in 
Development centres and Former state farms). In later years (1998-2001), employment was declining in all regions and all reallocation of 
jobs took place within clusters. This trend continued also following the year 2003 thus confirming the claim that the improvement of 
the labour market situation and the increase in employment applied to all clusters. 
 Table II.15.
Reallocation of jobs within and between poviats
As from 1998, employment reallocation between enterprises has been taking place, also at the poviat level, above all within such local 
labour markets.
Table II.16. demonstrates how the rates of job creation and destruction evolved in Poland in the period 1997-2004. Prior to 2003, em-
ployment in existing companies has been on the decline, which is in line with the general employment developments at the level of 
enterprises (employing more than 9 people) in the economy of that time. The only episodes when there were substantial divergences 
in relation to the available data on all enterprises in Poland took place in 1998-1999 and 2001-2002. During the period of crisis and 
economic slowdown, the decrease in the number of jobs in the existing companies was much greater than the total net employment 
fall. This proves that the net entries of companies into the market (entries of new companies minus exits of the existing ones) largely 
mitigated the situation in the labour market.30
30 This diﬀerence can probably also be explained by under representation [of small ﬁrms (less than 49 employees) in our database. International research indicates that in case of an economic 
slowdown these companies exhibit slower and lower decrease in employment than in the largest companies (PARP, 2001). 
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Table II.16. 
Job ﬂows in the period 1997-2004 (percentages)
Source: Own calculations based on Infocredit data.
These job ﬂows were not, however, evenly distributed across the country. Job creation was characterised by relatively low diﬀeren-
tiation in the examined period, although in Towns and Low-productivity agriculture, in 1998-2001, it was much lower than in the other 
regions. Downsizing took place in companies from all clusters and was determined by high job destruction rates, which increased 
substantially in 1999. What is more, companies in Towns reacted to the economic crisis of 1998 with a slight delay and the greatest 
decrease in employment occurred there in 2000 (see Chart II.13.). The reaction of companies that continued operation to the economic 
revival was the weakest in Low-productivity agriculture, which conﬁrms the conclusions on their poor market position. 
As demonstrated in Box II.8., the rate of excess reallocation is often treated as an approximation of the employment restructuring that 
takes places in the market. It is widely argued in the literature (e.g. Faggio and Konings, 2001) that greater “turbulence” in the labour 
market (measured in excess reallocation) leads to a greater employment increase. The above authors, in their analysis of regional labo-
ur market developments in a number of CEE countries, observed a positive correlation between the excess reallocation rate and net 
employment growth. Similar correlations (although substantially varied in time) were observed in the clusters that we have singled 
out (see Chart II.12). Although the excess reallocation within clusters for the entire examined period (1996-2004) was not correlated 
with net employment changes (coeﬃcient of correlation for the entire period is close to zero), during the period of crisis of the end of 
1990s, and even more so during the economic slowdown of 2001-2002, high rates of excess reallocation evidently correlated with the 
increase (or lower decrease) in net employment (coeﬃcient of correlation for the period 2001-2002 amounted to 0.79).
Charts II.12.
Net employment growth and excess reallocation rate in clusters in the period 1996-2004
Blue dots represent values for 2001-2002.
Source: Own calculations based on Infocredit data.  
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Charts II.13.
Job ﬂows within clusters in the period 1997-2004
   
   
   
Source: Own calculations based on Infocredit data. 
Faster and deeper restructuring and reallocation of jobs to more eﬃcient and productive ﬁrms was mitigating total employment falls 
in enterprises. Moreover, restructuring i that took place at that time often exerted a positive inﬂuence on labour market performance in 
the later years – correlations between the employment growth in 2004 (in poviats) and the rate of excess reallocation in 2001-2002 are 
weak but statistically signiﬁcant. During boom periods, the situation would change radically – in regions where companies increased 
employment at a higher rate, the excess reallocation rates were lower. However, the rates of jobs creation in poviats in 1996-1997 and 
then after the period of economic slowdown (2004) are not correlated, which indicates that the “regional map” of ﬁrms traditionally 
increasing employment has changed. The literature provides evidence that employment growth tends to be greater in companies 
located in regions with better infrastructure (see Mickiewicz, Gerry and Bishop, 2004). Aidis and Mickiewicz (2005) have demonstrated 
that regional job creation in was enhanced by the region’s links with foreign markets. Rutkowski and Przybyla (2002) have proven also 
that job creation rates are positively correlated with infrastructure indicators (such as the number of telephone lines) as well as with 
the level of human capital. These results seem to be further supported by our analysis which implies that the highest level of entrepre-
neurship achieved in Development centres is related to their relatively highest levels of infrastructure and human capital, which we had 
taken into account when creating the six clusters of regional labour markets.
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2.3. Productivity and employment in regional perspective 
In this section, we make an attempt at answering the question about the degree of regional disparities in productivity between Polish 
companies and about their potential sources. The level of ﬁrm productivity31 in particular clusters was characterised by signiﬁcant 
– although declining with time – diﬀerences demonstrated in Chart II.14. Both in 1995 and in 2004, enterprises from Development 
centres distinguished themselves by the highest productivity, nearly twice higher than productivity in the worst-performing - in terms 
of productivity- enterprises in Former state farms and Low-productivity agriculture. Although diﬀerences between regions for the worst 
and average productive enterprises (i.e. at the level of 1st. and 5th. decile) were diminished in the course of the examined decade, the 
gap between companies with the highest productivity in Development centres and Former state farms persisted, which points to the 
inability of the latter to attract capital and high-productivity investment. The situation got much better in this respect in Suburbs and 
Towns where a number of enterprises with above-average productivity emerged in the period 1996-2004. 
Chart II.14. 
Average ﬁrm-level productivity by clusters in the years 1995 (left graph) and 2004 (right graph) 
   
Source: Own calculation based on Infocredit data.
Regional diﬀerences in productivity result from diﬀerences in the sector composition of ﬁrms within clusters as well as from diﬀerences 
in the ﬁrms productivity among particular sections. The level of ﬁrm-level productivity depends on a range of factors which characte-
rise a given enterprise (i.e. section of the economy, where it operates, its ownership structure, capital intensity, level of innovativeness, 
etc.). Available literature32 indicates that certain characteristics of the region where a given company operates may also play a role. 
Among these, the signiﬁcance of conglomeration eﬀects (including the so-called spillover eﬀects, knowledge and skills diﬀusion pat-
terns) is particularly worth stressing. According to research conducted in Great Britain (Boddy et al., 2005), it is population density in 
particular regions and distance (time of travel) from the capital that shape diﬀerences in productivity between regions. Other factors 
include production structures of particular regions (regions with high productivity are often characterised by a large share of employ-
ment in services, although their structure is also of importance33), as well as human capital levels in a given region.
Data on Polish enterprises indicate that the correlation between the level of ﬁrm productivity and population density in the poviat 
where it operates is weak, but statistically signiﬁcant. These observations were reﬂected in a regression analysis, the results of which 
we present in Table II.17. The above-mentioned analysis demonstrated that greater population density in a given poviat is associated 
with higher average company productivity. Population density is an indication of the size of local labour markets and it most probably 
translates into economies of scale for entrepreneurs, thus leading to higher average productivity. Moreover, the structure of production 
in a given poviat is also signiﬁcant, and even more so the share of employment in industry because the latter is negatively correlated 
with the average level of productivity.34 Firm level productivity is also positively inﬂuenced by local employment rates although the 
direction of this causality is not obvious. The results of our analysis are in line with the observations of similar phenomena in other 
countries, namely that often “younger” companies are characterised by higher productivity. What is more, enterprises operating in 
some sections of the economy typically exhibit substantially higher productivity than companies that oﬀer “other services” (section 93) 
– these are the sections that have been highlighted in bold in Table II.17.
31 In this chapter productivity is approximated by revenues from sales per one employee.
32 See for instance “European Competitiveness Report 2003” by the European Commission.
33 For instance, tourism-related services are characterised by relatively lower productivity.
34 Which is rather astonishing. Nevertheless, data from regional  accounts conﬁrm that productivity in services is in most regions slightly higher than productivity in industry.
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Table II.17. 
Estimation results of parameters in the model explaining labour productivity in enterprises in the period 1995-2004
* “Other service” serve as a reference group (93).
parametr
constant
employment in industry, % in 2004 
ﬁrm age ( 2004)
NACE
Mining and quarrying
Mining and quarrying of energy producing materials
Mining and quarrying, except of energy producing materials
Manufacture of food products, beverages 
Manufacture of tobacco
textiles 
Manufacture of wearing apparel
Manufacture of leather and related products
wood and of products of wood and cork 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media
Manufacture of coke and reﬁned petroleum products
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
Manufacture of basic metals
Manufacture of machinery and equipment
Manufacture of oﬃce equipment
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
manufacture of radio, tv and communication equipment
manufacture of medical instruments
manufacture of transport  equipment
manufacture of other transport  equipment
manufacture of furniture
recycling  
electricity, water and gas supply
Collection and distribution of water
construction
sale of motor vehicles
wholesale and commission trade
retail trade
hotels and restaurants  
land transport
water transport
air transport  
supporting transport activities
post and telecommunications
ﬁnancial intermediation
insurance
auxiliary activities to ﬁnancial intermediation
real estate
renting of machinery and equipment
IT
R&D
other business activities
public administration
education
health and social policy
sewage disposal
Activities of membership organizations
cultural activities
employment rate 
population density
Estimates
123.6
-273.5
-2.2
257.4
150.4
130.3
376.5
2096.9
149.8
84.9
103.0
249.7
395.7
140.0
1408.4
380.3
254.2
209.4
395.8
171.4
1019.2
138.3
284.7
94.4
392.4
146.8
194.9
462.2
248.3
73.5
158.4
1115.4
996.6
233.2
-35.6
99.0
602.3
90.2
300.9
534.1
837.7
419.6
1873.2
299.7
640.9
134.5
-42.5
315.5
2730.8
-21.7
23.7
62.0
-91.9
359.2
58.8
16.0
Standard error
172.6
81.7
.293
248.5
198.6
184.7
172.6
328.2
183.9
184.3
205.7
182.6
185.6
180.7
270.7
178.2
177.2
176.5
186.7
174.6
305.3
180.9
197.1
190.6
186.8
194.3
178.9
223.0
174.7
178.4
171.8
174.6
171.0
174.1
188.8
174.6
297.2
539.754
178.3
200.7
185.6
281.1
219.2
172.9
260.3
182.3
183.3
174.2
422.9
185.8
177.9
183.4
286.8
188.1
6.8
6.6
Signiﬁcance level
.474
.000
.000
0.30
0.45
0.48
0.03
0.00
0.42
0.65
0.62
0.17
0.03
0.44
0.00
0.03
0.15
0.24
0.03
0.33
0.00
0.45
0.15
0.62
0.04
0.45
0.28
0.04
0.16
0.68
0.36
0.00
0.00
0.18
0.85
0.57
0.04
0.87
0.09
0.01
0.00
0.14
0.00
0.08
0.01
0.46
0.82
0.07
0.00
0.91
0.89
0.74
0.75
0.06
0.00
0.02
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An increase in productivity of a given enterprise depends above all on its individual features (such as level of innovativeness, ownership 
structure, size, etc.) and to a lesser degree on the macroeconomic environment or section of the economy in which it operates (Bukow-
ski et al., 2006b). The decline in the diﬀerences in the average level of company productivity between clusters in 1995-2004 was mainly 
due to the rapid increase in productivity in companies with the lowest initial levels of productivity (Bukowski et al., 2006b), which were 
more numerous in worse-performing – in terms of productivity – clusters. The factor of localisation of an enterprise in a given region 
was of no intrinsic signiﬁcance for changes in its productivity.
The substantial increase in productivity in the recent years – at the level of the entire economy – has been accompanied by a consi-
derable decrease in employment. At the same time, data on individual ﬁrms show a far-reaching heterogeneity of the situation in the 
above respect: companies which saw an increase in productivity mainly at the expense of employment operated alongside expanding 
companies which saw increasing productivity and employment. Their share was subject to considerable ﬂuctuations – it was lowest 
during the period of economic slowdown in 2001-2002, and it grew rapidly in 2003-2004, that is as soon as the economic situation 
improved (see Chart II.15.). 
Chart II.15. 
Share of enterprises increasing productivity and employment against all enterprises
 
Remark: due to the speciﬁcity of the data base, enterprises increasing employment / productivity include also those enterprises that declare no changes 
in relation to the previous year.
Source: Own calculations based on Infocredit data.
Regional diﬀerences in the extent of “defensive restructuring” (understood as enhancing productivity at the expense of employment) 
were signiﬁcant especially during the period of economic crisis towards the end of the 1990s and during the period of slowdown in 
2001–2002, when the share of enterprises increasing productivity and employment in Development centres was twice larger than in 
Towns. Moreover, the above observations conﬁrm that Towns were most aﬀected by the decline in economic activity and by the re-
structuring processes. In the later period, diﬀerences between clusters were scaled down.
During the economic transformation of the early 1990s, some 20-25 per cent of companies entered or exited the market in the CEE 
countries every year (compared with 10 per cent in the OECD countries). According to the World Bank data, the entry of new ﬁrms at 
that time accounted for the creation of approx. 40 per cent of all jobs in Estonia, Hungary and Latvia, and as much as 70 per cent in 
Romania and Slovenia (Rutkowski, Scarpetta, 2005). Moreover, the correlation between the number of new ﬁrms in a given country 
or sector and total job creation was much stronger in the transforming countries than in the case of mature OECD economies. On 
the other hand, however, job destruction was eﬀectively not associated with ﬁrm exit because the job destruction resulted almost 
completely from job reductions in companies which continued operating. As the economic transformation unfolded, job ﬂows in the 
labour market became similar to those observed in mature market economies, where job creation and destruction is related above all 
to adjustments within companies and not to their entry and exit. 
Regional discrepancies in ﬁrm-level productivity between the examined clusters, in accordance with the classical economic theory, 
should be reﬂected also in diﬀerences in average labour costs incurred by companies. The latter diﬀerences seem to be much smaller 
than diﬀerences in revenues from sales per employee. Although, in 2004, in the distribution of average labour cost in enterprises at 
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the poviat level the 9th. decile was higher than the ﬁrst by a little bit more than 60 per cent, diﬀerences in productivity reached up to 
260 per cent. As demonstrated in Chart II.16., particularly enterprises in poviats belonging to Former state farms were characterised by 
relatively high wages in relation to productivity. These observations may suggest there exists downward wages rigidity, which even in 
companies with relatively low productivity are not shaped freely.
Chart II.16. 
Median value of labour cost and productivity in enterprises in the years 1998 (left graph) and 2004 (right graph), Poland=100
   
Remark: Productivity measured by revenues from sales per employee.
Source: Own calculations based on Infocredit data.
Diﬀerences in productivity and labour costs incurred by companies in diﬀerent regions remain extensive, however, in the last couple of 
years, they have been largely scaled down. In 1998, average productivity of companies from the 9th decile of poviats was almost nine 
times higher than that on poviats from the 1st decile, whereas labour costs were only twice higher. As for the situation of companies in 
Former state farms, it changed only slightly as also in 1998 their average labour cost was relatively high in relation to productivity. Firms 
operating in poviats belonging to Low-productivity agriculture saw diminishing diﬀerences in the above respect, above all thanks to 
the relatively rapid growth in their productivity. As previously mentioned, the gap in ﬁrm productivity in Former state farms remained 
invariably high.
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Summary 
Disparities among voivodeship labour markets in Poland – in terms of both the unemployment rate and the employment indicator 
– are average in international comparison. At the same time, however, greater disparities among local (poviat) labour markets are 
evident – both within particular voivodeships and at the national level. One typical feature for Poland is the lack of a strong correla-
tion (at the subregional level) between the labour market situation and GDP per capita. Although subregions with high GDP per 
capita are characterised by low unemployment, subregions with low GDP per capita include subregions with very low and very high 
unemployment. The above ensues from nominally good labour market indicators for subregions with a large share of employment in 
agriculture, which is largely backward and characterised by low productivity.
As much as diﬀerences between local labour markets are signiﬁcant, there are certain similarities that can be captured between groups 
of poviats. In our cluster analysis we have distinguished six such groups, which we have symbolically labelled as Development centres, 
Suburbs, Towns, Former state farms, Low-productivity agriculture and Agricultural and industrial. Poviats belonging to these groups diﬀer 
greatly as to the characteristics of their labour markets as well as other statistics describing the level of social and economic develop-
ment. However, the analysis of changes in the labour market indicates that both between the labour markets of particular clusters and 
between voivodeships the diﬀerences in the employment rates persisted over the years 2000-2005. At the same time, however, 
there occurred signiﬁcant changes in the level of output per capita, productivity and in the employment structure.
Best-performing Development centres not only maintain their dominant position but they are also able to generate positive outcomes 
in the labour markets of the surrounding Suburbs. This impact is reﬂected not only in employment and unemployment indicators but 
also in favourable changes in the sector structure of the economy and in labour productivity growth. Towns, although in many ways 
similar to Development centres, ﬁnd themselves in the midst of stagnation and their position has been subject to gradual deterioration 
– not only in relation to Development centres but also to other clusters. In particular, Towns (with some exceptions) are not able to gene-
rate any greater positive outcomes for the neighbouring poviats. Some poviats belonging to Former state farms, recorded a substantial 
improvement in their situation, irrespective of the highest unemployment rate throughout the entire examined period. In particular, 
the above concerns those poviats that are located in the western part of Poland, however, this group was characterised by high degree 
of heterogeneity. Low-productivity agriculture did not change its relative position but it saw high labour reallocation from agriculture to 
industry and services. Growth of employment in industry at the cost of agriculture and services could also be observed in Agricultural 
and industrial cluster. 
It is possible that the increase in employment in industry in the last three clusters (Former state farms, Low-productivity agriculture, 
Agricultural and industrial) was accompanied by only a marginal increase in industry productivity, however, this claim cannot be 
ﬁrmly asserted on basis of available data. Moreover, although regional diﬀerences in labour market indicators was scaled down, there 
emerged evident diﬀerences in GDP per capita and productivity (especially in industry). The above can be deduced from the fact that 
in large areas in Poland the improvement of labour market performance is due to the expansion of low-productivity and highly labo-
ur-intensive manufacturing. In the long term, this may mean that, ﬁrstly, the low ability of the Polish labour market to accommodate 
economic shocks will persist, and secondly, the absence of high-productivity industry will limit the expansion of services – accordingly, 
data on changes in the employment structure by clusters indeed evidence no increase in employment in services in Agricultural and 
industrial. 
Our observations of changes in employment and productivity are further conﬁrmed by the analysis of the situation in companies. In 
particular, data on ﬁrm entry and job survival are in line with the relatively good situation in Development centres and Suburbs, whereas 
low scale of economic activity (especially with respect to larger units) in Towns corresponds to the stagnation that has plagued poviats 
belonging to this cluster.
As for other clusters, it should be emphasised that in rural areas the relation between the situation of enterprises and labour market 
indicators is less direct because of the high employment in agriculture. Notwithstanding the above, ﬁrm – level data substantiate the 
rather good, although uneven, results of Former state farms, especially in poviats where SEZs are located, as well as certain reallocation 
and expansion of industry in Agricultural and industrial. When it comes to Low-productivity agriculture, one feature attracts attention, 
namely very low level of economic activity – both in terms of the number of existing ﬁrms and their results – however, also in this 
respect, there have been certain shifts in the employment structure, mainly due to the high dynamics of the ﬁrm entry..
As far as ﬁrm-level productivity is concerned, our analysis has revealed that regions (i.e. location of ﬁrms) are relevant to their pro-
ductivity. What is more, as much as in the period 1995-2004, the distance between the median values of ﬁrm productivity in particular 
clusters was gradually decreasing, in the case of more productive companies (10th decile) this gap actually widened. This ﬁnding is fully 
coherent with the earlier observations concerning the increase in productivity disparities at the level of subregions.
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Introduction
This Part looks at spatial mobility of human resources, which has been in the focus of interest of a number of social sciences – including, 
above all, demography, sociology and economics, but also psychology, political sciences and history. The terminology used in these 
research studies is rather varied and it does not constitute a coherent system. Therefore, for the avoidance of doubt, in Box III.1, we 
brieﬂy present the forms of mobility which are the subject of our further investigations.
The purpose of the analyses presented in this Part of the report is to describe migration movements that are directly or indirectly 
connected with employment, namely internal and international migration as well as work commuting. For each of the above, we 
attempt at estimating the scale of migration and at assessing the factors which – at individual and aggregate levels – determine the 
probability of changes in residence. we put, at the same time, special emphasis on economic factors, including those which are directly 
or indirectly related to the labour market.
Alongside separate analyses of internal and international migration as well as work commuting, we give a lot of attention to mutual re-
lations between these three forms of spatial mobility. We intend to determine to what extent these phenomena substitute or comple-
ment each other. In the conclusions, we also present an assessment of the potential impact that international and internal migration 
as well as work commuting have on the Polish economy and labour market in the medium and long term.
Box III.1. Analysed types of migration
The most important criteria that allow the identification of different types of mobility are (1) distance at which a given person moves 
and borders s/he crosses and (2) time spent away from the primary place of residence. The range of individual motives for change in 
residence is an essential – although often difficult to incorporate in the analyses – aspect of this concept.
Considering the distance and border criterion, we can distinguish internal migration (within a given country) and international 
migration. If we take into account the time spent away from the primary residence, we can make a distinction – commonly referred 
to in the literature on the subject – between (1) work commuting – when migration movements are daily there-and-back commutes 
between home and work, (2) short-term migration – when an uninterrupted stay away from the permanent place of residence lasts 
between approx. 2 and 12 months, and (3) long-term migration – when a stay away from the permanent place of residence lasts more 
than a year. We investigate work commuting alongside migration due to the substitutability of these forms of spatial mobility.
The literature on the subject sometimes also distinguishes permanent residence migration which refers to people who have fulfilled 
all the relevant administrative procedures (e.g. permanent stay registration at the municipal council). Bearing in mind the divergences 
– well-documented in the literature on the subject – between migration records and the actual scale of this process, it should be 
assumed that such approach is subject to a number of limitations and it may give rise to confusion (see, for instance, Bijak, Koryś 2006, 
Sakson 2002).
In accordance with the recommendations of the UN, a stay away from the primary place of residence should be uninterrupted for 
a certain period to be regarded as migration (internal or international, excluding work commuting) – where a period of 2-3 months 
is most commonly accepted as a minimum duration. It is also assumed in the research practice that shorter stays away from the 
primary place of residence do not usually entail employment and are more likely to be connected with tourism, business travels, etc. 
However, the above assumption is not always valid. The literature on spatial mobility of the CEE inhabitants gives an account of the 
phenomenon of seasonal migration, which consists in cyclical periods of approx. 7-8 weeks (Kaczmarczyk, Okólski 2005), when pe-
ople engage – for a specified period – in work away from the place of their residence. This type of migration is typically connected with 
employment in sectors that are characterised by extensive seasonality (e.g. in construction, agriculture, hotel and catering services), 
often (although not always) outside the country of origin. Therefore, when estimating the scale of migration movements – especially 
international migration – we also account for seasonal workers, bearing in mind that they pursue different strategies of their stay and 
work away from the usual place of their residence than long-term migrants.
In our examination of various forms of migration, we also give attention to the phenomenon of return migration. This term refers to 
situations where people who had left and settled in a different country or region, return to the place of their original residence after 
a certain period. Irrespective of the fact that they have the potential to largely modify the long-term impact of migration movements 
on economies and labour markets of both source and destination regions, they constitute the least researched form of spatial mobi-
lity because data necessary for its quantitative description are either incomplete or unavailable. The above also gives rise to difficulties 
which hinder the establishment of an accurate assessment of population reallocation processes – in terms of internal and internatio-
nal mobility – in Poland, which we discuss in the subsequent part of the report.
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1. International migration from Poland before and after EU accession
1.1 Introduction
The accession to the European Union of ten new member states in May 2004 was undoubtedly one of the most signiﬁcant factors 
inﬂuencing migration movements in Central Europe – a region the population of which accounts for a vast majority of the new EU 
citizens and which has had an invariably negative international migration balance for the last several dozen years.
In view of the above migration trend as well as low GDP per capita levels in relation to the EU15 average (see part I) and a relatively 
more diﬃcult labour market situation in the new member states than in the countries of the “old” EU, even before the EU enlargement 
it had been expected that a large wave of economic migration would come from this region to Western Europe. The public debate 
about the likely scale of the inﬂow of immigrants which took place in most EU15 countries was accompanied by various estimations 
of the migration potential of candidate countries. The results of these studies often gave rise to totally divergent conclusions, which 
partly resulted from diﬀerent methodologies used (not always appropriate, as indicated by, for instance, Kupiszewski (2002)) but which 
had to do also with the political context of the discussions about future migration processes.
In accordance with the results of calculations performed by an international research consortium at the request of the European Com-
mission in 1999, the migration potential of the new member states in the long term (until 2030) amounts to approximately 2.7 million 
people. It was assumed that the volume (intensity) of migration would increase abruptly and reach its maximum value of about 335,000 
people immediately after the accession. Then, it was supposed to decrease gradually (to approx. 83,000 people in 2015) and stabilise 
at a low level between a few and several thousand . According to the estimates provided by the said consortium, approximately 25-35 
per cent of all people emigrating during the above-mentioned period, i.e. 700,000-900,000, were supposed to be of Polish origin (see 
Brucker et al. 2003, Kaczmarczyk, Okólski 2005). These estimates are in line with the picture painted by a Polish research team (Orłowski, 
Zienkowski 1999), which estimated that in the 10-12 years following the accession the total outﬂow of emigrants from Poland should 
amount to approx. 770,000 people.
In this chapter we attempt at verifying the accuracy of these prognoses as well as the scale of increase in migration from Poland to 
the EU member states after 1 May 2004. Moreover, we intend to answer a number of questions that should be posed in the context of 
migration analysis, among others, how do the Poles do in the European labour market, how does the volume of migration from Poland 
compare to other new member states, what individual- and aggregate-level factors encourage people to move abroad and what are 
the consequences of this migration for the economy and labour market in Poland.
 
1.2. External migration from Poland before and after EU accession.
1.2.1 Introduction
The task of estimating the actual scale of international migration from Poland is hindered by the absence of data of relevant quality.
It is a problem which concerns most of the CEE countries – Poland is no exception in this respect (see Bijak, Koryś 2006). Presently, there 
are a couple of databases which enable the development of independent (also in terms of methodology) estimates of the number of 
Polish international migrants (see Box III.2).
Box III.2. Potential data sources on international migration
Potential data sources which enable estimation of changes in the volume of international migration in the recent years include:
• district records (ewidencja gmin) of people notifying the authorities about the abandonment of permanent residence
 in Poland,
• European Social Survey (ESS), 
• Polish Labour Force Surveys (LFS), which records members of households who were staying abroad at the time of a given
 survey,
• data on work permits issued and registration procedures processed at labour offices throughout the EU,
• data derived from labour force surveys carried out in countries receiving Polish migrants,
• data derived from the National Population Census (NPC) carried out in Poland in 2002 as well as from national censuses carried  
 out in other EU countries,
• data generated by the National Bank of Poland and the Ministry of Finance concerning private transfers and tax returns
 (PIT, bank transfers) transferred to Poland from abroad.
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As for data from the district records, the literature on the subject commonly regards them as statistical ﬁction (Kędelski 1990) and there-
fore in this report we do not treat them as the principal source of information but only as a supplement to the presented quantitative 
estimates.1 We have decided not to employ information from the European Social Survey because of small sample and missing infor-
mation on migration dates. Data derived from the Polish LFS are also subject to considerable methodological deﬁciencies which lower 
the reliability of potential estimates. On the one hand, they cover people who were away from a given sample household due to their 
stay abroad. On the other hand, however, they do not cover those who – prior to emigration – had lived in one-person households 
or in collective households. People aged 18-342 have a large share in the total number of migrants and probably many of them had 
lived in one-person households before emigration so they are not included in the LFS. The above undermines the potential migration 
estimates based on this data source. A similar problem applies to students who constitute a large share of all migrants (especially sea-
sonal). Students who had lived in halls of residence prior to departure are not registered in the LFS because collective households [are 
not included in the random sample. Consequently, data derived from the LFS can be used in the study of migration processes, only if 
the speciﬁc features of this survey are borne in mind.
Considering the above-mentioned drawbacks, when estimating the scale of emigration before the accession, we have used above all 
data from the NPC as well as information about the number of work permits issued in the EEA countries. In our estimates of the number 
of people working abroad after 1 May 2004, we have relied above all on data on the number of work permits issued throughout Eu-
rope. Our calculations have been supplemented by data derived from labour force surveys carried out in Poland and in other countries, 
as well as by ﬁgures taken from the literature on the subject. As for data on the growth dynamics of the number of people emigrating, 
we have used BAEL and data on private transfers published by the NBP.
Box III.3. Polish communities abroad
The Polish have one of the most numerous diasporas in the world. The number of people of Polish origin who are staying abroad 
is estimated at approx. 20 million (Pieślak 2006). Other numerous diasporas include: the Chinese – approx. 30 million, Russians – 27 
million and Italians – 22 million. Therefore, the Polish diaspora ranks fourth in terms of total population size. However, if we look at 
the size of particular diasporas in relation to the number of a given country’s population, Poles come after: the Irish (approx. 80 per 
cent), Jews (approx. 75 per cent), Armenians (approx. 66 per cent), Albanians (approx. 50 per cent), and the Portuguese (approx. 35 per 
cent). The share of people of Polish origin who are staying abroad in relation to the total Polish population is estimated at 33 per cent. 
The largest Polish communities live in the United States (approx. 10.6 million), Germany (approx. 2 million), Brazil (approx. 1.8 million), 
France (approx. 1.05 million), Great Britain (approx. 1 million), Belarussia (approx. 0.9 million), Canada (approx. 0.9 million) and Ukraine 
(approx. 0.9 million) (Pieślak, 2006). 
It should be noted that a vast majority of people included in the Polish community abroad have Polish ancestors and cultivate their 
national past, however, they are already culturally closer to the societies to which they belong. It is rare that they are interested in 
reviving their cultural bonds with Poland. In the above respect, it is the Polish community living beyond the eastern border, i.e. in the 
former USSR countries, that exhibits a different attitude (Koseski, 1998). 
Polish culture and contacts with Poland are maintained through social and cultural organisations, Polish Houses (Domy Polskie) as well 
as institutes, parishes and sports clubs. Moreover, Polish media also play an important role (e.g. the weekly „Cooltura” published in 
Great Britain, the daily “Dziennik Chicagowski”, radio stations such as “Wietrzne Radio” in Chicago and “Rytm” in New York). Poland-re-
lated materials can also be found in foreign museums and archives such as the Museum at Montrésor in France, the Budapest Museum 
and Archives of the Polish Community in Hungary. Social and cultural organisations activate the Polish community and stimulate them 
into action – for instance, they get involved in charity fund collection (e.g. aid to the Polish homeless, meals for the poorest children 
in Polish schools). One example of a recent initiative undertaken by the Polish community in Great Britain is the protest campaign 
against double taxation of income.
1.2.2 International migration before Poland’s accession to the EU
In accordance with the NPC, in 2002, the number of Polish citizens staying abroad for more than 12 months can be estimated at 
626,000 people, of whom approx. 356,000 had moved to the EEA countries (see Table III.1.) The number of people who decided to 
emigrate in the period 1989-2001 amounts to approx. 528,000. The NPC does not cover emigrants who notiﬁed the local authorities 
before leaving the country, however, this ﬁgure can be estimated based on the district records and it amounts to approx. 300,000 peo-
ple. This means that in the period 1989-2001 an average of approx. 70,000 people emigrated from Poland every year, which sums up to 
more than 800,000 emigrants. Notwithstanding the above, the actual number of long-term departures in particular years was greater 
because some people had returned to Poland in the meantime, whereas the NPC only recorded their last departure abroad. The above 
ﬁgures are in line with the OECD estimates, according to which approx. 94,000 people emigrated from Poland in 2000 (OECD 2006). 
Moreover, the OECD estimates that at the beginning of the 21st century approx. 1.3 million people born in Poland were staying in the 
OECD countries with the largest Polish populations in the United States, Germany, France and Great Britain. It should be noted that the 
above ﬁgure includes people who emigrated after 1989 as well as those who had been living abroad for much longer.
1 Prior to the transformation, there was a requirement that people who were changing their place of residence had to notify the relevant district authorities about the fact of abandoning 
permanent residence. In theory, this requirement is still in force, however, very few people observe it when moving abroad or to a diﬀerent place in Poland. Data derived from this source 
are of little research value (see Okólski, 1997, Bijak, Koryś, 2006).
2 This fact is evidenced among others by economic migration monitoring reports in Great Britain and Ireland, which are now the principal – apart from Germany – migration destinations.
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Table III.1. 
Number of Polish long-term migrants before EU accession
The NPC data cover people who have their permanent residence in Poland but who – in 2002 – stayed abroad for more than 12 months.
Source: NPC, OECD.
It should be emphasised that the NPC and OECD data do not account for seasonal migration which became increasingly important 
in the 1990s (see Box III.4.). It is estimated that in 2000 the scale of seasonal migration came to approx. 550,000 people, of whom ap-
prox. 200,000 departed illegally, i.e. in disregard of the bilateral agreements between Poland and the receiving countries (Kaczmarczyk, 
Okólski 2005). These estimates are conﬁrmed by data of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy on the number of work permits issued 
in the EEA countries. Based on this data source, it can be estimated that approx. 400,000 Poles undertook work in the EEA countries 
in 2003 (see Table III.3.). Most of them, i.e. around 320,000 people, were seasonal workers, especially in Germany (approx. 265,000 
people).
Rough estimates of the number of emigrants from Poland can be obtained based on the NBP data on private foreign transfers. The 
literature on the subject (European Commission, 2004rem, USGAO, 2006) estimates that emigrants who decide to make such transfers, 
send on average about 15-20 per cent of income derived from work to their families back home. Hence, monthly income of about EUR 
1,400-1,700 generates transfers of about EUR 3,000-3,600 per year. In view of the fact that private transfers in 2003 reached the level of 
EUR 4,054,000,000 of which most transfers (80-90 per cent) were eﬀected by people working abroad, the number of migrants regularly 
sending a share of their income back home can be estimated at approx. 900,000-1,200,000 people. Working on the assumption (sup-
ported among others by USGAO 2006) that they account for about 75 per cent of the total population of immigrants allows to estimate 
the number of the latter at 1,200,000-1,450,000 people. It can be presumed that this ﬁgure includes only a limited number of seasonal 
migrants, who are probably less likely than other migrants to transfer their income via the banking system and who tend to bring the 
money along with them in cash.
To sum up, based on the NCP, OECD and administrative data, it can be assumed that immediately before the EU enlargement in May 
2004, some 1,700,0003-1,900,000 migrants from Poland stayed abroad every year and that about one third of them (550,000-600,000 
people) were short-term migrants (above all, engaged in seasonal work) and two thirds (approx. 1,150,000-1,300,000 people) – mi-
grants who stayed abroad for more than one year. The estimates based on the NBP data are slightly higher. In accordance with the 
latter, in 2003, the total number of emigrants – mostly non-seasonal4 – amounted to about 1,200,000-1,450,000 people. However, this 
estimate involves a greater degree of uncertainty due to some necessary ad hoc assumptions. Moreover, it should be emphasised 
that many long-term emigrants have maintained strong links with their homeland, especially in the situation where emigration was 
induced by economic motives and where it did not concern the entire family. On the other hand, there is a signiﬁcant group of emi-
grants (according to the OECD data – around a half of them, i.e. some 600,000-650,000 people) who already hold the citizenship of 
the current country of residence and who identify less with Poland. The principal direction of long-term migration routes was the EEA, 
which received approx. 50-60 per cent of all migrants. The United States and Australia emerged as the principal non-European receiv-
ing countries, with approx. 30-35 per cent of all migrants.
Country
Germany
USA
Italy
France
Great Britain
Belgium
Spain
Austria
Netherlands
Sweden
Ireland
Australia
Other
Total:
NPC
244.0
136.4
26.2
15.3
15.0
9.7
9.4
8.0
5.9
4.0
0.7
-
151.4
626
OECD
205
477
34
106.7
60.7
19.9
16.4
41.7
17.4
41.6
2.2
58.1
324.5
1347
3 In the NPC estimates we included people who notiﬁed the district authorities about the abandonment of permanent residence in the period 1980-2002and we assumed that some 560,000 
of people from this group are still living abroad.
4 Data on private foreign transfers do not allow to estimate the number of seasonal migrants because these transfers are typically seasonal and they peak in the last quarter of every year 
– which does not overlap with the departures themselves. It can be assumed, however, that seasonal workers are more likely to bring the money along with them in cash than to transfer 
it by wire.
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Box III.4. Seasonal migration – why do the Polish do seasonal work abroad?
Seasonal migration is an inherent element of mobility in Poland. The formal basis of this type of mobility includes bilateral agreements 
between the Polish government and the governments of other countries, which usually provide for a yearly quota of seasonal work 
permits to be issued to Polish citizens.
It should be borne in mind that seasonal migration is a specific form of mobility and that it rarely transforms into permanent emigra-
tion. Moreover, seasonal migration is typical for only some societies and some social groups. Therefore, international statistics and 
comparisons exclude seasonal migration from international migration analyses. Seasonal migration movements are generated by 
demand for relatively cheap labour force in some labour-intensive sectors of the economy (mainly in agriculture). Seasonal work op-
portunities abroad emerge in particular when low (compared with the average wage in the destination country) income derived from 
seasonal work constitutes a significant supplement to the household budgets of families in the country of origin (especially in the 
poorer regions and in the relatively lower-qualified social groups).
One example for the above can be found in German agriculture which provides seasonal employment to approx. 250,000-300,000 
Poles every year. The average net hourly wage offered to seasonal workers in agriculture comes to about 4-5 euros. Assuming that the 
daily working time is 10 hours and that the living cost amounts to about 15 per cent of income (Łukowski 2004), it can be estimated 
that people who engage in 2-month seasonal work in Germany generate an additional income of about EUR 1,800-2,400.
In accordance with the Eurostat data, the annual average gross income earned by manual workers in Poland in 2002 amounted to EUR 
5,522, which translates into net income of about EUR 3,780. Hence, for low-skill workers, the opportunity to engage in seasonal work 
abroad may produce income equal to approx. 50-60 per cent of their annual proceeds in Poland.
1.2.3 International migration after Poland’s accession to the EU
Dynamics – how strong was growth in the number of migrating Poles after the EU enlargement?  
Irrespective of the methodological problems, it can be stated that the volume of emigration from Poland has clearly augmented in 
the last couple of years. This fact is evidenced, among others, by data on the number of household members staying abroad derived 
from the LFS5. According to these data, the number of people staying abroad every year decreased in the second half of the 1990s, i.e. 
during the period of a relatively good economic performance in Poland. This decreasing trend was reversed after the year 2000 when 
the economy slowed down. It can be assumed that the increased number of emigrants was closely related to the diﬃcult situation 
in the labour market which was a consequence of the Russian crisis and of the later cyclical economic slowdown (see Bukowski et al. 
2005 and part I). In view of the fact that Polish migration is largely induced by economic motives (approx. 70-85 per cent of migrants 
recorded in the LFS are included in this category), it is not surprising that during periods of economic downturn people are more likely 
to look for jobs abroad.
It can also be noted that the dynamics of the number of migrants gained pace in the second half of the year 2003 which was con-
nected with the EU enlargement prospects. The intensity of migration processes has not weakened since then, although the GDP 
growth rate in Poland has increased considerably since 2003, and especially so in 2004 and 2006 (see Chart III.1). Nevertheless, it can 
be presumed that this improvement in the economic situation in the country, including above all increasing employment and wage 
levels and decreasing unemployment, will lead to the relative decrease in the inclination of the Polish to engage in work abroad in the 
next couple of years. This tendency will be further reinforced by the increasing saturation of labour markets in the receiving countries, 
the capacity of which is limited (in the short term).
According to the LFS, there were approx. 45 per cent more migrants per year in 2005 than in 2003. It should be borne in mind that, 
as mentioned earlier, the LFS only covers people who are members of Polish households and whose stay abroad lasts more than
2 months. Therefore, if we assumed – in accordance with the NCP – that 786,000 people stayed abroad prior to Poland’s accession to 
the EU, then this 45 per cent increase in 2005 would mean that the number of Polish emigrants increased by approx. 350,000 per year. 
This ﬁgure should be treated as the maximum limit of the post-accession emigration growth. However, bearing in mind that a large 
share of these people would have emigrated even if the EU enlargement had not taken place, it should not be regarded as “pure” im-
pact of the accession on the volume of international migration. The above-mentioned value is slightly higher that the forecasts referred 
to earlier, according to which immediately after Poland’s accession to the EU, the number of migrants would have reached the level of 
approx. 335,000 people.
5 Despite problems relating to the representativeness of the LFS in terms of the number of emigrants, this survey can be used to assess the migration dynamics, if we make an assumption 
that it is similar for households of diﬀerent types – those included and those excluded from the LFS.
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Chart III.1. 
Growth rate for the number of people staying abroad (left axis) (compared with a given quarter of the preceding year) and of real GDP 
(right axis)
 
Source: Own calculations based on the LFS and CSO data.
In this context, we should bear in mind that according to the LFS, the post-accession growth in migration results above all from greater 
interest of Poles in short-term departures for two to twelve months. Based on the LFS data, the growth rate for the number of people 
staying abroad for more than one year can be estimated at about 10 per cent (see Chart III.2). Even if we assume that this value is un-
derstated due to the relatively short observation period, these data allow a statement that as a result of the accession the total number 
of long-term migrants increased by no more than 15,000-30,000 people by 2005.
Chart III.2. 
Number of migrants (in thousands) by duration of stay abroad (quarterly data)
 
Source: Own calculations based on the LFS, Kępińska 2005.
An independent estimate of growth in the number of migrants from Poland after the EU enlargement can be developed by measuring 
the scale of underestimation of the number of migrants in the LFS, based on the NPC of 2002. In accordance with the NPC, the number 
of people staying abroad from (two to twelve months amounted to 159,000 people, whereas the LFS provides the ﬁgure of approx. 
97,000 people. Working on the assumption that the scale of underestimation did not change, it can be assumed that if, according to 
the LFS, the number of people staying abroad for less than one year in 2005 increased in relation to 2003 by approx. 80,000 people, 
in fact, as from the accession, there have been approx. 130,000 more short-term migrants every year. What is more, during the post-
accession period, the number of migrants staying abroad for more than one year also went up. However, this growth was relatively 
insigniﬁcant – according to the LFS it only concerned 8,000 people. Notwithstanding the above, it can be presumed that the LFS tends 
to underestimate the number of long-term rather than short-term migrants (for instance, because long-term migrants include more 
young people, e.g. graduates who had lived in one-person households or halls of residence prior to migration). Therefore, the actual 
growth in the number of long-term migrants can oscillate within the range of 15,000-35,000 people. Based on the above calculations, 
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it can be established that in 2005 the number of migrants living abroad every year was greater by approx. 145,000-165,000 than before 
the EU enlargement. This ﬁgure is smaller by about a half that the above-mentioned estimates developed using the LFS, and therefore 
we treat it as the minimum limit of the volume of migration. Similarly to the previous estimate, this ﬁgure should also account for per-
manent residence migration, as recorded by the district authorities, i.e. an outﬂow of about 10,000 people a year.
The growth dynamics of Polish economic migration after 1 May 2004 is evidenced by the NBP data on private transfers from abroad 
(see Chart III.3). Revenues from these transfers have been exhibiting an increasing tendency since the beginning of the 1990s, which, 
even assuming some increase in real wages obtained abroad, clearly proves that the number of emigrants from Poland has been on 
the rise, especially so in the EU countries where most such transfers are eﬀected. It is worth noting that the growth rate for the volume 
of transfers has been rather stable in the medium term, despite evident ﬂuctuations from one period to another. An exceptionally low 
or even negative dynamics was only observed at the turn of the years 1998 and 1999, which can probably be associated with the im-
pact of the Russian crisis on transfers from countries which were directly or indirectly aﬀected by it. Due to a short period since Poland’s 
accession to the EU, it is only possible to provide an approximate answer to the question whether the dynamics of private transfers 
has increased signiﬁcantly since 2004. It seems certain, however, that immediately after the accession, the number of transfers soared, 
which implies a considerable increase in the number of migrants. The NBP data suggest also that in the successive quarters the dynam-
ics of migration slowed down a little, although it was still noticeably higher than before the accession (see Chart III.3). 
Chart III.3.
Private current transfers – revenues (ln / log / natural logarithm of million euros) in the period 1994-2005 and 2001 (ﬁrst quarter)-2006 
(third quarter)
   
Source: Balance of payments – annual and quarterly NBP data.
Assuming that an average monthly transfer was the same (approx. 250-300 euros) before and after accession, according to the balance 
of payments data which indicate that current private transfers from abroad (payments) in 2004 and 2005 amounted to 4,532,000,000 
and 5,495,000,000 euros accordingly, it can be estimated that in 2005 about 1,630,000-1,950,000 people stayed abroad long enough so 
that transfers via the banking system would be justiﬁed. This ﬁgure was higher by approx. 285,000-340,000 than one year earlier. A mi-
gration ﬂow of this intensity was previously observed in 2001 as a reaction to the economic slowdown of 2001-2002 (see Chart III.2). 
To sum up the above calculations, it can be said that data derived from the LFS, NPC and the administrative records imply that in 2005 
the number of people staying abroad for more than two months was greater by approx. 165,000-370,000 people a year than imme-
diately before the EU enlargement. These estimates are conﬁrmed by the NBP data on private transfers from abroad which provide
a narrower range of 285,000-340,000 people. The NBP data also allow to think that an abrupt increase in the number of emigrants took 
place only immediately after the enlargement (in the initial 1-2 quarters), whereas later the dynamics of migration weakened, although 
it was probably still higher than before the accession. It is highly probable that the number of migrants intending to stay for less than 
2 months (e.g. some seasonal workers) also went up. However, the dynamics of the latter phenomenon is diﬃcult to assess, among 
others, due to the fact that this type of migration is not recorded in the LFS or NPC, as well as that in a number of countries (e.g. in Great 
Britain and – for stays shorter than one month – also in Finland and Sweden) Polish migrants are not required to hold a work permit or 
registration conﬁrmation in order to work for such a short period.
It is also worthwhile to investigate the directions of Polish migration before and after the EU enlargement as well as their possible 
evolutions. The top receiving country for Poles was Germany, although her leading position has been growing weaker. Moreover, the 
interest in migration to the Anglo-Saxon countries, namely Great Britain and Ireland, has been evidently on the rise. Before the acces-
sion these countries had not been considered popular destinations – in accordance with the LFS, they had been receiving an average 
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of approx. 10 per cent of all migrants. In 2005, this share increased to reach the level of 28 per cent. It can also be presumed that migra-
tion to Great Britain and Ireland takes the place of migration to the United States, which has been decreasing in popularity since the EU 
enlargement (with 20 per cent of migrants before the accession and approx. 13 per cent after). This shift is most probably associated 
with the relatively higher cost of moving to the US, lengthy visa procedures and the declining average exchange rate of the US dollar.
Table III.2. 
Main Polish migration destinations before and after EU accession
   Before accession     After accession
The average annual number of migrants before the accession covers the period from the ﬁrst quarter of 1994 to the second quarter of 2004 and the 
migration share to particular countries is based on data for 2002-2005; post-accession estimates cover the period from the second quarter of 2004 to 
the fourth quarter of 2005.
Source: Own calculations based on the LFS, Kępińska 2005.
Forecasts – how is the number of Polish migrants likely to evolve in the future?
The abrupt growth in the volume of migration in 2004 is in line with the earlier expectations described in forecast studies on emigra-
tion from the CEE countries. The phenomenon of an abrupt increase in the number of people coming to a given country which is 
followed by a stabilisation of immigrant inﬂows is referred to in the literature as the so-called migration hump (Martin, Taylor 1996; 
Widgren, Martin 2002). Such abrupt growth results among others from the fact that at the initial stage of integration trade and labour 
migration are of complementary nature and it is only with time that they become substitutes. According to the migration hump mod-
el, the volume of migration decreases rapidly as the economic situation in the country of residence improves and as the diﬀerences in 
wages between the receiving and sending countries decline.
Presently, Poland’s experiences with emigration are too scarce to allow a ﬁrm assessment as to whether the emigration growth proves 
lasting, and in particular how long it will take to weaken the dynamics of economic emigration. Nevertheless, the experiences of such 
countries as Spain or Ireland demonstrate that thanks to structural reforms and the resulting improvement in labour market perform-
ance (decrease in unemployment and increase in wages), which ameliorate the economic situation of households, it is possible to 
totally reverse migration trends in a relatively short time (see Box III.5). 
Country
Germany
USA
Italy
Great Britain
Spain
France
Netherlands
Belgium
Sweden
Austria
Ireland
Other
Total
Number
(thousands)
52.0
33.5
21.0
15.1
6.7
6.7
6.7
5.0
3.4
3.4
1.7
12.5
167.7
Share
(percentage)
31
20
13
9
4
4
4
3
2
2
1
7
100
Country
Great Britain
Germany
USA
Italy
Ireland
France
Spain
Netherlands
Belgium
Sweden
Austria
Other
Total
Number
(thousands)
65.9
63.3
37.4
35.9
17.6
12.5
11.1
7.7
6.8
6.0
6.0
24.8
295.0
Share
(percentage)
22
21
13
12
6
4
4
3
2
2
2
8
100
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Box III.5. Migration movements in Spain after European Community accession
Concerns relating to mass inflows of immigrants resulting from EU enlargements are nothing new. They emerged, among others, at 
the time of the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986. The most commonly quoted motives inducing the inhabitants of Southern 
Europe to emigrate included much lower income levels, high unemployment rates and traditionally negative migration balances – in 
the 1960s and 1970s, Spain saw an exodus of more than 1 million people, mainly to Western Europe, and especially to Germany and 
France (Bover, Velilla 1999).
Fearing a mass inflow of immigrants, the EU member states decided to introduce a 7-year transition period which imposed limits on 
the access of Spanish and Portuguese workers to the EU labour markets. Models based on differences in unemployment and income 
levels forecasted that the inflow of migrants from new member states to Western Europe after the transition period would come to 
approx. 1,500,000-1,600,000 people (Straubhaar 1984). 
However, the subsequent years showed that the forecasts predicting a significant increase in the volume of migration from Spain did 
not materialise. Thanks to the implemented structural reforms as well as increased income levels and living standards, from a country 
with a negative migration balance, Spain turned into a country attracting migrants.
The number of Spanish emigrants in the other EU countries was on the decrease during the transition period and after the expiry of 
restrictions on worker flows. At the time of the enlargement, the countries of the European Community had a population of approx. 
495,000 Spaniards. In 1991, that is in the last year of the transition period, this figure was only 474,000 people, and in 1997 – 470,000 
people. As for the population of foreigners in Spain, it nearly grew twice during the above period – from 293,000 to 539,000 (Dustmann 
et al. 2003).
Scale of economic migration – how many Poles have been working in the EEA countries after 1 May 2004?
Apart from overall migration dynamics, it is also important to estimate the number of emigrants moving to the EEA countries with the 
intention to work there. In order to develop an estimate of the volume of economic migration from Poland after 2004, one can refer 
to information about work permits issued in some European countries as well as to statistics derived from the employee registration 
system in Great Britain and Ireland.6
The creation of collation, which will summarise information about issued work permits is diﬃcult due to diﬀerent deﬁnitions and struc-
tures of the registration systems used in particular countries.7 Data presented in Table III.3 may also not reﬂect the actual scale of migra-
tion because in some countries, such as Sweden, Finland and Lithuania, there is no requirement that seasonal workers be registered.
It seems, however, that the above countries are not among the principal destination countries for economic migrants from Poland and 
therefore an adjustment including migrants to these countries would be insigniﬁcant.
After the ﬁrst glimpse of the available statistics, one may conclude that the number of work permits and registrations of Polish citizens 
in the EEA countries amounted to approx. 610,000 in 2004 and 645,000 in 2005. These ﬁgures seem high, however, at least half of all 
permits were for seasonal work. The share of seasonal workers estimated on the basis of the above data is surely lower than its actual 
value because for some countries (e.g. Spain, Norway) no data is available on the nature of work covered by issued work permits. What 
is more, based on data derived from the British LFS, it can be assumed that probably about a half of Poles who came to Great Britain 
after the EU enlargement engaged in short-term work. This fact implies that the estimated yearly number of non-seasonal migrants 
from Poland should be decreased by approx. 40,000 people.
A similar situation can be observed in Ireland. The comparison of the results of the Quarterly National Household Survey with the 
number of granted PPS numbers8 indicates that approx. 65 per cent of foreigners coming from the new member states to Ireland 
return to their homelands after a couple of months or even weeks. The above allows to adjust downwards the annual average number 
of Polish migrants by another 30,000 people.
Data on the number of issued work permits obviously do not account for illegal stays – this probably concerns above all those coun-
tries which have not opened their labour markets. What is more, since 2004, as legal employment in the “old” EU has been becoming 
increasingly available to Polish citizens, the share of illegal migrants has probably been on the decline. Some people who after 1 May 
2004 registered with the relevant institutions in countries such as Great Britain and Ireland, had been working there before the above 
date and therefore to some extent the relevant statistics reﬂect the process of employment legalisation rather than the inﬂow of new 
immigrants. Research studies on immigration to Great Britain imply that the share of people who had been working in Great Britain 
prior to the EU enlargement and their registration under the Worker Registration Scheme amounts to approx. 18 per cent (this con-
cerns registrations eﬀected before June 2005) (Drinkwater et al. 2006). This means that the outﬂow of migrants from Poland should be 
further decreased by approx. 20,000 people per year.
6 Despite positive assessments of the impact of migration on the economies of countries which fully opened their labour market to NMS8 citizens, some countries from the former EU15 still 
apply transition periods. At the time of this report, workers from the NMS8 had an unlimited access to labour markets in Great Britain, Ireland, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Finland and Greece.
7 Data on the employment of Polish citizens abroad are collected on a regular basis by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, which maintains contacts with relevant ministries and 
institutions charged with the task of registering people engaging in overseas work. These data pertain to issued work permits and registration procedures processed by relevant oﬃces in 
the receiving countries that are responsible for monitoring economic immigration (e.g. Worker Registration Scheme in Great Britain, FAS in Ireland).
8 PPS number (Personal Public Service) is an insurance and tax identiﬁcation number which is necessary, among others, to engage in work in Ireland and to deal with social insurance 
institutions and the tax oﬃce.
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Table III.3. 
Number of work permits issued to Polish citizens engaging in work in selected EEA countries
a) data for the period from 1 January to 30 September 2003, b) data for 2002, c) estimates, d) average for the years 2002 and 2003, e) data for the period 
from 1 January to 30 August 2003.
For Cyprus, Denmark, Malta, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia and Hungary no data on inﬂows are available or 
oﬃcial estimates below 100 persons.
Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Policy.
To sum up, in order to interpret data on the number of issued work permits in terms of inﬂow of long-term immigrants from Poland 
to other EEA countries 9 one should deduct all people who left with the intention of engaging in seasonal work and returning home 
after a couple of months (or weeks). Considering the above estimates as well as conclusions derived from the analysis of the LFS data 
and data on private money transfers, it can be assumed that out of 610,000-645,000 people who are granted work permits in the 
EEA countries every year, at most 180,000-200,000 people decide to stay abroad for a longer period, whereas the others only 
engage in seasonal work. When assessing the number of long-term migrants who left Poland in 2004, the OECD has obtained similar 
results, i.e. 169,000 people (OECD 2006). This means that, according to the OECD, the volume of international migration from Poland 
increased after the accession by approx. 80 per cent – compared with the earlier period (94,000 in 2000). Nevertheless, this phenom-
enon was probably of individual nature and it made Poland head the league of the NMS10 in the ranking of the top emigration source 
countries (in terms of the number of emigrants rather than migration intensity).10. The calculated measure of population outﬂow due 
to long-term emigration amounts to approx. 1.1 per cent of the population aged 18-44 per year. It is worth emphasising, however, that 
this indicator is considerably lower than in a number of other new member states (see Box III.5) also these which have higher growth 
rates and better labour market performance than Poland. This fact implies that the nature of increased migration intensity after the EU 
accession was universal and that probably the main reasons behind it were diﬀerences in wage levels and living standards between 
Central and Western Europe and not the economic situation per se. Consequently, the period necessary to weaken the intensity of 
economic migration may be longer than in the case of Spain, which was relatively wealthier at the time of its accession to the EU than 
it is the case for the new member states.
Country
Austria
Belgium
Czech Republic
Finland
France
Greece
Spain
Ireland
Iceland
Netherlands
Germany
Norway
Slovakia
Switzerland
Sweden
Great Britain
Italy
Total
2003
9,7a)
3,9b)
7,4
0,7
7,8b)
8,4c)
6,9d)
2,7
-
9,5
274,9
15,3e)
0,1
-
6,6
1,4c)
45,7
401
2004
16,7
1,8
-
-
9,2
-
13,8
27,3
1,2
20,9
392,6
13
-
16,7
2,1
75,5
37
610
2005
10
3,4
3,8
0,2
9,7
0,2-0,3
11,6
64,7
1,2
26,5
321,8
23,8
0,3
3,8
2,8
129,4
33,5
645
 
including 5,200 seasonal
including approx. 3,100 seasonal
estimates, net inﬂow
seasonal workers are not covered by the permit requirement
including 8,200 seasonal
no information about the share of seasonal workers
issued between May 2004 and August 2005
including 17,900 in gardening, 4,200 in agriculture
including 273,00 seasonal
data accounts for work permit extensions, no information
about the share of seasonal workers
including approx. 2,600 seasonal
seasonal workers are not covered by the permit requirement
including approx. 20,500 seasonal
9 Data on work permits issued in the EEA countries should not be regarded as information on the number of people who left Poland in the period 2004-2005 and who are currently staying 
abroad. The aggregation of data on work permits issued in the period 2004-2005 in particular European countries and the interpretation of this ﬁgure as reﬂecting the stock of immigrants 
constitutes a methodological error. The above is evidenced by the example of Great Britain: although approx. 125,000 workers from the NMS8 were registered in 2004 under the British 
Worker Registration Scheme, the estimates of the National Statistics Oﬃce imply that – compared with 2003 – the number of emigrants from these countries increased by as little as approx. 
48,000 people. Hence, a clear distinction should be made between the notions of inﬂow and stock of immigrants, which unfortunately is often not the case in press releases on migration.
10 The number of emigrants depends above all on the population size of a given country. Poland has the largest population out of all NMS. Therefore, the fact that the share of Poles in the 
total number of migrants to Western Europe amounts to more than 50 per cent can be explained by the diﬀerences in the number of the early working age population.
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Box III.6. Is Polish migration exceptional compared with other new EU Member States?
When assessing the scale of inflow of Polish workers, it is often stressed that they constitute the largest national group migrating from 
the new member states to the former EU15. However, comparisons of migration intensity do not explicitly imply that Poles are typi-
cally most inclined to move abroad. When collating the number of people engaging in work in Great Britain, Ireland and Sweden after 
the EU enlargement with the numbers of the working-age population in the source countries, one may conclude that thus calculated 
Polish migration flow rate is three times lower than that of Lithuanians, twice lower than that of Latvians and comparable to that of 
Estonians and Slovaks. The above implies that the increased volume of migration after the EU accession is a widespread phenomenon 
and that it also took place in the new member states with higher economic growth dynamics and better labour market performance 
than Poland. 
Chart III.4.
Number of people engaging in work in Great Britain, Ireland and Sweden (in hundreds of thousands) and migration 
intensity after EU enlargement versus growth and unemployment rates (2005) in the NMS 
Source: Own calculations based on Accession Monitoring Report, Doyle et al. 2006, Eurostat.
1.3 Migration to Germany, Great Britain, Ireland and Sweden.
The opening of labour markets in Great Britain, Ireland and Sweden in May 2004 changed the framework for decisions made by Polish 
citizens as to whether engage in work in Poland or try to ﬁnd employment abroad (see Box III.7). The introduction of the free movement 
of workers in the English-speaking countries, namely Ireland and Great Britain was of particular importance because human capital 
and skills acquired in Poland can be used relatively more easily in these countries than in non-English speaking countries (except for 
Germany). This is so because, according to social studies, the knowledge of English is relatively common, especially among young 
people who are potentially most mobile. In fact, approx. 26 per cent of Poles declare that they have an active and passive knowledge 
of English, whereas for the population of below-24-year-old this ﬁgure increases to 73 per cent and for the age group 25-34 – 43 per 
cent. As far as the German language is concerned, analogous shares amount to 19.6, 44 and 24 per cent respectively. The level of com-
mand of the remaining European languages is marginal (see Diagnoza Społeczna / Social Diagnosis 2005). Consequently, it is much 
easier for Poles to ﬁnd a job in the Anglo-Saxon countries as well as in Germany and Austria than, for instance, in Sweden. Alongside 
relatively high chances of ﬁnding a job and receiving higher wages than in Poland, the above constitutes a natural incentive to migrate 
to these countries.
In view of the fact that the increase in the number of people who decide to engage in work abroad was above all a consequence of 
the increased interest in emigration to the EU countries, it seems worthwhile to give more attention to the assessment of the labour 
market situation, wages and prospects of return of people who have moved to Great Britain, Ireland and Sweden. It could also be useful 
to look closer at migration to Germany as this country still remains the most popular migration destination of the Polish.
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Box III.7. Legal grounds for freedom of worker mobility in the EU
The observable changes in Polish migration trends after the accession to the EU are connected, among others, with the freedom of 
movement for workers within the European Communities. At present, this freedom applied to Poles to a limited degree. Only some 
member states decided to open their labour markets to the Polish citizens after 1 May 2004 (new member states, excluding Malta, 
and three “old” member states, namely Great Britain, Sweden and Ireland). The remaining countries introduced transition periods thus 
postponing the possibility Poles enjoying full freedom of movement for workers within the EU.
The legal grounds for the free movement of workers have been provided in the Treaty establishing the European Community dated 
1957. In accordance with Article 39 of the Treaty, which guarantees freedom of movement for workers within the Community, “such 
freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as 
regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment”. The Treaty also guarantees freedom of enterprise 
and of provision of services by citizens of one Member State within the territory of another Member State. Community law provides 
also for an equal treatment of workers who are citizens of the employer’s home country and those who are citizens of other EU coun-
tries, as well as for the right of families of such workers to migrate and join them in the country of their employment.
The Treaty also contains provisions on measures in the field of social security, namely it provides that all periods taken into account 
under the laws of other countries be aggregated for the purpose of acquiring and retaining the right to benefit, and of calculating the 
amount of such benefit. Regulations pertaining to social security within the European Union also stipulate the right to unemployment 
benefit for 3 months in the amount to which a given citizen would be eligible in his/her home country.
Polish economic migration to the EU countries which have not yet opened their labour markets are regulated by bilateral agreements.
 
Great Britain and Ireland
Research studies carried out prior to the EU enlargement by the British Home Oﬃce estimated the expected number of immigrants 
from the new member states after 1 May 2004 at 5,000-13,000 people per year (Dustmann et al. 2003). These estimates turned out to 
be much understated and Great Britain became the preferred migration destination for workers from new member states.
According to data derived from the British Worker Registration Scheme, there were approx. 307,000 registration applications submitted 
by Poles between May 2004 and September 2006.11 This does not mean of course that this ﬁgure reﬂects the increase in the stock of 
immigrants from Poland in Great Britain because, as mentioned earlier, some of these people had been working in Great Britain before 
the accession and some of them returned to Poland after a short stay.
Data from the WRS and the LFS conducted in the United Kingdom (see Table III.4) clearly demonstrate that a signiﬁcant share of new 
registration applications submitted to the WRS system in 2004 concerned people who had been working in Great Britain before that 
date. What is more, the number of Poles staying in Great Britain in a given year estimated on the basis of the LFS was increasing about 
twice slower than suggested by the dynamics of registrations with the WRS system, which implies that a signiﬁcant share (probably 
about a half ) of people searching for jobs in Great Britain return to Poland after a relatively short time.12 Unfortunately, there is no infor-
mation available about the structure of the Polish immigrants in Great Britain and therefore it is diﬃcult to asses what are the shares of 
workers who came after the EU enlargement and of workers who had been living there before the accession. Thus, it is hard to establish 
accurately what share of workers return to Poland and after what period.
Nevertheless, the claim that migration after 1 May 2004 has been of short-term nature is supported by the survey carried out by the 
British Home Oﬃce. The most frequent answer given by immigrants from the new member states to the question concerning the 
planned duration of their stay in Great Britain – posed at the time of employee registration, i.e. usually at the beginning of their stay 
– was “less than three months” (45 per cent).
Table III.4. 
Inﬂow and number of Polish immigrants in Great Britain (in thousands)
(*) data covering the period before September 2006
Remark: inﬂow of workers estimated on the basis of the WRS, stock of immigrants from Poland based on the LFS for the period spring 2001 - spring 2006
Source: Home Oﬃce calculations.
11 Registration under the WRS system is obligatory for people who plan to work in Great Britain for more than one month. This requirement does not apply to the self-employed.
12 It can be assumed that the estimates of the number of immigrants from Poland based on the British LFS reﬂect quite accurately the actual size of migration to this country, and that they 
understate only the number of people who, for various reasons, intentionally avoided interviews with the pollster.
Year
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Employee registrations
-
-
75,5
129
109(*)
Stock of immigrants
(according to LFS)
49,5
65
77,5
132,5
219,5
Inﬂow of immigrants
(according to LFS)
-
15,5
12,5
55
87
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The LFS also allow to assess the situation of Polish workers in Great Britain in relation to immigrants from other new member states 
and from English-speaking countries.13 According to relevant research studies (Drinkwater et al. 2006), Polish workers who arrived in 
Great Britain after the accession are very young – about a half of them are aged 16-25, and together with the population from the age 
group 26-35 they account for more than 80 per cent of all Poles who came to the United Kingdom after the EU enlargement. The age 
of immigrants from the remaining NMS is similar, although the share of people aged 35+ is slightly higher. The information about the 
young age of workers from the NMS8 is line with data derived from the WRS register, from the NINO (British counterpart of the Polish 
Social Insurance Institution – ZUS) and from the International Passenger Survey.
The average age of education completion for Polish workers is 20.6 years and the average duration of education – 13.6 years. The above 
ﬁgures imply that a considerable part of Polish workers in Great Britain consists of students (including bachelor’s degree holders) and 
people with secondary education.14 The Polish LFS also provide information about the level of education of Polish migrants in Great 
Britain and in accordance with these data, in 2005, 35 per cent of people leaving for Great Britain for longer than 2 months had higher 
education qualiﬁcations. High qualiﬁcations of Polish workers are also conﬁrmed by the results of research studies carried out by the 
British organisation called Learning and Skills Development Agency (Sachdev, Harries 2006).
The employment rate for the Polish immigrants who came to Great Britain after the accession amounts to 82.1 per cent. It is higher 
than the employment rates for immigrants from other new member states and close to that typical for people from the English-speak-
ing countries. An average worker from Poland works similar number of hours as immigrants from the English-speaking countries, i.e. 
almost 42 hours per week (compared with 42.6 hours for workers from the English-speaking countries), however, he earns less – his 
hourly wage amounts to approx. 6 pounds. As for Anglo-Saxon immigrants, they make more than twice as much, i.e. 14 pounds per 
hour. This disparity is above all a consequence of diﬀerent employment structures. Poles, similarly to workers from other NMS, are 
mainly employed in positions which do not require high qualiﬁcations (the share of people involved in elementary occupations15 
amounts to 74 per cent), whereas migrants from the English-speaking countries most frequently work as managerial and specialist 
staﬀ (approx. 68 per cent) (Drinkwater et al. 2006). By way of comparison, in accordance with the LFS, the share of people involved in 
elementary occupations in the total population of employees in Great Britain amounts to approx. 12 per cent.
According to the British Home Oﬃce, out of all 307,000 Polish workers registered after 1 May 2004, more than 35 per cent have en-
gaged in work in administration and business, 20.5 per cent in the hotel and catering industry, 10 per cent in agriculture, 7 per cent in 
industrial production, 5.1 per cent in healthcare, almost 5 per cent in food processing industry, 4.3 per cent in retail and 4 per cent in 
construction. According to the LFS data from 2005, some 20 per cent of all hired workers in Great Britain were employed in distribution, 
hotel and catering services, approx. 1 per cent in agriculture, ﬁshery and forestry, 11.7 per cent in industrial production, 4.6 per cent 
in construction and 47 per cent in administration, business, education and healthcare. Thus, there is an evident overrepresentation of 
Polish workers in agriculture, whereas in the remaining sectors the above are similar.
It is also worthwhile to look at how the nature of economic activities of the Polish in Great Britain has changed after 1 May 2004. Prior 
to the EU enlargement, workers from the CEE countries could legally undertake onlyself-employment activity. According to the LFS, 
the share of people running their own businesses in the total number of Polish workers amounted to approx. 26.5-32.4 per cent prior 
to the accession. As restrictions on engagement in hired work were lifted, the share of entrepreneurs in the total number of new 
migrants declined to 3.5 per cent. Similar patterns can be observed for citizens from other new member states (see Drinkwater et al. 
2006). Even the assumption that the above could be a consequence of a signiﬁcant increase in the number of new immigrants, who 
either did not yet set up a company or who were less inclined to start with their own entrepreneurial undertakings, does not explain 
such a considerable decrease in the share of self-employed. It can be rather presumed that before 1 May 2004 a lot of Poles used to set 
up their own businesses in order to circumvent the requirement to obtain a (hired) work permit. Therefore, the opening of the British 
labour market resulted not only in increased inﬂows of workers from the new member states but also in less law circumvention and 
smaller shadow economy in this country.
After the EU enlargement, Ireland has also become a popular migration destination among Poles. The number of PPS numbers
issued in 2005 was 16 times greater than in 2003. What is more, some 156,000 Polish citizens have registered with this system to date. 
However, it should be emphasised again that these data cover all migrants – irrespective of whether they are still working in Ireland 
or how long they have been working there. Although as from the EU enlargement, the trend in the number of issued PPS numbers is 
clearly rising, seasonal workers from Poland and from other new member states account for a substantial share in the above number 
(see Chart III.5).
13 Immigrants from English-speaking countries (USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa) constitute a suitable group for comparison because research studies carried out in Great 
Britain point to the occurrence of a phenomenon referred to as “language penalty” (Dustmann, Fabbri 2003; Leslie, Lindley 2001 from: Drinkwater et al. 2006). 
14 Although the average does not always reﬂect accurately the mainstream trend – these may as well be people with basic vocational education and university graduates.
15 Including routine and semi routine occupations.
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Chart III.5. 
Number of personal public service numbers issued in Ireland to the citizens of Poland and the NMS10 in the period 2004-2006
(thousands). 
 
Source: Department of Social and Family Aﬀairs.
As indicated by the Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, according to the Irish Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, 
in May 2006, there were 35,000 Poles working in Ireland. Similar results are provided by the Quarterly National Household Survey, which 
estimated that in the fourth quarter of 2005 almost 73,000 of citizens from the new members states stayed in Ireland. In view of the fact 
that in the period 2001-2005 Poles accounted for about a half of all NMS citizens applying for PPS number, the number of Poles staying 
in Ireland can be estimated at approx. 36,000 people.
Relevant research studies demonstrate that the phenomenon of Polish immigrants engaging in employment below their qualiﬁca-
tions in Great Britain is not an exception. Ireland, similarly to Great Britain, attracts young people who are relatively well-educated but 
who work in positions which do not require high qualiﬁcations, i.e. below their nominal level of education (Minns 2005). This phenom-
enon does not concern Polish citizens only, it is relatively common in all OECD countries (see, for instance, OECD 2005, Barrett et al. 
2006). Data on the employment of citizens from the NMS10 in Ireland indicate that they work above all in production and construction 
(approx. 31 per cent) as well as in the services sector, especially in the hotel and catering industry (8.6 per cent) and in trade (8 per cent) 
(Doyle et al. 2006). 
At the ﬁrst glimpse, the picture which emerges from the employment statistics for Polish migrants in Great Britain and Ireland does not 
seems optimistic. It is worthwhile to consider why Poles – despite their rather high average level of education, work in positions which 
do not require high qualiﬁcations and are paid relatively low wages.
Potential reasons for the above may include:
• actual qualiﬁcations of Polish immigrants are no match for the qualiﬁcations of people with the same nominal level of 
 education from other regions, especially from the Anglo-Saxon countries, 
• some Polish immigrants with high qualiﬁcations – comparable to those of the British – are not well recognised by British 
 employers (possibly due to large information asymmetry) and consequently end up working in positions which are below 
 their skills and receiving wages which are relatively lower,
• relatively young age of Polish migrants translates into scarce work experience and thus limits their options and bargaining 
 power in the labour market compared with older immigrants from other countries,
• insuﬃcient English language skills may be an obstacle to ﬁnding a job. In order to engage in work as a specialist, it is
 necessary to have a good command of professional terminology. It is worthwhile to note that Poles do much worse in tests 
 of English not only than the Danish and Dutch but also than people from the other NMS (see Chart III.6).
Poland NMS10 Poland - trend
133
Employment in Poland 2006                       Spatial Mobility
   III. 
2 0 0
2 1 0
2 2 0
2 3 0
2 4 0
2 5 0
2 6 0
2 7 0
0
0 . 0 2
0 . 0 4
0 . 0 6
0 . 0 8
0 . 1
0 . 1 2
0 . 1 4
De
nm
ar
k
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
Be
lg
iu
m
Au
st
ri
a
Fi
nl
an
d
Po
rt
ug
al
Ge
rm
an
y
Sl
ov
en
ia
Sw
ed
en
Es
to
ni
a
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bl
ic
Fr
an
ce
Sp
ai
n
Hu
ng
ar
y
La
tv
ia
Gr
ee
ce
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Po
la
nd
It
al
y
Gr
ee
ce
Es
to
ni
a
It
al
y
Ge
rm
an
y
Fr
an
ce
La
tv
ia
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Fi
nl
an
d
Sw
ed
en
Au
st
ri
a
De
nm
ar
k
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
Sp
ai
n
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s
Be
lg
iu
m
Hu
ng
ar
y
Sl
ov
en
ia
Po
la
nd
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bl
ic
Po
rt
ug
al
Chart III.6. 
Average score obtained in the TOEFL (CBT) exam by the citizens of the EU countries and the share of exam-takers in the population aged 
15-39 in the period 2003-2004.
  Average number of points     Number of exam-takers in relation to
       the population aged 15-39 (percentages)
 
  
Source: TOEFL Test and Summary Score Data, 2003/2004.
• wages indicated in the statistics are wages which Polish workers received in their ﬁrst jobs. It is diﬃcult to assess to what 
 extent registration data reﬂect pay rises, which may be granted at the end of the trial period, or promotion. Moreover, 
 because a large share of Polish workers is employed in sectors such as hotel and catering services, wages might not reﬂect 
 the whole income of such workers (which might largely depend on, for instance, tips),
• when going abroad, many people do not intend to leave Poland for more than a couple of months. They do not devote much 
 time to look for a job prior to departure. Moreover, the temporary work sector typically oﬀers employment in elementary 
 occupations which do not require qualiﬁcations. Some migrants return to Poland, some decide to stay and they probably 
 ﬁnd better jobs. This fact is not always reﬂected in the statistics which – as they demonstrated the present state of things – do 
 not allow for an accurate assessment of how migrants improve their labour market status,
• referenced research studies concerned above all Polish workers who have come to the EU countries relatively recently (not 
 earlier than in May 2004), whereas research studies on overeducation indicate that with time immigrants tend to ﬁnd better 
 jobs as they acquire knowledge and skills necessary to operate within the new labour market (Weiss 2000). This is possible 
 among others thanks to their work experience acquired in the receiving country and their improved command of English.
Of course, these conjectures must be veriﬁed – as time goes by, new data and information about Polish migrants will make it possible 
to conduct more detailed analyses which should be used in future research.
It should also be emphasised that although the inclination of Poles to leave for the Anglo-Saxon countries is considerable and Polish 
migrants do relatively well in the British and Irish labour markets, they also encounter many diﬃculties in the process of assimilation 
and integration with the local community and their decision to go abroad often gives rise to numerous concerns (see Box III.8).
Box III.8. Obstacles and difficulties encountered by emigrants in Ireland and Great Britain
Research studies carried out by the European Citizen Action Service in October 2006 showed that the most common obstacle (which 
appears already at the time of making a decision about departure abroad) is the lack of sufficient foreign language skills (Radiukiewicz 
2006). Emigrants also pointed to cultural and social barriers. When moving abroad they feared loosing their jobs and contacts with 
relatives staying in Poland. In particular, emigrants’ concerns concerned their ability to maintain close contacts with partners and 
children.
The first problems after departure from Poland with which migrants are faced are usually connected with finding accommodation. 
Migration networks are of particular importance in this respect, especially at the early stage of stay abroad. Difficulties encountered by 
emigrants result from their lack of knowledge of the legal and tax systems of the receiving country, as well as of procedures for bank 
account opening and for receiving social assistance or unemployment benefits.
Economic migrants also have to face difficulties connected with their participation in the labour market. People who enjoy 
support of family members and friends while looking for a job, find employment fastest. According to Polish workers in Ireland 
and Great Britain, work-related problems include above all unpaid overtime work, work below potential, lack of employment 
contracts and health insurance as well as a sense of discrimination.
One additional difficulty for emigrants is the insufficient consular assistance provided to Poles in London, which is a consequence, 
among others, of an inadequate number of employees of the consulate in relation to the number of the population of Polish emi-
grants.
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Germany
The introduction of a transitory period, which has limited the access of workers from the CEE countries to the German labour market, 
resulted in there being no increased interest among Poles in emigrating to Germany after 1 May 2004. On the contrary – although 
Germany is still the most popular Polish migration destination, in the recent years it has been decreasing in popularity in favour of 
Great Britain and Ireland. According to the LFS, in 2000, some 35 per cent of all Polish migrants went to Germany, whereas in 2005 this 
number came to only approx. 22 per cent.
Economic migration to Germany is mainly of short-term nature. Most people leaving for Germany, i.e. approx. 85 per cent, engage in 
seasonal work (up to four months) – above all in agriculture – in accordance with the bilateral agreement of 1990. The annual quota of 
seasonal work permits is approx. 300,000 permits. Research studies (data from the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, Łukowski 2004) 
on this type of work in Germany indicate that Poles often work for the same employer every year, which allows to minimise risk under 
circumstances of incomplete information. When searching for jobs, migration networks prove essential – almost 85 per cent of people 
found seasonal occupation thanks to their family members or friends. The fact of engaging in seasonal work abroad often entails op-
eration in two labour markets. More than a half of people who decide to go to Germany to work have permanent jobs in Poland. They 
do seasonal work in Germany during holiday or sick leaves in Poland..
One typical characteristic of people migrating to Germany is their average age (37 years) which is higher than that of other migrant 
groups. Almost 40 per cent of seasonal workers are 40+. Moreover, the population of people engaging in seasonal work is clearly over-
represented by men, inhabitants of rural areas and people with secondary education. What is more, more than 62 per cent of seasonal 
workers leaving for Germany did not know German before their ﬁrst departure to work, and only 4 per cent of them had a good com-
mand of this language.
Sweden
Sweden is one of the countries which decided to remove all restrictions on access to their labour market by citizens of the new EU 
member states. It was often emphasised in the public debate that this decision may entail an abrupt increase in the number of im-
migrants attracted by high wages and low unemployment on the one hand, and by an extensive social security system on the other 
(see Box III.9). Contrary to expectations, although the volume of immigration from the CEE countries has been on the rise since the EU 
enlargement, it remains insigniﬁcant mainly due to the small base size. 
Data from the Swedish Statistical Oﬃce indicate that, compared with 2003, the number of long-term immigrants16 from the new EU 
member states went up by approx. 77 per cent after the enlargement. This growth trend was maintained in 2005 which means that 
the inﬂow of immigrants did actually take place and that is was not only a consequence of the legalisation of stay by people who had 
been living in Sweden before 1 May 2004. Poles accounted for approx. 60 per cent of all immigrants from the new member states who 
came to Sweden after the EU enlargement (see Table III.5). 
Table III.5. 
Inﬂow of immigrants from Poland and other NMS to Sweden in the period 2000-2005
Source: Statistics Sweden
In 2004, 17 the employment rate for Polish migrants amounted to 59.2 per cent, which means that it was lower then the national aver-
age by 15 percentage points. Poles living in Sweden work above all in healthcare (24 per cent), trade (17 per cent) and manufacturing 
and mining (16 per cent). It is mainly well-qualiﬁed people that leave for Sweden – as many as 36 per cent of Polish migrants have 
tertiary education qualiﬁcations and 44 per cent – secondary. These shares clearly diverge from the education distribution in the Polish 
population, even if we account for an overrepresentation of young people among migrants. It is worth to note that the average salary 
of Poles in Sweden amounts to 23,000 Swedish crowns, which is an amount comparable to the national average (SEK 25,700) (Doyle 
et al. 2006).
To sum up, it should be stated that although the number of immigrants went up after the EU enlargement, this inﬂow – in absolute 
terms – seems to be marginal in view of the size of Swedish labour market and the fact that Sweden is one of three countries which 
lifted all restrictions on access to the labour market upon the EU enlargement. The above-referenced data imply that the inclination 
of the Polish to engage in work in Sweden has been small compared with their eﬀorts to ﬁnd jobs in Ireland and Great Britain. Nev-
 
Poland
NMS10
2000
780
1890
2001
908
2095
2002
1186
2584
2003
1134
2381
2004
2521
4232
2005
3516
5559
16 Immigrants are deﬁned here as people who intend to stay in Sweden for at least one year.
17 Data covering the period before 2004.
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ertheless, it should be taken into account that people who leave for Sweden for less than three months are not obliged to apply for 
residence or work permits and therefore Swedish statistics – as opposed data in Ireland and Great Britain – do not cover seasonal work-
ers. Despite this fact, even if seasonal workers were included, it seems unlikely that the total number of people who came to work in 
Sweden would be even close to the numbers recorded in the Anglo-Saxon countries.
Box III.9. Immigrants versus social security – what do the Polish do in other EU countries?
In the midst of the debate which preceded the EU enlargement, opponents of the liberalisation of the movement of workers had 
warned that immigrants from the new member countries would abuse social insurance systems in the Western European countries. 
This type of concerns emerged also in countries which decided to remove barriers to access to their labour markets. Consequently, 
Great Britain and Ireland restricted access to their social security systems, whereas Sweden – which was an exception in this respect 
– offered  immigrants from the new member states free access to the national social insurance system immediately after the EU en-
largement.
The concerns that immigrants from the new member states, including Poles, would engage in temporary employment in order to be 
eligible for social insurance benefits did not materialise. Migrants move to the Western European countries above all in order to work 
and generous social insurance systems do not constitute a strong incentive attracting immigrants, which is evidenced, among others, 
by the fact that relatively few people migrate to Sweden.
 
The employment rate for Poles who arrived in Great Britain after the EU enlargement is estimated at 82.1 per cent, which is a figure 
that exceeds the national average. Neither did the Irish feels the pressure on their social insurance system – in the second quarter of 
2006, the rate of employment for immigrants from the new member states amounted to 87 per cent. As for Sweden, towards the end 
of 2004, the employment rate for Poles reached the level of 59.2 per cent. What is more, in accordance with the data of the Swedish 
National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen), the number of social benefit applications submitted by Poles has not increased. 
Both in 2003 and 2004, Polish citizens filed approx. 1,700 such applications (Doyle et al. 2006). 
At the same time, the number of Poles who apply for family benefits abroad has been on the increase. This is so because child benefits 
in Western Europe are much higher than in Poland, they are usually granted to families irrespective of their income and they can be 
obtained even if one family member works abroad and the child stays in the home country. According to the Home Office in Great 
Britain, from January to September 2006, 22,900 family benefit applications submitted by citizens from the new member states were 
positively evaluated – compared with 6,200 during the same period in 2005.
1.4 Individual determinants of Polish international migration.
1.4.1 Introduction 
Knowing the facts concerning Polish emigration before and after the accession, we can take a closer look at the reasons why Polish 
citizens decide to leave Poland and make an attempt at assessing why certain social groups are more likely to go to work abroad than 
others.
Research studies on factors that aﬀect the scale of Polish emigration tend to focus on the labour market situation. It is often raised that 
wages are much lower in Poland than abroad and that job opportunities are scarcer. It should be borne in mind that these opportuni-
ties are varied and that they depend on a range of factors, including above all level of education and of professional experience. It can 
be assumed, however, that for many people it pays to go to work to another country than to search or continue a job in Poland. The 
outcome of such calculation is also aﬀected by such factors as decreasing costs of job hunting and of working abroad, due to Internet 
expansion, lower cost of transport, etc.
The approach to the analysis of migration processes based on the comparison of proﬁts and losses associated with emigration refers 
to the human capital theory (see, for instance, Bauer, Zimmermann 1999; Kaczmarczyk, Okólski 2005). In accordance with this theory, 
emigration is a kind of investment in future income of an individual and the decision about departure abroad is made as a result of 
a comparison of individual expected beneﬁts and costs connected with going to work to a diﬀerent country or staying at home (see 
Box III.10). 18 
The assessment of migration in terms of an individual investment allows to explain not only the reasons for but also the age selective-
ness of this process – most migrants are young people. The relatively high migration potential of the young Poles is evidenced among 
others by the results of the Eurobarometer of 2002, which indicate that people aged 15-24 account for approx. 64 per cent of all people 
declaring their intention to go abroad, and together with the age groups 25-39 – more than 92 per cent (Krieger 2004). Among others, 
this is so because the expected discounted beneﬁt from migration is lower for elderly people. Similarly, if we take into account the 
risk of failure, for young people, losses associated with a potential ﬁasco can be stretched out for a number of years. The cost of migra-
18 In most theoretical models it is assumed that this decision is irreversible – they do not account for either return or incomplete migration.
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tion includes ﬁnancial outlays as well as emotional losses connected with breaking family and social ties and having to adapt to new 
circumstances. Therefore, it can be reasonably expected that there are relatively many single people among migrants – people who 
do not have family commitments, i.e. mostly young people. The above observations ﬁnd their conﬁrmation in the results of empirical 
studies (see, for instance, Bauer, Zimmermann 1999). 
Box III.10. Migration as investment
Migration can be regarded as investment in the future income of an individual. When making a decision about going abroad,
a potential migrant compares expected benefits and costs of migration. Benefits from migration include above all expected wages 
in relation to chances of finding a job (offering hourly rates at a certain level) abroad. What is more, at least in the case of people 
who are characterised by a high initial level of human capital, advantages also include professional experience and skills acquired 
abroad. As for costs, they include:
• alternative income which a potential migrant might earn, if s/he found (or continued) work in Poland;
• transaction costs connected with looking for a job abroad;
• cost of breaking the social bonds and adapting to new conditions;
• differences in living cost in the home country and in the migration destination (above all cost of accommodation).
The issue of human capital selectiveness is not as obvious under the model of migration as investment. On the one hand, high capac-
ity for collecting and processing information (e.g. Internet literacy, foreign language skills) which is typical for highly educated people, 
allows for a more eﬀective job search abroad and – what comes with it – greater expected net beneﬁt from migration due to lower 
transaction cost and higher probability of ﬁnding a better paid job. On the other hand, however, highly educated people have relatively 
high chances of ﬁnding a job in their home country, which means that for them migration entails higher alternative cost.
Box III.11. Migration versus level of education – can we talk about brain drain? 
The phenomenon of mobility of professionals which consists in their employment in the destination country in positions and profes-
sions which are in line with their qualifications is commonly referred to as brain exchange. It is a two-way flow. In the case of a much 
greater net outflow of skilled labour force, we are dealing with a brain drain. An opposite trend is referred to as brain gain. However, 
when a highly qualified worker engages in work which requires lower qualifications and less experience than s/he can offer, we are 
dealing with depreciation of skills which leads to brain waste. 
Chart III.7. 
Level of education of Polish long-term emigrants (left graph) and level of education of Polish emigrants aged 13+
who stayed abroad for more than 2 months in the period 1989-2002.
   
Source: Own calculations based on the NPC 2002
In the period 1989-1991, the share of university graduates in the total number of Polish migrants staying abroad temporarily amount-
ed to 9 per cent. In the period 1998-2001, this share grew to 11.5 per cent, which surely has to do with the increased interest in tertiary 
education in the Polish population. At that time, Polish graduates most frequently moved to: the US – 25.8 per cent, Germany – 19.4 
per cent, Great Britain – 9.8 per cent and Canada – 3.2 per cent, and they tended to choose Anglo-Saxon countries more frequently 
than lower qualified workers. Similarly to other migrants, people with tertiary education who go to work abroad are usually young 
– aged 25-34. The increase in the volume of emigration of Poles with tertiary education does not yet deserve to be referred to as brain 
drain. In 2000, the share of Polish emigrants with tertiary education amounted to approx. 10 per cent, whereas for the Irish it was as 
high as 26.1 per cent, and for New Zealanders – 24.4 per cent (OECD 2006). Therefore, the growth trend in the number of migrants 
with tertiary education is mainly connected with the increasing intensity of migration, growing share of people with higher education 
in the total population and young age (up to 35 years) of migrants as their level of education is high.
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When applying the above considerations to the situation in Poland, it can be observed that theoretically groups with relatively high 
level of qualiﬁcations should be more inclined to migrate. It would be diﬃcult to carry out a regular study which would allow a veriﬁca-
tion of these conjectures due to the lack of representative and suﬃciently detailed data, although the above-referenced statistics for 
Great Britain and Ireland seem to support this thesis. We can also refer to examples of groups for which the “migration as investment” 
theory appears to illustrate well the process of engaging in work abroad. However, the case studies presented below, which concern 
particular social and economic groups, cannot be considered arguments in favour or against the above theory in its strict sense.
1.4.2 Migration of healthcare workers
A relatively well-documented example of workers for whom the diﬀerence in expected salaries may play a signiﬁcant role when mak-
ing emigration decisions are people employed in healthcare services. Their propensity to emigrate is evidenced by data of the Ministry 
of Health on the number of issued certiﬁcates conﬁrming professional qualiﬁcations. Such certiﬁcates are issued to doctors and nurses 
intending to work abroad(see Kaczmarczyk, Okólski 2005). The number of certiﬁcates issued should not be seen as an exact reﬂection 
of the outﬂow of healthcare workers abroad, however, it provides an approximation of the extent of interest in emigration. Although in 
most EU countries salaries in the healthcare sector are relatively low compared with salaries in other sectors, they may seem very high 
in relation to those oﬀered by Polish healthcare institutions. Considering the number of certiﬁcates issued by the end of May 2005, it 
can be assumed that the tendency of healthcare staﬀ to emigrate was not dramatically high, although it exceeded slightly the relevant 
values reﬂecting tendencies in the entire population –qualiﬁcation certiﬁcates were issued to approx. 2.2 per cent of doctors and 
approx. 1.2-1.5 per cent of nurses in Poland. At the same time, considerably higher percentages were observed for certain groups of 
medical consultants and for some regions in Poland. The former included in particular anaesthesiologists (7.7 per cent), chest surgeons 
(7.1 per cent), plastic surgeons (7.2 per cent) and emergency rescue specialists (4.1 per cent). By way of comparison, the share of phar-
macists (i.e. people with relatively high salaries in this sector) who applied to have their qualiﬁcations recognised abroad amounted to 
as little as approx. 0.6 per cent. As for nurses and midwives, more than 8 per cent of them applied for the above-mentioned certiﬁcates 
at the District Nursing Council in Krosno and almost 0 per cent in Warsaw. Hence, it seems that it is mainly healthcare employees in 
low pay areas or those who work in the less developed regions – where salaries are low and it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd additional jobs (and 
additional income) in private healthcare institutions – that tend to emigrate. In less developed regions, migration may be a noteworthy 
alternative also from the perspective of entire household, because it is less likely that income earned by spouse would compensate for 
low income derived from work in the Polish healthcare sector. At the same time, strong demand for employees with particular qualiﬁ-
cations (e.g. plastic surgeons) and the possibility of achieving high income abroad are of great importance.
1.4.3 Migration of students
Students seem to be a group which can beneﬁt a lot from migration. The level of employment of young people in Poland – similarly 
to other NMS8 – is rather low, irrespective of their relatively high (nominal) level of education (see part I). To some extent this results 
from high education activity of the young which can hardly be combined with work, especially full-time work. On the other hand, it 
should be noted that in Poland  small – in international context - share of working students coexists with high share of students in 
evening and part-time education(see, for instance, Bukowski et al. 2005). Low employment rate of students is probably associated with 
the insuﬃcient development of the service sector in Poland because it is a service sector where young people and students are usually 
employed (Bukowski et al. 2005). The above applies above all to students from smaller towns. Consequently, despite language and 
cultural barriers, students have more opportunities to ﬁnd work abroad than in Poland. . The Eurobarometer survey of 2002 indicates 
that students accounted for almost 53 per cent of all Poles declaring intention to migrate (Krieger 2004). However, it can be assumed 
that students’ migrations are mainly of short-term nature. This is so because a decision to stay abroad for a long time would entail a 
high risk of not completing the studies, which would lead, in turn, to the l decrease of potential future incomes and to the wasting of 
outlays related to hitherto education.
The above-presented mechanism of migration of young people and students is in line with the results of relevant empirical studies. 
They imply, among others, that students constitute a relatively large group in the total number of people arriving in Great Britain with 
the intention to work and that most of them engage in employment in hotel and catering services, i.e. in the same sectors in which 
most students from Western Europe ﬁnd employment and which are characterised by evident seasonality in labour demand.
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1.4.4 Migration of university graduates
People who have recently completed studies are another example of potential emigrants . Although in Poland tertiary education 
graduates ﬁnd jobs relatively easily, due to their scarce work experience they earn relatively low salaries (in relation to the average 
salary oﬀered to a person with tertiary education). Most graduates do not yet have any family obligations. What is more, due to their 
young age, the rate of return from migration (if, according to plan, migration is of long-term nature) is likely to be positive (they will 
live long enough for potential discounted proﬁts or losses connected with migration to generate expected net beneﬁts). Moreover, 
in view of the rather high level of foreign language skills among young people (see Diagnoza Społeczna / Social Diagnosis 2005), it 
can be expected that in their case the adaptation process goes rather smoothly. Even if jobs undertaken abroad are not well-suited 
to the level or area of their education, in the short term (i.e. in the horizon of a few months), decisions to go abroad may prove very 
beneﬁcial. It seems, however, that in the long term, beneﬁts from working abroad may no longer outweigh the costs. This is because 
after working for a few years in Poland, tertiary education graduates would probably make a satisfactory professional career, whereas 
abroad an average Polish worker takes a high risk of working below his/her level of qualiﬁcations permanently, which in the long term 
leads to human capital depreciation and limits work opportunities abroad or after return to Poland. Thus, it is important  how tight 
is the boundary between particular labour market segments in countries, which constitute migration destinations for young people, 
what are their chances for professional development and when do they decide to return to Poland.
1.4.5 Migration of the unemployed
Theoretically, the unemployed constitute one of the socio-economic groups which could beneﬁt a lot from migration. The alternative 
costs of migration are lower for them than for workers because for the latter a departure abroad would be associated with change of 
employer and loss of income in Poland. Moreover, the unemployed are in the position to devote relatively more time to a job search 
abroad than workers. At the same time, empirical studies indicate that the unemployed are rather reluctant to migrate – both at the 
international and regional levels (see, for instance, World Bank, 2006)..
Low mobility of the unemployed can be explained by:
• problem of structure – elderly people, who do not tend to go abroad (for reasons mentioned earlier)constitute a large share 
 of the unemployed population. Moreover, a large share of the unemployed in Poland work in grey economy (approx. 20-30 
 per cent). These people have a source of income which they might not want to give up in order to take up employment 
 abroad.
• liquidity problem – for the unemployed, especially those living in less developed, poorer regions, low incomes may constitute 
 an obstacle to migration (Olesen 2002 after: Krieger 2004). Similarly to other investment decisions, a decision to emigrate 
 may only be made on condition that a potential emigrant has suﬃcient funds to cover the direct costs of departure (transport, 
 job searching and initial living costs), which may be high at the ﬁrst stage of emigration.
• problem of job search method – the unemployed are often characterised by low level of  human capital. This can 
 make their job search less eﬀective or limit them to local or regional labour markets. Moreover, when looking for jobs, some 
 of the unemployed (especially low-skilled or from small towns and villages)  tend to rely mostly on informal information 
 sources (see World Bank, 2006), which largely limits the spatial range of their job search eﬀorts. On the other hand, however, 
 the existence of a family network in the place of potential migration is a factor which substantially increases the probability 
 of ﬁnding a job abroad (see Box III.12).  
Anecdotal information as well as quantitative research imply that the unemployed are relatively more likely to opt for seasonal work 
abroad rather than for long-term emigration (see Kaczmarczyk, Okólski 2005). 
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19 The term “relative deprivation” in the context of migration theory was used by Stark and Taylor (1989, 1991)
Box III.12. Social networks and migration
A large share of emigrants find work abroad thanks to social networks (Radiukiewicz 2006). Migration networks are defined as “sets of 
interpersonal relations that link migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in the source and destination countries by way of social 
connections” (Faist 1997). Social networks can connect family members, friends or can even be based on indirect relations. Family is 
of the greatest importance for migration network. In the literature on the subject, the following functions of migration networks are 
usually presented:  
• security against cost and risk connected with migration,
• maintenance of contacts with the sending community, 
• isolation from the receiving community,
• influence on the decision which household members migrate,
• influence on types of activities undertaken by migrants,
• transfer of information, goods and norms,
• influence on the choice of migration destination,
• influence on the extent of migration flows and their dynamics (Gurak, Cases 1992).
Thanks to migration networks people can obtain first-hand information on the living and working conditions in the receiving country 
from people whom they can trust. These connections are an essential element of the social capital of an emigrant. Considering the 
size of the Polish community abroad, the potential of Polish migration networks can be considered as high.
The strong influence of migration networks on decisions about moving abroad and on choices of migration destinations is reflected, 
among others, in strong migration trends of people from particular towns in Poland to particular countries or even towns in Western 
Europe. For instance, large numbers of inhabitants of Siemiatycze, a town of 16,000 people in the podlaskie voivodeship, engage 
in work in Brussels. First migrations from this town to Belgium took place in the 1980s. The inhabitants of Siemiatycze soon gained
a reputation of diligent and honest workers which opened the door to chain migration. According to the authorities of Siemiatycze, 
more than a half of the town’s inhabitants have been working abroad in the past (Tygodnik Przegląd 2002).
Social networks also play an important role for seasonal workers in Germany – as demonstrated in relevant research studies, almost 85 
per cent of them found employment thanks to the help of family members or friends (Łukowski 2004).
 
Although the neoclassical theory of migration seems to be intuitively coherent and consistent with facts, it is now commonly claimed 
in the literature on the subject that it does not provide an exhaustive picture of the observed migration trends (e.g. it does not explain 
migrations which involve engagement in work abroad when wage levels are higher in the country of residence than in the destination 
country). The New Economic Theory of Migration gives an explanation, among others, of the above behaviour. In accordance with the 
above theory, migration decisions are usually made by entire households rather than by individuals. Economic migration may result 
not only from the desire to make additional income but also to diversify its sources in a particular household. This allows to reduce the 
risk of income loss, e.g. as a result of a shock in the local labour market.
Another key tenant of the New Economic Theory of Migration is the notion of relative deprivation, which postulates that the satisfac-
tion of a given individual with his/her income is not only a function of its absolute level but that it rather depends on the position 
attained in relation to other people from the reference group (e.g. local community). This means that the inclination to migrate should 
be greater in social groups and regions where there is a particularly large diﬀerentiation in income levels. 19 
Box III.13. Methods for searching jobs abroad
Most jobs performed by Poles abroad are those commended to migrants by family members or acquaintances. Since decisions about 
emigration and chances of finding a job are most frequently conditioned by contacts with other migrants, it is said that there exists 
the so-called “supranational social space” (Kaczmarczyk, Okólski 2005). Another commonly used source of information is the Internet 
(Radiukiewicz 2006) – thanks to, among others, online discussion forums potential emigrants acquire information about job and ac-
commodation search methods, living costs, etc. from people who have gone abroad earlier. Moreover, the role of employment agen-
cies, press articles and other official sources of information is more and more significant.
The intensification of economic migration has given rise to the necessity of developing employment agency services. Regrettably, 
they are not always reliable or even legal. It is rather frequent that jobs offered to migrants prove to be fictional or they are performed 
in conditions that are much worse than agreed. At the same time, agents charge a lot for all the information provided. The said fees 
are usually one-time payments equal to the amount of the first monthly salary, or less frequently periodical – in the form of a fixed 
percentage of the wage.
The following employment institutions help in the process of finding jobs abroad: employment agencies in Poland, HR advisory, 
professional and temporary work agencies. Moreover, upon Poland’s accession to the European Union, Poles gained access to the 
European Employment Service (EURES), which is an information exchange network which brings together public employment serv-
ices in the countries belonging to the EEA with other regional, national or international organisations which operate in the sphere of 
employment.
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The New Economic Theory of Migration helps also to explain the fact that it is mainly young people who tend to emigrate. The success 
of the generation of Poles who entered the labour market in mid-1990s incited the professional expectations of the young. Nowadays, 
however, the situation of graduates in the labour market is more diﬃcult and career opportunities which were available to their older 
colleagues are now scarcer. Hence, we can talk about a relative deprivation between particular cohorts entering the labour market.
What is more, it can be assumed that young Poles tend to more frequently compare themselves with their peers from Western Europe 
than older people (e.g. due to their better command of foreign languages, better Internet skills, participation in international student 
exchange programmes, etc.). Such wider reference group boosts the professional aspirations and expectations of the young genera-
tion of Poles who may thus sense greater dissatisfaction with their own economic situation. Consequently, they tend to decide more 
often to go abroad where they can count on better wages, although often at the cost of performing jobs that are below their qualiﬁca-
tions.
1.5 Determinants of Polish international migration at aggregate level
In the preceding section, we have presented an overview of factors which aﬀect individual decisions about migration. Factors which 
form such decisions at the individual level should translate into the extent of migration at the aggregate level and be reﬂected in the 
composition of the migration ﬂow. Determinants of international migration at the aggregate level can be divided into:
 • push factors from the sending country (relatively low wages, high unemployment, low employment growth, relatively high 
 living costs, etc.)
• pull factors to the receiving country (high wages, high absorption of labour force which leads to low unemployment and 
 dynamic employment growth, relatively low living costs).
The public debate on Polish economic migration is dominated by the view that relatively high  international mobility is mainly due 
to the diﬃcult situation in the labour market as well as to low wages in Poland. Hence, it is assessed that push factors are of decisive 
importance. Discussions in the media in the countries which have opened their labour markets often emphasise that robust economic 
growth, high wages and high labour demand in the rapidly developing services sector in the receiving countries are the factors which 
attracted workers from the new member states:. Another important group of factors aﬀecting the movement of human resources 
between countries are institutional factors, e.g. immigration policy of the receiving country2 which pertains mostly to the use and 
removal of barriers to the free movement of workers. The fact of channelling the ﬂow of migration immediately after the accession of 
ten new member states to those Western European countries which have opened their labour markets (Great Britain, Ireland, Sweden) 
evidently illustrates how institutional factors can aﬀect the destinations migration ﬂows. In particular, under common market condi-
tions, limitations to the free movement of labour force – although they can decrease the scale of immigration to some extent – lead 
above all to the application of illegal practices when employing immigrants. If demand for foreign labour and supply of foreign work-
ers are high, restrictive immigration policies lead inevitably to the development of the shadow economy. This phenomenon can be 
observed nowadays in a number of European countries, especially with respect to immigrants from Africa but also to seasonal workers 
from Central and Eastern Europe.
It is diﬃcult to objectively assess the role of particular aggregate and individual determinants of migration not only because of the 
quality of the available data but also because of the multidimensional nature of migration. In the literature on the subject, however, 
there is a consensus that the main factors responsible for increased migration from relatively poorer to richer countries, including from 
the NMS8 to the EU15 following the EU enlargement, are on the one hand: lower wages and living standards as well as the insuﬃciently 
developed services sector in the sending countries, and on the other hand, high labour demand in the receiving countries.
Moreover, the migration ﬂow should be:
 • the larger, the more numerous the early working age population, characterised by relatively low wages in the sending 
 country, and the greater the probability that these people ﬁnd jobs abroad and generate higher income than that generated 
 in their country of residence,
• the larger, the greater the diﬀerences in income levels between the sending and the receiving countries,
• the smaller, the higher the transaction costs (connected with the legal terms and conditions of engaging in work abroad, 
 overseas family network, cost of travel between the sending and the receiving countries),
• the smaller, the greater the diﬀerence in living cost levels,
• the smaller, the stronger the institutional and cultural barriers between countries.
A synthetic collation of individual and aggregate determinants of migration is presented in Table III.6.
20 It seems that emigration policies in democratic countries are of smaller extent – they are limited to a more or less active participation in the establishment of conditions for a free choice 
of jobs for citizens.
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Table III.6. 
Determinants of inclination to migrate at the individual level and their impact on factors at the aggregate level
Source: Own elaboration 
 
1.6. Impact of international migration on the labour market and economy 
The process of international migration gives rise to many controversies both in the country which is the source of emigration (sending 
country) and in the destination country of the ﬂow of migrants (receiving country). Opponents of migration pronounce many critical 
views thus pointing to its adverse impact on the economies of sending and receiving countries alike. Migration supporters, on the 
other hand, stress the evidently positive – in their opinion – aspects of international movements of people. According to the former, 
the net outcome of the economic processes is bound to be negative, whereas the latter claim that this outcome is in fact positive.
According to migration sceptics, potential threats that international migration may pose are generally similar for countries receiving 
and sending migrants. Negative phenomena that emigration apparently causes in sending countries include above all concerns that it 
can lead to increased deﬁcits in the labour market – especially in certain professions and specialist areas, and accelerate the imbalance 
in public ﬁnances due to lost tax income generated by people at the age of maximum economic activity and unchanged expenditures 
on beneﬁts for the elderly. Additionally, emigration gives rise to concerns about the economic growth potential in sending countries 
when the most motivated and enterprising as well as best educated people decide to migrate. As for receiving countries, fears are 
often voiced about excessive competition in the labour market as a consequence of large population inﬂows and about the resulting 
wage drops and increased unemployment among local workers. At the same time, the imbalance in public ﬁnances is said to increase 
because budgetary expenditures on beneﬁts granted to immigrants would exceed income from taxes paid by them. Moreover, im-
migrants are said to slow down (temporarily) economic growth because their human capital and savings are too low to quickly ﬁll the 
gap in capital per capita and in investment on research and development.
Determinants at the 
individual level
higher expected income 
abroad
transaction cost
diﬀerence in living cost levels
relative deprivation
professional experience
and skills
cost of breaking social 
ties and adapting to new 
environment
Determinants at the aggregate level
• average wage oﬀered to employees (with a given level and type of qualiﬁcations) in 
 the country of residence of a potential emigrant
• expected wage in the destination country of potential migration (with 
 assumptions concerning the type of work which can – with a degree of probability – be 
 undertaken in such country)
• unemployment and employment rates (number of new jobs) in the country of residence 
 of a potential emigrant
• unemployment and employment rates (number of new jobs) for groups of people with 
 a similar level and type of qualiﬁcations in the destination country of potential 
 migration
• legal regulations determining the possibility of engaging in legal work in the country 
 of potential migration (risk connected with illegal employment, cost of the work permit 
 application)
• distance between the destination and the source countries
• existence of a contact network connecting family members and acquaintances in the 
 destination country of potential migration (diaspora size and level of migration in 
 preceding years)
• diﬀerence in average living costs in the destination and source countries (mainly 
 cost of accommodation)
• risk of relative deprivation in the sending country reﬂected in income inequalities in 
 a given region or social group
• barriers which make it diﬃcult to fully use the knowledge and skills acquired in the 
 source country when working in the destination country of potential migration (cultural 
 links, language, etc.)
• role of family and traditions versus taste for migration in the culture of the sending 
 country,
• population structure by age and education
• general living conditions: climate, political and economic stability
• share of homeowners, degree of urbanisation
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Migration enthusiasts provide a similar catalogue of positive phenomena which are said to arise in connection with migration proc-
esses and concern countries sending and receiving migrants alike. They claim that immigration of better qualiﬁed and highly industri-
ous people constitutes an additional pro-growth impulse in the destination country. Consequently, they argue that immigrants help 
to ﬁll the employment gap in sectors which lack suﬃciently qualiﬁed local workers and to remedy the problem of aging society thus 
allowing the population of the receiving country to keep up high social insurance and retirement beneﬁts. As for sending countries, 
supporters of migration emphasise that migration is a cure for high unemployment because it relieves the local labour market and that 
emigrants, who tend to send signiﬁcant amounts of money back home, support the home economy and increase the living standards 
of their families who stay in the source country. What is more, the potentiality of emigrating may encourage a number to people to 
improve their qualiﬁcations and invest in human capital, whereas in the long run only some of them would actually go abroad. Also, 
many today’s emigrants are likely to return to their home country in the future and bring along their savings thus feeding and develop-
ing the national economy.
A number of empirical studies in the ﬁeld of labour economics have been carried out to verify the views of supporters and opponents 
of international migration (see, for instance, Friedberg, Hunt 1995, Ghatak et al. 1996, Borjas 1999, Commander et al. 2003, Drinkwater et 
al. 2003). Based on the above research it can be stated that in the case of receiving countries both concerns and hopes are justiﬁed to 
some extent, although the actual impact of immigration on the economy and labour market is generally not excessively large, mainly 
due to the moderate contribution of migrants to total human capital resources in the economy of the receiving country.
It seems that the postulate about the pressure exerted by immigrants resulting in the limitation of growth of wages oﬀered to local 
workers is in fact viable, although this pressure is actually rather small (i.e. 10 per cent increase in the number of workers causes a 1-3 
per cent drop in wages of local workers). There are, however, some speciﬁc sectors which are exceptions to the above rule and which 
tend to become dominated by immigrants who thus ﬁll deﬁcits in the labour market of the receiving country. Secondly, most ﬁrst-
generation immigrants work and pay taxes and therefore do not constitute a burden for the social insurance system or public ﬁnances. 
At the same time, examples of some countries demonstrate that the situation is slightly diﬀerent for second-generation immigrants, 
although this depends on how well they assimilate in the receiving country.
One economic conclusion is that the impact of immigration on the level of output in receiving countries is positive though relatively 
small (i.e. 10 per cent increase in the number of workers causes a 1-2 per cent increase in output levels), which is due to the fact that 
because of immigration the labour supply of local workers slightly decreases and that immigrants engage in simple, low-productivity 
and low-wage jobs. This impact is greater, if a large share of migrants consists of highly qualiﬁed people. As a result, immigration helps 
to remedy problems connected with the ageing of the population at most to a marginal extent and because immigrants often assume 
the procreation model of the receiving country it is also a remedy that only delays these problems rather than prevent them.
Although the economic literature seems to support immigration related hopes rather than concerns of receiving countries, in the 
case of sending countries the situation is right the opposite – even though the actual impact of immigration on sending countries is 
also relatively limited. To begin with, it should be noted that the extent of emigration varies signiﬁcantly between countries as well as 
in time. It also strongly depends on the scale of individual beneﬁts that emigrants expect to derive from migration as well as on vari-
ous institutional possibilities of leaving the source country for destination countries. Thus, emigration rarely exceeds 5 per cent of the 
population in the economically productive age and in fact it is more likely to reach much lower levels. Hence, concerns about potential 
depopulation of sending countries are unfounded. 
Despite the conﬁrmed negative impact of emigration on output due to brain drain, it usually is not very large because of the limited 
scale of this phenomenon and the positive eﬀect on the accumulation of human capital in sending countries (i.e. brain gain prevails 
over brain drain). As for money transfers to source countries, they often exert a considerable positive impact on the living standards 
and drop in poverty of the families of emigrants – especially in Third World countries – but at the same time they often lead to the 
strengthening of economic and social inactivity behaviour. When it comes to return migration, the situation is a little bit more complex. 
Although only a small share of migrants from Third World countries returns to their home countries, the extent of return migration 
among European emigrants is much higher. What is more, former emigrants are more inclined than their families back home to pro-
ductively use the income earned from their work abroad.
To sum up, it can be said that international migration brings advantages and disadvantages to sending and receiving countries alike. 
Beneﬁts derived by receiving countries are smaller but they last longer, whereas drawbacks concern only some social groups. The 
latter are the greater, the more educated the immigrants are. As for drawbacks on the part of sending countries, they are temporarily 
minimalised by the ﬂow of money transfers sent to the families of emigrants as well as by increased accumulation of human capital. 
Economic policies which minimalise these drawbacks in sending countries are simply policies that enhance rapid economic growth 
and real convergence in relation to receiving countries
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2. Internal mobility and work commuting
2.1 Intensity of internal migration in Poland compared with other EU countries
In accordance with the NPC data, the number of people who changed their region of residence in the period 1989-2002 and moved 
elsewhere in the country can be estimated at 3,924,300, out of whom approx. 70 per cent moved within one poviat and approx. 25 
per cent – within one voivodeship.21 The average annual share of migrants aged 15-64 amounted to approx. 1 per cent in 1989-2002. 
Their actual intensity, however, was most probably higher because some migrants recorded in the NPC moved at least twice, whereas 
the methodology did not allow for multiple entries.22 Hence, a question emerges about how Poland compares to other European 
countries in terms of mobility.
In the literature on spatial mobility in Poland, it is often assessed that the extent of internal migration is relatively low as compared 
with other Western European countries (see, for instance, OECD 2005, World Bank 2006a). Such statement should be subject some 
reservations, however. Above all, when comparing the intensity of internal migration across countries, one should keep in mind that 
the European countries diﬀer substantially with respect to the size and density of populations of territorial units across countries or 
diﬀerences in the number of regions. This concerns in particular the NUTS classiﬁcation and NUTS-2 regions, which correspond to 
voivodeships in Poland and for which the comparative analysis is feasible. In accordance with the basic “laws of gravity” formulated by 
the forerunners of research on the processes of mobility, the number of inhabitants and the distance to the migration destination are 
the key determinants of the intensity of migration (see Box III.14). Hence, the level of migration intensity (measured as a percentage 
share of people moving to a diﬀerent region within one year) should decrease as the area of a given territorial unit increases. For this 
reason, only in the case of some European countries – namely France, Hungary, Italy and Spain – migration statistics are comparable at 
the NUTS-2 level with data for Poland. As for comparisons with the Czech Republic, Greece, Slovakia ad Germany, the average area of 
regions in these countries in approximately twice as small as in Poland (see Table III.7). When it comes to the Baltic states, Netherlands 
and New Zealand, internal migration data are not comparable with those for Poland, because in each of the above countries the largest 
region is smaller than the smallest of all Polish voivodeships.
The comparability of migration intensity across countries is also hindered by diﬀerences in the number of territorial units. The more 
regions between which people can migrate within one country, the greater ceteris paribus the potential intensity of migration.23 For 
this reason, for instance in Hungary, due to the small number of NUTS-2 units, migration intensity is slightly understated in relation to 
the rate for Poland. Hence, comparing the mobility of these two countries, has to be conducted with caution.
Data presented in Table III.7 indicate that in the group of countries which are best comparable with Poland only in France the share 
of people aged 15-64 moving to a diﬀerent region – corresponding to Polish voivodeships (NUTS-2), is considerably higher than in 
Poland.24 For other countries in this group, i.e. Spain, Hungary and Italy, migration intensity rates are similar to that of Poland. The same 
can be said about Germany, if we take into consideration the size, area and population as well as the number of German territorial units. 
Migration intensity is much lower in Greece than in Poland – although if we take into account the average size of NUTS-2 regions in 
Greece, internal migration intensity at this level should in fact be higher.
Box III.14. The gravity models
In the so-called laws of migration, the forerunner of migration research, Ernest Ravenstein, stated among others that most people 
move at small distances and that they tend to move from rural areas to towns. A hierarchy of mobility is thus established, because 
migrants, who move to larger cities, create “gaps” which are filled by migrants from more peripheral areas. This observation has been 
generalised using an analogy to the physical notion of gravity. The basic gravity model assumes that the number of migrants is in-
versely proportional to the square root of the distance between the place of residence and the migration destination as well as directly 
proportional to the product of the numbers of populations of the two places. Although the currently used models are much more 
complex (they account for, among others, the endogeneity of population size), Ravenstein’s laws are still used in research on mobility 
– both regional and international – as well as in commuting models.
21 In the NPC, migration means a change of place of residence within one district (NUTS-5) as well as movements from rural to urban areas (and vice versa) within one district. Moreover, all 
migrants were accounted for, including those aged 15- at the time of migration. This approach diﬀers from that used in international comparisons which used LFS data (see, for instance, 
Table III.7. which uses OECD data).
22 This problem has been observed in all countries. Since national censuses are carried out every ﬁve years and the migration intensity rate, which is estimated baseing on registration data, 
concerns the number of changes of place of residence, the literature on the subject often makes references to the “1-year-5-year problem”. This problem consists in migration intensity 
estimated basing on annual data being higher than the average annual value of migration intensity estimated based on data from national censuses carried out every ﬁve years. This is so 
because if a person migrates a number of times during the ﬁve-year period, the national census will only take account of the last migration, whereas the annually collected data will take 
account of every single migration.
23 The relationship between migration intensity and the number of regions can be expressed by the following formula: m = K * log (n2) , where m = migration intensity rate, n = number 
of regions (so-called Courgeau index, see Bell et al. 2002)
24 Unfortunately, at this point a problem arises which is connected with methodological diﬀerences between LFSs with respect to the deﬁnition of household members. It has been con-
ﬁrmed in an oﬃcial publication of Eurostat that in France students can be considered twice, if they live in rented accommodation.
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Table III.7. 
Spatial description of regions versus internal migration intensity
Source: OECD 2005
Apart from the diﬀerent numbers, sizes and population densities of territorial units, one should also take into consideration the fact 
that EULFS, a database used for cross-country comparisons of migration, covers not only economic migration, but also changes in 
place of residence driven by motives such as starting a family and taking up education at tertiary level as well as movements of people 
in pre-retirement or retirement age (retirement migration). Migration of this type may be more common in other countries than in 
Poland because of diﬀerent housing market situation. We elaborate more on this problem in chapters on individual determinants of 
migration and on work commuting.25 
Migration intensity level in Poland has ﬂuctuated considerably in the last decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, the intensity of spatial 
mobility was rather high, above all due to large inﬂows of people from rural areas to towns. Firstly, “large-scale socialist investment” at-
tracted workers from peripheries, and secondly, poor infrastructure and limited access to services often pushed families to move from 
rural areas to towns in order to increase their living standards (Kupiszewski 2001). The crisis of the 1980s brought a halt to the ﬂow of 
rural population to urban areas thus lowering the intensity of migration. In the 1990s, migration intensity decreased further – increased 
unemployment, housing shortages as well as changes in the population age structure (decreasing share of the most mobile age 
group i.e. 18-34, in the total population), caused another drop in migration intensity (Chłoń 1997, Kupiszewski 2001). This issue is worth 
stressing, because in some studies it is posited that, considering the increasing regional disparities in the labour market situation, an 
intensiﬁcation of migration should have occured. Nevertheless, as indicated by Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989), an increase in the 
aggregate level of unemployment and the resulting economic uncertainty may discourage migration, which could prevail over the 
eﬀects of increased regional diﬀerentiation of chances to ﬁnd a job. Considering that dismissals eﬀected in Poland within last between 
twenty years were often accompanied by policies which encouraged redundant workers to withdraw from the labour market and 
discouraged them to seek other employment opportunities – even in their region of residence, it should not come as a surprise that 
the internal migration level in Poland did not increase in that period.
Understanding the causes of changes in migration intensity in Poland as well as an examination of their relatively low levels requires 
discussion over the mechanisms involved in making decisions on migration. Individual determinants of migration are examined in the 
following sections of this chapter. We also discuss regional determinants of migration and the issue of substitution of internal migra-
tion by international migration or by commuting to other regions. This chapter ends with an analysis of implication of the process of 
migration for the labour market.
Country
POLAND
High degree of comparability with Poland
Spain
France
Italy
Hungary
Lower degree of comparability with Poland
Greece
Czech Republic
Austria
Germany
Great Britain
No comparability with Poland
Slovakia
Netherlands
Number of regions 
(NUTS2
16
16
22
20
7
13
8
9
36
11
4
12
min.
9 412
5 014
8 280
3 263
6 198
2 307
496
415
404
321
2 053
1 363
max.
35 412
94 193
45 348
25 703
18 314
18 811
17 616
19 173
29 477
39 777
16 243
4 983
average
19 543
31 095
24 726
14 756
13 290
10 125
9 858
9 318
9 917
6 590
12 259
2 823
Average population
density
(persons/km2)
88.3
93.6
88.3
119.7
89.5
83.4
286.8
334.3
303.8
531.6
57.4
328.3
Annual ﬂows
(% of 15-64)
LFS 2003
0.3
0.2
2.11
0.58
0.4
0.21
2.11
0.64
1.36
2.28
0.14
2.15
Migration intensity
rate
        Area (km2)
25 At the same time, in Poland, the group of potentially (and actually) most mobile people – namely those who take up studies away from their place of residence and then, having com-
pleted their studies, they take a job in that place instead of returning to their original place of residence – is not counted as migrants because of the construction of the survey. During their 
studies, when they live in halls of residence, they cannot be selected and included in the sample, whereas when they ﬁnish their studies they are included in the subpopulation which has 
been living in a given place for more than one year.
 Regions
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2.2 Individual determinants of internal migration
The literature refers to a range of individual determinants of migration, such as age, education attainment, family status, stage in the 
life course and status on the labour market (see, for instance, van der Gaag et al., 2003). Authors studying the processes of internal 
migration in Poland usually focus on describing migrants by certain characteristics that reﬂect their situation after moving to another 
place of residence. Such static approach ignores changes in education, family status and economic situation, which could potentially 
be the direct reasons for such move. Events such as starting and completing education, taking up or loosing a job, starting a family 
or joining another one, may be of importance for decisions about migration as status attained after their occurrence, although their 
impact might have a diﬀerent direction. For instance, the fact of starting a family is often connected with the change of residence but 
in the same time people, who already have set up families, are less likely to move at a longer distance. As much then, as the process of 
starting a family may increase the chances of migration, the fact of having a partner and children reduces the tendency to migrate.
Another illustration of problems connected with static approach are the diverging conclusions about the relationship between the 
current status on the labour market and the probability of migration derived from two models: hiring model and speculative migration 
model. In the speculative migration model, migration occurs before taking up employment, so migrants can be observed as unem-
ployed for a certain stage of their stay in the new place of residence. In the hiring model it is assumed that an unemployed person 
can search for a job using media, which are available irrespective of the actual distance from the migration destination (e.g. Internet) 
and decides to migrate only after conclusion of a contract with the employer. This means that after migration most people should 
be employed. If the hiring model accurately explains the process of spatial job search in Poland, the interpretation of the correlation 
between the current status on the labour market and the inclination to migrate may be misleading. The fact that people, who already 
have a job at the time of the survey, were relatively more likely to have migrated than those who are unemployed, does not mean that 
unemployment does not generally encourage migration.
Summing up, a distinction between the impact of certain event on the probability of migration and the impact of status attained as a 
result of the occurrence of this event should be made:
• the impact of the level of education should be assessed considering the possible co-occurrence of migration and the 
 starting or completing education,
• impact of having a family should be assessed taking account of the timing of setting up a family,
• relationship between migration and the situation in the labour market should be analysed in the context of changes in 
 abour market status (taking a job, loosing a job, withdrawing from the labour market, etc.) rather than the current labour 
 market situation of a migrant.
Such dynamic approach has been attempted in the model, the results of which are provided in the subsequent part of this chapter. 
From the point of view of discussions presented in this report, the most important of the above three issues is the last one, i.e. the 
question about the impact of certain events in the labour market career on the probability of migrating. The impact of other factors 
must be, however, also taken into account.26 One should expect that if age and education levels are controlled for, people without 
jobs should typically be more likely to migrate than the employed because for them alternative costs of such decision are lower (Pis-
sarides, Wadsworth 1989). However, as much as the empirical studies based on data from the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s for the United 
States, the Netherlands and Great Britain conﬁrm the fact of being out of employment largely increases the tendency to migrate, 
later studies of selected Western European countries published by OECD (2005e) as well as those on the CEE countries by World Bank 
(2006a) indicated that no such relationship existed. The lack of a clear and easily identiﬁable relationship between unemployment and 
the probability of migrating is usually explained by the lack of creditworthiness of the unemployed and by a relatively easy access to 
various transfers (e.g. unemployment beneﬁts, accommodation allowances) for which an unemployed persons would not be eligible 
outside the place of origin.
The impact of individual labour market status on the probability of migrating in Poland can be assessed basing on individual LFS data. 
In doing so one should keep in mind that according to the hiring model the unemployed may ﬁrst look for a job and migrate only after 
accepting an appropriate job oﬀer, and so the current individual unemployment can be negatively correlated with the probability of 
migration. On the other hand, however, it seems that in Poland – due to the structural nature of unemployment – a large share of job-
seekers do not have access or skills to search for jobs at a distance. Since it is diﬃcult to establish a priori which of the two models (hir-
ing model or speculative migration model) better reﬂects the typical method of searching for a job away from the place of residence 
in Poland, we have taken account of the individual labour market status both before and after the timing of migration.27 The results of 
this analysis are presented in Table III.8.
26 Unfortunately, due to the LFS providing no data on the date of marriage, it was impossible to include this factor implicite – hence, the interaction of age and family position with respect 
to the head of the household was introduced as a proxy variable. It can be assumed that daughters- and sons-in-law of the head of the household had to change their place of residence. 
Such approach should give better results than the inclusion of family status explicite because in Poland, marriage often entails joining another household instead of starting a new one. At 
the same time, it is impossible to assess the impact of taking up education on migration because the LFS does not cover people who live in collective households. It does not seem, however, 
that this fact downgrades the quality of this analysis because it intends rather to assess the impact of the labour market situation of a given person. Yet, the impact of completing education 
and starting to look for a job or actually ﬁnding one has been taken into account.
27 The LFS data allow to create a panel in which data bases from two consecutive periods are combined into a single data base. However, in view of the fact that address of residence is an 
element of the observation identiﬁer, as a result of the above-mentioned operation observations for migrants are lost. In order to determine how labour market status of a given person in 
Poland aﬀects his/her inclination to migrate, one could compare past information about such status from one year before the survey with the current information and thus estimate the 
extent of shifts between employment, unemployment and economic inactivity based on a quasi-panel.
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It emerges that in 2001-2005 the share of people who were out of employment and who actually found a job is greater by about
4 percentage points for migrants than for the entire population. Migration coincided not only with taking up a job but also with loosing 
or giving it up, however. In the group of people, who had a job one year before the survey and then – within the subsequent 12 months 
– changed their place of residence, there are more people who became unemployed or economically inactive than in the entire popu-
lation (by 3.3 and 1.4 percentage points respectively). At the same time, migration was also associated with taking up employment by 
people who – one year before the survey – used to be unemployed, ill or disabled, or who had family obligations. It is worth remarking 
that for the group of economically inactive due to bad health or family obligations the share of people taking up employment was 
higher for migrants by 3.3 and 3.6 percentage points, respectively. As for other groups of economically inactive, changes of place of 
residence were closely associated with a job search – the percentage share of people in this group who became economically active 
was greater by approx. 10 percentage points than in average for the entire population.
Interesting conclusions can be drawn from a comparison of the results presented in Table III.8 with the estimates included in Employ-
ment in Europe 2006 for the EU15. It appears that in the EU15, in the group of migrants who had jobs one year before the survey, 
11 per cent became economically inactive after migration (76 per cent were still in employment and 12 per cent lost their jobs). This 
means that in that countries, as opposed to Poland, the changes of place of residence connected with the birth of a child or retirement 
might play a signiﬁcant role. This seems to be conﬁrmed by the observation that in Poland the share of people aged 35-64 in the total 
population of migrants comes to 17 per cent, whereas in the EU15 – to 40 per cent. On the other hand, however, in the EU15, in the 
group of migrants who were out of employment one year before the survey, 55 per cent found jobs after migration and only 3 per cent 
withdrew from the labour market. In Poland, migration of the unemployed was relatively more often associated with the unemployed 
withdrawing from the labour market rather than ﬁnding jobs – this, however, is mainly due to a diﬀerent structure of migration ﬂows 
in the Polish labour market and not to a diﬀerent proﬁle of Polish migrants moving within the country.
 
Table III.8.
Structure of migrants and population of 15-year-olds and over by labour market status prior to migration (percentages)
Source: Own calculations based on LFS.
As indicated earlier, the impact of the current labour market status of people changing their place of residence can be misleading 
because the events that aﬀect the probability of employment, such as taking up studies or starting a family, can be the actual reason 
for migration. The co-occurrence of changes of residence and of changes in labour market status could reﬂect coincidence rather than 
from a causal relationship. Therefore, the above observations concerning the relationship between changes in labour market status 
and place of residence are confronted with the results of logistic regression, which allows to control for the impact of all analysed 
factors which potentially determine the probability of changing the place of residence in a given year. The reference group in the 
presented model are women aged 30-34, with secondary education, who were economically inactive 12 months before and at the 
moment of the survey. 
The results of the regression (see Table III.9) conﬁrm that age is the primary factor which determines the probability of migration. 
At the same time, a high probability of migration for the age group 20-29 often has to do with the fact of entering into marriages. The 
inclusion of the interaction between age and position in the household is intended to control for this eﬀect. In line with the expecta-
tions based on results of studies carried out for other countries, irrespective of the impact of completing studies on the probability of 
working
82.7
33.3
27.2
0.9
6.3
37.8
10.1
3.8
52.0
unemployed
11.6
40.0
18.6
3.5
4.8
50.7
14.6
30.2
20.5
inactive
5.8
26.7
54.2
95.6
88.9
11.5
75.3
66.0
27.5
working
87.3
29.3
18.2
2.2
3.1
37.6
6.5
5.5
49.7
unemployed
8.3
43.7
14.1
3.5
4.1
51.3
16.3
18.2
15.6
inactive
4.4
27.0
67.8
94.3
92.9
11.1
77.1
76.4
34.7
work
unemployment
schooling, training
(early) retirement
disability
military service
family obligations
other forms of economic inactivity
total
Status at the time of the surveyStatus one year before 
the survey
Migrants    Total
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changing residence, the level of education does aﬀect migration probability – people with tertiary education are much more likely 
to migrate than those with secondary education (those who are still in education and those who have completed it). People with basic 
vocational and primary education decide to migrate much less frequently. In addition, graduates who have taken up employment or 
who have started looking for jobs are typically characterised by a much higher probability of migration than people who were unem-
ployed one year before or at the time of the survey. These results suggest that graduates entering the labour market are particularly 
spatially mobile, although, at the same time, it cannot be assessed on the basis of the LFS data whether this greater inclination to 
migrate is associated with their return to the place of origin or with a greater spatial job-search range. At the same time, for people 
who were still in education one year before the survey and who are still economically inactive, the tendency to migrate is considerably 
smaller. 
Table III.9. 
Logit model results for change in residence during 12 months before survey
Reference category: women aged 30-34 irrespective of their family status, with secondary education, economically inactive one year before and at the 
time of the survey. For additional methodological remarks see Appendix 11.
a) odds ratios indicate how the probability of Y=1 changes, when X is 1 (for other binary variables)
Source: Own calculations based on BAEL 2001-2005 (ﬁrst waves)
A change of residence appears to coincide with the fact of taking up employment mainly in the group of young and well-educated 
people – in other words, when such factors as age and level of education are controlled for, there is no signiﬁcant association between 
the fact of an unemployed person ﬁnding a job and migration. As for the labour market integration of people who used to be inactive, 
it has a statistically strong and considerable impact on the probability of migration. However, the relatively greater probability of migra-
tion for the economically inactive taking up employment may be a result of temporary leave due to illness, disability, family obligations 
or military service. Taking up employment could then be then associated not so much with an eﬀective job search in the destination 
region but with return to work after an absence in the place of residence. In this group of people return migration might in fact prevail 
over economic migration. 
The results of the logit model indicate that there is no substantial relationship between individual unemployment and the inclina-
tion to migrate. These conclusions are in line with the results of a similar analysis carried out based on LFS 1994 (see Chłoń 1997). At the 
macro level the absence of such relationship may be reﬂected in local or regional unemployment rates not increasing the risk of migra-
tion, unless the aggregate labour market situation has an impact on decisions made by the employed. This would mean, however, that 
migration not only does not constitute an eﬀective mechanism which decreases the diﬀerences in the level of employment but that 
it may actually increase the regional labour market disparities.28 The mechanism of inﬂuence of regional unemployment and of other 
labour market features on outmigration will be discussed in detail in the next section, whereas a broader description of consequences 
of migration for regional development – in the summary section.
One drawback of the above-presented model is the lack of control over unemployment rates within regions – unfortunately, relevant 
rates reﬂecting the situation in the previous place of residence can only be determined at the voivodeship level, which – due the 
size of these units – does not provide information allowing to draw useful conclusions. In accordance with most empirical studies on 
internal migration, however, regional unemployment rates do not have a substantial impact on the individual probability of migration 
28 In fact, OECD (2005e) conﬁrms the existence of this phenomenon in the Czech Republic.
Variables
Age and position in relation 
to the head of household
15-19
20-24 son-/daughter-in-law
20-24 other family member
25-29 son-/daughter-in-law
25-29 other family member
35-64 son-/daughter-in-law
35-64 other family member
Education
tertiary
basic vocational or less
Gender
male
Signiﬁcance 
level
 
0.12
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.22
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Parameter 
estimate a)
 
0.71
24.39
1.94
9.57
1.57
2.17
0.27
1.83
0.55
1.58
Variables
Labour market status one year 
before and at the time of the survey
work-work
unemployment- work
education-work
inactivity-work
work-unemployment
unemployment-unemployment
schooling-unemployment
inactivity-unemployment
work-inactivity
unemployment-inactivity
schooling-inactivity
Signiﬁcance
level
 
0.01
0.37
0.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.54
0.00
0.01
0.96
0.00
Paremeter 
estimationa)
 
0.75
0.82
2.02
3.40
2.60
0.56
1.19
3.30
1.98
1.01
0.56
148
Employment in Poland 2006                       Spatial Mobility  
    III. 
(Greenwood, 1997). Nonetheless, in this analysis, the control of this factor is important to the extent that comparisons involve people 
who were not in employment one year before the survey and who then found jobs within 12 months. The absence of a clear-cut 
relationship between the migration and the fact of an unemployed person engaging in work may therefore result from the fact that 
throughout the preceding period this person was aware that the situation in his/her region of residence is favourable and that there 
are reasonable chances of ﬁnding a job within less than one year. All attempts at including the unemployment rate estimated using 
small area estimation (see Lewandowski et al., 2007) suggested that the direction and intensity of the relationship between ﬁnding
a job and migration are not aﬀected when the labour market situation is controlled for, whereas the rate itself which shows the diﬀer-
ences between unemployment in the previous and current places of residence was of no considerable impact on the risk of changing 
residence.
To sum up, factors which aﬀect individual decisions about changing residence distinguished in the results of the logit model are fol-
lowing:
• entering into marriage or a change of living arrangements which includes joining a household – especially for people of 
 less than 29 years (it was only possible to distinguish people who joined their partner’s household; the lack of detailed data 
 does not allow for an assessment of the impact of starting a new household);
• men and people aged 20-20 as well as people with higher education are typically characterised by a higher relative 
 probability of migration;
• job search undertaken by people completing education as well as loosing (or giving up) a job are associated with migration 
 more frequently than staying inactive, whereas there is no substantial relationship between the transition from unemployment 
 to employment and migration. 
At the same time, although shifts from economic inactivity caused by illness, disability or family obligation to employment are of vital 
importance when it comes to the change of place of residence, it seems that the occurrence of such events does not determine the 
level or patterns of economic regional migration movements.
 
2.3 Regional determinants of internal migration
Migration determinants at the regional level can be analysed basing on the same theoretical concepts, which explain the process of 
international migration (Willekens, 1995). The extent of outmigration and structure of population movements from regions may be 
determined by a range of factors such as location of the source region in relation to other regions “pulling” workers and economic situ-
ation of the region, which constitutes one of the “pushing” factors. This issue is discussed in detail in Box III.15.
The NPC data covering the period 1989-2002 indicate that internal migration trends in Poland are in line with the basic laws of migra-
tion. People mainly migrate away from regions which are relatively less developed to those oﬀering much better working and living 
conditions. Table III.10 shows outﬂows and inﬂows of people in poviats grouped according to the classiﬁcation established in the Part 
concerning regional diﬀerences in labour market situation (see Part II). The largest outmigration has been recorded in clusters of povi-
ats with the lowest level of development: Former state farms and Low-productivity agriculture. As for poviats belonging to Agricultural 
and industrial cluster, the extent of outmigration is only slightly higher than average and they are characterised by a rather dynamic 
population inﬂow. Consequently, the balance is migration in these poviats is close to zero – as opposed to Former state farms and Low-
productivity agriculture, where this balance is deﬁnitely negative.
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Box III.15. Local labour market characteristics versus migration intensity
One element of the analysis of internal migration is the assessment of processes which take place in the labour market and which 
determine the attractiveness of a given region for its inhabitants and for potential immigrants.
Firstly, one should take into account the unemployment rate. If it is higher in a given area than in the neighbouring areas, jobless 
people are more likely to look for employment outside their place of residence, which might increase the intensity of migration. What 
is more, higher unemployment levels make the employed more sceptical about their chances of getting a promotion, pay rise or of 
finding a better job within their region, which also encourages them to move. Thus, higher regional unemployment rates should be 
related to greater average outflows from a given region. In the same time, relatively higher unemployment in the given region discour-
ages people from other regions from settling down and decreases the intensity of migration inflow.
Another feature of regional labour markets which may exert an impact on the intensity of migration are wages, which determine 
(together with chances for finding a job) the expected amount of net return from investment in changing residence. In regions, where 
wage levels are relatively lower, the outflow of human resources should be, ceteris paribus, higher (as long as, for instance, lower 
nominal wages are not levelled out by lower living costs).
The third issue worth mentioning in the context of migration is the sector employment structure in the local labour market. The 
above results from a long-term trend of changes in the employment structure – increasing numbers of jobs are generated in the 
services sector, whereas less and less of them – in agriculture. The greater the share of services in a given region, the higher the living 
standards, which affects other, non-employment migration flows, motivated by, for instance, looking for better living conditions, ac-
cess to better education opportunities, health services, etc.
Poviats characterised by higher level of development, namely Development centres and Suburbs tend to attract migrants strongly and 
are characterised by low outmigration. Towns constitute a distinct group of poviats from the point of view of internal mobility. They not 
only have the smallest level of outmigration but also low level of immigration. The balance of migration in these poviats is therefore 
positive but lower than that in Suburbs or Development centres.
Tabela III.10. 
Average migration outﬂow and inﬂow in poviats by clusters (percentages)
Remark: intensity rates have been estimated for people in the economically productive age (aged 18-59/64) as the population at risk
Source: Own calculations based on the NPC 2002.
A measure allowing to assess the eﬀectiveness and symmetry of migration as a process of population reallocation is the percentage 
share of the migration balance in the total volume of gross ﬂows within a given region. A high positive rate value indicates that out-
ﬂows from a given source region are not levelled out by inﬂows to it and vice versa.29 Data presented in Table III.11 show an evident 
outﬂow from Development centres to Suburbs (so-called suburbanisation) and a dynamic inﬂow to Development centres from all other 
clusters. It is worth noting that the population of Towns which moves to Development centres is then replaced by a ﬂow of people for 
agricultural areas (Former state farms, Agricultural and industrial and Low-productivity agriculture).
 
Development centres
Suburbs
Towns
Former state farms
Low-productivity agriculture
Agricultural and industrial
Total
Outﬂow (emigration) from poviats 
belonging to a given cluster
15
14
13
21
22
18
19
Inﬂow (immigration) to poviats 
belonging to a given cluster
18
18
15
19
16
18
17
Diﬀerence 
(inﬂow – outﬂow)
+3
+4
+2
-2
-6
0
-2
29 The classical index of migration eﬀectiveness is estimated using the following formula:
EI = Σ
i
 |D
i
 – O
i
| / Σ
i 
(D
i
 + O
i
), where D
i
 is the total inﬂow to the region i and O
i 
 is the total outﬂow from the territorial unit i.
(after: Bell et al. 2002). However, since thus estimated index informs only about the symmetry of migration ﬂows but (as opposed to the net migration index) it does not tell us anything about 
their direction, it has been modiﬁed to better illustrate migration ﬂows between clusters:
EI* = Σ
i
 (D
k,i
 – O
i,k
) / Σ
i 
(D
k,i
 + O
i,k
), where D
k,i
 is the total inﬂow from poviats belonging to cluster k to poviats belonging to cluster i and O
i,k
 is the total migration outﬂow from cluster i to cluster k.
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Table III.11. 
Migration eﬀectiveness in poviats by clusters (percentages)
Source: Own calculations based on the NPC 2002.
In the literature, it is often suggested that migration in Poland is weakly related to the situation on the local labour markets and that 
it does not alleviate problems arising from the spatial mismatch of labour demand and labour supply. It is stated that in a number of 
regions unemployment could be lower, if jobless people were more inclined to engage in job search outside their place of residence. 
This conclusion has often been formulated on the basis of regression model results, in which unemployment levels had no eﬀect for 
the intensity of migration (see, for instance, Firdmuc 2003, Mainardi, 2004, Huber 2003). Slightly divergent results emerged from multi-
variate analyses based on LFS data (see World Bank 2006a) – the relationship between the level of unemployment in a given region and 
the intensity of migration appeared relevant but it was associated with the mobility of workers rather than of the unemployed. In this 
report, the design of study assessing the impact of aggregate labour market situation on migration follows the one taken in the ﬁnal 
report presenting the model of internal mobility in Great Britain prepared for Eurostat (van der Gaag N. et al., 2003). The key features of 
the applied approach are discussed in Box III.16
Box III.16. Two-stage model of decision-making about migration
The underlying assumptions of the model are based on the observation that the process of making decision on migration consists 
of two stages. The first stage involves the assessment of the situation in the region of residence – if it is unfavourable compared with 
other regions, individuals may decide to look for a job in another region. The second stage comes down to choosing a new place of 
residence.
This concept of migration leads to the estimation of two equations: one of them describes the intensity of labour resources outflow 
from particular regions, and the other examines the distribution of migrant population between destination regions. The study uses 
data on migration derived from the NPC covering the period 1989-2002 (for detailed information labour estimation models see Ap-
pendix 3). This model allows to give a better insight into the factors, which determine the directions and intensity of human resources 
flows as presented in Table III.11.
First stage – impact of place of residence on probability of migration
In the model of the ﬁrst stage of migration, the impact of variables describing the labour market situation is consistent with the pre-
dictions of the classical model of migration. The higher the ratio of the number of the unemployed to the number of job oﬀers in
a given region (in relation to the average for all poviats), i.e. the smaller the relative chances of ﬁnding a job – the greater the intensity 
of labour resources outﬂow. The relationship between unemployment and migration has proven to be statistically signiﬁcant. At the 
same time, migration was motivated by low average wages. Moreover, the model accounts for the value of the population index, 
which illustrates the availability of other regions.30 The latter is proved to be strongly negatively correlated with the intensity of migra-
tion. The above conclusion seems to be counterintuitive, however, it can be explained by the results on the interdependence between 
the availability of large agglomerations and the intensity of work commuting, which are discussed in greater detail in the next section. 
If a relatively underdeveloped region is located near to an attractive region, and the commuting time is not too long, workers may pre-
fer to commute rather than to migrate. This suggests a substantial degree of substitutive interaction between work commuting and 
migration in Poland. Similar observation for Sweden have been made by Eliasson et al. (2003) – his study pointed that in regions lo-
cated near to attractive labour markets, there was a signiﬁcant mutual substitution of migration and commuting to work. Considering 
the problem of low availability of ﬂats in Poland, it can be assumed that the choice between commuting and migration to a diﬀerent 
region is additionally modiﬁed by the situation in the local housing market (Reichmann, Henderson 2000). The inclusion of a variable 
reﬂecting the availability of housing in the sending region (which is measured by the standardised number of newly provided rooms 
per capita) shows that a relatively large supply of ﬂats is negatively correlated with the intensity of migration and therefore a favourable 
situation in the housing market in the sending region may discourage from migrating elsewhere.
Cluster of residence prior to 
migration
Development centres
Suburbs
Towns
Former state farms
Low-productivity agriculture
Agricultural and industrial
Development 
centres
- 
-10
32
26
31
8
 
Suburbs
-
1
3
9
3
 
Towns
 -
24
31
20
 Forme
state farms
 -
11
5
 Low-productivity 
agriculture
- 
-2
Agricultural and 
industrial
- 
Cluster of residence after migration
30 The construction of this variable is discussed in greater detail in the Part on regional labour markets. At this point, it has been modiﬁed to take account of populations available in regions 
other than the region of residence.
151
Employment in Poland 2006                       Spatial Mobility
   III. 
Table III.12. 
Model results for the ﬁrst stage of the migration process – decision on emigrating from the source region
a) Standardised regression coeﬃcient
Source: Own calculations based on the NPC 2002. 
From the point of view of labour resources outﬂow from a given region, high employment levels in services are of no signiﬁcant 
importance, whereas regions with a large share of people working in agriculture (with distance and areas of potential destination 
regions being controlled for) saw a dynamic outﬂow of workers. This result is in line with the above-observed direction of population 
outﬂows from less- to better-developed regions, and may be connected with the inhabitants of rural areas searching for jobs in sectors 
other than agriculture.
Second stage – impact of destination region characteristics on probability of migration 
In the model examining the determinants of choice of destination regions, all variables – apart from the number of unemployed peo-
ple per job oﬀer, proved to have a considerable impact, which was in line with the theoretical predictions concerning interregional 
migration ﬂows. On the basis of the obtained results, it can be stated that high wages constituted a strong pulling factor for people 
who decided to change residence, similarly to the large share of services in employment. The larger the share of people working in 
agriculture in a given region, the lower the migration inﬂow. The situation is similar for distance and accommodation supply. The fact 
that a vast number of unemployed people per job oﬀer did not discourage migrants from moving to a given region can be explained 
by referring to the results of the model examining an individual inclination to migrate (as presented in the previous subchapter) – mi-
grants are often young and well-educated, whereas high unemployment in regions which see high inﬂows of migrants may result from 
diﬃculties in ﬁnding jobs for low-skilled workers and it may have nothing to do with the chances of ﬁnding employment by ‘typical 
migrants’.
Table III.13. 
Model results for the second stage of the migration process – choice of destination (region)
Source: Own calculations based on the NPC 2002.
Explanatory variables
logarithm of the function of population availability in other 
regions (weighted by distance)
standardised average amount of wage in the region
standardised ratio of the number of the unemployed to the 
number of job oﬀers
standardised share of people working in agriculture in the 
total population of workers in the region
standardised share of people working in services in the total 
population of workers
standardised number of newly delivered rooms per capita
Parameter estimate a)
-0.47
-0.08
0.13
0.27
-0.02
-0.15
Signiﬁcance level
0.00
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.60
0.00
Explanatory variables
number of unemployed people per job oﬀer (ln)
wages (ln of the average for the region)
share of people working in service in the total population of 
workers in the region (ln)
share of people working in agriculture in the total population 
of workers in the region (ln)
ln of the reverse function of distance
number of newly delivered rooms ber capita (ln)
Parameter estimate
0.0
2.9
2.0
–0.2
1.8
0.3
Signiﬁcance level
0.40
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
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To sum up the results of the models for the both stages of the migration process, it can be stated that they conﬁrm the theoretical 
predictions concerning migration ﬂows. The higher the level of development of a given region, the greater the extent of outmigration. 
The more developed regions generally tend to attract migrants, but the extent to which they encourage migration inﬂow depends 
on the distance between the region of residence and the source region. The above results allow to assess the impact of labour market 
situation on mobility and they indicate that unemployment, wages and employment structure in a given region largely determine the 
tendency to change residence and aﬀect the choice of the destination region. In general, the more distant the region, the weaker 
the pulling strength, although this relationship is not linear – it can be assumed that in the case of small distances work commuting 
constitutes an attractive alternative to migration. In the next chapter, we make an attempt at assessing this thesis. However, before we 
do this, we intend to classify the interdependencies between various forms of mobility.
2.4 Substitution of internal migration with other forms of mobility
The extent of internal migration in Poland – although obviously not one of the highest in the EU – does not seem to be exceptionally 
low, taking into account Poland’s spatial structure. On the other hand, however, if we put together information about international 
and internal migration, it may seem that the level of the internal mobility of the Polish people contrasts with the level of international 
mobility. Nevertheless, there is no contradiction between a relatively high intensity of one type of mobility and a relatively low inten-
sity of another type, because they are mutually competitive. The substitution of decisions about moving to another region or to 
another country has been documented in empirical studies on population mobility in Poland (see, for instance, Korcelli et al., 1992) 
and is further conﬁrmed by the observations presented in this report. Assuming that the total annual long- and short-term as well as 
seasonal migration abroad comes to the level of a several hundred of thousands, it can be assessed that more than 1 in 3 individuals, 
who decides to leave their home town (permanently, for a number of months or weeks) chooses to go to a diﬀerent country rather 
than to a diﬀerent region in Poland. In other words, for some jobseekers it is more proﬁtable to take up employment abroad and earn 
higher or additional income than to migrate elsewhere in Poland.
In the recent years, the attractiveness of international migration has increased – due to both the opening of foreign labour markets 
and as a consequence of decreasing costs of taking up employment abroad, including, among others, the emergence of low-cost 
airlines, development of road transport services and increasing availability of the Internet. Moreover, the recent frequency of interna-
tional migration may also be a reason why more and more people know other people who once moved or are currently staying in one 
of the EU countries and can give advice or assistance in decision about emigration. The existence of extensive social networks further 
lowers the cost of international economic migration.
The attractiveness of engaging in work abroad – due to its aggregate level – only partly explains the relatively low level of internal 
migration in Poland, especially that in the context of the entire population in the economically productive age international migration 
does not have a considerable impact of regional labour resources. For most people, work commuting constitutes a more available 
alternative to internal migration. The substitution of commuting and internal migration is often referred to in theoretical and empiri-
cal literature (see, for instance, van Ommeren, 2004, van Ommeren et al., 1997, Cameron, Muellbauer, 1998). However, very few studies 
address both commuting and migration as alternative mobility forms and no attempts have been made to assess the relationship 
between them (OECD 2005, World Bank 2006a).31 
Commuting can play an important role especially when the direct cost of migration is high. In countries, where the conditions for mi-
gration are not favourable, people who are looking for employment outside their regions of residence tend to commute to work rather 
than move somewhere closer to it. Thus, the average level of migration is lower, which is often misinterpreted as low general mobility 
of labour resources. Commuting can also play a complementary role to migration. The choice of place of residence is then usually mo-
tivated not only by low availability of accommodation in towns but also by more favourable living conditions within areas surrounding 
large urban centres. The complementary nature of relationship between migration and commuting should make the general levels 
of these forms of mobility ceteris paribus higher than in countries, where commuting substitutes migration. For example, in the 1970s 
and 1980s, suburbanisation trends were observed in a range of EU countries. These trends were connected with moving households 
to suburban areas characterised by easier access to leisure services as well as less noise and pollution.32 The beginning of these trends 
can also be observed in some regions in Poland (see Box III.18). It seems, however, that the process of suburbanisation is currently still 
rather limited due to lower income level in the Polish society.
31 Empirical studies on the relationship between mobility and labour market situation rarely account for work commuting mainly because of the lack of available and comparable data. In this 
report, we have given up the idea of including implicite ﬂows of people commuting to work in the internal migration model because data on migration cover the entire period 1989-2002, 
whereas data on work commuting are only available for the year 2002. Although in general the impact of migration is cumulative, it seems that referring to cumulative ﬂows for such a long 
period would entail a too large burden of error. However, work commuting is indirectly instrumentalised by the population index and accommodation availability.
32 The so-called green wave phenomenon in Sweden, Great Britain, and some regions in France – see the results of research studies performed as part of the project Internal Migration and 
Regional Population Dynamics in Europe carried out at the School of Geography, University of Leeds.
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Box III.17. Moving to Warsaw or to Dublin?
The costs of moving to Warsaw and abroad may be similar, whereas the benefits may prove higher in the the latter case – mainly 
due to higher wages, which exceed the differences in the difference in the level of costs of living. Obviously, the above comparison 
involves a great deal of generalisation, nevertheless, it shows that for a lot of people, especially those who speak foreign languages, 
going abroad is more profitable than moving to another region in Poland.
From Eurostat data it emerges that in the EU15 the wages offered to workers in almost all professional groups are several times higher 
than in Poland. However, one should also take into consideration the higher living costs, different level of taxes and the fact that the 
migrants – at least at the beginning of their stay abroad – tend to get relatively lower wages (e.g. average monthly net wages of Poles 
who came to Great Britain after the recent EU enlargement amount to approx. 1,300 EUR, which is approx. 53 per cent of the British 
average wage – see Drinkwater 2006). When we take all the above issues into account, it appears that an average single person in 
Ireland could generate a net income 1.7 times larger than the income that this worker would be able to earn in Poland, providing that 
that s/he is paid 2/3 of the average wage abroad and the average wage in Poland (see Table III.14).
Table III.14. 
Gross and net monthly pay of a childless person with a wage equal to 100 per cent of the average wage in Poland and
67 per cent in other EU countries in 2004 (in EUR and PPSa)
a) Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) – artificial currency which reflects differences in national price levels which are not accounted for 
by exchange rates.
Source: Eurostat
Although generally PPS reflects the differences in the purchasing power of wages by making international comparisons of living costs, 
it is worth taking a look at flat rental prices because they usually constitute the largest cost incurred by migrants. According to data of 
the Irish real estate agency – Daft, the rental of a one-room flat in Dublin costs approx. 590 EUR. A similar flat in Warsaw can be rented 
for about 250 EUR (www.szybko.pl). In Ireland, the cost of renting accommodation takes up about 40 per cent of the monthly income 
of a migrant, whereas in Warsaw, where net average wages amount to approx. 560 EUR, this share amounts to almost 45 per cent. 
When moving to Warsaw, the ratio of wages and rent is slightly better than in the case of migration to Dublin. What is more, taking 
into account the fact that durable goods prices (electrical devices and household appliances, etc.) in Poland are comparable to those 
in Western Europe, it can be expected that moving to Ireland makes it easier to attain higher living standards.
The above example shows that international migration poses an attractive alternative to internal mobility because benefits derived 
from higher wages and living standards may make up for losses resulting from engaging in work below qualifications and from differ-
ences in the level of costs of living.
Based on the Polish Social Insurance Institution data, it can be estimated that the share of people commuting to work to another poviat 
in the total population of workers amounted to approx. 30 per cent in 2002. To compare, in 1999, in France, this share amounted to 
approx. 23 per cent and in Hungary – to approx. 10-11 per cent.33 The lack of fully comparable international data makes it more diﬃcult 
to assess the extent of the phenomenon of commuting in Poland, however, it seems that compared with other countries, and taking 
into account Poland’s spatial structure, the intensity of commuting in Poland is relatively high.
33 NPC data (2001)
Country
Poland
Great Britain
Netherlands
Germany
Austria
Belgium
Ireland
France
Finland
Spain
Sweden
Denmark
Italy
Gross wage
(EUR)
539
2223
2057
2280
1826
1977
1676
1642
1752
1102
1832
2363
1225
Net wage
(EUR)
368
1711
1430
1437
1335
1292
1476
1219
1317
933
1286
1447
956
Net wage
(PPS)
701
1620
1359
1349
1288
1240
1199
1129
1072
1068
1062
1056
931
Net wage ratio in PPS 
(Poland=1)
1.00
2.31
1.94
1.92
1.84
1.77
1.71
1.61
1.53
1.52
1.51
1.51
1.33
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In the subsequent part of this chapter, we analyse regional determinants of the intensity of labour force ﬂows between regions, using 
data from the Polish Social Insurance Institution on places of work and residence for workers who pay social insurance contributions.34 
We also present results of our analysis of individual features that have an impact on commuting time which allow to better assess the 
consequences of regional determinants of spatial mobility in Poland.
 
Box III.18. Migration versus commuting
The migration model can be extended to allow for situations where the places of work and residence are located in two different 
regions. Every combination of place of work and residence represents a determined level of utility decreased by the loss of utility 
connected with the necessity to devote additional amounts of time and money to commute. For people who decide to work away 
from their place of residence, commuting constitutes a form of mobility that substitutes migration. The effect of substitution may be 
particularly strong in case if the places of work and residence are located close to each other. However, if this distance is consider-
able, then the only option is to migrate. Decisions about migration and commuting do not necessarily have to be mutually excluding 
options – for people who change their residence but do not change their jobs, commuting is complementary. One illustration of the 
latter interaction between migration, commuting and employment are the observation of the local district authorities in Serock:
…the entire Serock district (in the period 1995-2004, author’s note) has seen a dynamic increase in the number of population. The rural areas 
within the Serock district are characterised by unique environmental resources which makes them great places to live. People who move to our 
district mainly come from Warsaw. However, it should be noted that these people are not employed in the local area (…) but they commute to 
work in Warsaw. Similarly to most towns and district surrounding the Warsaw agglomeration, migration in the Serock district is characterised 
by positive rates. (…) The farther from Warsaw, the smaller the values of positive migration balance. Districts which are rather far from War-
saw are in fact characterised by large negative migration balances .These are, among others, inhabitants of these districts that move closer to 
Warsaw in an attempt to find better living and working conditions.35
The complementary relationship of migration and work commuting is rather common in more developed countries, where the sub-
urbanisation trends are more advanced. In such countries, there exists a distinct social stratification across different areas – suburban 
areas are occupied by wealthy and better-educated inhabitants, whereas town centres are inhabited by people who are relatively less 
well-off. In Poland, similar trends have recently emerged, however, they are not yet so much widespread. As indicated by the authors 
of the above quote, on the one hand Serock is a migration destination for people who want to settle in a quiet areas, but on the other 
it attracts people from more remote and poorer areas who decide to settle in Serock and not in Warsaw (where they often work), 
because of lower accommodation costs. It seems that in Poland people tend to commute to work from smaller towns because they 
cannot afford buying or renting accommodation near the workplace rather than because they are wealthy enough to build a house 
outside Warsaw or some other large city.
 
2.5 Regional determinants of work commuting
The largest share of employees commuting to work in other poviats can be observed in Suburbs – more than one in four people 
working outside their region of residence lives in a poviat belonging to this cluster. Considering the observations of the interaction 
between the intensity of human resources ﬂows and distances involved, the above observation is not surprising. Suburbs are located 
in close to attractive labour markets in Development centres. Inhabitants of poviats surrounding large agglomerations can ﬁnd relatively 
well-paid jobs there and take advantage of lower living costs. At the same time, commuting time to work in Development centres 
– given the fact that the average commuting distance is not too large – is acceptable. Inhabitants of poviats belonging to other 
clusters, such as Former state farms, Agricultural and industrial and Low-productivity agriculture, are in a more diﬃcult situation. In their 
case the decision about commuting to work is usually associated with the necessity to travel much longer distances. Therefore, the 
share of employees living in these regions in the total number of people commuting to work to other poviats is proportional to the 
share of inhabitants in the total population of Poland. Despite the fact that commuting from less-developed regions to Development 
centres and to Towns is less intense, taking into consideration diﬀerences in average distances from source and destination regions, the 
mobility of inhabitants of poviats belonging to Former state farms, Agricultural and industrial and Low-productivity agriculture should 
be considered as relatively high. As for the low tendency of workers living in Development centres and Towns to commute to work in 
other poviats, it results from their ability to ﬁnd satisfactory jobs in their regions of residence.
Similarly to migration, we have estimated the eﬀectiveness of ﬂows of people taking up employment in poviats other than their poviat 
of residence. The level of eﬀectiveness of work commuting is higher that than of migration because the former is motivated exclu-
sively by economic reasons, whereas demographic considerations have no impact whatsoever. The higher eﬀectiveness coeﬃcient 
conﬁrms the thesis pronounced earlier that work commuting contribute to a much greater degree than migration to the optimali-
sation of labour resources reallocation between regions that diﬀer in terms of development level and labour market situation.
34 The source database contains information about the place of reported place of residence, actual place of residence and place of work of a given person. Due to the fact that many people 
in Poland do not register with the district authorities after migration, our analysis accounts for data on the place of residence. For a detailed description of how relevant data has been 
handled see Appendix 3.
35 Selected fragments of the Appendix to the resolution no 370/XLIV/05 of the Town Council in Serock dated 4 November 2005 on the “Local revitalisation programme of the town of Serock 
and the post-military areas in Zegrze for 2005-2013” Footnote and comments were added by the authors of the report.
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Table III.15. 
Volume of interregional commuting by region of residence and structure of employees commuting to work outside their region of 
residence
*Number of all inhabitants in a given region who are in employment and for whom social insurance contributions are paid
Source: Own calculations based on ZUS 2002. 
When the results presented in Table III.16 are compared with migration eﬀectiveness coeﬃcients, a conclusion can be drawn that the 
eﬀect of substitution of interregional migration with interregional commuting is strong in Former state farms and in agricultural poviats. 
The relationship between commuting and migration between Suburbs and Development centres – in accordance with the tendencies 
illustrated in Box III.18 – is of complementary nature. Commuting does not constitute a factor which would outbalance low migration 
levels from Towns. It can be argued that, on the one hand, the distance from Towns to other areas which oﬀer attractive job opportuni-
ties is too high for their inhabitants to be able to commute from them, but on the other hand, diﬀerences in unemployment and wage 
levels are probably not signiﬁcant enough to make migration proﬁtable.
Table III.16. 
Eﬀectiveness of work commuting between regions
Source: Own calculations based on ZUS 2002. 
Based on the model assessing the extent to which the intensity of commuting from one region to other poviats depends on the situa-
tion in the local labour market, it can be stated that apart from the availability of attractive labour markets, the inclination to commute 
to work in another regions is mostly aﬀected by: large shares of agriculture in employment, available job opportunities (measured 
as a ratio of the number of the unemployed to the number of job oﬀers) and wage levels.37 Thus, the interaction between the intensity 
of commuting and the situation in the local labour market are analogous to that involving migration. Greater inclination to commute 
to work in regions other than the regions of residence is also associated with the better average availability of private means of 
transport – in regions characterised by higher numbers of registered cars, the intensity of commuting to other regions is greater. As for 
railway and road networks density, it proved to be of no signiﬁcant importance.
Region
of residence
Development centres
Suburbs
Towns
Former state farms
Low-productivity agriculture
Agriculture
Development 
centres
63
64
83
72
80
 
Suburbs
-46
56
65
50
 
Towns
70
67
61
Former state 
farms
12
-24
 Low-productivity 
agriculture
-33
Agriculture
Region of work
Region
of residence
Development centres
Suburbs
Towns
Former state farms
Low-productivity agriculture
Agriculture
Total
Share of people 
commuting to 
other regions in the 
total number of all 
employees living in 
the region*
28
42
19
26
35
30
30
Share of employees 
living in
the region in
the total number of 
people commuting 
to other regions
11.6
25.5
11.5
14.2
17.5
19.7
100.0
Share of people 
commuting to a given 
destination region
in the total number of 
people commuting to 
other regions
39.2
14.0
28.6
4.9
5.3
8.0
100.0
Share in
the population 
of Poland
15.3
14.9
15.8
17.4
17.8
18.8
100.0
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Table III.17. 
Model results for work commuting volume outside the region of residence
a) standardised regression coeﬃcient
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Polish Social Insurance Institution (2002).
The results of the model are in line with the theoretical predictions as well as with the observations concerning internal migration. 
These are marginal chances of ﬁnding a well-paid job in the services sector or in industry in a given area that encourage people to start 
searching for jobs in other regions. Jobs are easiest to ﬁnd in areas which are closely located and hence these regions attract a large 
share of nearby population. If a region where a job was found is located relatively close to the place of residence, many people – espe-
cially those with cars – decide to commute instead of migrating to that region. It can be assumed that such decision makes it possible 
for people whose potential wages are not suﬃciently high and whose employment is not secure and stable, to ﬁnd jobs outside their 
place of residence without any additional costs which would be otherwise necessitated by migration. Thus, to the extent to which 
migration – as a process of redistribution of labour resources across regions – is very selective and oﬀers possibilities of improving the 
situation of young and well-educated people above all, commuting provides such possibility to a relatively broader group of workers.
High intensity and lower selectivity makes commuting to work an important form of spatial mobility. In Poland, due to high accom-
modation prices compared with wage levels, poor access to information about vacancies outside the place of residence and long job-
searching time, work commuting may even play a greater role in alleviating the consequences of spatial diﬀerences in labour market 
situation than migration. This hypothesis can be supported by the results of studies on spatial mobility in Germany. They proved that 
for people who were unemployed, taking up work outside the region of residence was more frequently associated with commuting 
than with migration (Hunt 2000). Unfortunately, in Poland so far no longitudinal surveys that provide data on commuting have been 
carried out and it is impossible to conduct similar analysis. 
36 The model estimation method – similarly to the ﬁrst of the two migration models – see Appendix 3.
Explanatory variables
standardised ratio of the number of unemployed people to 
the number of job oﬀers
standardised amount of wages
logarithm of the function of population availability in other 
regions (weighted by distance)
number of newly delivered rooms ber capita
standardised share of people working in agriculture in the 
total population of workers
standardised share of people working in services in the total 
population of workers
standardised number of cars registered in a given region
per capita
Parameter estimate a)
0.20
-0.18
0.42
0.07
0.21
-0.01
0.11
Signiﬁcance level  
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.13
0.00
0.82
0.02
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2.6 Individual determinants of commuting duration
Basing on the results of empirical studies carried out in diﬀerent countries, it can be established that the average commuting dura-
tion does not vary across countries to much extent and its similar level can be observed in countries at diﬀerent levels of social and 
economic development and with diﬀerent cultures (Rouwendal, 2004a). This can be considered as an argument that there are certain 
behavioural determinants which aﬀect the choice of place of work depending on the distance from the place of residence. One typical 
feature of the distribution of commuting duration is not only that is the average is not very diﬀerentiated across countries but also that 
commuting frequency is concentrated below a certain threshold value of commuting duration. In other words, the empirical research 
results imply that up to a certain point workers do not care how much time it takes them to commute to work as long as this com-
muting duration does not exceed a certain threshold value. Empirical observations indicate that the range of tolerance comes to 
about 30-40 minutes, whereas after this level is exceeded, the number of commuters drastically diminishes. At the same time, workers 
who must commute longer than 30-40 minutes tend to declare more frequently that they are looking for another job. In the literature 
on the subject, this maximum threshold is referred to as “critical isochrone” or maximum acceptable distance (Ommeren, 1996, Getis 
1969). 
Although in general the average work commuting duration is not very varied across countries, in Poland, similarly to other CEE coun-
tries, it is evidently much longer than the typical commuting time in Western Europe (see Chart III.8). It emerges from the ESS data 
that in Poland people spend more then 30 minutes per day on commuting, whereas in other EU countries work commuting usually 
takes approx. 20-25 minutes. Similar results have been obtained in the research study carried out by the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions in 2001 (see Stutzer, Lalive 2004). Longer average commuting time in Poland is mainly 
due to a large number of workers whose commuting time exceeds the threshold of “acceptable” distance.
 
Chart III.8. 
Average commuting time
Source: Own calculations based on ESS 2004. 
From the economic point of view the tendency to spend considerable amounts of time on commuting to work should not be inter-
preted as ‘being more mobile’, because commuting time is an income earning cost which should be minimalised. Therefore, work-
ers should reduce this time by either moving closer to the place of work or by changing their job and taking up one which does not 
involve long work commutes (Rouwendal, van der Vlist, 2002, Clark et al., 2003). The long average commuting time in Poland suggests 
that – for a number of reasons – this mechanism does not work. On the one hand, the labour market situation makes the job search 
last long and require a lot of eﬀort, and on the other hand, the supply of housing in potential migration destinations is usually limited. 
Thus, it can be assumed that long commuting is – at least to some extent – a result of an interaction of substantial spatial diﬀerences in 
labour market situation and of low cost-eﬀectiveness of migration to regions characterised by high chances of ﬁnding a job. In Poland, 
high migration costs hit above all the group of people with a relatively weaker position in the labour marker and with greater ﬁnancial 
liquidity constraints, which results in their smaller inclination to change residence. It should be emphasised that the high incidence 
and duration of commuting may be a manifestation of the ineﬀectiveness of the market mechanism, if workers commute to work 
although they could ﬁnd a comparable job closer to their place of residence. The primary factor leading to the risk of such wasteful 
commuting is incomplete and asymmetrical information about available vacancies, which decreases the eﬀectiveness of job searching 
(see Hamilton, 1982, Kim, 1995). As indicated by empirical studies (see, for instance, van Ommeren, van der Straaten, 2005), a large share 
of commuting may be ineﬀective in this sense. It can be assumed that the above phenomenon concerns in particular commuting in 
strongly urbanised areas, whereas its signiﬁcance is probably marginal in the case of commutes within regions which are not located 
in the near proximity of major urban centres.
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The above observations allow for a conclusion that if migration is an employment option less accessible to people with lower income, 
the alternative oﬀered by commuting may be particularly beneﬁcial for them. There are also some theoretical premises allowing to 
formulate such thesis. In most studies on commuting to work, it is often stated that one of the factors explaining the diﬀerences in 
commuting duration is individual value of time (see, for instance, van Ommeren, Rietveld, 2002). In this context, the greater the pro-
ductivity of a worker and the higher his/her income, the higher the value of his/her time and – what comes with it – the smaller the 
tendency to devote this valuable resource on commuting (unless the employer makes up for it by paying additional beneﬁts). On the 
other hand, however, people with tertiary education are typically characterised by greater specialisation and for this reason they can 
be more inclined to commute longer distances in order to work in the profession which matches their qualiﬁcations (see Buchel, van 
Ham, 2003), and therefore for them the commuting can last longer on average. As indicated by the OECD (2005eo), this eﬀect can be 
observed in Great Britain and in Germany, whereas such countries as Austria, France and Italy, these are low-skilled workers that com-
mute longer distances. Hence, the inclination to commute depends essentially on the overall beneﬁt in terms of wages in relation to 
the individual cost of time spent on commuting. What is more, in spite of the expectations of the theory of individual value of time, 
empirical studies usually provide evidence that women tend to commute shorter distances – irrespective of their lower wages. In their 
case, this fact is determined by certain constraints resulting from time budgeting which is often limited by family and domestic obliga-
tions. Shorter commuting time is typical especially for women who take care of their children. This fact, however, does not go against 
the concept of value of time per se but it indicates that when assessing the beneﬁts arising from work commuting, non-ﬁnancial fac-
tors are also taken into account.
When assessing the individual determinants of commuting time, one has to bear in mind that in accordance with the so-called theory 
of compensating diﬀerentials, inconveniences connected with long distance commuting can be compensated by beneﬁts resulting 
from lower living costs – it would mean that people commuting should inhabit suburban or rural areas. On the other hand, however, 
the spatial structure, greater population density and higher heterogeneity of labour supply and demand in large cities may be associ-
ated with the fact that the commuting time for the inhabitants of large agglomerations is long.
Therefore, as much as in the case of migration it is relatively easy to predict which socio-economic groups will prove to be most likely 
to move, the identiﬁcation of determinants of work commuting is not so straightforward. Due to Poland’s diﬀerent – in comparison to 
the Western European countries – patterns of choosing the place of work and residence, it is worth making such attempt. The analysis 
covers people aged 18-44 who are in employment and who commute to work. Apart from factors which, according to theoretical 
premises, may potentially aﬀect the commuting time, we have also accounted for the possible emergence of eﬀects – distinct for 
Poland – which would explain which groups of workers are prone to spend more time on commuting than expected based on the 
observable patterns of behaviour of European workers.
Table III.18. 
Logit model results for commutes lasting longer than 30 minutes in the EEA countries
The analysis covers people aged 18-44 who completed their education, are in employment and commute to work. Reference group: men with children 
from medium-sized towns in the EEA (excluding Poland), with tertiary education and not engaging in work below their qualiﬁcations. For additional 
methodological comments see Appendix 11.
a) Odds ratios indicate how the probability of Y=1 changes, when X is 1 (for binary variables)
Source: ESS 2004.
Variables  
work below qualiﬁcations
Gender and family situation
mother with a child
woman without children
man without children
Education
primary
secondary
Place of residence
large city
village
Poland
Signiﬁcance 
level
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.35
0.70
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.52
Parameter 
estimatea)
1.24
0.79
1.07
1.03
0.58
0.79
1.35
1.19
0.78
Variables 
Interactions with the fact of living in Polan
mother with a child, Poland
woman without children, Poland
man without children, Poland
primary, Poland
secondary, Poland
large city, Poland
village, Poland
Signiﬁcance 
level
0.07
0.14
0.81
0.15
0.29
0.05
0.42
0.02
Parameter 
estimatea)
–
0.60
1.09
1.60
1.46
1.92
1.31
2.18
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The results of the regression conﬁrm the interdependencies – described in the literature on the subject – between time spent on 
commuting and gender or position in the household. In the EEA, women are less inclined to spend more than 30 minutes on 
commuting, although this impact is only signiﬁcant in families with children – women who do not take care of children are typically 
characterised by a similar inclination to commute long distances to men.38 In Poland, this eﬀect is even more pronounced, namely 
mothers with children are more reluctant to commute long distances than women in other EEA countries. This may be so due to 
relatively higher predominance of the traditional model of family in which women are burdened more with child care and domestic 
duties. Thus, they are relatively more inclined than women in other countries to give up better-paid jobs which require long-distance 
commuting to take care of their children.
Long-distance commuting of inhabitants of large cities is a feature typical for all examined countries and neither level of education 
nor residence in a given country diﬀerentiate greatly the relative probability of long-distance commuting in this group. Workers in 
Poland diﬀer from other countries by the exceptionally long commutes of rural inhabitants. The above statement is in line with the 
observations concerning regional determinants of work commuting and in particular with the fact that the inhabitants of poviats be-
longing to Low-productivity agriculture and Agricultural and industrial tend to commute relatively frequently to work in other regions.39 
It appears that the intensity of work commuting in the case of inhabitants of such areas is large not only compared with workers from 
other regions in Poland but also compared with agricultural regions in other countries.
The model also indicates that in general less-qualiﬁed workers in Europe are less inclined to commute long distances – although 
the value of time of low-productivity workers is lower in ﬁnancial terms, they are less inclined to devote it to commuting.40 The above 
suggests that for them the eventual gain from commuting is relatively smaller than for better-educated people who can beneﬁt more 
from the fact of having a job which is better suited to their qualiﬁcations even if it requires that they commute. This feature is somewhat 
reversed in Poland where these are people with secondary education that are typically tend to commute long distances. Since the 
above does not concern people with primary education, it can be assumed that the relatively more intense work commuting in the 
case of people with secondary education consists above all in people commuting from small towns to larger towns, e.g. poviat centres, 
which oﬀer jobs in the services sector (transport, retail and public services) and in small-scale manufacturing.
Therefore, it can be stated that – next to inhabitants of large agglomerations – another group of people in Poland characterised by 
greater average inclination to commute long distances are rural inhabitants. It is largely due to the mobility of the latter group that 
Poland is marked by longer average work commuting time compared with other European countries. Taking into account the results 
of the model of regional determinants of commuting, it can be assumed that commuting to another region makes it possible for these 
people to ﬁnd employment outside agriculture which probably generates higher income than that available in the place of residence. 
For them, commuting constitutes a beneﬁcial option because it doesn’t mean the necessity of investing in new accommodation. Even 
if commuting requires considerable amounts of time, these costs are relatively low due to the low-productivity (and low value of time) 
of these workers. In the case of some employees, especially those with secondary education and living in remote areas, commuting to 
larger towns can be the only way to engage in work which matches their skills. 
 
2.7 Consequences of internal migration and commuting for the labour market and economy
Internal migration (leaving aside its crucial social and demographic dimensions) should be perceived as a manifestation of labour re-
source allocation in the economy. Economic mechanisms which aﬀect population movements within one country do not diﬀer all that 
much from the mechanisms relevant in the case of international migration. In both cases, the primary factor which enhances changes 
of residence is the diﬀerence between expected wages and living standards in the destination region and those in the sending region. 
Dynamic population movements tend to occur when diﬀerences in living standards and economic growth rates between regions are 
extensive, and when they are not associated with barriers such as accommodation shortage in better-developed areas. Rapid eco-
nomic development of large agglomerations – Development centres surrounded by Suburbs (see Part II), which see the concentration 
of investment in sectors with the highest potential for productivity increase, should then lead to suﬃciently high increase in labour 
demand and in wages that migration from poorer regions would become attractive to the inhabitants of the latter.
In this context, internal migration is above all a result of the market mechanism of balancing demand and supply in the conditions 
of an increasing price of a rare good (in this case, wages). Moreover, internal migration is important mainly from the point of view 
of changes in local and regional labour markets at least in the medium term, thus leading to the expansion of larger urban centres 
and their surrounding areas at the cost of progressing depopulation of poorer and more remote areas. This phenomenon is some-
times regarded as undesirable due to human resources being drained from peripheries to the centre. However, it is at the same time
a necessary condition for eﬀective economic allocation of human resources which ﬂow in the same directions as investment. Since 
investment tend to cluster due to the positive scale eﬀects at the local level, labour resources also have to conform to this pattern.
38 The explanatory variables in the model is the probability that commuting time exceeds 30 minutes, increasing this threshold to 40 minutes does not aﬀect the discussed interactions.
39 Unfortunately, the small survey sample of the ESS makes it impossible to establish a connection between respondents’ place of residence and data characterising poviats and therefore 
the veriﬁcation of these two relationships is not feasible.
40 This means that even in the EU countries where less-educated people are characterised by greater wealth than in Poland, they also rarely commute to work longer than 30 minutes.
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If the above process is hindered by, among others, obstacles related to accommodation supply or bureaucratic requirements, includ-
ing, for instance, limits on the right to settle in the capital city, investment as well as economic growth must also be slowed down.
In view of the above, one should consider to what extent internal migration can be substituted by work commuting. Based on the ob-
tained results, it can be argued that this extent can be large on condition that transport infrastructure is suﬃcient and available. In such 
case, improved mass transport infrastructure allowing large numbers of people commuting to work from peripheral areas to urban 
agglomerations can to some degree be an alternative to migration from less-developed regions which enhances the emergence of 
a more balanced national development model. Work commuting can somewhat diminish the eﬀect of “draining” labour resources to 
the centres. It should be borne in mind, however, that the inclination to commute drops abruptly after a certain threshold amount of 
time devoted to commuting is exceeded, which means that daily commutes to Development centres and Suburbs can be an alternative 
available only to some inhabitants of peripheries. Better transport infrastructure allows to make agglomerations available to people 
living in more remote areas only to a limited extent. Consequently, increased intensity of work commuting should be regarded as
a complement rather than an alternative for internal migration from smaller to larger settlements.
Last but not least, it should be emphasised that neither internal migration nor work commuting constitute an eﬀective adaptation 
mechanism to changes resulting from economic ﬂuctuations. This is so because the latter are occasioned by aggregate shocks and 
what comes with it they aﬀect the entire economy and all regional labour markets more or less to the same degree and at the same 
time. They can provide, however, a means to accommodate local shocks (such as, for instance, bankruptcy of the key employer in
a given poviat). If local communities are mobile enough, migration and in particular commuting – due to much smaller selectivity in 
terms of age and education – could soon become a remedy for the problematic advantage of labour supply over labour demand at 
the local level.
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Summary
The analyses presented in this Part allow to draw a number of important conclusions concerning the nature and consequences of 
international and internal economic migration as well as of work commuting in contemporary Poland.
To begin with, it must be noted that migration behaviours (both internal and international) in Poland seem to follow the same basic 
laws as those identiﬁed in the literature on the subject based on experiences of other countries. In particular, Polish migrants are above 
all young people aged 30 and less, relatively better educated (mainly tertiary degree holders). As for internal migration, migrants are 
also people who face important personal events in their lives such as starting a family or entering an alternative living arrangement.
People who move elsewhere in Poland or go to work abroad tend to relatively more frequently attain a diﬀerent labour market status, 
such as re-entering the labour market after a period of economic inactivity (including due to studies) or unemployment, than people 
who do not migrate. Relatively low spatial mobility is usually associated with long-term unemployment. Thus, it can be stated that 
migration plays a positive role from the point of view of individuals participating in the labour market and the situation of migrants is 
relatively better than that of people who did not make any such attempt.
The probability of migration is largely aﬀected by the economic situation in both the sending region and the receiving region. Hence, 
the principal motive for international migration is the desire to improve one’s living standards thanks to higher income from work 
which can be achieved in relatively wealthier countries even in the case of work below one’s qualiﬁcations. As for internal migration, 
an evident correlation can be observed between the inclination to move and the level of local development. The general pattern 
of migration is fully compliant with the gravity laws of migration. Greater outmigration is enhanced by a relatively worse labour market 
situation and by relatively lower wages as well as by high share of employment in agriculture. Migrants tend to move to regions with 
higher average GDP and wage levels and more modern production structures, however, they also try to choose regions which are 
located as close as possible to their places of origin.
Consequently, better-developed poviats – namely those belonging to Development centres and Suburbs – strongly attract new 
inhabitants, alongside relatively low outmigration trends which results in the total populations of these areas being on a constant 
increase. The situation is quite the opposite in clusters which gather poorer poviats such as Former state farms and Low-productivity 
agriculture. These poviats see outmigration trends which greatly exceed in migration trends. Poviats from Agricultural and industrial are 
subject to the smallest population shifts as a result of migration because in their case population outﬂows are largely levelled out by 
inﬂows. Towns is a distinct group of poviats which is characterised by the lowest level of migrant outﬂows and inﬂows alike. Therefore, 
the migration balance in these poviats is positive but lower than in Suburbs and Development centres.
The overall intensity of internal migration in Poland is not the highest compared with other European states, although, at the same 
time, it is not as low as it is often claimed. Given the fact that Poland is a country which is relatively scarcely urbanised, where the 
process of dynamic migration movements from rural areas to towns was halted some 20-30 years ago after a much shorter period than 
in other European countries, it can be stated that migration intensity in Poland is lower than it potentially could be. On the one hand, 
its increase depends on rapid development of large and medium-size urban centres and suburbs, and on the other hand, on the 
availability of accommodation which is a factor that greatly aﬀects the probability of migration.
The evident substitution of migration by work commuting merits special attention. In other words, in regions where it is possible 
– thanks to relatively easy transport access – to participate in an attractive labour market in, for instance, Development centres, the 
extent of migration is smaller than when such facilities are scarcer. Combined with the availability of accommodation, the above gives 
rise to the phenomenon of suburbanisation as a result of which particularly many inhabitants are attracted to suburban areas sur-
rounding Development Centres or (less frequently) towns. In Poland, apart from inhabitants of large agglomerations and their suburbs, 
it is inhabitants of rural areas (often less-educated) who are also ready to commute long distances. Notwithstanding the above, out of 
all rural inhabitants, it seems that it is people with slightly higher qualiﬁcations who are still more inclined to commute. Consequently, 
work commuting plays a role of a factors which increases (although not excessively) the eﬀectiveness of labour resources allocation 
in Poland.
International migration also has a certain (although smaller than work commuting) impact on bringing the intensity of internal migra-
tion in Poland to lower levels. Moving to another town within one country can be marginally less costly than moving abroad, where 
the latter is an alternative which is also more attractive from the economic point of view. At the same time, the extent of international 
migration, although large, is not large enough to exert a decisive impact on the intensity of internal migration and in this respect it is 
no match for work commuting. For many years, Poland has been a country with a negative balance on net international migra-
tion. Throughout the period 1989-2001, an average of approx. 70,000 people emigrated from Poland every year. At the same time, the 
number of migrants going abroad to work largely exceeds the number of people leaving Poland for good because most people who 
seek employment beyond Polish borders are workers engaging in seasonal work or staying abroad only temporarily.
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This situation has not changed after Poland’s accession to the EU in May 20004. The accession led to an abrupt increase in the number 
of people staying abroad every year by about 165,000-370,000 people, that is by approx. 10-20 per cent of the total number of Poles 
participating in foreign labour markets every year. The above increase is mainly due to the intensiﬁcation of departures to Great Britain 
and Ireland, although people seeking employment abroad tended to take up seasonal or temporary jobs and only about one third of 
them stayed in destination countries for longer periods. The abrupt increase in the intensity of migration of 2004 was a one-oﬀ event 
which bore the features of the so-called migration hump, or a sudden increase in the number of people coming to a given country 
followed by a stabilisation of immigration at more or less the previous level. It can be expected that the intensity of migration will de-
cline when the economic situation in Poland improves and when the diﬀerences in income levels between receiving and sending 
countries become smaller. The past experiences of such countries as Spain and Ireland prove that as a result of structural changes, 
which brought about an improvement in the labour market situation (decreased unemployment and increased wages) and – what 
comes with it – an improvement in the economic situation of households, it is possible that the emigration trend will be reversed 
within a couple or a dozen or so years.
In the case of Poland and of other CEE countries for which the productivity and wages gap as compared with the wealthiest European 
economies is greater than that of Spain twenty years ago, it can be expected that the time necessary for their inhabitants to stop mi-
grating to work abroad in such large numbers will be relatively longer. Nevertheless, the shortening of this time should be the more 
realistic, the more dynamic and steady the economic growth in Poland and in particular regions. In this manner, the levelling of living 
standards within the European Union could be achieved sooner.
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Introduction
Informal economy is a universal phenomenon. It occurs on a larger or smaller scale in all countries around the world and it generates 
a range of adverse eﬀects on the social and economic spheres alike. The existence of a shadow economy obscures the picture of the 
working population and makes it diﬃcult to implement an appropriate labour market policy. People working in the black economy 
are not protected by law and they are not eligible for any support from the social security system in case they become unable to work 
(due to health deterioration or accident), neither do they provide for their old age.
In the literature, one can come across numerous terms for economic activity that is not reported to public authorities or statistical 
oﬃces. Among these, the most common are such expressions as unregistered work or economy, shadow economy, informal work, 
work in the black economy, clandestine economy, etc. Despite so many expressions in use, what is commonly understood as denoting 
this form of economic activity is work performed without a formal work agreement with the employer or services provided without 
reporting the resulting income to the tax authorities and without paying any social security contributions. In reality, however, black 
economy covers a much broader range of phenomena. This is so because activities undeclared to relevant public authorities can 
include legally-prohibited activities as well as legal activities the scale of which is partly or entirely concealed. What is more, black 
economy may refer to both people working outside the oﬃcial sector of the economy, and those who have registered work but who 
understate the number of hours worked or who conceal the fact of performing an additional job. This “hidden” sector of the economy 
may also comprise a part of household production for own use and activities performed by entities which are not under the obligation 
to register with relevant authorities. 
The nature of unregistered work and the legal consequences of providing services in the grey market render extremely diﬃcult all 
attempts to measure the size of the black economy or to estimate the number of people working within it. Survey studies and indirect 
methods based on econometric analyses allow to describe only certain aspects of this phenomenon. Moreover, the emerging results 
are only an approximation of the actual numbers. In view of the above, the existence of the black economy gives rise to considerable 
challenges for economic and social policies – including protection against illegitimate collection of social beneﬁts, assistance to people 
who are ineligible for retirement / pension beneﬁts due to their past work in the black economy as well as to those who for various 
reasons cannot undertake oﬃcial employment.
In the subsequent chapters of this Part, we will present various methods of estimating the size of the black economy and of unregi-
stered employment. We analyse the causes for the above phenomena and we make an attempt at characterising people who turn to 
unregistered work. This Part ends with a chapter in which we demonstrate how the existence of the black economy may inﬂuence the 
economy and with a summary which encapsulates our key conclusions and ﬁndings.
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1. NOE and Unregistered Employment Estimation Methods
Estimating the size and structure of unregistered work is a very diﬃcult task. Considering the nature of this phenomenon, namely the 
fact that it is neither observable nor registered, it is rather problematic to obtain reliable estimates. Most unregistered work estimation 
methods focus on demonstrating its outcome as a share in GDP. Only a few methods allow to estimate the number of people involved 
in this sector of the economy. This ensues above all from methodological drawbacks which prevent a reliable estimation of the number 
of people involved or the number of hours worked, whereas the estimation of the approximate value of income from unregistered 
work in total terms is a relatively easier task. It should be emphasised that none of the groups of methods presented below provides
a fully reliable estimates of the size of unregistered work or NOE, nor does it allow to exhibit all of its dimensions. This is so because each 
of these methods examines the phenomenon of unregistered work in a diﬀerent context (which is not always entirely deﬁned).
The accepted deﬁnition of black economy plays a key role in determining the scale of this phenomenon. In the literature a number 
of expressions are employed to denote this phenomenon, however, all of them refer to the deﬁnition provided for in the System of 
National Accounts.
Box IV.1. Definition of NOE according to the System of National Accounts
Most statistical studies normally use the terminology drawn from the System of National Accounts (SNA93). In accordance with SNA93, 
all activities which are not included in any statistical registers are jointly referred to as non-observed economy (NOE). The term NOE 
has been introduced above all to standardise the methodology of estimating basic aggregates of national accounts by national sta-
tistical offices – especially when estimating the value of GDP with a view to those forms of activity that are hidden from the national 
statistical and public authorities.
NOE encompasses all productive economic activities that may not be captured in the basic data sources used for national accounts. 
SNA93 distinguishes four problem areas of NOE: underground production (production activities that are legal but deliberately con-
cealed from public authorities), illegal activities (productive activities forbidden by law), informal activities of household for own 
use and other forms of activity, which are outside the official statistics due to deficiencies of national data collection and compilation 
systems (UNECE 2003).
Simiarly there are numerous deﬁnitions of work in NOE. The most commonly used approach is to adopt that the basic criterion that 
determines participation in NOE is the failure to report employment. This approach has been employed by the European Commission, 
OECD and CSO alike.
The deﬁnition adopted by the European Commission describes undeclared work as: any paid activities that are lawful as regards their 
nature but not declared to the public authorities (taking into account diﬀerences in the regulatory system of Member States) (COM 1998). The 
report released by the European Commission in 2004 describes undeclared work as: productive activities that are lawful as regards to 
their nature, but are not declared to the public authorities, taking into account the diﬀerences in the regulatory system between Member States 
(Renooy et al 2004)1. Consequently, the scope of undeclared work was extended to include also unpaid activities which are productive 
(e.g. housework). As for the OECD deﬁnition of hidden employment, it refers to employment (...) which although not illegal in itself, has 
not been declared to one or more administrative authorities (OECD 2004a).
More precisely, the above deﬁnitions (apart from the deﬁnition employed by Renooy et al. 2004) do not cover illegal production and 
they do not always specify whether activities regarded as concealed work constitute productive activities. Therefore, it can be assumed 
that they cover the sector of underground production (tax evasion and failure to pay social security contributions are not productive 
activities) as well as of informal production. Moreover, the European Commission deﬁnition is narrower than the OECD deﬁnition be-
cause it refers only to those activities that are paid and it leaves out a considerable part of home production.
In Poland, NOE is mainly handled by CSO as part of estimation of aggregates of national accounts. The term “hidden economy”
(gospodarka ukryta), as understood by CSO, means hidden production which includes: underreporting some economic values by reg-
istered entities, non-registered economic activity conducted on own account and illegal production, i.e. all activities prohibited by law
(e.g. drug production and sale, prostitution, theft, fencing and smuggling). However, in the national accounts, similarly to the prac-
tices of other EU member states, CSO presents only underground production estimates. When it comes to deﬁning the concept of 
undeclared work,2 according to CSO, it covers work performed without a formal employment relationship, i.e. without an employment 
contract, order agreement, assignment agreement or any other written agreement between the employer and the employee irrespec-
tive of ownership sector (including natural persons and individual agricultural holdings). Neither can such work be performed as a 
result of nomination, appointment or election. People performing undeclared work are not eligible for social insurance and therefore 
they do not have the right to receive any social security beneﬁts. Moreover, the period when undeclared work is performed is not 
counted as a contribution period from the point of view of the Social Insurance Institution (SII), employers do not deduct relevant SII 
1 This deﬁnition has been hammered out for the purposes of the mentioned Report, whereas the oﬃcial deﬁnition used by the European Commission is included in the Communication 
of 1998.
2 This deﬁnition was employed in the LFS module survey on “Undeclared work” which was conducted in August 1995, August 1998 and in the 4th quarter of 2004.
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3 In the subsequent parts of this report the following terms are used interchangeably: non-observed economy, grey economy and informal economy.
or Labour Fund contributions from remuneration and income from undeclared work is not taxed with personal income tax. According 
to CSO, undeclared work also means work performed on one’s own account, if the resulting ﬁnancial obligations towards the state are 
not fulﬁlled (CSO 2005).
In the subsequent parts of this chapter, whenever referring to undeclared work, we use this term as understood by CSO. By NOE,3 we 
mean legal activities or their parts which have not been registered, or activities where income is not reported and consequently taxes 
and social insurance contributions are evaded. Whenever possible, we also take into consideration work performed for households or 
other entities, if the resulting ﬁnancial obligations towards the state are not fulﬁlled. Undeclared workers will be included irrespective 
of whether their work is principal, additional, permanent or temporary.
In the literature it is possible to distinguish some groups of methods of measuring undeclared economy and work, namely direct and 
indirect methods as well as macroeconomic modelling (see Box IV.2.). Regardless of diﬀerent characteristics of these methods, they 
all have one drawback in common, namely they provide only roughly approximate estimates as to the size of NOE. Another shared 
characteristic of majority of methods is that they measure the undeclared economy as a whole and the result is presented in absolute 
terms or as a share in GDP.
Box IV.2. NOE measurement methods
Direct methods include different types of random sample survey studies and interviews (of enterprises, households and individuals). 
These methods allow to work out estimates of the scale of undeclared work (expressed as the number of employed persons or of 
hours worked) together with information on social and economic characteristics of the entites involved, on motives for undertaking 
such work and income derived therefrom. The use of direct methods in estimating the scale of undeclared work entails considerable 
cost and risk of a low response rate as well as of missing or untrue data. In view of the above, it is commonly accepted that results 
based on questionnaire surveys constitute the lower bound of undeclared labour estimates. This is so because respondents tend 
to conceal their current status in the labour market rather than to lie that they work as unregistered employees. Irrespective of the 
above-mentioned drawbacks, questionnaire surveys – if conducted appropriately – seem to be the best source of data on economic 
and social aspects of undeclared work and on motives for undertaking it.
Indirect methods are methods which are much more commonly used in estimating the scale of undeclared work. They are based 
on interpreting phenomena observed in the economy as the so-called tracks of undeclared economy. These methods are used by 
all EU member states in their national accounts when estimating total outcome generated in the economy with a view to outcome 
generated in the non-observed economy (exhaustiveness of national accounts). Indirect methods comprise, for instance, discrepancy 
analyses between data sources and sensitivity analyses. These methods usually provide data on the size of undeclared economy as
a share in GDP, although the use of discrepancy analysis for data on labour demand and supply allows to generate an estimated 
number of people working in NOE. It should be emphasised that results obtained with these methods may be distorted due to meth-
odological differences between the compared data bases.
Modelling the scale of non-observed employment and economy is carried out using a range of econometric techniques which 
comprise:
• monetary methods, 
• electricity consumption methods,
• structural equation modelling – used above all in social and marketing studies,
• methods based on simple growth models and on rational behaviour theory.
Macroeconomic modelling used to measure NOE only to some extent allows to determine the number of people involved in this 
sector of the economy. Most of these methods present the size of NOE as a percentage share of GDP and they do not allow for a dis-
aggregation of results for sectors of the economy or categories of expenditures. Moreover, there exist a number of reservations as to 
both assumptions made and results obtained. Among them, the most significant are:
• no well-defined object of a study – it is difficult to determine which areas of NOE it measures,
• adoption of incorrect or simplified model assumptions, which renders impossible the use of results obtained (it concerns 
 especially the monetary and electricity methods),
• divergent results when estimating NOE for one country using the same assumptions but different methods or using the same 
 method by a number of authors,
• results thus obtained cannot be used with other estimates, especially with results obtained with indirect methods.
As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, questionnaire surveys allow only to determine the lower bound of shadow economy 
estimates. Therefore, in order to identify its role in the economy in a more precise way, one should refer to other methods. The oﬃcial 
data source on the share of NOE in GDP is the national accounts published by CSO. CSO obtains its estimate by applying a combination 
of methods (among others, they use data from direct studies and discrepancy analyses). In accordance with data provided by CSO, the 
share of the shadow economy in total GDP in Poland amounts to approximately 12-15 per cent, where about 2/3 of outcome gener-
ated in NOE are produced by registered units which understate their revenues and proﬁts. As opposed to data on employment, the 
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largest share in outcome generated by NOE does not fall on construction but on the trade and repairs, whereas agriculture plays a rela-
tively insigniﬁcant role. The marginal share of agriculture results above all from low productivity in agriculture in Poland. Consequently, 
a large share of people informally employed in agriculture translates into a minor contribution of this sector in outcome generated by 
NOE. Interestingly enough, the share of GDP produced in the shadow economy has been on a steady decline,4 which is a tendency 
opposite to those observable in most OECD countries.
Table IV.1.
Share of NOE in GDP for 1994-2004 in current prices
 
* Data for 2000-2004 are not comparable with data for previous years. In 2006, CSO updated estimates of shadow economy for 2000-2004, taking into 
account, among others, results of the module survey of 2004.
Source: CSO (2002), CSO (2006b).
Apart from oﬃcial statistics, there are also estimates of shadow economy in Poland based on other sources and other methods (see 
Table IV.2). It is only the results obtained by Johnson et al. (1997) for the period 1994-1995 that are similar to the ﬁgures published by 
CSO. The remaining studies indicate that the scale of the black economy in Poland is even twice larger than the oﬃcial estimates. What 
is more, the results obtained by Schneider (2002) suggest that the share of the black economy in the Polish economy has been increas-
ing in the last years. The interpretation of these results gives rise to certain diﬃculties. It is not clear whether the shadow economy 
deﬁnitions used in the above two estimation procedures are identical. For instance, Schneider (2006) limits shadow economy to legal 
paid activities that involve pecuniary payoﬀ, whereas he leaves out – similarly to CSO – illegal production and home production. On 
the other hand, he makes an assumption that one of the indicators describing the evolution of NOE is the rate of currency per capita 
which may in fact depend on the scale of illegal production. Consequently, there is a discrepancy between the deﬁnition of hidden 
production as employed by CSO and the deﬁnition of shadow economy as used by Schneider. Unfortunately, it is very frequent that 
estimates of the black economy do not clearly refer to any deﬁnition of the term, which hinders comparisons of results between dif-
ferent data sources.
Table IV.2.
Scale of NOE in Poland according to various measurement methods
Source: * Johnson et al. (1997), Johnson et al. (1998); ** Lackó (1999); *** Schneider (2002), Schneider (2006).
Moreover the problem of reliability of the results based on econometric methods comes to light.5 This is so because the same electric-
ity consumption method produced completely diﬀerent results for the period 1989-1995. Thus, it is controversial which estimates are 
4 A major increase in the NOE estimates between 1999 and 2000 was rather artiﬁcial and resulted from an upward adjustment of NOE estimates starting from the year 2000. The unadjusted 
values suggested that the share of NOE declines slowly but steadily
5 A critical review of the electricity consumption method as well as of other econometric methods is presented, among others, in Thomas (1999), OECD (2002a).
.
Method
Electricity consumption method*
Electricity consumption method**
DYMIMIC***
1989 -1990
17.7
27.2
–
Share of NOE in GDP
1990 -1993
20.3
31.8
22.3
1994 -1995
13.9
25.9
–
1999 -2000
–
–
27.6
2001 -2002
–
–
28.2
2002 -2003
–
–
28.9
Details
Gross domestic product (excluding NOE,
unpublished category)
Gross domestic product (including NOE)
NOE estimate:
- in registered units
- undeclared work performance
Industry
Construction
Trade, repairs, hotels and restaurants
Transport, storage and communications
Real estate and business activities
Other sections
1994
100.0
117.2
17.2
12.1
5.1
1.9
3.0
8.6
1.2
0.9
1.6
1995
100.0
116.6
16.6
11.9
4.7
1.9
3.1
8.6
1.0
0.6
1.4
1996
100.0
115.9
15.9
11.3
4.6
1.6
2.9
7.8
1.0
1.0
1.6
1997
100.0
115.2
15.2
11.0
4.2
1.5
2.5
7.2
0.9
1.6
1.5
1998
100.0
115.3
15.3
11.0
4.3
1.6
2.5
6.9
0.9
1.9
1.5
1999
100.0
114.5
14.5
10.4
4.1
1.4
2.5
6.5
0.8
1.9
1.4
2000*
100.0
117
17
11.7
5.3
1.3
2.5
6.5
1
2.6
3.1
2001*
100.0
116.3
16.3
11.1
5.2
1.2
2.4
7.3
0.4
2.3
2.7
2002*
100.0
115.3
15.3
10.1
5.2
1
2.2
6.4
0.6
2.3
2.8
2003*
100.0
115.4
15.4
10.3
5.1
0.9
2.2
6.5
0.6
2.4
2.8
2004*
100.0
114.4
14.4
9.5
4.9
1.2
2.1
6
0.5
1.9
2.7
percentages
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closer to the actual number. On the other hand, the estimates worked out by Schneider can also be questioned as overstated. Is it really 
probable and reliable that almost one third of production is eﬀected in the shadow economy? Notwithstanding the above, there is no 
certainty that the estimates calculated by CSO are closer to reality than the above-mentioned results. All in all, it should be acknowl-
edged that the shadow economy constitutes a signiﬁcant element of the Polish economy and that it accounts for a considerable share 
of GDP. The scale of the black economy is greater than in such countries as Germany, France and Great Britain, but it is comparable to 
that of other countries in the CEE region.
 
2. NOE and Undeclared Employment Determinants 
When analysing the phenomenon of undeclared work, one should begin with answering the question about what makes particular 
persons, enterprises and households to conceal their activity or income. The key factor is the ﬁnancial motive – higher income from 
business activity or performed work, or lower payments relating to the purchase of goods or services produced or provided in NOE 
as a result of avoidance of taxes and other related contributions imposed by the state. Apart from taxes and social insurance contri-
butions, the following are often quoted as factors determining the scale of NOE: regulations – in particular those pertaining to the 
labour market, social transfers, quality of public sector services (see, for instance, Schneider, Enste 2000, Johnson, Kaufmann, Zoido-
Lobaton 1998). In practice, each of the above-mentioned factors is a set of more detailed factors which aﬀect the scale of the black 
economy in diﬀerent ways, shape the structure of this phenomenon and motivate people to get involved in NOE. The ﬁnal extent of 
the shadow economy depends of the intensity and characteristics of each of the above-mentioned groups of factors as well as of other 
determinants – much more diﬃcult to measure – which arise from the general macroeconomic situation of a given country, nature 
of relationships between particular macroeconomic aggregates, production structure, level of education and strictly sociological fac-
tors such as mentality of a given society, risk-aversion, civic virtue, conﬁdence in public authorities and the integrity of the tax system 
(Schneider, Enste 2000, Hanousek, Palda 2003, OECD 2004a). 
The subsequent part of this chapter provides a description of basic groups of factors shaping the scale of NOE and of undeclared work. 
Moreover, we analyse the impact of minimum wage and typically sociological factors on NOE.
2.1 Tax burden and social insurance contributions
A vast majority of authors who study NOE and undeclared work consider taxation as the fundamental or one of the key causes that 
inﬂuence the extent of the above phenomena. Most commonly, tax burden is deﬁned as the amount of mandatory contributions to 
be paid to the state or public institutions that are imposed on the employer or the employee. It is assumed that it is the amount of tax 
burden that is the basic motive for undertaking undeclared employment and for concealing a part or all of performed work to avoid 
taxation.
The impact of taxation on the process of shaping labour demand and supply translates above all into the disturbed relationship be-
tween work and leisure. A change in labour demand resulting from increased taxes occurs if the total labour costs (i.e. the total amount 
of wage eﬀectively paid by the employer and comprising the net wage plus all additional labour charges) increase due to the increase 
of the ﬁscal burden. On the other hand, labour supply decreases, if the increased tax burden adversely aﬀects the amount of net wage, 
thus lowering the attractiveness of work in relation to untaxed leisure (see Bukowski et al. 2006). The ﬁnal inﬂuence of taxation on the 
labour market depends on the elasticity of labour supply and demand, and consequently on the impact of income and substitution 
eﬀects on employees and employers.6 The transition from employment to non-employment (i.e. to unemployment or inactivity) is also 
aﬀected by the tax elasticity of net wages that determines the possibility of shifting the tax burden from the employer to the employee. 
Also the availability and ﬁnancial attractiveness of social insurance beneﬁts which inﬂuence the extent of labour supply elasticity in 
relation to net wages plays an important role in this process. Based on theoretical premises, it can be reasonably assumed that the 
substitution eﬀect generally prevails over the income eﬀect, and that in an economy which comprises both oﬃcial and undeclared 
labour markets, tax increases lead to the substitution of registered work for undeclared work or leisure (see Bukowski et al. 2006). 
Whether individuals chose the former or the latter depends largely on individual factors but also on the combination of other identi-
ﬁed determinants shaping the size of the shadow economy – in particular on the integrity and complexity of the tax system, degree of 
detectability of tax evasion, and on the general economic conditions. Moreover, it is very diﬃcult to empirically demonstrate to what 
extent changes in tax burden lead to changes in overall labour supply and demand, and when do they bring about shifts in supply 
and demand between the oﬃcial and informal sectors of the economy. These diﬃculties stem from, among others, scarce availability 
of statistical data. For this reason, in the empirical literature which examines the impact of increased taxation on the labour market, the 
existence of informal economy is very rarely taken into account.
6 We refer to the income eﬀect when, as a consequence of increased taxes, the actual income from work of a given household decreases, which leads to increased labour supply. This 
mechanism is supposed to result in bringing net income to the level from before the tax increase. As for the substitution eﬀect, a decrease in the relative cost of leisure, alongside an 
increased cost of income from work, makes workers substitute work for leisure.
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When analysing links between taxation and the extent of the black economy, it should be borne in mind that the key condition for 
the emergence of the above phenomenon is the possibility of gaining notable proﬁts by those oﬀering work and by those beneﬁting 
from it. In other words, undeclared work must be cheaper than taxed employment and wages must be higher or at least comparable 
with net wages oﬀered in the oﬃcial sector of the economy (in both cases, with a view to the cost of potential disclosure of the tax 
evasion). If the employer have the possibility of ﬂexible adjusting the net wages in reaction to tax changes, then the additional taxation 
of income from work in the oﬃcial economy will bring about a decrease in the households disposable income in comparison with 
the situation from before the tax increase. The greater the change in the tax wedge, the greater this decrease. Therefore, theoretical 
arguments (see Bukowski et al. 2006) prove that in the long term when wages are fully ﬂexible, changes in tax burden aﬀect the labour 
market exclusively through changes in labour supply. Nevertheless, in the short term, if downward wage rigidity occurs (for instance, 
in the presence of statutory minimum wage or powerful trade unions), this mechanism is limited. In the latter situation, an increase in 
taxes leads to decrease in labour demand for low-productivity, low-paid workers. These people, in view of the possibility of working in 
the shadow economy, are more likely to react to tax impulses by replacing the legal labour supply rather than by decreasing overall 
labour supply (see Bukowski et al. 2006).
In fact, nearly all available empirical studies show that taxation is positively correlated with the size of the shadow economy. This corre-
lation emerges, in most cases7, irrespective of the applied taxation indicator. Taxation can be measured by variables that refer to indirect 
or direct taxes as well as social insurance contributions, or by indices that cover all or some of the above-mentioned elements. Eﬀective 
tax rates imposed on the average production worker income (APW) or Paying Taxes Index of the World Bank are such indicators. The 
former measure takes into account additional labour costs as well as any other monetary beneﬁts. The World Bank index refers to the 
total tax burden incurred on the business activity of a medium size enterprise together with administrative burden related to paying 
taxes.8 In both cases, increased levels of these indicators are accompanied by greater share of the black economy. The above connec-
tions, although measured only by simple correlations, seem to be signiﬁcant but not strong enough to regard taxes as the only factor 
deciding on the total size of the shadow economy.
Chart IV.1.
The size of the shadow economy (as percentage share of GDP) versus the World Bank taxation index and the sum of income tax and so-
cial insurance contributions decreased by monetary beneﬁts expressed as a percentage share in the average production worker income 
(APW) for a single person at the level of 167 per cent of APW 
Note: In the left graph, the extent of the shadow economy and the index value have been derived from the World Bank 2006b and they pertain to 
the year 2005. In the right graph, the extent of the shadow economy has been derived from Schneider 2006 and it pertains to the estimates for 2002-
2003.
Source: Own calculation based on data provided in Schneider 2006, World Bank 2006b and OECD 2004a.
Although to some extent high taxes enhance the expansion of NOE and increase the share of the population involved in undeclared 
work, they do not constitute an imperative or – even more so – suﬃcient condition of its growth. In other words, a high tax wedge 
between net and gross wages as well as high tax rates are not the only motive for undertaking employment in the black economy. 
Although the CEE and Southern European countries are characterised by a positive correlation between the above two factors, as 
indicated in Chart IV.1, in some developed Western European countries, high tax rates are accompanied by low levels of undeclared 
work and small NOE. This indicates that there must be other factors related to taxation which aﬀect the size of the shadow economy 
to a greater extent than tax rates. Johnson et al. (1998) argues that it is not the level of tax rates but the functioning of the tax system 
as a whole that is mainly responsible for the scale of NOE. According to him, it is high instability of tax regulations, precariousness of 
procedures and high level of discretion in tax decision making that are more likely to push people to switch to NOE than the eﬀective 
and marginal tax rates. Countries which reconcile high marginal and average tax rates with a low burden stemming from functioning 
7 Friedman et. al. (2000) attained a negative correlation between direct taxes and the size of the shadow economy. However, after the introduction of the GDP per capita variable (which 
reﬂects the wealth of a given country) to the model, this negative correlation ceased to play a role. The authors explain this by referring to the fact that wealthier countries are characterised 
by better-functioning administration and higher tax rates.
8 For a more detailed description of the index see the Appendix 5 to this report.
Paying Taxes - World Bank index income tax plus employee and employer contributions 
less cash beneﬁts
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of the tax system exhibit small level of NOEs expressed as a share in GDP (e.g. Austria, Sweden). Countries which experience an oppo-
site relationship between the above two factors – low marginal tax rates and highly bureaucratic tax systems – are often characterised 
by higher shares of NOE in GDP. Corruption exerts a similar impact on the shadow economy because it constitutes an informal burden 
which is supplementary to or which partly replaces taxes. Another explanation for the low correlation between tax rates and the scale 
of the shadow economy can be found in the dual equilibria model (see subchapter 2.3).
Schneider (2006) also claims that a large number of available tax deductions as well as deﬁciencies of the tax system – such as narrow 
tax base – exert an adverse eﬀect on the rate of undeclared labour supply. This ensues from the fact that a malfunctioning tax system 
allows for lawful and relatively simple evasion of higher taxes, that in turn increases the cost of functioning in the informal sector and 
makes it scarcely competitive compared with oﬃcial employment. In this context, the governmental measures intending to widen the 
tax base by way of eliminating tax deductions as well as legal loopholes may paradoxically lead to the expansion of the black economy. 
This pattern could be observed in Austria towards the end of the 1980s. The tax reform implemented in 1989 was supposed to lower 
marginal tax rates as well as eliminate some tax deductions and loopholes in the tax law that applied in Austria at that time by sim-
plifying the tax system and by covering more areas by relevant tax law regulations. One consequence of these developments was an 
increase in the size of the shadow economy, which means that the resulting widening of the tax base to cover previously untaxed areas 
and increased regulation cancelled out the positive impact of lower average and marginal tax rates. The above example demonstrates 
how greatly changes in the tax system and regulations can inﬂuence the size of the informal economy. However, the literature does 
not provide any ﬁrm consensus as to how the impact of these factors should be assessed and consequently what panacea should be 
applied. On the one hand, DeSoto (2000) argues that the increased size of the shadow economy in such circumstances results above all 
from increased regulation and public intervention in the ﬁelds where they should never occur or from their completely unacceptable 
nature from the perspective of business entities and units. On the other hand, however, Schneider 2002 (after Cebula 1997) points to 
the fact that maintaining maximum marginal tax rates at the same level may at most limit the shadow economy expansion in the long 
run, whereas in order to actually decrease the size of this phenomenon tax inspections must also be rendered more rigid and penalties 
for failure to fulﬁl tax obligations must be increased. The impact of the scope and nature of regulations on the shadow economy is 
further discussed in the next subchapter.
2.2. Regulations 
Labour market regulations and institutions also constitute a very important factor which aﬀects the size of the informal economy. In 
this context, it is the labour market regulations that are particularly signiﬁcant as they set out the rules of establishing and carrying on 
business activities, employing workers, securing appropriate working conditions, etc. They also have a great inﬂuence on the future 
business prospects as well as on any additional business costs (not only ﬁnancial). Similarly to taxation, there is no consensus in the 
literature as to whether it is the regulations themselves and their number or the way they are enforced (or not) by the state that have 
an impact of the extent of the shadow economy.
Participation in the oﬃcial economy is characterised by relatively high costs of entering and lasting in the market compared with the 
informal sector.9 In order to commence a legal business activity one has to register the enterprise as well as obtain all required licenses 
and permits. The necessity to fulﬁl all formalities related to running a business and employing workers generates additional costs. Em-
pirical studies10 indicate that these costs (ﬁnancial, time needed to complete all formalities, deferred income when waiting the issue of 
relevant licenses and permits, etc.) often make the setting-up and running of a registered business “costly” and thus hardly competitive 
in relation to activities carried on in the shadow economy. This concerns above all small enterprises which employ one or a couple of 
employees and which carry on their activity on a small scale without it being necessary to apply for special licenses or permits, enter-
prises that do not need to establish an easily identiﬁable oﬃce, or to maintain contacts with the public sector, etc.
One characteristic of work in the oﬃcial economy is the requirement to fully regulate employment relationship. This means that the 
employer is under the obligation to conclude a contract with the employee (most commonly in writing), which determines the terms 
and conditions of performing work and provides the employee with at least the minimum of protection. The employer is also obliged 
to register the fact of hiring an employee with the relevant institutions, to apply for social insurance, to inform the tax authorities and 
other institutions, as required by law, and to provide such employee with appropriate working conditions, which in particular are safe 
and healthy. Hence, entrepreneurs who intend to legally employ their employees may shift some employment costs to the latter by, for 
instance paying them lower wages (than possible). Alternately, employers can oﬀer higher wages on condition that the employment 
relationship remains undeclared and the above-mentioned costs are avoided.
Regulations are often measured by referring to the number of legal acts, restrictions on employing foreigners, trade barriers, etc. An in-
creased number of legal acts regulating the process of setting up and running an enterprise, of building and purchasing real properties 
and of employing workers may constitute a considerable obstacle impeding the entrance of small companies into the oﬃcial sector 
9  In the case of the shadow economy, these entrance costs include above all information about employers, principles of functioning of this sector as well as about employment opportunities. 
The collection of this information also requires time and therefore generates certain costs (including ﬁnancial costs, in the form of, for instance, bribes)
10 This concept is discussed in greater detail in, among others, Schneider (2000), Johnson et al. (1998), OECD (2004a).
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of the economy and narrowing their chances of surviving within it. Too large a number of obligations imposed by the law in the form 
of concessions, licenses, barriers to trade or limited access to capital can entail increased costs: direct costs – relating to the taxation 
of labour, and indirect costs – relating to the fulﬁlment of obligations imposed by them. These increased costs lead to the expansion 
of NOE because a great part of the above obligations can be shifted onto employees thus causing a rise in undeclared employment 
(DeSoto 2000, Schneider, Enste 2000).
The question of how labour law ﬂexibility aﬀects the extent of undeclared work has not been thoroughly examined in theoretical or 
empirical research studies. The indicated eﬀects are often of intuitive nature which results from the assessment of the impact that 
this factor has on the labour market as a whole and on particular age groups. In the literature on the subject, no consensus has been 
reached as to the impact of labour law ﬂexibility on the overall labour market. This is so because the degree of legal regulation may 
bring diﬀerent results in diﬀerent countries as it depends on the entire situation in the labour market (Bukowski et al. 2005). In the short 
term, the degree of labour law ﬂexibility shapes the relative status of various social groups, i.e. the employment structure, although it 
has no inﬂuence over the actual level of employment. In the long term, the impact of ﬂexible labour law regulations is largely deter-
mined by other social and economic factors as well as by the institutional framework of the labour market.
Regulations, including broadly understood labour law, may be treated as a certain speciﬁc form of burden the nature of which is similar 
to that of the tax burden and as such it exerts a comparable inﬂuence on the shadow economy. High ﬂexibility in employing and dis-
missing workers lowers the relative cost of participation in the oﬃcial sector of the economy and allows to adapt relatively easily to the 
changing business environment without infringing the labour law. Moreover, taking into account the cost relating to undeclared em-
ployment, the latter becomes less competitive (other factors remaining unchanged) in relation to employment in the oﬃcial economy, 
which leads to a decrease in the size of the shadow economy. This correlation is evidenced by a simple comparison of the size of the 
black economy with the Employing Workers Index used by the World Bank as well as with the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) 
index, as presented in Chart IV.2. 
Chart IV.2. 
Employing Workers Index used by the World Bank and the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index versus the shadow economy
   
Note: In the left graph, the extent of the shadow economy has been derived from Schneider 2006 and it pertains to the estimates for 2002-2003. In the 
right graph, the extent of the shadow economy and the index value have been derived from the World Bank 2006b and they pertain to the year 2005.
Source: Own calculation based on data provided in Schneider (2006), World Bank (2006b) and OECD (2004a).
In the two cases presented above, the increase in the index value means less ﬂexible and more restrictive labour law. The EPL index11 
consists of three elements: regulations relating to permanent contracts, regulations relating to ﬁxed term contracts and temporary 
work and regulations relating to collective layoﬀs. The World Bank index12 comprises the following elements: rigidity of employment 
index (including regulations relating to hiring and ﬁring employees, rigidity of working hours), non-salary costs of hiring a worker and 
costs involved in dismissing a redundant worker (costs resulting from the statutory periods of notice, severance pays and penalties 
imposed on the employer for ﬁring an employee). Irrespective of diﬀerences in the construction of the above-mentioned indices and 
of a diﬀerent scope of information that they carry, in both cases, a positive correlation was observed between the increase in the index 
value and the size of the shadow economy. This may mean that rigid labour law, which does not allow to hire and ﬁre employees in
a relatively simple manner or to freely shape working hours, may aﬀect the extent of undeclared work. However, it should also be borne 
in mind that the above conclusions are not supported by a rigorous empirical veriﬁcation and thus they do not take account of a range 
of other factors which may shape the presented relationships. In particular, the above correlation may be spurious, if the degree of 
labour market regulation – which does not in itself have any impact on the size of the shadow economy – is at the same time corre-
lated with another factor (e.g. the degree of overall regulation of business activity), which eﬀectively determines the size of NOE. In this 
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11 The EPL index has been worked out by the OECD to measure labour law regulation ﬂexibility. This issue is discussed in greater detail in  Bukowski et. al. 2005.
12 The values of particular components of this index are determined for a particular type of employer who hires employees with features indicated in the index methodology. See Appendix 
6 for details.
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context, De Soto (2000) points to regulations concerning the real property market which, in a number of countries, make it impossible 
to accumulate enough capital to carry on an oﬃcial business activity and thus force numerous companies into the black economy.
As in the case of taxation, Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) argue that the most signiﬁcant factor aﬀecting the size of the shadow 
economy is the eﬀectiveness of enforcing particular regulations rather than the regulations themselves. An extensive number of legal 
acts and of the resulting obligations for entrepreneurs, if it is not eﬃciently enforced by state authorities, should not have any signiﬁ-
cant impact on the size of the black economy. In view of the above, failure of state authorities to eﬀectively fulﬁl their duties, similarly 
to taxation, may modify the impact of law, including labour law, on the extent of black economy.
2.3 Quality of public services and dual equilibria hypothesis
One of the many tasks of public administration consists in ensuring a smooth law enforcement, safety of business activity (e.g. by eﬀec-
tive contract enforcement) and assistance to people, who for various reasons are unable to generate income from work (unemployed 
people, working poor). These services are ﬁnanced from the state budget revenues or from the local government budgets which are 
fed mainly by revenues from taxes and social insurance contributions. The existence of the informal sector of the economy results in
a decrease in public revenues and consequently in the deterioration of the quality of services provided by the state. This may manifest 
itself in deﬁcient judicial system, lack of eﬀective protection of employee rights, low eﬃciency of the social insurance system or inef-
fective civil and business law enforcement. In such case, irrespective of good-quality legal solutions, the lack of eﬀective control over 
their enforcement as well as low probability of detecting illegal activities leads to the increased size of the shadow economy (Schneider 
2006). This, in turn, results in the lowering of state revenues which usually translates into higher tax rates.
An alternative mechanism where the quality of public services aﬀects the size of the shadow economy is presented in the so-called 
dual equilibria hypothesis. This hypothesis allows also to explain the rather weak correlation between tax rates and the extent of NOE 
in European countries. The above concept was formalized in the study of Johnson et al. (1997). It treats the quality of public services as 
a factor aﬀecting the size of the informal economy, however, not it terms of the eﬀectiveness of the system of controlling and monitor-
ing the economy, but in terms of incentives faced by entrepreneurs and employees . A signiﬁcant role within this concept is played 
by the non-tax obligations imposed on entrepreneurs, i.e. obligations that do not ﬁnance the delivery of public services. This group of 
obligations includes various types of regulations which determine the degree of complexity of procedures related to the setting-up 
and running of business activities, as well as a burden resulting from corruptive practices in the public and private sectors. The key 
factors determining the quality of public services include above all the level of spending on the provision of these services (depending 
on the tax revenue) and the procedural eﬀectiveness of public institutions in fulﬁlling their tasks.
Assuming that, in a given economy, the quality of public services, the amounts of proceeds from taxes and the size of the shadow 
economy are moderate. Moreover, tax rates are more or less stable and ﬁxed at a high level. At some point, as a consequence of
a reform, the eﬃciency of state institutions increases and – what comes with it – the quality of public services improves (e.g. improved 
functioning of the judicial system consisting in shortening the time necessary to handle business cases and thus increasing the degree 
of protection of ownership rights by the state). Entities which have not been prone to pay taxes and social insurance contributions due 
to insuﬃcient quality of public services13 register their business activity.14 The tax base increases and thus gives a green light to further 
improvement of the quality and scope of public services. The process continues until an equilibrium is attained which is characterised 
by small extent of the black economy, low degree of regulation, wide tax base, considerable tax revenue and high quality of public 
services (A equilibrium). In accordance with the second scenario, increased regulation, decreased eﬀectiveness of public institutions 
and increased corruption discourage entrepreneurs to register their business activity. Tax revenue goes down and the quality of public 
services gets worse which results in further decrease in tax proceeds. In the ﬁnal phase, the economy attains an equilibrium where tax 
revenue and the quality of public services are low, the scope of non-tax obligations is wide and the size of the shadow economy is 
considerable (B equilibrium). 
Both scenarios leave tax rates ﬁxed. According to the dual equilibria hypothesis a certain level of taxation may be accompanied by
a number of combinations of the size of NOE and the level of tax revenue. Relatively high tax rates may coincide with relatively small 
extent of the shadow economy, if the institutions function well enough and provide high-quality public services, and the burden 
resulting from regulations, corruption and complexity of procedures relating to the setting-up and running a business activity is small. 
If the dual equilibria hypothesis is indeed valid, then the low correlation between the share of NOE in the economy and the amount 
of tax burden suggests that it is above all regulations and institutional eﬃciency and – to a lesser extent taxes sensu stricto – that are 
behind the diﬀerences within the OECD countries.
13 It can be assumed that they purchased these services from private entities or delivered them themselves. For instance, Johnson et al. (2000) claims that 90 per cent of the polled Russian 
managers declared that companies operating within their sector pay for “private protection”. In Slovakia and Poland this share amounted to 15 and 8 per cent respectively. 
14 A similar eﬀect would be prompted by the lowering of non-tax obligations imposed on entrepreneurs.
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Factors
shadow economy as % of GDP
% share of taxes and contributions in GDP
rule of law index
government eﬀectiveness index
regulation index
corruption perception index
cost of setting up and carrying
on business activity*
  including the Scandinavian countries:
shadow economy as % of GDP
% share of taxes and contributions in GDP
rule of law index
government eﬀectiveness index
regulation index
corruption perception index
cost of setting up and carrying
on business activity* 
shadow economy as % of GDP
% share of taxes and contributions in GDP
rule of law index
government eﬀectiveness index
regulation index
corruption perception index
cost of setting up and carrying
on business activity*
shadow economy as % of GDP
% share of taxes and contributions in GDP
rule of law index
government eﬀectiveness index
regulation index
corruption perception index
cost of setting up and carrying
on business activity*
In order to illustrate the results of the above-mentioned theory, we have referred to the cluster analysis, thus dividing European coun-
tries into 3 sets in accordance with three groups of factors:
• size of the shadow economy,
• share of total taxes in GDP (as a measure of tax revenue),
• rule of law and government eﬀectiveness indices (as a measure of the quality of public services).15 
Table IV.3.
Dual equilibria hypothesis in the group of European countries (in 2002-2003)
*data for 2005.
Source: shadow economy as percentage of GDP – Schneider (2006); percentage share of taxes in GDP (share of total receipts from taxes and social contri-
butions after deduction of amounts assessed but unlikely to be collected in GDP) – Eurostat; Rule of Law Index, Government Eﬀectiveness Index – World 
Bank; Regulation Index – Heritage Foundation; Corruption Perception Index – Transparency International; cost of setting up and carrying on business 
activity (position in the “Doing Business”ranking) – World Bank.
15 Higher index values mean a higher quality of public services. See Appendices 7 to 9 for a more detailed description of indices presented in Table IV.3.
Minimum
10.9
28.8
  1.4
  1.5
  1.0
  6.9
5
17.3
43.3
  1.9
  2.0
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7
 32.6
27.9
-0.2
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  2.8
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 20.1
31.4
  0.3
  0.6
  2.0
  3.6
20
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18.4
50.1
  2.0
  2.1
  3.0
  9.7
47
18.4
50.1
  2.0
  2.1
  3.0
  9.7
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41.3
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  1.0
  4.0
  5.5
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 29.4
45.1
  1.5
  1.8
  3.0
  7.6
111
Average
15.4
41.5
  1.8
  1.9
  2.5
  8.5
17.7
17.9
46.4
  1.9
  2.1
  2.3
  9.3
10.5
 37.9
29.8
  0.3
  0.5
  3.2
  4.1
38.6
 24.4
37.0
  0.9
  1.0
  2.9
  5.3
55.7
Standard deviation
2.71
6.12
0.18
0.26
0.71
0.93
12.93
  0.58
  3.15
  0.02
  0.05
  0.96
  0.39
  3.51
  3.35
  2.30
  0.41
  0.54
  0.84
  1.02
25.23
  3.72
  4.08
  0.36
  0.40
  0.32
  1.44
25.37
N
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
 5
5
5
5
5
5
5
 10
10
10
10
10
10
10
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he
r
A
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The results seem to conﬁrm the dual equilibria hypothesis in the group of European countries. The ﬁrst cluster may be attributed to
A equilibrium and is characterised by the low share of NOE, high quality of public services (high index values for rule of law and gov-
ernment eﬀectiveness) and a relatively high share of tax proceeds in GDP. The Scandinavian countries distinguish themselves in the ﬁrst 
group by their particularly high level of taxation. Moreover, they are characterised by very high quality of public services and an excep-
tionally small burden resulting from regulations, corruption and barriers to running business.16 Consequently, the size of the shadow 
economy in these countries is rather small. The group of countries which are in a similar situation to that described by the hypothesis 
includes: Austria, France, Germany, Netherlands, Ireland and Great Britain. These countries are characterised by lower proceeds from 
taxes, a bit lower quality of public services and similar size of NOE compared with the Scandinavian countries.
At the other extreme, there are countries such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania. They are typically characterised by 
the large size of the shadow economy and the low share of proceeds from taxes and social contributions in GDP, which suggests that 
their situation can, to some extent, be explained by referring to the concept of B equilibrium. It is worth noting that irrespective of rela-
tively low tax and social insurance contributions rates, the extent of non-tax obligations in the above countries is considerable, which 
is evidenced by the high regulation and low corruption perception indices as well as by low positions in the “Doing Business” ranking 
published by the World Bank. The general burden relating to the running of a registered business activity and hiring employees legally 
is large, which discourages numerous entities from operating in the oﬃcial sector of the economy.
In the group of other European countries, which apart from Poland includes other countries in the CEE region, namely the Czech Re-
public, Hungary, Slovakia, Southern European countries – Greece, Slovenia, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Belgium (the only representative 
of the western part of the continent), particular index values are close to the average levels for Europe. This group is very heterogene-
ous and particular countries are characterised by diﬀerent combinations of the above-mentioned factors. The model proposed by 
Johnson et al. (1997) cannot describe the situation in these countries.
 
2.4. Individual factors
The decision to undertake undeclared work or employment often depends on, apart from the previously discussed factors, many other 
determinants which are often speciﬁc for a given individual and thus diﬃcult to measure. The motives of particular persons for starting 
work in NOE may diﬀer based on their education, labour market status or source of income. Persons with high professional qualiﬁca-
tions and a good labour market position are relatively less likely to undertake work in NOE and in particular work that is completely 
unoﬃcial. The fact of undertaking work in NOE may in such case be perceived as a professional degradation. This is so because work in 
the shadow economy usually consists in simple, low-skill and low-wage tasks, and for educated people even a temporary experience 
of this kind can have adverse eﬀect on later attempts at ﬁnding work that matches their competences. It seems that persons with 
higher professional qualiﬁcations tend to conceal some of their income from undeclared activities in the oﬃcial sector (e.g. working 
longer hours), which require the use of their qualiﬁcations and knowledge, whereas they are relatively less likely to get involved in work 
typical for NOE. One example of such activities is the provisions of medical services during or outside the oﬃcial working hours, which 
generated income that can be entirely concealed from the public authorities. Persons with lower professional qualiﬁcations turn to 
undeclared work in NOE much more frequently than better-educated people. There is an evident overrepresentation of people with 
vocational secondary or lower education among all people working in the black economy (according to the LFS module – in 2004, 
approximately 70 per cent). Another argument is the length of employment in NOE – the average duration of work in NOE in Poland 
in the period from January to September 2004 for people with vocational secondary or lower education amounted to almost 37 days, 
whereas for persons with post-secondary or higher education – 22 days.
The decision about selecting a job in the oﬃcial or informal sector of the economy may also depend on the quality and availability of 
labour-related social beneﬁts that can be obtained from the employer or from the social security system after a certain deﬁned and 
documented period of work in the oﬃcial sector. Existing theoretical studies show that higher levels of unemployment beneﬁts have 
an extensive inﬂuence on people searching and taking jobs in the oﬃcial economy (see, for instance, Fugazza, Jacques 2001). In this 
respect the connection between eligibility for unemployment beneﬁt, which compensates (at least partly) the income lost as a result 
of job loss, and the contributions paid in the past plays an important role. This means that in countries where the systems of unemploy-
ment insurance and of unemployment assistance operate side by side (e.g. Finland, Great Britain), and where certain groups of people 
are outside the obligation to prove a minimum period of insured work in the oﬃcial sector of the economy in order to become eligible 
for unemployment beneﬁt, the level of the above beneﬁts should not aﬀect the size of the shadow economy.
As indicated by Hanousek and Palda (2003), the impact of individual factors on the extent of tax evasion and of the shadow economy 
is not clear (see Box IV.3). The obtained high correlation between morality and tax evasion may result from reverse causation. A person 
who evades the payment of taxes may excuse his/her behaviour by stating that it does not go against his/her morals. On the other 
hand, a person who considers tax evasion as moral may evade the payment of taxes without any scruples. This means that the observa-
16 Higher regulations index value means greater extent of regulation. The higher the corruption perception index and the higher the “Doing Business” ranking, the smaller the extent of 
corruption and the more friendly the business environment.
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tions of certain signiﬁcant correlations between the fact of being employed in NOE or consuming goods or services generated in the 
shadow economy and such factors as morality or remorse does not necessarily have to imply that there is a causal relation between 
them.
 
Box IV.3. Social and individual perception of the black economy
The persistence of considerable size of black economy in particular countries is possible among others because there is a widespread 
acceptance of this type of activity. The fact of working within NOE often does not entail social ostracism and, what is more, the inclina-
tion of particular communities to cooperate with the authorities by reporting companies that employ unregistered workers is scarce. 
Consequently, undeclared work is associated with lower cost (among others, due to lower expected fines in case irregularities come 
to light) compared to the situation of non-acceptance of such practices. In the questionnaire survey carried out in Germany (Schne-
ider (2006)) as many as 2/3 of respondents considered the fact of participating in the shadow economy merely as a minor offence (in 
German, Kavalierdelikt).17 Moreover, less than one in ten respondents said that those working in the shadow economy should be pro-
secuted and that people should inform relevant authorities about all undeclared employees that they become aware of. In addition, 
only approx. 5 per cent of respondents acknowledged that a person working in NOE, if caught, should be severely punished.
The impact of individual attitudes and opinions of the close environment on tax evasion was described by Hanousek and Palda (2003). 
The analysis of results of survey studies conducted on a sample of approx. 1,500 Czechs and Slovaks evidenced that in the case of re-
spondents who come from circles where there is a firm disapproval of tax evasion practices, tax avoidance is rather rare. Moreover, the 
above research demonstrated a positive correlation between the inclination to avoid taxes and the perceived extent of this phenom-
enon in the closest environment. People who claimed that the degree of tax avoidance by others – both in the country and among 
acquaintances – is high, often failed to pay taxes themselves. Therefore, the fact that the perceived scale of the shadow economy goes 
down with frequency of tax evasion practices may effectively be due to moral factors. Persons convinced that only very few people 
in their circles avoid paying taxes are less likely to get involved in the shadow economy themselves. Notwithstanding the above, it is 
also possible that those who resort to fraudulent practices may excuse their own behaviour by pointing out that everybody in their 
environment does it.
 
3. Employment in the Shadow Economy in Poland
3.1. Introduction
The relatively most exhaustive source of information about undeclared work, revenues and expenditures relating to this phenomenon 
as well as about the social and economic features of persons who perform such work in Poland are the LFS module surveys. Until now, 
CSO carried out three surveys of this type: in August 1995, August 1998 and in the fourth quarter of 2004.
In the above-mentioned module surveys, undeclared work is deﬁned as work performed in the absence of a formal employment 
agreement between the employer and the employee, irrespective of sector (including natural persons and individual agricultural 
holdings), which cannot be performed as a result of nomination, appointment or election. Undeclared work does not entitle to social 
insurance beneﬁts. Employers do not deduct any taxes or SII or Labour Fund contributions and employees do not pay the personal 
income tax. The module surveys also took into consideration self-employment, if no relevant ﬁnancial obligations towards the state 
are fulﬁlled (e.g. taxes).
In principle, module surveys involve questions pertaining to three subject groups:
• opinions about undeclared work in Poland – expressed by people performing such work, people beneﬁting from such work 
 and people who know this phenomenon from observation only,
• performing undeclared work,
• using services oﬀered by people performing undeclared work.
The module surveys cover half of the sample used in LFS, i.e. it is limited to people involved in the latter survey for the second time and 
people involved in LFS for the fourth (and last) time. The reason behind the above was to minimise the risk of refusal to participate in 
the survey.
In 1995 and 1998, the samples included approx. 11,000 households, which gave a total number of more than 25,000 people 15 years 
old and over. In 2004, the survey sample included approx. 9,500 households, i.e. about 23,700 people. In all three cases, the response 
rate was very high taking into consideration their speciﬁc subject-matter. The share of provided answers amounted to 91.2 per cent 
in 1998 and 88.9 per cent in 2004 (compared with the number of people from all reference groups that responded to the basic LFS 
questionnaire). The share of refusals to participate in the survey amounted to 1.8 and 3 per cent respectively. In the remaining cases, 
missing answers were due to the fact that a given respondent was not available at home when the survey was conducted (it should be 
17 The results of the survey indicate that the Germans perceive stealing a newspaper from the letter box as a much more serious oﬀence.
178
Employment in Poland 2006                           Labour in Non-Observed Economy
    IV. 
18 Moreover, the employer is under the obligation to advise the employee in writing, not later than 7 days as from the conclusion of the employment agreement, about working time, salary 
payment schedule, paid leavetermination notice and, if the employer is not compelled to provide work regulations – about night time (work), place and time of wage payment  and the 
adopted methods of clocking in, conﬁrming attendance at work and excusing absences.
19 It is not possible to determine the number of people working in the shadow economy in particular months (due to the fact that some people undertook undeclared employment a couple 
of times). Therefore, the ﬁgures provided in the subsequent parts of this subchapter relate only to the ﬁrst eight months of 1994 and 1998 and to the ﬁrst nine months of 2004.
emphasised that, as opposed to the basic questionnaire study, questions included in the module questionnaire had to be answered in 
person). However, preliminary data analyses demonstrated that in the case of some questions – pertaining above all to income from 
undeclared work and to related expenses – there is a lot of missing information, i.e. more than 20 per cent in all studies.
The estimates of the number of people involved in undeclared work, as referred to in the subsequent part of this chapter, have been 
supplemented with the results of the Time Use Survey (TUS). The above study allows to determine the lower limit of estimates as to 
the size of the shadow economy among employees and their structure in terms of some basic social and economic characteristics. The 
TUS was conducted by CSO between June 2003 and May 2004, using a sample of more than 25,000 people 15 years old and over (out 
of whom more than 20,000 completed the questionnaires and time sheets), i.e. a sample similar to that of the LFS module.
Box IV.4. LFS module survey and TUS
Due to the specific nature of the LFS module survey, the characteristics of informal workers as well as of employers offering such work 
is deficient and subject to significant error. Therefore, the number of people declaring to work in NOE should be treated as a minimum 
value of the actual extent of the shadow economy in Poland. The above results from the fact that a certain proportion of respondents 
could have concealed their real status in the labour market. Moreover, LFS does not cover people who live in collective accommoda-
tion establishments (lodging-houses for employees, student hostels, boarding-schools, army barracks, houses for the poor and the old, 
etc.) or people staying abroad for more than 2 months. Another factor that argues for a cautious interpretation of data resulting from 
the module survey is the fact that it refers to the first eight – or nine in the 2004 study – months of the year, and that the answers to 
questions included in the module questionnaire were of retrospective nature. This means that the respondents answered questions 
relating to past activity in NOE, which is always subject to a certain error. Moreover, the comparability of data for 2004 with data from 
previous periods is limited due to changes in data collection methods (observation of the reference week in the middle month of the 
quarter has been replaced by continuous observation) as well as changes in the base of generalising the results to the entire popula-
tion as from 2003 (on the basis of the NPC 2002 data). Nevertheless, the LFS module conducted by CSO are the only such extensive 
research initiative pertaining to the phenomenon of undeclared work in Poland. Bearing in mind all deficiencies of this study, one 
can still derive therefrom some basic social and economic characteristics of informal workers, determine the lower bound of wage 
estimates, and establish some characteristics of shadow employers.
As opposed to the LFS module survey, TUS allows to determine the number of people working without a formal employment contract. 
Under Polish law, employment contracts must be in writing and, in case this written form requirement is not observed, the employer 
must confirm in writing all previous arrangements concerning the type and content of the agreement not later than on the day of 
commencement of work by the employee.18 The absence of such confirmation may suggest that the employee is engaged in undecla-
red work. TUS makes it possible to identify employees hired without a formal contract at the time when the survey was conducted. The 
above fact carries some consequences for the resulting estimates. The module survey provides a number of people who in the first 8-9 
months of the year have performed work within NOE, irrespective of whether they were in undeclared employment when surveyed 
or not. Therefore, relevant figures should be greater for the module survey than for TUS. Although the time use survey was conducted 
in the course of 12 months, it allows only to identify those working without a written contract in the week preceding the survey. For 
instance, a person who terminates or completes work in NOE at least 8 days before the study, is not considered a person participating 
in NOE. On the other hand, the module survey would regard such person as engaged in the shadow economy. What is more, answers 
to questions about the past are in principle imprecise. In view of the above, it is possibly that a person who was employed in NOE 
in January, simply does not recall this fact three quarters later and denies having participated in undeclared work. If this person was 
examined in January as part of TUS, s/he would probably be identified as a NOE participant. One of the deficiencies of TUS is the fact 
that it does not enable the identification of people carrying on unregistered business activity.
In accordance with the LFS module survey of 2004, approximately 1,317 people declared that they have been involved in undeclared 
work in the course of three quarters of that year. This is the lowest value, compared with the previous surveys which recorded approx. 
2,199 people engaged in NOE in 1995 and 1,431 people in 1998 (these values refer to the ﬁrst 8 months of the year).19 This means that 
about 7.6 per cent of over-15-year-olds were in undeclared employment in 1995, and 4.7 per cent and 4.2 per cent in 1998 and 2004 
respectively. A decreasing tendency in the number of informal workers is observable in all groups. In view of the above and taking into 
consideration the imperfect comparability of data for 2004 with data resulting from earlier surveys, all ﬁgures provided in the subse-
quent part of this subchapter are data for 2004, unless otherwise stated.
The TUS results indicate that in the second half of 2003 and in the ﬁrst half of 2004 there were 764,000 employees (541,000 men and 
223,000 women) on the main job in the shadow economy, which accounted for 5.1 per cent of the total employment. This number was 
close to that derived from the module survey, which identiﬁed 829,000 employees (505,000 men and 324,000 women) on the main job 
performing work in the shadow economy.
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3.2. Motives for undertaking undeclared work according to LFS module survey
In the LFS module survey, questions about undertaking undeclared work were directed to all respondents, irrespective of whether
a given person participated in undeclared work or not, or whether a given household beneﬁted from such work. Opinions on motives 
for undertaking undeclared work did not diﬀer considerably between people involved in NOE and persons who have never had any-
thing to do with it. Hence, information provided in the subsequent part of this chapter refer to the entire population.
.
In the years 1995 and 1998, among the most commonly indicated reasons for undertaking undeclared work there were insuﬃcient in-
come and lack of job opportunities, taxation of income, and higher wage oﬀers from employers. In total, in 1995 and in 1998, these 
factors accounted for 78.5 per cent of all responses. In 2004, the respondents also pointed to the above causes, however, in a diﬀerent 
frequency order positions. In 2004, the most common motive for undertaking undeclared work was the lack of job opportunities. Most 
probably this was a reﬂection of the diﬃcult situation in the Polish labour market at the beginning of this decade. What is more, in 2004, 
the answer patterns for two factors changed, namely for the amount of taxes and social insurance contributions. In 1995 and 1998, 
the respondents tended to point to high taxes as a motivation to conceal income (13.3 and 10.9 per cent respectively) and slightly 
less frequently to high social insurance contributions (8.8 and 9.4 per cent respectively). In 2004, the frequency order position for the 
above two factors was reversed. The respondents pointed to high social insurance contributions (12 per cent) more frequently than to 
high taxes (7.5 per cent). This shift can be attributed to the switch from net to a gross earnings concept which took place in 1999 and 
which consisted in dividing the payment of the mandatory social insurance contribution between the employer and the employee 
and in increasing the employee’s gross wage accordingly. Although this mechanism did not result in increased net wages, it was of 
considerable psychological signiﬁcance. Employees, who realised that certain social insurance obligations were paid from their gross 
wages, could have started perceiving these obligations as an additional and heavy burden, which, in accordance with their subjective 
perception lowered their potential net wage.
Table IV.4.
Motives for undertaking undeclared work in Poland (percentage share of all answers)20 
Source: Own calculation based on CSO 1996, CSO 1999, CSO 2005.  
The results of the LFS module survey indicate that, according to the subjective judgement of employees, labour taxation does not 
constitute the key motive for undertaking undeclared work. In all three surveys, high taxes and high social insurance contributions 
accounted for approximately 19.5-22 per cent of all answers, which, in view of the possibility of selecting multiple answers, is not
a considerable share. On the other hand the general presentation of other motives in the questionnaire does not allow to establish 
ﬁrmly whether such causes as insuﬃcient income and the lack of employment opportunities do not result indirectly from taxation.
 
3.3 Undeclared work versus real status in the labour market
The construction of the module survey of 1995 and 1998 makes it possible to determine the actual labour market status of people 
engaged in the shadow economy in August of a given year by referring to the basic LFS survey. The above surveys included a question 
about the performance of undeclared work also in the month when the survey was conducted (i.e. in August) and thus it was possible 
to indicate the labour market status (according to the basic LFS survey) of informal workers. In 1998, approximately 60 per cent of 
people involved in undeclared work was classiﬁed in the basic LFS survey as employed, whereas approximately 18 per cent as unem-
ployed. This means that approximately 5.5 per cent of the working population (according to LFS) is involved in undeclared work in the 
main and/or additional job. Moreover, some 14.6 per cent of the unemployed and 2.4 per cent of the economically inactive engage 
in work in NOE. If the number of the working unemployed and the working inactive was included in the total number of the working 
population, the value of the employment rate would increase by 1.9 pp., whereas the unemployment rate would decrease by 1.7 pp. 
20 The values for particular years may not add up to 100 per cent because refusals to answers and other answers were left out.
Motives
insuﬃcient income
lack of job opportunities
taxes discouraging to declare income
employer oﬀers higher wages on condition that work is undeclared
high social insurance contributions
potential loss of some beneﬁts in the case of performing declared work
family or life situation (taking care of one’s child, state of health, event in life, etc.)
reluctance to lastingly bind oneself to one work place
1995
34.7
21.5
13.3
8.9
8.8
5.7
4.8
0.7
1998
33.6
23.3
10.9
10.6
9.4
5.3
4.5
0.9
2004
26.5
36.0
7.5
10.3
12.0
4.3
3.2
0.3
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In 2004, the module survey was carried out in the fourth quarter and the questions pertaining to undeclared work referred to the ﬁrst 
three quarters of the year. In view of the above, it is very diﬃcult to ﬁrmly establish the labour market status of people engaged in 
undeclared work. This is so because ﬂows between diﬀerent status groups (in particular age and education groups) of the respondents 
should also be taken into account. Leaving these ﬂows aside, in 2004, approximately 50 per cent of informal workers were classiﬁed in 
the basic LFS survey as working people, 30 per cent – as unemployed, and 20 per cent – as economically inactive. The above values 
reﬂect the situation in the labour market as of the fourth quarter of 2004, i.e. not at the time when undeclared work was performed. In 
view of the aforementioned, the values are only approximate and they may diﬀer considerably from the actual labour market status of 
those involved in undeclared work at the time of its actual performance.
 
3.4. Characteristics of people involved in undeclared work by age 
In 2004, according to the LFS module survey, an average of 4.2 per cent of over-15-year-olds was involved in undeclared work. Most 
frequently, this type of work is performed by people at the age of the highest participation rates i.e. those aged 25-44. In 1995, these 
people constituted more than half of all people engaged in undeclared work. This share was declining in the subsequent surveys and 
in 2004 it reached the level of 46 per cent. Marginal involvement in undeclared work can be observed among the elderly (aged 60+), 
which reﬂects the generally very low participation in this age group.21 
The level of involvement of young people (aged 15-24) in undeclared work is considerable. In 2004, this group accounted for more 
than 20 per cent of all people declaring their participation in undeclared work as well as 4.8 per cent of the total population in this age 
group. Interestingly enough young people undertake undeclared work relatively more frequently than older people (at the age of 45 
and more). As for the oﬃcial sector of the economy, it is young people who have lower employment rates compared with older people, 
whereas in NOE these rates are the same or higher for the young.
Table IV.5.
Structure of the population of informal workers by age (percentages)
Source: Own calculations based on CSO 1996, CSO 1999, CSO 2005.
The highest shadow employment rate22 was recorded in 1995 and it amounted to 7.6 per cent. In the subsequent survey periods, it 
was declining until it reached the level of 4.2 per cent in 2004. This tendency is typical for all age groups, apart from people aged 45-59.
As presented in Chart IV.3., the latter group is the only group which saw a (slight) increase in the above-mentioned indicator compared 
with 1998. In absolute terms, it is also the only group where the number of people declaring their involvement in the shadow economy 
had not changed signiﬁcantly compared with 1995.
Chart IV.3.
Shadow employment rate by age groups in 1995, 1998 and 2004 (percentages)
 
Source: Own calculations based on CSO 1996, CSO 1999, CSO 2005.
21 In 1995, the participation rate for over-60-year-olds was at the level of 16 per cent and it decreased to 9 per cent in 2004.
22 Shadow employment rate represents persons in shadow employment as a percentage of the total population.
age
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-59
60+
1995
22.4
25.5
26.9
17.6
7.6
1998
23.1
22.2
26.8
21.4
6.4
2004
20.5
24.4
22.0
29.2
3.9
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The TUS results provide a similar age characteristics of employees working in the shadow economy. Undeclared employment con-
stitutes the largest problem in the youngest age group. Although the share of people aged 15-24 involved in the black economy in 
the total number of informal employees is smaller than that of people aged 25-34, however, the smaller share of the former group is 
due to lower probability of participation and engagement in work in general. In the age group 15-24, approximately 16.7 per cent of 
employees used to work without a written employment contract, compared with 7.2 per cent for the total population. About a half 
of them were in education at that time (in the overall population of people aged 15-24 it was 77 per cent), and a quarter did tetriary 
education courses and postgraduate university courses.
Chart IV.4. 
Shadow employment rate (left axis) and the share of informal employees in the total population of employees (right axis) by age groups 
(percentages)
 
The employment rate pertains only to employees.
Source: Own calculations based on TUS.
When entering the labour market, young people ﬁnd themselves in a relatively diﬃcult situation compared with the rest of the popu-
lation. It can be observed that in the LFS module survey of 2004 young people tended to indicate the lack of job opportunities in the 
oﬃcial sector as the key reason for shadow employment. Diﬃculties in ﬁnding a job result from the lack of work experience and the 
unidentiﬁed level of their professional qualiﬁcations.23 As a rule, these people, and in particular people with low qualiﬁcations, lack 
bargaining power in negotiations with potential employers. Moreover, average wage that employers are willing to oﬀer to people 
entering the labour market is lower than the average wage in the economy.24 Hence, low wages as well as employers’ reluctance to 
employ people without prior work experience may force young people into the black economy.
Another interesting ﬁnding is that the proportion of elderly workers hired in the shadow economy in the total number of employees 
aged 60+ is larger than average.25 This fact may result from two things: ﬁrstly, for elderly people the lack of retirement, pension and 
social insurances is of lesser signiﬁcance than for other age groups which may regard the above as a factor that discourages from 
engaging in undeclared work. The elderly, who already receive old-age pension are not inclined to pay social insurance contributions 
and thus, they are relatively more likely to decide to undertake undeclared work. Secondly, for people who decide to retire early (and 
thus receive early retirement beneﬁts) the fact of engaging in oﬃcial work may result in the reduction of retirement beneﬁts. In line 
with the provisions of the Act on retirement and pension beneﬁts from the Social Insurance Fund (FUS), retirement pay is reduced, if 
the gross wage exceeds 70 per cent of the average wage in the economy, and suspended, if the gross wage exceeds 130 per cent of 
the above ﬁgure.
3.5. People involved in undeclared work by education and work type
In general, work in the shadow economy is commonly thought to be dominated by people with low professional qualiﬁcations and 
low level of nominal education. This claim is supported by the ﬁndings of the LFS module survey and of TUS. According to the module 
survey, approx. 70 per cent of all people declaring their participation in undeclared work are people with at most basic vocational 
23 The analysis of the situation of young people in other EU and OECD member states proves that the rate of unemployment for young people is usually twice higher – or even more than 
that – than the average unemployment rate in a particular country. The situation of young people in the labour market has been discussed in greater detail in Bukowski et. al (2005).
24 In October 2004, the average wage of people aged 15-24 amounted to approx. 60 per cent of the average wage in the economy. In view of the currently applicable regulations, employers 
can employ a young person for wage amounting to 80 per cent of the minimum wage in the ﬁrst year of such person’s employment (Act dated 10 October 2002 on minimum wage; Journal 
of Laws No. 200, item 1679, as amended). This means that in 2004 the minimum gross wage of a young person could amount to PLN 659.20, whereas the net wage to as little as PLN 497.
25 In view of the rather low sample size used in the calculation of this indicator, the presented result should be treated with a degree of caution.
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education. This pertains above all to men, for whom this proportion amounted to 75 per cent in 2004, thus reaching the level which 
was higher by almost 17 percentage points than the analogous share for women. An opposite situation can be observed in the case of 
people with tertiary and post-secondary education. In this group women were more likely to turn to undeclared work, which can be 
associated with the fact that they are statistically better educated than men. This argument is conﬁrmed by the absence of signiﬁcant 
diﬀerences in the levels of employment rates by gender.
Table IV.6.
Structure of the population of informal workers by level of education (percentages)
Source: Own calculation based on CSO 1996, CSO 1999, CSO 2005.
In 2004, the shadow employment rate for people with basic vocational education amounted to 5.2 per cent. After eliminating the 
youngest group who are still in education, the employment rate increases slightly (by mere 0.2 percentage point). As demonstrated in 
Chart IV.5., the group of people with basic vocational education is typically characterised by the highest shadow employment rates.
Similar results were obtained in TUS – undeclared work is most widespread among people with low level of education. The largest 
group of people employed without formal employment contract consists of people with at most lower secondary education (20.7 per 
cent of all employees in this education group). In the group of employees with basic vocational education almost one in ten had been 
employed in the informal sector of the economy. It can be reasonably concluded that the higher the level of education, the lower the 
share of employment in the shadow economy.
Chart IV.5
Shadow employment rate in 2004 by age groups and level of education
 
Source: Own calculations based on CSO data.
The informal sector of the economy demands above all low-qualiﬁed work – in all module surveys, the respondents pointed most 
frequently to gardening and agricultural services, construction and installation services, neighbour services, renovation and repair 
services. The share of people providing the above-mentioned types of services oscillated between 63 per cent (in 1995 and in 2004) 
and 71 per cent (in 1998). On the other hand, the share of people providing high-qualiﬁed work amounted to 6-7 per cent of all people 
involved in undeclared work. High-qualiﬁed work was deemed to include private tuition and translation, medical and nursing services, 
accounting and legal advisory services. The above services are provided almost exclusively by people with at least higher secondary 
education.
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Table IV.7. 
Frequency of informal work by type of activity in 1995, 1998, 2004 (percentages)
Source: Own calculations based on CSO 1996, CSO 1999, CSO 2005.
It should be noted that, according to the 1995 and 1998 surveys, only people with higher secondary (vocational and general) edu-
cation were engaged in all types of services examined as part of the undeclared work survey. Moreover, this group of people most 
frequently provided gardening and agricultural services, neighbour services, construction and installation services and were involved 
in trade. People with at most basic vocational education undertook above all gardening and agricultural services, neighbour services, 
construction and installation services as well as renovations and repair services.
3.6. Spatial diversity of undeclared work
In accordance with the LFS module survey, the share of undeclared workers is similar for those living in rural areas and for those living 
in towns. Nevertheless, considering the degree of urbanisation of the country, it is the population of rural areas that is more likely 
to engage in work in NOE. This relationship is valid for any age, gender, or education group. The above argument is reﬂected in the 
frequency of undertaking gardening and agricultural tasks by people working in the shadow economy. As indicated in the previous 
subchapter, in all three surveys the share of this work category was the largest. Moreover, the LFS module survey of 2004 allows to 
identify types of work performed as part of neighbour services. As for neighbour services, gardening and agricultural tasks dominated 
this category with a great majority share of more than 62 per cent, thus increasing the total share of all people engaging in this type 
of activity within NOE to 31.8 per cent.
The size of the place of residence is a variable that is of smaller importance than age or level of education when it comes to explain-
ing propensity to work in NOE. In 2004, participation in the shadow economy was least popular in medium-size towns (50,000-99,999 
inhabitants). Undeclared work attracted above all the inhabitants of rural areas and of small towns (up to 50,000 inhabitants) – in 2004, 
almost 73 per cent of all people involved in NOE came from these areas. What is more, rural areas and small towns saw the highest 
shadow employment rates which amounted to 5.4 and 4.5 per cent respectively.
The TUS results suggest that shadow employment rates (without self-employed) vary even less with the size of the place of residence. 
The largest extent of unregistered work can be observed in rural areas. One out of ten employees living in a rural area had been em-
ployed without a formal contract, whereas in large cities (more than 500,000) the share of NOE amounted to 6.8 per cent (similar results 
were obtained for other towns).
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Chart IV.6.
People engaged in unregistered work – left axis (thousands) and the shadow employment rate – right axis (percentages) by size of the 
place of residence in 2004
 
Source: Own calculations based on CSO data.
Greater concentration of black economy in rural areas may have to do with two factors, namely higher participation of people living in 
rural areas in the oﬃcial economy and the nature of performed work, including above all low-qualiﬁcation tasks. In 2004, 48 per cent 
of all people living in rural areas provided gardening and agricultural services, including neighbour services.
The results of the module survey on undeclared work of 2004 do not allow to determine the degree of regional diﬀerentiation in un-
registered work intensity. In earlier surveys, spatial diversity of undeclared work was presented at the level of macroregions.26 
Chart IV.7.
Relation between shadow employment rates in NOE in particular macroregions and the overall shadow employment rate in NOE for 
Poland (percentages)
 
Source: Own calculations base on CSO 1996, CSO 1999.
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26 It should be borne in mind that the ﬁrst two surveys were conducted at the time when the territorial division of the country into 49 voivodeships was still in place. In view of the above, 
the regional analysis of involvement in undeclared work has been presented for 9 (1995) and 10 (1998) macroregions. Data derived from the 2004 survey have not been included in the 
regional analysis.
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According to both surveys, the greatest concentration of unregistered work, as presented in Chart IV.7., was recorded in the voivode-
ships of northern and north-eastern Poland and pertained to the following macroregions: north-eastern, central-eastern and north-
ern (in 1998 divided into northern and north-western macroregions).27 Moreover, in 1995, above-average concentration of unregis-
tered work was observed in the capital and its surrounding areas.
3.7. People involved in the shadow economy by occupation and economic activity
Considering the types of work performed in NOE as well as the level of education of people engaging in their performance, it can be 
reasonably assumed that a considerable proportion of people work in occupations that do not require high professional qualiﬁca-
tions. The analysis of data from the LFS module survey indicates that in 2004 approx. 85 per cent of people involved in unregistered 
work, who were classiﬁed as employed in the basic LFS survey, worked in the following groups of occupations:
• service workers and shop and market sales workers,
• skilled agricultural and ﬁshery workers,
• craft and related trades workers,
• plant and machine operators and assemblers,
• elementary occupations.
The above estimate is incomplete and therefore it mirrors only the nature and not the scale of the phenomenon. This is so because 
it only refers to working people, who are asked in the basic LFS survey about their occupations. Moreover, this information refers to 
the IV quarter of 2004, whereas the questions about unregistered work included in the module survey refer to quarters I-III of the year. 
Therefore, a more precise description of the structure of unregistered work by occupation could be generated from individual data 
after taking into account the scale of ﬂows between labour market status groups and between large occupational groups.
As opposed to the LFS module survey, TUS enables to establish a more precise description of the occupational proﬁle of people work-
ing without formal employment contracts. The analysis of data indicates that the problem of unregistered work touches above all low-
qualiﬁcation manual workers, whereas it is less signiﬁcant in the case of people with higher qualiﬁcations (specialists), people involved 
in oﬃce work, and it is virtually non-existent in the case of people in managerial positions. According to TUS, the share of the above-
mentioned groups in the total number of people working in the black economy amounted by nearly 90 per cent, i.e. it reached the 
level similar to that resulting from the LFS module survey. In the period from June 2003 to May 2004, craft and related trades workers, 
with construction workers constituting the majority,28 accounted for approx. 1/3 of all people working in the clandestine economy. 
Elementary occupations constituted another large group, including mining and construction labourers, who accounted for 30 per 
cent of the group population (it is highly probable that, in view of the small extent of black economy in mining, this group mainly con-
sists of construction workers29), agricultural labourers (27 per cent), domestic and related helpers, cleaners and launderers (18 per 
cent). Moreover, service and sales workers were also numerous in terms of involvement in unregistered work. Drivers of motor vehicles 
accounted for 60 per cent of all informally employed plant and machine operators and assemblers.
The share of informal employees was largest in elementary occupations. It should be emphasised that people involved in NOE ac-
counted for more than a half of all mining and construction labourers as well as agricultural labourers. In the group of craft and related 
trades workers, approximately one in ten employees did not have a formal employment contract. In the case of extraction and build-
ing trades workers, this share amounted to approx. 25 per cent. In the group including service and sales workers, the highest share of 
people working in NOE was recorded for personal care workers (21 per cent), whereas only 5.5 per cent of all car drivers worked in the 
shadow economy.
 
27 The capital city macroregion covers the following former voivodeships: ciechanowskie, ostrołęckie, radomskie, siedleckie, warszawskie; the north-eastern macroregion: białostockie, 
łomżyńskie, olsztyńskie, suwalskie, the northern macroeregion: elbląskie, gdańskie, słupskie, the north-western macroregion: gorzowskie, koszalińskie, szczecińskie, the southern 
macroregion: bielskie, częstochowskie, katowickie, opolskie, the south-eastern macroregion: kieleckie, krakowskie, krośnieńskie, nowosądeckie, przemyskie, rzeszowskie, tarnobrzeskie, 
tarnowskie, the central-eastern macroregion: bialskopodlaskie, chełmskie, lubelskie, zamojskie, the central macroregion: łódzkie, piotrkowskie, płockie, sieradzkie, skierniewickie, the 
central-western macreoregion: bydgoskie, kaliskie konińskie, leszczyńskie, pilskie, poznańskie, toruńskie, włocławskie, the south-western macroregion: jeleniogórskie, legnickie, wałbrzyskie, 
wrocławskie, zielonogórskie. In 1995, the northern and north-western macroregions constituted one macroregion, namely the northern macroregion.
28 Other professions that were relatively well-represented were wood treaters (11 per cent), mechanics (7.5 per cent), people employed in the textile industry and in apparel production 
(6.4 per cent).
29 The ratio of the number of employees in NOE in the mining sector to the number of people employed illegally in the construction sector is 1:7.
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Table IV.8.
Structure of the population of informal workers by occupation.
Source: Own calculations based on TUS data.
The type of performed unregistered work points indirectly to sectors where it is performed most frequently. According to TUS, the 
largest group of people involved in undeclared work consisted of those employed in the construction sector and in the simple servi-
ces sector.30 Their share in the total number of people involved in NOE amounted to 29.5 and 22.4 per cent respectively. It should be 
noted that in the construction sector, more than one in ﬁve employees ended up working in the shadow economy.31 As for simple 
services, the share of people working without a formal contract amounted to 5.6 per cent.32 What is more, a considerable proportion 
of people engaged in unregistered work were employed in agriculture (14.3 per cent) and in industry (15.6 per cent), where the latter 
included above all workers in manufacturing.33
Chart IV.8.
Structure of the population of informal employees (percentages) (left axis) and the share of informal employees (percentages) (right 
axis) by economic activity 
Source: Own calculations based on TUS data.
The problem of unregistered work largely touches people working part-time. About 54 per cent out of all employees working without 
a formal employment contract performed part-time work, whereas this share in the overall population of employees amounted to 12 
per cent. The share of people working part-time was highest for the oldest age groups (55+), where it amounted to approx. 90 per cent, 
and the lowest for the age group 25-34 (37.7 per cent). For young people aged 15-24, this share reached 57.7 per cent. One in three 
part-time employees worked in the black economy.
30 NACE branches G to I.
31 This percentage share was the highest in the 15-24 age group (34.5 per cent).
32 The highest share of unregistered employees was recorded in the section “Hotels and restaurants” – 14 per cent. This was mainly due to the large extent of the shadow economy among 
young people working in this section (35.3 per cent involved in the black economy).
33 As for the relative signiﬁcance of the shadow economy, the section “Activities of households” stood out because 34,000 of 43,000 employees in this section were involved in unregistered 
work (TUS data). 
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A considerable part of cost of legal employment is a ﬁxed cost – invariant with work time and wage. The cost consists of time or expen-
ses (in the case of outsourcing) relating, among others, to registering an employee with social insurance and tax authorities, and to de-
ducting taxes and contributions. Therefore, as the number of hours worked decreases, the hourly cost of formal employment relatively 
increases. Hence, in the case of part-time work, motives in favour of employing workers without registering are stronger.
3.8.Work in the shadow economy in the main and additional job
From the point of view of the labour market, it is important whether work in the shadow economy constitutes the principal economic 
activity or whether it is treated as additional one and it does not constitute the principal source of income or of a considerable part 
thereof. The LFS module survey allows to determine the nature of the recently undertaken unregistered work, its frequency and
duration.
In accordance with the LFS module survey, in 1995 and 1998, the nature of unregistered work was above all additional. In those years, 
respectively 56.5 and 53.7 per cent of respondents combined unregistered employment with legal employment. In 2004, only 37 per 
cent of respondents declaring participation in the black economy considered their undeclared work additional. This means that in 
2004 for a majority of people involved in the black economy unregistered work was the main job. This is supported by the fact that 
in 2004, as opposed to the previous surveys, unregistered work was delivered once a month. In 1995 and 1998, approximately 65-66 
per cent of people engaged in undeclared work a number of times every month, in 2004, this share decreased to 3.8 per cent. The 
two above-mentioned processes were accompanied by an extension of an average duration of unregistered jobs during the surveyed 
period (eight/nine months) from 20 days in 1995 and 24 days in 1998 to 35 days in 2004. In the period 1995-2004, the number of peo-
ple engaging in undeclared work for a period longer than 60 days almost trebled. The above-mentioned changes could have been 
due to the general situation in the Polish labour market at the beginning of the 21st century. Harsh labour market conditions which 
manifested themselves in very high unemployment rates as well as in considerable diﬃculties in ﬁnding employment could not have 
been without any impact on the nature of unregistered work. What is more, this situation could have caused a proportion of people 
experiencing problems with ﬁnding an oﬃcial job to undertake permanent unregistered work. In 2004, the most commonly cited mo-
tive for engaging in unregistered work was exactly the lack of job opportunities. The share of answers pointing this cause increased by 
approx. 10 percentage points compared with the earlier surveys. Moreover, during this period, employment in the shadow economy 
lost the typical features of this form of economic activity, namely short period of work, occasionality and impermanence of the work 
relationship. As demonstrated in Box IV.5, undeclared work may be procyclical. Therefore the economic slowdown of the beginning 
of this century with all its consequences in the labour market was reﬂected in increased stability of unregistered work. Moreover, the 
slump in employment levels in the oﬃcial sector of the economy translated into the decrease in shadow employment. Although the 
data collection period was extended in 2004 from eight to nine months, the number of people declaring their participation in unreg-
istered work went down by approx. 8 per cent compared with 1998.
For women and town dwellers, unregistered work was more frequently the main job. Women, who are statistically less likely to engage 
in unregistered work than men, tend not to combine it with registered employment. A similar situation occurs in the case of town 
dwellers for whom – according to all surveys – unregistered work was above all their main job (only in 1995, the share of informal 
workers in the main job amounted to 50 per cent). This means that although men and people from rural areas are characterised by 
higher probability of shadow employment, in their case unregistered work typically constitutes an additional job which provides 
extra income on top of income from oﬃcial employment.
Unregistered work as the main job is a typical form of employment for young people. In the 2004 module survey, approx. 78 per 
cent of the young population engaged in unregistered work pointed to this form of employment. Considering that the employment 
rate in the oﬃcial sector of the economy is low (in 2004, it amounted to 20 per cent), it can be assumed that the exclusive engagement 
in undeclared work is widespread in this group. In accordance with the basic LFS survey, in 2004, the share of young people engaged 
in unregistered work on the main job in the total working population amounted to 19.3 per cent. For older age groups, this indicator 
came to approx. 5 percent.34 
Similarly to age, the probability of engaging in unregistered work on the main job also varies with the level of education. In fact, the 
higher the level of education, the more often unregistered work is an additional occupation. In 2004, people with tertiary and post-
secondary education constituted the only group for which unregistered work was above all an additional occupation, whereas in the 
case of all other groups it constitutes the main job.
In accordance with TUS, there were 103,500 informal employees in an additional job and almost all of them were employed oﬃcially 
on the main job. Therefore, people performing an additional job without a formal employment contract constitute a separate category 
(from the one mentioned above) of shadow employees. The above ﬁgure is much lower than the number of people engaged in unreg-
istered work as an additional occupation, as identiﬁed in the above-discussed module survey. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind 
34 This measure reﬂects only an approximate scale of the phenomenon because a proportion of people involved in undeclared work – also in the main job – is classiﬁed in the basic LFS 
survey as employed, which results in referring to the same people in the denominator and in the numerator. 
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that the questions included in the module survey asked about the fact of involvement in NOE throughout the period of eight/nine 
months, whereas TUS asked about the fact of performing an additional job at the time of the survey. Moreover, in TUS, the group of 
people performing an additional job is strongly underrepresented. In TUS it includes 337,000 people, whereas only in the 1st quarter of 
2004, LFS identiﬁed more than three times more people belonging to this group.35
Box IV.5. Undeclared work and the business cycle in Italy
When analysing the role of the shadow economy in the economy, the question of the cyclical nature of NOE can hardly be neglected. 
One significant drawback in the empirical verification of the hypothesis about the acyclical, anticyclical or procyclical nature of unreg-
istered employment is the absence of sufficiently long and reliable time series. Italy is an exception in the above respect as the Italian 
statistical office – ISTAT – published data on the extent of employment in NOE throughout a period of more than 20 years (1980-2002). 
These statistics were used, for instance, by Bovi (2006) who conducted an econometric study on changes in unregistered employment 
in the course of an economic cycle in Italy. Although due to the low frequency of available data as well as modest sample size the 
results of this study should be treated with a certain caution, it surely allows to form some view on the nature of NOE. 
In his article, Bovi divides labour into three components: registered workers, self-employed workers and unregistered workers, and 
then he examines the correlation between the above-mentioned aggregates and the size of the GDP gap in Italy.36 The key conclu-
sions from the study are as follows:
• shadow employment is procyclical and there is a instantaneous causality between the GDP gap and unregistered work
 (however, there is no Granger causality);
• number of employees in the official sector behaves in a procyclical manner but its adjustment to the GDP gap occurs with
 a delay that exceeds one year (Granger causality from GDP to official employment);
• no clear correlation between the number of self-employed and the GDP gap in the course of an economic cycle.
There is no rigidity connected with the adjustment of the number of employees and the amount of hours worked in the unofficial 
economy. Therefore companies may react immediately to the improving (deteriorating) economic conditions with an increase (de-
crease) in undeclared employment. Moreover, in view of the repressive measures undertaken by the state, there exists a certain limit 
to the increase in unregistered employment. Thus, the number of people engaged in the shadow economy increases until it reaches 
a certain level and than remains relatively stable. Hence, there is no correlation between the shadow economy and the lagged GDP 
gap. On the other hand, the fact of employing a worker on the basis of a formal contract incurs much greater cost, whereas the fact 
of dismissing a worker may necessitate the payment of a considerable severance pay. Therefore, when making decisions on hiring a 
worker, enterprises that go for registered work are bound to take into account – to a much greater extent than companies operating 
in NOE – the future size of the GDP gap. It is only after they establish that the economic revival is of a lasting nature, and thus that the 
expected demand for goods and services can be reasonably assumed to remain high, that they may want to increase employment. 
As for self-employment, it is similar to work in the shadow economy because the cost of employment partly shifts to the employee 
(among others, the cost of time spent on registering a business activity as well as calculating and deducting taxes and social insurance 
contributions) and there is no severance pay obligation with respect to dismissed employees. The acyclical nature of self-employment, 
as demonstrated by Bovi, may be due to the fact that unregistered work assumes the role of this form of employment as an instrument 
that enables an immediate adjustment of the labour input in response to economic shocks.
As opposed to the module survey, TUS makes it possible to describe the characteristics of the group of people who undertake ad-
ditional employment in NOE and to compare it with other employees who decide to engage in additional work. One in three people 
performing an additional job did not have a formal employment contract. Men accounted for approximately 2/3 of people engaged in 
unregistered work (exactly the same result was derived from the module survey). The largest share of people working without formal 
contract in the total population of people performing an additional job can be observed in the youngest population where it amount-
ed to 75 per cent. This is reﬂected also in the high value of this share for people with at most lower secondary education. People with 
tertiary and post-secondary education also make up a large group of people with an additional job in NOE, which is a consequence of 
greater inclination of better-educated people towards taking up additional jobs. The reason for this is that for better-educated people 
the price of leisure is higher than for worse-educated people, and that the former dispose of a wider range of skills that they can oﬀer. 
Another reason for this state of things is that people of this proﬁle are overrepresented in the TUS sample. The share of people working 
in NOE in the total number of the population performing an additional job in this group does not exceed 16 per cent which is much 
lower than the average for the total population of people working multiple jobs. Thus, similarly to shadow employees on the main job, 
it can be stated that the problem of employment in NOE aﬀects well-educated people only marginally.
35 Moreover, the fact of underrepresentation of this group may distort the results. If it was not random, e.g. if there was a greater probability of not including young people who 
perform an additional job in the TUS sample, the statistics and sampling distributions presented below would be biased estimators of the statistics and distributions in the population. 
With TUS, we might actually be facing this sort of problem. This is so because compared with LFS, the share of people with university degrees in the total number of people 
performing an additional job is higher by approx. 15 percentage points. This ﬁnding has been taken into account when analysing the employment structure by level of education.
36 Bovi examines the presence for Granger causality and instantaneous causality (Geweke test) using bivariate VAR analysis (labour input component, GDP gap).
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Box IV.6. Paid assistance
Apart from employees involved in regular unregistered work, TUS allows also to identify people who provide other household with 
small services for a consideration. With a degree of certainty, we can establish that such activities are usually unregistered due to low 
profitability. Moreover, the probability of such activites being detected by tax or control authorities is low.
Within the four weeks preceding the survey, 506,000 people provided small services to other households in return for a consideration. 
What is more, for one person in four it had been one-time assistance, whereas for more than a half such assistance had been provided 
on average less frequently than once a week. Only 17 per cent of the above group had been providing such services on average more 
frequently than twice a week. Thus, the performance of this type of work is above all of casual nature. The structure of the discussed 
group by gender, age and level of education is very similar to the structure of NOE workers, as derived from the module survey.
Chart IV.9:
Structure of people providing small services for a consideration by age and level of education
 
 
Source: Own calculation based on TUS data.
The population of people providing small services was dominated by men (their share amounted to approx. 2/3), although, com-
pared with women, they provided them sporadically (on average less frequently than once a week). As for types of provided services, 
they included above all construction and renovation services, gardening services (mainly men), baby-sitting and care for elderly or 
ill (mainly women), and cleaning services. At the time of the survey, people classified as employed accounted for 42 per cent of the 
population providing paid assistance, and the unemployed and inactive – 20 and 38 per cent respectively. Almost 1/3 of employees 
providing small services were employed without a formal employment contract, and they engaged mainly in construction and reno-
vation services as well as in vehicle-related services. The examined group overlaps only to some extent with the population of informal 
employees, as identified in this subchapter, and the provision of small services constitutes the (additional) source of income also for 
those working in the official sector of the economy as well as for the unemployed and inactive.
The largest group involved in providing small services consists of young people aged 15-24. Considering the relatively small inclina-
tion of this group for any economic activity, it can be stated that, similarly to employees, the problem of participation in the black 
economy concerns above all those who enter the labour market for the first time. Almost 3/4 of the young population providing small 
services were still in school education. This fact was reflected in the high share of people with lower secondary and lower education in 
the population of small service providers. Another, equally numerous, group was made up of people with basic vocational education 
who had the highest share of small service providers of all groups. This share was similar for the group with tertiary and post-secondary 
education and the group with secondary education. It should be noted that in the group of people with secondary and tertiary educa-
tion paid assistance was provided on a more systematic basis (the share of people providing small services on average less frequently 
than once a week was lower than in other groups). As for types of services provided, these people are likely to engage in baby-sitting 
and private tuition, i.e. tasks which in principle are not incidental. Although people aged 60+ constitute the least numerous group 
when in comes to providing small services, this form of money-making is in their case of greater importance than in the case of people 
aged 25-59. The elderly exhibit a marginal inclination towards taking up any job and if they nevertheless do engage in employment, 
they tend to opt for the provision of small services for a consideration.
3.9. Income from work in the shadow economy
It is very diﬃcult to make judgements about wages of informal employees. All attempts at comparing the average wage in the oﬃcial 
and black economies provide a rather distorted picture due to diﬀerent sectoral structures of these two parts of the economy and 
what comes with it due to diﬀerent structures in terms of occupation and level of education. As mentioned above, people employed 
in NOE are usually low-qualiﬁed which is the reason for the average wage in NOE being generally lower. Moreover, any comparison of 
wages between people with the same level of education and belonging to the same occupational group (at the second level of desag-
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gregation), taking into account number of hours worked, is bound to lead to the conclusion that net wages in the oﬃcial economy are 
slightly higher than in NOE. The more the analysed groups are alike in terms of occupational structure and education, the smaller the 
diﬀerence in average wage. The main reason for this is that people involved in unregistered work have more motivation to understate 
their income. This claim is supported by the low amounts of income declared in the LFS module survey. Moreover, shadow workers 
who are well paid tend to either avoid providing information about their income or conceal some of it, thus lowering the estimates for 
relevant average values in the population. What is more, it is scarcely probable for such a large proportion of people to declare their 
readiness to work in NOE for a net pay which does not exceed that of a person working in the same profession and having the same 
level of education in the oﬃcial economy. If net wages are identical in the two sectors, it is more beneﬁcial for employees to under-
take work on the basis of a formal employment contract because they not only get the same wage but they also acquire the right to 
social insurance. Notwithstanding the above, the ratio of the average wage for unregistered work to the average wage in the oﬃcial 
economy or the minimum wage allows to compare the purchasing power of income from unregistered work for particular years.
The LFS module survey on undeclared work makes it possible to determine the lower bound of estimates for income derived from 
undeclared employment and it is the only survey which allows to observe how these values evolved in time. Nonetheless, these data 
refer only to income from the recently performed work and they do not cover income from all jobs performed throughout the year. 
Moreover, the available ﬁgures are only declarations of the respondents and, as they pertain to past events, they may be subject to 
signiﬁcant distortions.
In gross terms, between 1995 and 2004, the average income derived from unregistered work increased more than twofold from PLN 
172 to PLN 392. However, if we refer these ﬁgures to the average wage in a given year, we may well observe that income from unreg-
istered work oscillated around the level of 35-40 per cent of the net average wage, as estimated from LFS.37 The average income from 
undeclared work amounted to 78.2 per cent of the net minimum wage in 1995, 68.1 per cent in 1998 and 65.1 per cent in 2004. These 
ﬁgures were a consequence of a more rapid growth of the real minimum wage in relation to real income from unregistered work.
The average wage for unregistered work, similarly to the oﬃcial sector, is lower for women than it is for men. For women, this amount 
oscillated around the level of 35 per cent of the average wage obtained by women in the oﬃcial sector, whereas for men it amounted 
to more than 41 per cent. This means that gender pay gap in NOE is greater than in the oﬃcial economy. In the oﬃcial sector, the 
average wage for women in October 2004 amounted to approx. 83.6 per cent of that for men, whereas the average income derived by 
women from undeclared work in 2004 constituted merely 80 per cent of the average income for men. Moreover, women worked on 
average one day longer than men and this fact aﬀected the statistics to the extent that the amount of daily pay for women came to 
PLN 9.38, compared with PLN 12.10 for men. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of wages presented by TUS.
Apart from gender, age and education aﬀect the amount of income derived from unregistered work. As demonstrated in Chart IV.10, 
the structure of the average wage for unregistered work by age and education diﬀers greatly from an analogous structure in the oﬃcial 
economy.
Chart IV.10.
Wage indicator for people working in the oﬃcial and informal economy by age and education in 2004 (percentages) 
100 per cent refers to the average wage in the shadow economy and in the oﬃcial economy.
Source: Own calculation based of LFS data and CSO 2005.
37 According to LFS, wages are values declared by the respondents and therefore the reliability of the indicated absolute values of net wages is limited. However, information about income 
derived from unregistered work is collected in the same manner. In view of the above, it can be assumed that the deﬁciencies of the presented measures are of similar nature and therefore 
that the comparison of the two wage levels is in fact more appropriate than any references to values worked out in the average wage estimates and based on other sources.
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Particularly large diﬀerences in terms of the average wage/income are typical for the “extreme” age groups, i.e. 15-24 and 60+. Generally, 
it is younger people who receive higher wages for their work in the shadow economy, whereas in the oﬃcial economy the situation 
is exactly the opposite. The above may stem from the fact that almost 78 per cent of the young population engage in unregistered 
work as their main job which means that their income is higher compared with income derived from additional work. Moreover, the 
share of people earning more than PLN 400 per month in this age group was the largest (more than 30 per cent). When it comes to 
the level of education, it can be observed that in the young population – more frequently than in the other age groups – undeclared 
work is performed by people with secondary and post-secondary education. This may mean that students who wish to earn some 
extra money, make up a considerable proportion of the young population (aged 15-24) engaged in NOE.38 The average income for 
unregistered work received by the elderly (aged 60+) amounts to as little as 30 per cent of the average income derived from unregis-
tered work, whereas in the oﬃcial sector they typically receive wages that are much higher than the average. Such large diﬀerences in 
the relation of average income derived from work in particular age groups to the average income in the oﬃcial and informal sector of 
the economy are probably connected with diﬀerent proﬁles of people performing work in the two sectors. Over-60-year-olds involved 
in work in the oﬃcial economy are usually men, out of whom 25 per cent have tertiary education. Wages oﬀered to people from this 
group in the oﬃcial economy are the highest. Elderly people participating in unregistered work are usually women who engage in 
work sporadically.
The relationship between income from work and education is diﬀerent in the oﬃcial and inoﬃcial economy. In NOE, the highest in-
come is obtained by people with basic vocational education and in fact this is the only group the income of which is higher than the 
average income derived from unregistered work. As for people with secondary education, the average income from unregistered work 
is very similar to the average income. The largest diﬀerences in relative average income levels derived from work in NOE and in the 
oﬃcial economy concerned people with tertiary and post-secondary education. For this group, the average income from unregistered 
work was considerably lower than the average income in the informal economy, whereas in the oﬃcial economy this group enjoys 
the highest wages. However, taking into consideration the average time of work in the shadow economy, i.e. the average daily income 
from unregistered work, the above patterns change, which is demonstrated in Chart IV.11. 
Chart IV.11.
Indicator of daily income derived from undeclared work by age and education in 2004 (percentages) 
  
100 per cent refers to the average amount of wage in the shadow economy.
Source: Own calculations based on CSO 2005.
Having taken the average work time of particular groups into account, the relative average income by age did not change signiﬁcantly. 
Only in the case of people aged 45-59, the average daily income turned out to be higher than the average for the total population, 
which is probably due to a much lower average number of days worked in the shadow economy compared with younger age groups 
(30 days compared with 39 days for people aged 25-34). Much greater diﬀerences may be observed in the case of division into edu-
cation groups. If we consider the average time of work in NOE, it turns out that people with the highest level of education attain the 
average daily wage which is much higher than for other groups. In 2004, people with post-secondary and tertiary education worked on 
average about 22 days, whereas people with basic vocational – 37 days. Therefore, similarly to the oﬃcial economy, there is a strong 
relationship between wage and nominal level of education in the shadow economy.
38 Moreover, compared with other age groups, young people were more eager to provide information about their income from unregistered work. Assuming that it was those with high 
income that refused to reveal such information, the average income  for other age groups could be understated more heavily than the average income in 15-24 age group.
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Chart IV.12. 
Wage structure of full-time employees in the oﬃcial and informal economy by age and education 
The above chart presents percentage deviations from the average wage in the oﬃcial and informal economy accordingly. The over-60-year-olds are not 
distinguished due to insuﬃcient sample.
Source: Own calculations based on TUS data. 
As indicated above, relatively high wages oﬀered to young people involved in the shadow economy are probably a consequence of 
a diﬀerent proﬁle of performed work. The assessment of average wages of full-time employees engaging in unregistered work on the 
main job (TUS data) allows for a conclusion that this could be the exact reason for the occurrence of considerable diﬀerences in the 
wage structure by age between the shadow and oﬃcial economy. The lowest wages in NOE are oﬀered to the youngest people aged 
15-24. Therefore, it can be ﬁrmly established that, similarly to the oﬃcial economy, in NOE work experience constitutes a considerable 
determinant of wage levels.39  
3.10. Entities declaring demand for undeclared work 
The LFS module survey on unregistered work makes it possible to determine which entities beneﬁted from unregistered work as well 
as what was the resulting amount of expenses. In 2004, questions about employers in the shadow economy were directed to both en-
tities performing work as well as to those beneﬁting from it. People involved in undeclared work provided a type of their last employer. 
The following types of units were distinguished: an individual (a household), a private company or a cooperative in the system of home 
work, a private company or cooperative in a system other than home work, a state or municipal company, self-employment. Separate 
questions were directed to households, people carrying on a business activity, company and farm owners. In this case, the questions 
referred to their resorting to unregistered labour within the preceding year.
People involved in NOE indicated that private individuals were the key employer category in the shadow economy. In 2004, more than 
65 per cent of all unregistered workers performed work in favour of households, which constituted a decrease compared with 74 per 
cent in 1998. In the subsequent surveys, the share of people performing unregistered work to companies and associations was on the 
rise from as little as 14 per cent in 1995 to nearly 22 per cent in 2004.
In 2004, approximately 1,019,000 households beneﬁted from undeclared work. Compared with 1995, this ﬁgure decreased by nearly
a half (from 1,911,000 households). In the subsequent part of this subchapter, we present proﬁles of shadow employers.
When it comes to beneﬁting from unregistered work, it is above all employees’ households (in 2004, they accounted for approx. 34.5 
per cent of all households beneﬁting from unregistered work) as well as retirees’ and pensioners’ households (32.5 per cent) that resort 
to unregistered labour. Moreover, the above types of households are most common in the economy and, in 2004, they accounted for 
40 per cent and nearly 36 per cent of all households. In the rural areas, it is mainly farmers’ households and employee-farmers’ house-
holds (in total, they constituted 33 per cent of all households in the country) that are most likely to employ unregistered workers. What 
is more, as demonstrated in Chart IV.13, the subsequent surveys proved the share of farmers’ households was on the decline. This phe-
nomenon should be attributed to the gradually decreasing share of people for whom work in their own farms was the primary source 
of income in the total rural population. In 1995, this share amounted to 20.6 per cent, whereas in 2004, it went down as low as 14 per 
cent. However, as demonstrated in Chart IV.13., only in the case of these two types of households, there was a strong overrepresenta-
tion of households which beneﬁted from unregistered work in relation to their number in the total number of households.
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39 Diﬀerences in the results derived from the module survey and from TUS may arise, among others, from the fact that the former allows to determine – apart from people who declared 
their participation in unregistered work – income derived from such work by the unemployed and the economically inactive (according to LFS), which, in view of the low participation rate 
for the young population and the relatively high uemployment rate, may aﬀect the estimation of income from unregistered work.
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Chart IV.13. 
Households beneﬁting from unregistered work by household type (percentages)
 
  
Source: Own calculation based on data from CSO 1996, CSO 1999, CSO 2005.
Retirees’ and pensioners’ households tended to resort to unregistered work nearly as frequently as employees’ households. In all sur-
veys, they accounted for an average of approx. 30 per cent of all households beneﬁting from unregistered work. These households 
usually included elderly and disabled people and people whose income was much lower then the average wage in the economy. Due 
to their health condition, these people were more likely than other groups to beneﬁt from small services – mostly consisting in house-
keeping (e.g. cleaning, washing, etc.), neighbour services, gardening services and long-term care. It can be reasonably assumed that 
the key motive for avoiding registration in this respect is the desire to avoid the bureaucratic inconveniencies relating to their legalisa-
tion. Moreover, low income from pensions and retirement beneﬁts compels their recipients to minimize the cost of these services by 
failing to register them for tax purposes.
Work performed in favour of households used to be occasional. In 2004, its average duration came to 13 days (for urban households 
16 days and for rural households – 10 days). Nevertheless, urban households spent more on the unregistered services provided to 
them than rural households. These diﬀerences stem from diﬀerent types of work involved. Urban households were more likely to hire 
“well-paid unregistered workers” providing services which require certain knowledge and skill (for instance, private tuition, medical and 
nursing services, accounting and legal advisory services).
4. Probit-Probit Sample Selection Model
In order to fully identify the factors aﬀecting the individual probability of undertaking work in NOE, taking into account the non-ran-
dom selection to the sample of employees, a sample selection model was estimated, where both the equation describing the sample 
selection and the probability of undertaking work without a formal contract take the form of a probit regression. The parameter values 
have been estimated by ML, whereas their standard errors have been calculated using the Huber-White sandwich estimator. As the 
base category we have selected a married woman aged 45-54, living in a town of 20,000-50,000 people, having secondary education, 
who is not longer in education, who does not have any health problems and who is employed as a full-time service/sales worker in 
the simple services sector.
The following variables have been included in the selection equation:
• gender
• age group (15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-59/64, 60/65+)
• level of education
• marital status
• size of place of residence
• school/university education
• health condition (illness, disability)
• unemployment rate in a given voivodeship.
Apart from the last one, all of the above variables have been introduced by a relevant set of dummies. The results are in line with 
common intuition. The probability of being employed is, among others, smaller for women, it decreases alongside decreasing level of 
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education and is highest for people aged 25-44. In the case of the equation describing the probability of employment in the shadow 
economy, we have used two diﬀerent speciﬁcations. In the ﬁrst one, we included occupation (broad occupational groups) and sector 
of the economy, where a given employee is employed, among explanatory variables. In the second one, we have adopted a diﬀerent 
approach. We have assumed that the key factors that explain the variance of the extent of the shadow economy between diﬀerent 
occupational groups and NACE sections are: the share of people receiving wages below the minimum cost of labour and the average 
company size in the oﬃcial sector.
The ﬁrst variable measures the proportion of people in a given occupational group (second level of desaggregation) who receive the 
lowest wages, i.e. equal to the minimum wage or marginally higher. It can reasonably be expected that for occupations for which 
this share is high, both the proportion of people who cannot undertake work due to their low level of education and the resulting 
low level of (potential) wages, which does not exceed the minimum cost of labour, and the proportion of companies ready to em-
ploy workers below the minimum statutory cost, are high. By way of introducing this variable, we intended to demonstrate to some 
extent the impact of legislation relating to the minimum wage and the tax wedge for the lowest income on individual probability of 
employment in the shadow economy. In view of the fact that wages are on average lower in smaller companies, the assessment of 
the extent of this impact can be distorted. Small companies have more possibilities in terms of concealing employment from tax and 
social security authorities and thus the probability of detecting unregistered employment in their case is smaller. In view of the above, 
we can expect that there exists a relationship between company size and the probability of engaging in NOE. Bearing this in mind, we 
have introduced an additional variable into the model which reﬂects the number of people employed in a given company. Due to the 
fact that the questions in TUS do not cover company size, we have used an approximation, i.e. for every employee in TUS, we assigned 
the average number of employees in a given NACE section (second level of desaggregation) based on individual data from the wage 
structure survey carried out by CSO in October 2004. This source has been also used to derive the share of people receiving wages 
below the minimum cost of labour.
By comparing the goodness-of-ﬁt measures for both speciﬁcations, we can reasonably conclude that they ﬁt the data equally well, 
with a slightly better result for Model 1. Although the value of likelihood function40 for Model 2 exceeds the relevant value for the ﬁrst 
speciﬁcation, the value of R2 argues for the choice of Model 1. The results of the Wald test for the second model indicate that the fact 
of including the selection equation largely aﬀects the parameter estimates. Therefore, the non-random selection to the sample of 
employees may give rise to signiﬁcant bias in the parameter estimates.
The estimation results for both models provide slightly diﬀerent results for the shared parameters. Although in both cases the prob-
ability of employment in the shadow economy is higher for the younger population (aged 15-34), and in particular for the youngest 
age group of 15-24, as well as for large city dwellers and single people41, a direct inclusion of the occupational and sectoral variables in 
the model (Model 1) leads to diﬀerent conclusions as to the role of education. In such case, it can be noted that only the fact of having 
a lower education (max. lower secondary) does signiﬁcantly increase the tendency to undertake employment in NOE. In Model 2, in 
turn, diﬀerences in education seem to play a greater role, although it can also be observed that the probability of shadow employment 
decreases considerably for people with higher education. Similar results have been obtained for the gender variable. If the explanatory 
variables set explicitly accounts for occupation and type of economic activity, the probability of engaging in unregistered work is the 
same for women and men. Therefore, it should be acknowledged that the occupational choice constitutes a decisive factor which 
shapes the tendency to engage in unregistered employment, and that neither education nor gender play a similar role. It is only 
people with the lowest education that distinguish themselves with a higher probability of engaging in the shadow economy. What is 
more, the signiﬁcance of the sector in which a given person works is equally essential as that of the occupational choice. 
Signiﬁcant parameter estimates for the youngest age groups mean that work experience is also one of the crucial factors that shapes 
the chances of undertaking work in the oﬃcial economy. Firstly, young people who have not been in employment suﬃciently long 
lack the required work experience, and therefore, even if they have relevant nominal education, they are not able to match the level 
of productivity typical for long-serving employees. Secondly, the qualiﬁcations of young people who enter the labour market for the 
ﬁrst time are not easily recognised by employers because these people are not able to document the level of their productivity. What 
is more, the model indicates that the probability of older people (aged 55+) engaging in unregistered work is not, ceteris paribus, con-
siderably greater than that for employees aged 35-54. Therefore, the observed high share of people from the above age group in NOE 
is essentially due to other factors, including above all their involvement in part-time work. As indicated above, elderly people are more 
likely to opt for part-time employment (according to TUS, 38 per cent of all employees aged 55+ worked part-time42) because they 
usually have another source of income, namely their retirement, pension or pre-retirement beneﬁt, and they consider their income 
from work mainly as a supplement to income derived from other sources. Due weak incentives to register part-time employees, a large 
proportion of them stay in NOE. Consequently, elderly people end up working in the shadow economy relatively more frequently.
40 Strictly speaking, of a pseudo-likelihood function.
41 All ﬁndings described at this point should be interpreted with the ceteris paribus assumption in mind, i.e. assuming that all other factors are equal. For instance, a signiﬁcant and positive 
parameter value for the single person dummy means, among others, that if there are two men with the same education, in the same age, living in the same town and working in the same 
profession and sector but where only one of them is married, the probability that the other man engages in the shadow economy is greater.
42 According to BAEL, this share amounts to 20-25 per cent.
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Table IV.9.
Sample selection model estimation results
Wald test at 10 per cent signiﬁcance level.
(*), (**), (***) stands for signiﬁcance at 10-, 5- and 1 per cent level respectively.
Source: Own calculations based on TUS data.
The parameter estimates for occupational and sectoral dummies are in line with intuition as well as with the earlier ﬁndings. For people 
involved in occupations that require a high level of education, i.e. professionals and technicians, the probability of ending up in the 
black economy is relatively lower. What is more, the highest parameter estimates were obtained for the occupational groups which 
are characterised by a relatively low required level of qualiﬁcation, i.e. for craft and related trades workers and elementary occupa-
tions. As for farmers, plant and machine operators, service and sales workers they exhibit ceteris paribus a similar tendency to engage 
in employment in NOE. The analysis of the role of sector in which a given employee is hired, allows for a conclusion that the chances 
Variables
male
age group 15-24
age group 25-34
age group 35-44
age group 55-60/64
age group 65+
single
tertiary education
post-secondary education
basic vocational education
lower secondary or less
town of more than 500,000
town of less than 20,000
rural area
part-time work
legislators, senior oﬃcials and managers, clerks
professionals, technicians and associate professionals
skilled agricultural and ﬁshery workers
craft and related trades workers
plant and machine operators and assemblers
elementary occupations
agriculture
industry 
construction
business services
public administration and national defence, education, healthcare
other NACE sections
households maintained from non-earned sources
average number of workers in a given division (two-digit code)
share of workers receiving wage below the minimum cost of labour
in a given occupational group (two-digit code)
unemployment rate in a given voivodeship
constant
R2
log-likelihood
Wald test for non-random sample selection (H0: bias due to non-random 
selection is insigniﬁcant)
Model 1
 0.10
       0.35*** 
       0.31***
 0.03
-0.11
 0.03
       0.33***
 0.07
  0.15
 0.08
     0.29**
     0.23**
  0.11
 0.05
      1.26***
     -0.58***
     -0.37***
 0.23
       0.39***
-0.03
       0.42***   
       0.85***
      -0.33***
       0.65***
      -0.48***
      -0.45***
 0.16
     0.46**
–
–
  0.01
      -2.30***
  0.52
-16205056
do not reject H0
Model 2
      0.39***
      0.32***
      0.26***
 0.01
-0.16
 0.25
       0.33***
     -0.35***
 0.03
       0.28***
       0.64***
       0.25***
 0.09
     0.16**
       1.27***
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
       0.52***
      -0.08***
       1.08***
  0.01
      -2.19***
  0.45
-16201736
reject H0
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of undertaking unregistered work is much greater for those involved in agriculture and construction. The probability of participation in 
informal work in the simple services sector is higher than in industry or in the other sectors. It is worth noting that the ﬁrst three of the 
above-mentioned sectors are characterised by lower productivity indicators than the remaining ones.
When analysing the impact of other factors, it should be emphasised that part-time employees are more likely to engage in the 
shadow economy than other employees. The above claim is connected with the above-discussed decreasing relative advantages 
of unregistered work alongside the increasing work time. Moreover, there is a considerably higher probability that employees from 
households earning their living from non-wage sources (beneﬁts and other allowances) engage in undeclared employment. As eli-
gibility for beneﬁts and allowances, as well as their amount, depends on whether a given person is formally employed or not (e.g. 
unemployment beneﬁt) and on the oﬃcial amount of income (social assistance), people living in households maintained from non-
earned sources, including people receiving beneﬁts or allowances, are less inclined to start work in the oﬃcial sector. This is so because 
the fact of engaging in work on the basis of a written employment contract may entail the loss or reduction of income from beneﬁts 
or allowances. As for the unemployment rate in a given voivodeship, it does not aﬀect the probability of engagement in the shadow 
economy. In view of the observations presented in the previous part of this report, this ﬁnding should not be surprising. Considering 
the high level of aggregation, it is impossible that the unemployment rate at the voivodeship level could reﬂect the existing disparities 
among the local labour markets.
Some interesting conclusions can be derived from the second model. The probability of engagement in the shadow economy de-
creases with the average company size in a given division. Another signiﬁcant factor is the share of people working for a wage below 
the minimum cost of labour. People who are in occupations where wages are close to the minimum wage have limited options when 
it comes to ﬁnding oﬃcial employment and thus the probability of their participation in unregistered work is greater. The above results 
suggest that the currently applicable regulations on minimum wage, in view of high tax wedge for the lowest income group, may exert 
a considerable inﬂuence on the extent of NOE. The fact that the minimum wage is determined centrally – without any diﬀerentiation 
between occupations or sectors – may pose an obstacle to legal employment in low-productivity, and thus low-wage, occupations.43
 
Table IV.10. 
Comparison of conditional shadow employment probabilities for some selected proﬁles (Model 1) 
* The mazowieckie voivodeship was adopted as a place of residence for the base category.
The income source was the same as the main source of income for the household, unless indicated otherwise.
Source: Own calculations based on TUS data.
Proﬁles
married (male) retiree with primary education, living in Wrocław, working 
part-time in a security company
single (female) university student living in Kraków, working part-time
as a waitress in a restaurant
married man aged 35-44 with basic vocational education, living in
 a village in the zachodniopomorskie voivodeship, working full-time
as a bricklayer at a construction site
single man aged 25-34 with secondary education, living in a town of less 
than 20,000 inhabitants in the podlaskie voivodeship, working full-time as 
a driver in a shipping company 
single woman aged 55-59 with primary education, living in a town of 
20,000-500,000 inhabitants in the śląskie voivodeship, working part-time 
as a domestic help, member of a retirees’/pensioners’ household
married man aged 45-54 with tertiary education, living in a town of 
20,000-500,000 inhabitants in the wielkopolskie voivodeship, working
full-time as a health professional
single man aged 15-24 with basic vocational education, living in a village 
in the podkarpackie voivodeship, part-time employee, member of
a households maintained from non-earned sources
Ratio of probabilities
(denominator: conditional shadow 
employment probability for the base 
category*)  
14.9
40.4
16.8
6.8
33.1
0.2
88.4
 
 
  
  
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
43 These ﬁndings do not constitute a ﬁrm evidence for the existence of a relationship between the minimum wage and the size of the shadow economy. They prove only that people who 
are in professions that are characterised by low labour productivity and thus by low wages, are more likely to engage in NOE. It can be reasonably expected that in such occupations the 
minimum wage constitutes a more signiﬁcant obstacle to oﬃcial employment.
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In order to better illustrate the results of the model, we have estimated conditional shadow employment probability ratios44 for some 
selected proﬁles and we have related them to the probability for the base category. Only in the case of the man from point 6, we can 
observe a lower inclination to engage in unregistered work than for the woman portrayed in the base category description. The fact 
that this man performed a job of a specialist working in the sector “public administration and national defence, education, healthcare” 
was of key importance in this case because the above constitutes a factor which largely decreases the probability of engaging in un-
registered employment. It should also be noted that this probability is only approximate because the variables describing the occupa-
tional group and sector are deﬁned at a high level of aggregation. The young man living in a village in the podkarpackie voivodeship 
is most likely to engage in work without a formal contract. The reason for this is that in his case we can observe most risk factors that 
increase such probability, namely part-time work, employment in agriculture, young age, singleness and belonging to a household for 
which transfers are the main source of income. As for the student from Kraków, she is much less likely to engage in NOE, although she 
belongs to the same age group and she also works part-time. However, as opposed to the above man, she belongs to an employees’ 
household. A similar probability of participation in NOE can be observed in the case of the married woman from point 5 who has
a lower level of education in relation to the base category. The relative probability for the retiree from point 1 is considerably lower 
than for the student and similar to that of the construction worker from point 3. Compared with the remaining proﬁles, the married 
man working in a shipping company (point 4) has a relatively low probability of shifting into the shadow economy, although this prob-
ability is still higher than that for the base category. Although, similarly to the base category, he works full-time in the simple services 
sector but due to his young age he has little work experience, which decreases the probability of ﬁnding employment in the oﬃcial 
economy.
To sum up, one important factor aﬀecting the probability of engaging in undeclared work is company size. Smaller companies tend 
to more commonly hire workers without formal employment contracts. The greater the extent of the business, the more diﬃcult it 
becomes to conceal such practices from the inspection authorities. Therefore, the risk of punishment increases and – what comes with 
it – the advantages of operating in NOE decrease. Another factor which greatly aﬀects the probability of participation in the shadow 
economy is the ratio of wages in a given occupation to the minimum wage. The lower the average wage in a given occupational 
group, the greater obstacle the statutory minimum wage poses to legal employment. The negative impact of the regulations on 
minimum wages is further enhanced by high taxation in the lowest income group. Moreover, people who decide to work part-time 
also have greater probability of shifting into illegal employment than full-time workers. Last but not least, employment in the shadow 
economy tends to attract young and single people.
5. Impact of NOE on the Economy and Labour Market 
The existence of the shadow economy is a common phenomenon and an inherent feature of all economies worldwide. However, the 
extent of this phenomenon in Poland is remarkable compared with those recorded in the developed countries, and in particular in
a majority of EU member states. In this context a question emerges of whether the large share of NOE should be perceived as a threat to 
the economy or whether it is a factor which exerts a positive inﬂuence on the levels of employment, consumption and investment.
NOE is often seen as an undesirable phenomenon. The argument that labour productivity in the shadow economy is lower than in 
the oﬃcial economy (see Johnson et al. (1997)) is often raised in order to substantiate its negative impact on the level of economic 
growth. This is so because enterprises operating in NOE have a limited access to capital and therefore the fact of shifting production 
from the oﬃcial to the informal sector may result in a decrease in accumulation of capital and in average productivity in the economy. 
Moreover, in the face of repressive measures undertaken by the state, companies which resort to unregistered employment must incur 
certain costs to conceal their activity which generates pure loss because these funds are not invested in the production process (see 
Schneider (2003)). 
On the other hand, however, high ﬂexibility of employment in NOE as well as the scope of jobs performed (neighbour services or small 
scale production) within it may enhance competition and boost eﬃciency in entities involved in production or services of similar type 
as well as restrict the extent of public intervention in the economy (Enste (2002)). It is highly probable that a proportion of goods and 
services generated in the shadow economy would not have been otherwise generated in the oﬃcial economy due to much higher 
cost. The presented survey carried out in Germany indicates that as little as 25 per cent of goods and services generated in NOE overlap 
with goods and services generated in the oﬃcial production, and therefore, a vast majority of businesses carried on in NOE would not 
have been started in the oﬃcial sector (see Schneider (2006)). If this eﬀect was of decisive importance, the expansion of NOE would 
lead to increased GDP levels. From this perspective, the intensiﬁcation of repressive measures undertaken by the state may in fact result 
in the increase of the number of the unemployed (see Boeri, Garibaldi (2006)).
The total impact of the shadow economy on welfare is not straightforward not only when we focus on the total output and economic 
growth but also from the point of view of purely social considerations. NOE and unregistered work may be perceived in a positive 
manner, if they help to prevent poverty, create new jobs for those who are ready to work but for various reasons are not able to ﬁnd
44 We are not talking at this point about the traditional conditioning against the values of explanatory variables but about the probability of becoming an unregistered employee calculated 
in accordance with the following formula:
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a job in the oﬃcial market. This pertains above all to low-qualiﬁed workers and the simple services sector. The value of production gen-
erated by these people is often comparable or lower than the cost incurred by employers for oﬃcially registered employment, which 
renders the legal employment of people from this group scarcely proﬁtable. On the other hand, the income derived by this group 
from unregistered work is immediately spent in the oﬃcial sector of the economy thus increasing total consumption and aggregate 
demand. Schneider and Enste (2000) claim that at least two thirds of income generated by NOE is spent in the oﬃcial market which 
stimulates its development.
Nevertheless, there are also opinions which point to the negative externalities of the shadow economy. Firstly, it is often raised that 
companies which operate in the informal sector or which resort to unregistered work give rise to unfair competition for entities operat-
ing legally (OECD (2004)). Unregistered employment, especially in those countries where the informal sector is large, aﬀects the tax and 
social insurance systems. Large size of the shadow economy is reﬂected in low tax revenue, decreased quality of public services and 
increased social allowances paid from central budget or from state earmarked funds. The above produces a considerable pressure on 
public expenditure and results in increased tax burden. Higher taxation, in turn, is an additional motive encouraging people to engage 
in NOE because oﬃcially employed workers (and their employers) incur greater employment costs and thus become less attractive 
compared with those operating in NOE. This situation concerns in particular low-skill workers and workers involved in low-productivity 
jobs and has an adverse eﬀect on oﬃcial employment rates in this group of workers.
A similar mechanism may concern social insurance. On the one hand, people operating in NOE have a limited access to social insur-
ance beneﬁts and they are excluded from most systems that guarantee basic social safety (paid holiday and maternity leave, sick leave, 
retirement insurance, etc.). On the other hand, however, it is sometimes possible to free-ride, meaning a situation where some people 
engaged in unregistered work beneﬁt from loopholes in the system and receive beneﬁts which are essentially intended for the poor 
and unemployed, although they actually have (unregistered) jobs and fail to pay relevant taxes or contributions. The above situation 
renders it diﬃcult or even impossible to manage the social insurance system eﬀectively. In the absence of means to eﬀectively verify 
entitlement to beneﬁts, including the veriﬁcation of the lack of income from work or of the amount thereof, hinders measures intended 
to help those who are most needy and diminishes the eﬀectiveness of the social policy.
To sum up, it can be stated that the existence of the shadow economy may be perceived in a negative or positive light, and therefore 
a decision whether its existence in a given country is welfare enhancing or welfare reducing is an empirical question which requires 
individual approach. Generally, it can be said that a shadow economy of a moderate size, that is of up to 20 per cent, do not give rise 
to a situation where attempts at decreasing its size could bring about large positive aggregate outcomes. On the other hand, however, 
if the black economy generates more than 20-30 per cent of total outcome, it can be assumed that the regulations as well as the tax 
system do not match the expectations of the society, and that structural reforms could bring about not only a reduction in the size of 
the shadow economy but above all a more eﬃcient utilisation of the existing resources.
The implementation of regulatory reforms intending to decrease the size of the shadow economy may also put into motion the 
mechanism of positive feedback. Measures set to reduce the extent of NOE (see OECD (2004)), including the deregulation and loosen-
ing of the existing, though unnecessary, legal straitjacket, the simpliﬁcation of the tax system and rationalisation of the tax base, the 
liberalisation of the Labour Code and its improved enforcement by relevant authorities, should result in registering some of the entities 
operating in NOE. As a result of these policies, more individuals would pay taxes and social security contributions (the tax base would 
widen), the pressure on the budget would be smaller and consequently, the marginal tax rates could be lowered and the participation 
in NOE would become relatively less proﬁtable.
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Summary
The assessment of the extent and structure of informal work and economy is a very diﬃcult venture and therefore diﬀerent methods 
intended to measure this phenomenon in Poland often generate extremely divergent estimates. In accordance with the estimates of 
the Central Statistical Oﬃce, which are based on a combination of several methods, NOE accounts for approx. 12-15 per cent of GDP. 
This ﬁgure is approx. twice, three times lower than estimates derived from studies based on other methods (e.g. electricity and other 
econometric estimation methods) and it should, above all, be treated with caution, as an indication that the actual size of the shadow 
economy in Poland is not excessively large compared with other countries worldwide.
The factors that we have identiﬁed in this part of the report as encouraging people to engage in undeclared work and thus leading to 
the larger black economy include, on the one hand, a ﬁnancial motive – i.e. escape from excessive taxation, and on the other hand, 
refusal to subject to excessive regulations. These factors can interact thus enhancing or cancelling out their eﬀects. Hence, there are 
countries where high taxation and large public sector providing high-quality services coexist with small-sized shadow economy as well 
as others, where this situation is right the opposite or which represent a mixed model.
In this context, Poland can be included in the relatively heterogeneous group of countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slova-
kia, and the countries of Southern Europe – Greece, Slovenia, Italy, Portugal, Spain, where average (on the European scale) size of public 
sector is accompanied by average or poor quality public services and diﬀerent (medium or large) sizes of their shadow economies. 
Poland is not one of the countries where the small size of NOE coexists with eﬀective but expensive State (e.g. Sweden, Norway, Den-
mark, Austria, France, Germany), or of the countries with relatively small public sector and poor quality of public services which have 
large shadow economies (Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia).
At the individual level, it can be stated that young and poorly educated people are relatively more likely to engage in the shadow 
economy as well as people whose work experience is scarce. Moreover,the shadow economy mostly attracts people to work in sectors 
and jobs which do not require specialist qualiﬁcations, namely construction, agriculture and simple services. Consequently, wages in 
the shadow economy are relatively low and employment is less stable, shorter-term and often performed as an additional job or part-
-time job. Moreover, according to the available data, people who belong to households that earn their living from non-wage sources 
also tend to engage in unregistered employment more frequently.
Conclusions for The Economic Policy
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Despite the current cyclical economic upturn, Poland has not managed to narrow the gap between her and the EU15 in terms of 
employment and participation rates, although other countries in the CEE region have. Consequently, the Polish labour market of 2006 
is in a similar position with respect to other EU member states to that of 2002. In all age groups the share of economically active and 
working people is much smaller, whereas unemployment is much higher.
Continued good economic performance in the forthcoming years is likely to bring Poland closer to the EU15, however, total and ra-
pid convergence of social welfare levels will not be achieved without complex structural and institutional reforms. One factor which 
makes it easier to address these challenges is good economic situation. Hence, in the Conclusions, we focus on actions intended to 
bring rapid increase in labour productivity and wages and we complement them with the key tenets of a policy aimed to boost labour 
supply and employment in the long term.
Macroeconomic stabilisation policy, labour supply and demand
As demonstrated in Part I, for the last dozen years, the Polish labour market has been greatly impacted by macroeconomic shocks and 
economic ﬂuctuations. In this respect, reallocation shocks have been of major importance as they lead to changes in the structure of 
labour supply and demand and made considerable structural maladjustments between expectations of new and restructured com-
panies and labour supply. At the same time, the macroeconomic policy-mix pursued during that period exerted a mixed inﬂuence 
on the economy. Monetary policy resulted in the fall of inﬂation expectations, in the reduction and stabilisation of inﬂation at a low 
level, and – what comes with it – in the eﬀective decrease in real exchange rates which in the long term should boost investment and 
create new jobs. Notwithstanding the above, the period of excessively restrictive monetary policy which took place at the beginning of 
this decade probably deepened (but not caused) the economic slowdown of 2001-2002, thus contributing to lasting unemployment 
hysteresis.
In general, the impact of monetary impulses on the labour market has not been as great as that of broadly understood ﬁscal policy. 
This is so because as much as the public sector deﬁcit has been under control throughout the last dozen or so years and its ﬂuctuations 
contributed only marginally to ﬂuctuations of aggregate demand and output, it was permanent in nature and all ﬁscal impulses that 
we have identiﬁed – apart from one – had a negative eﬀect on labour supply and employment. The main reason for the above state of 
things was the increase in social transfers to people in the economically productive age at times of downturn ﬁnanced by the reduc-
tion of productive government expenditures or by the increase in deﬁcit or debt. The ﬁrst alternative could be observed in 1998-2000, 
when increased transfers were ﬁnanced by the contraction of government investment, whereas the second – in 2001-2022, when the 
public ﬁnance balance, which had been left unreformed, deteriorated. Thus, it can be assumed that in both cases ﬁscal impulses had 
an adverse impact on the accumulation of capital, labour supply and employment.
The social policy model adopted in Poland determines above all the long-term trends which have been visible in the Polish labour 
market since the beginning of the 1990s. The arguments delivered in Part I, which further support the conclusions presented in the 
previous issue of Employment in Poland, prove that labour supply and employment have been at an invariably low level throughout 
the period of transformation in the economically productive age group of 55+ (and in some cases of 50+), who can only count on the 
easily available social transfers, including in particular early retirement and pre-retirement beneﬁt schemes. Although in the conditions 
of improved economic performance employment increases and unemployment decreases for younger age groups, the oldest labour 
market participants – similarly to previous years – are highly inclined to withdraw from it earlier than in other European countries, 
including the NMS8. This means that the employment gap between Poland and the EU will not be bridged in the long term without 
a necessary review of the passive labour market policy directed at people in the immobile age, especially that other EU countries have 
seen far-reaching reforms in this respect which gradually increase the eﬀective retirement age, irrespective of it presently being higher 
by 5-7 years than in Poland. The analysis of participation and employment trends among the elderly during the period of strong econo-
mic revival in 2003-2006 clearly conﬁrmed the appropriateness of recommendations included in the previous issue of Employment in 
Poland which indicated that failure to implement reforms in the area of social transfers would lead to Poland being a country with one 
of the lowest employment rates in Europe. The moment that unemployment falls to its natural level, i.e. within the next 2-3 years given 
the current dynamics, companies are bound to face a ﬁrm supply barrier in the labour market resulting from an eﬀective limitation of 
labour resources to people aged 55 and less. Consequently, total output generated by the economy as well as wealth of households 
will be lower, whereas wages of those in employment will have to be burdended with higher taxes which are indispensable to ﬁnance 
the extensive beneﬁt system. In other words, early withdrawals from the labour market lead to, ﬁrstly, lower income from work for the 
young and prime-age populations (i.e. those bringing up children), and secondly, relatively lower retirement beneﬁts for the elderly 
which are ﬁnanced by levies imposed on the young generation of workers. If the average period of participation in the labour market 
in Poland was extended to match that typical for other EU countries, both the average amount of retirement beneﬁt and the living 
standard of the elderly could be increased and the tax burden imposed on working households could be cut down. The latter would, 
in turn, open up new implementation opportunities for an eﬀective pro-family policy and it would favour the increase of one of the 
lowest reproduction rates in Europe.
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The above remarks prove that it should be a priority for macroeconomic policy to stabilise public ﬁnances above all through the re-
-shaping of the social policy so that a smaller ﬂow of transfers would be directed to people in the pre-retirement age. In other words, 
it is necessary to reduce social expenditures in areas where they aﬀect labour supply in an adverse manner, namely those which are 
intended to ﬁnance consumption of people in the economically productive age. In the long term, decreasing public expenditures 
would allow not only to reduce deﬁcits, which would create better conditions for a ﬂexible anticyclical ﬁscal policy and lead to incre-
ased public investment and productivity of government expenditures (e.g. on research and development), but also to lower taxes thus 
improving capital and labour supply. It seems that that it would be particularly justiﬁed to introduce mechanisms which lower taxes 
imposed on lowest-income workers (e.g. through higher tax relief for work related expenses) and pro-family allowances for young 
workers with children. The implementation of structural reforms in public ﬁnances would favour the pursuit of a neutral monetary 
policy. This aspect of the policy-mix requires particular attention so that past achievements consisting in relatively low interest rates, 
low inﬂation expectations and low inﬂation would be sustained. The social cost of disinﬂation including slightly higher unemployment 
in 2001-2002 has already been paid and therefore another increase in price dynamics would be a proof of extravagance. On the other 
hand, however, more attention and insight ought to be given to mechanisms of transmission of monetary impulses and of propaga-
tion of supply and demand shocks in the Polish economy in order to minimise the risk of overly restrictive or expansive monetary policy 
adopted in response to inappropriately identiﬁed aggregate disruptions. For exactly the same reasons, the coordination of ﬁscal and 
monetary policies should be strengthened to make Poland’s accession to the Euro zone possible within a relatively short time horizon. 
This would, in turn, allow for a decrease in the market evaluation of risk and return on Polish T-bonds and – what comes with it – in real 
interest rates, which would positively aﬀect investment and decrease the public debt servicing cost in Poland.
Investment, real convergence and international migration
In Part I, we have demonstrated that although the last between ten and twenty years were a period of rapid closing the development 
gap between Poland and the EU-15 countries, the average output growth rate was lower than that necessary to keep up with the 
other CEE group. In other words, although Poland has been developing at a relatively fast rate, if we look at the initial level of wealth, 
it becomes apparent that the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Hungary and particularly the Baltic states have been developing even faster 
thus improving their relative position with respect to Poland. Based on the above diagnosis, it can be claimed that the reason for such 
state of things was Poland’s relatively lower growth dynamics of total production factor productivity which was partly due to the fact 
that the level of capital equipment of labour was initially lower in Poland than in the other NMS8 – relatively more industrialised and 
urbanised. Consequently, despite relatively low investment rates, the contribution of accumulation in Poland was greater than, for 
instance, in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Estonia. Nevertheless, even if we bear in mind these diﬀerences, the fact that 
Poland’s average TFP growth rate in 1994-2006, which amounted to less than 4 per cent per year, was much lower than that of Slovakia 
(6 per cent) and the Baltic states (7-9 per cent), and marginally higher than that of countries which were considerably richer at the 
point of departure, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia (3-3.5 per cent), is bound to have substantial consequences on 
the overall assessment of Poland’s economic potential. This is so because as much as in the short term increased capital accumulation 
or labour input per capita may lead to changes in the level of GDP per capita, it is exclusively the TFP dynamics that determines the 
real level of wealth in the long term. Hence, it is a priority for the economic policy to increase this dynamics by at least 2 percentage 
points annually. It should be emphasised at this point that, conversely to some occasionally voiced concerns, there is no choice be-
tween labour and growth. On the contrary, the popularly called non-employment economic growth, i.e. a situation where high labour 
productivity dynamics is obtained at the cost of increased unemployment, is only temporary as a response to economic slowdown. In 
medium term, it leads to increased return on capital which in turn entails an acceleration of investment and labour demand and – what 
comes with it – a decrease in unemployment. Such situation could be observed in Poland in 2000-2006. Therefore, the task of incre-
asing the average productivity dynamics in the long term should be regarded as a challenge to improve the convergence rate of living 
standards between Poland and Western Europe. In the long term, higher TFP variation rate must lead to faster dynamics of equalizing 
the real wage levels in Poland and the UE15. As demonstrated in Part III, it is exactly diﬀerences in living standards and wage levels that 
constitute the primary motive for Polish international migration. Hence, the intensity of economic migration from Poland – including 
permanent migration – can only be curbed by way of closing the income gap between Poland and the other EU countries.
From the macroeconomic perspective, this means that the primary challenge for the national economic policy is to build a regulatory 
environment and infrastructure which would favour fast accumulation of physical and human capital as well as a dynamic increase 
in the productivity of the above two production factors. As for the regulatory framework, it is necessary to enhance privatisation, de-
regulate the economy and remove bureaucratic barriers inherited from the past wherever they hinder the opening and operation of 
businesses and especially investment. A number of independent rankings on economic freedom and competitiveness drawn up by 
diﬀerent institutions indicate that in these respects Poland comes after most EU countries. Reservations are pronounced in particular 
with respect to the lengthiness of judiciary procedures, high cost and lengthiness of investment procedures, excessive state bureau-
cracy in business, including lengthy registration and ﬁrm setting up procedures, legislative inﬂation and overregulation, especially 
in tax law. The simpliﬁcation of the regulatory framework, which hinders business activity and increases business costs, including in 
particular decreasing the number of procedures and shortening the time necessary to start investment (including construction and 
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infrastructure investment), is bound to increase the capital accumulation dynamics and labour demand. The successes of other CEE 
countries, especially of Slovakia and the Baltic states, in attracting foreign investment, as well as the example of Special Economic 
Zones operating in Poland allow for a conclusion that by commonly applying certain tax instruments, such as low and simple taxes 
on corporate income (since recently applicable also in Poland), accelerated amortisation and investment concessions (applied, for 
instance in Estonia), favour the accumulation of capital and the creation of new productive jobs. In this context, the role of the central 
government and local governments is essential, especially when it comes to constructing road and railway networks, developing land 
intended for investment and performing IT infrastructure – wherever they cannot be provided by the private sector, increasing outlays 
on research and innovations and increasing the quality of human capital.
As for the last of the above-mentioned tasks, our recommendations included in the previous issue of Employment in Poland remain 
fully valid. We stress the necessity of paying more attention than in the past to the development of young people’s ability to think cre-
atively and independently as well as to reason logically and we call for the promotion of science education and attempts at increasing 
the number of graduates with scientiﬁc and technical degrees. The increase in labour supply of engineers and scientists is particularly 
important, if we think about a model of long term development for Poland. It is the development of the innovation potential in Poland 
through modern and market-oriented research and development centres established by private companies that is expected to bring 
the highest returns in the future. As the gap between Poland and better-developed countries will be levelled out, the mechanism of 
growth based entirely on imitation and comparative beneﬁts derived from lower labour costs will diminish. The development of R&D 
centres as well as of the highest-productivity sectors of the economy is conditioned on the one hand by appropriate tax regulations 
and infrastructure support on the part of the national and local authorities, and on the other, by suﬃcient labour supply of people with 
relevant qualiﬁcations. Since the consequences of the implementation or failure to implement reforms of the educational system in 
Poland will only become visible after many years, this problem should be considered now when the scale of deﬁciencies in this area 
has not fully come to light. It is worthwhile to consider the introduction of both a mandatory A-level examination in mathematics as 
well as preferential treatment of those secondary education graduates who decide to take scientiﬁc and technical university courses 
– one example of this attitude is the inititive of the city of Wrocław which has started a special assistance programme targeting this 
group of graduates.
Internal migration, work commuting, infrastructure and urbanisation
The analyses discussed in Part II devoted to regional labour markets provide an additional dimension to the discussion on the neces-
sity of increasing the average economic growth rate as well as the labour productivity dynamics. We indicate that one indisputably 
positive phenomenon of the recent years is no increase in diﬀerentiation between voivodeships and poviats (and in some aspects 
even a marginal decrease) and the progressing modernisation and restructuring of agriculture which has been occurring throughout 
Poland (although with diﬀerent intensity). At the same time, however, in a large number of subregions, there have been some barriers 
to productivity, especially to the productivity of industry, as well as to enterprise development. This fact places the permanence of the 
recent positive labour market developments in some subregions under a question mark. The absence of rapid labour productivity 
growth is particularly evident in peripheral areas located far from the largest urban centres, whereas the largest agglomerations – to-
gether with the surrounding areas – achieve relatively high growth dynamics in the above respect. It seems that although diﬀerent 
levels of infrastructure and human capital are of great importance here, it is the mere beneﬁts the metropolises bring that are the main 
diﬀerentiating factor, namely the existence of a large, compact market which allow companies to achieve the scale eﬀect on their 
operations, including in particular access to the beneﬁts of a large local labour market.
In international comparison, Poland distinguishes herself by low level of urbanisation and a small number – for a rather large and po-
pulous country in the European context – of large cities. What is more, the largest and most dynamic Polish agglomerations, such as 
Warsaw (1,700,000 inhabitants in the city / approx. 2.5 million in the entire agglomeration), Łódź (approx. 770,000 / 1.3 million), Kraków 
(approx. 757,000 / 1.5 million), Tricity (approx. 750,000 / 1 million), Wrocław (approx. 635,000 / 1 million) and Poznań (568,000 / 1 mil-
lion) are relatively small not only in relation to the agglomerations of Paris (9.8 million), London (7.2 million) and Berlin (5.1 million) but 
also to those of Manchester (2.5 million), Hamburg (2.7 million) and Milan (4.3 million). Hence, compared with the other EU countries, 
a much smaller share of the Polish population lives not only in cities but above all in the largest urban agglomerations. Consequently, 
the growth potential of Development centres and of the surrounding Suburbs is smaller than it could be. This, in turn, undermines the 
development potential of the entire country the dispersed population of which can hardly beneﬁt from the spill-over and diﬀusion 
eﬀects of large agglomerations. In the context of the above analysis, we can conclude that the priorities of the social and economic 
policy should include extending support to the existing Development centres and enhancing factors that facilitate immigration from 
other, relatively poorer and peripheral regions to Development centres.
The research analysis presented in Part III persuades that the process of dynamic urbanisation in the conditions of rapid economic 
growth is largely natural. Internal migration, similarly to international migration, is clearly determined by economic factors and therefo-
re, Poland’s current acceleration of economic growth rate, especially in large urban centres, should be associated with the intensiﬁca-
tion of migration movements from the relatively less-developed areas, particularly from Towns and to some extent from regions from 
Former state farms and Low-productivity agriculture. These movements will be further reinforced by populous cohorts of young and 
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relatively well-educated people entering the labour market as these people are much more spatially and professionally mobile than 
the average population. This ﬂow could possibly be relatively smaller due to the increased intensity of international migration in the 
recent period, which does not necessarily translate into decreased outﬂows from peripheral regions. However, even now, in all large 
agglomerations, one comes across considerable structural barriers which prevent rapid increases in the number of their populations, 
although they would in fact be of great beneﬁt to these agglomerations and to the social and economic development of the entire 
country. The above-mentioned barriers have to do above all with the (non-)availability of accommodation – both for purchase or 
rent, and they result mainly from the absence of detailed spatial development plans, from low supply of land intended, for residential 
development for which local governments are responsible, as well as from lengthy investment procedures. Consequently, the number 
of residential construction projects and of delivered buildings is rather scarce. This situation should be remedied by both the central 
government (simpliﬁcation of relevant regulations, strengthening of public services charged with state-ﬁnanced construction) and 
by local and self-government authorities (spatial development plans, sale of land for development and of council ﬂats to individuals). 
Another serious obstacle is the lack of economic incentives to build and oﬀer accommodation for rent. In the latter case, the problem 
is the excessive protection of tenant interests in relation to that of real property owners. Consequently, some houses and ﬂats remain 
unoccupied irrespective of the large market demand for residential premises, and some (especially those managed by districts) are 
rented at below market rates to people who are marginally involved in the labour market. In this context, it is worthwhile considering 
two possibilities: ﬁrstly, that of diminishing the extent of protection oﬀered to tenants who fail to pay rent and other charges, and 
secondly, that of abandoning such protection in the case of newly-constructed ﬂats intended for rent.
Since, as stressed in Part III, migrants are usually young people and internal migration largely depends on such factors as going to uni-
versity in a diﬀerent city, it seems that the process of urbanisation could also be enhanced by increasing access to university education 
in large urban centres to students from other regions. This could be achieved through increased numbers of full-time day students as 
well as of places available in halls of residence and student houses. Infrastructure deﬁciencies and ﬁnancial problems faced by public 
universities are mainly due to the abolishing of cross-ﬁnancing of day studies by extramural students. Remedies to these problems 
should be sought either in increased public expenditures on tertiary education or in greater co-ﬁnancing by students themselves. 
Whatever the measures, they should aim to increase the accessibility of university studies in large urban centres, including the largest 
agglomerations, because the urbanisation process could thus be enhanced and Poland’s dynamics of accumulation of human capital 
– which is currently one of the lowest in the EU – could be increased.
The removal of barriers which are at the root of insuﬃcient supply of accommodation in Development centres and Suburbs, as well as 
the development and improvement of transport infrastructure (especially railways) to allow large numbers of people to commute to 
work relatively cheaply and quickly (up to 1 hour) from more distant areas, would surely boost rapid economic growth and wage levels 
not only at the local but also at the national level as a result of diﬀusion and spill-over eﬀects. As for peripheral areas which are located 
too far from Development centres to commute – even with the best transport infrastructure, their key objective should consist above 
in developing the nearby Towns. If this condition is not met, it can hardly be expected that the gradual depopulation of these regions 
will be halted in the long term. Only if strong, attractive growth centres are created within such peripheral areas, positive outcomes 
can be achieved for the surrounding areas. As evidenced by the extent of positive impact exerted by the existing Development centres, 
in Poland, poviats can greatly beneﬁt from the proximity of dynamically developing regions. Nevertheless, if such medium-size cities as 
Szczecin, Bydgoszcz and Toruń, Olsztyn, Białystok and Lublin were to take on the role of regional centres, it would be necessary for them 
to implement appropriate policies in the areas of investment and education and to focus on pro-development objectives rather than 
on increasing consumption and living standards of the current generation. This concerns in particular the use of EU structural funds, 
both those intended for the development and revitalisation of infrastructure as well as those meant to enhance the accumulation of 
human capital within regions. In the conditions of increased availability of such funds, or even of their relative excess, it is essential that 
they not only be spent but eﬀectively channelled to support projects with high social and economic rates of return. This issue is of 
particular importance in the context of urban centres of relatively smaller populations which are not as attractive to investors as larger 
agglomerations.
Economic regulations, taxes and shadow economy
Another topic that we have looked into in this issue of Employment in Poland is unregistered work and non-observed economy. Altho-
ugh work in NOE has both positive and negative consequences for the economy, it seems that in the literature on the subject there 
prevails an opinion that the reduction of NOE by including parts of it in the oﬃcial sector of the economy is generally justiﬁed from the 
economic point of view. This is so because companies operating in the shadow economy have much smaller potential development 
opportunities than companies operating in the oﬃcial economy. They do not have access to external ﬁnancing, they cannot insure 
their assets or use marketing services. What is more, they are not in the position to fully beneﬁt from scale eﬀects due to considerable 
diﬀusion of their businesses. As for workers engaging in undeclared work in companies which operate in the oﬃcial economy, altho-
ugh they evade taxation, they are also excluded from most mechanisms which guarantee basic social security to people employed 
oﬃcially (e.g. paid annual holiday and maternity leaves, sick leaves, retirement and pension coverage, etc.). 
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Having analysed determinants of participation in unregistered employment, we indicate that the sources of non-observed economy 
should be sought not only in excessive state ﬁscalism but also in overly burdensome economic regulations which are in total disregard 
of social expectations. In other words, people engage in undeclared work in the ﬁrst place when access to oﬃcial employment is limi-
ted and in the second place when it is ﬁnancially unattractive. In view of the above reasons, the only method to reduce the size of NOE 
is essentially by applying recommendations intended to improve the dynamics of economic growth and labour productivity, namely 
by eliminating bureaucratic barriers and cutting taxes. Moreover, the reduction of the shadow economy may be further enhanced, if 
law regulations are loosened wherever their rigorousness reaches levels which commonly induce entrepreneurs to conceal their busi-
nesses or to employ workers without registering them. The above pertains above all to labour law the liberalisation and tightening of 
which seems to decrease and increase the shadow economy respectively. By way of example, let us mention the obligations to register 
and complete tax returns when employing people to help in households and farms. In some cases, these obligations may constitute 
a greater barrier to oﬃcial employment than the amount of tax itself. From a broader perspective, it can be stated that the promotion 
of more liberal forms of employment and the liberalisation of the labour code would be a great advantage to all companies which 
employ workers on an intermittent and irregular basis, in accordance with the ﬂuctuating demand for their services or products (e.g. 
renovation teams, small-scale gastronomy, etc.).
For similar reasons, solutions which directly limit labour demand among lowest-wage workers should be replaced by solutions which 
increase such people’s net wages without increasing the gross labour costs. In this context, high average tax rates, which eﬀectively 
encourage low-productive workers to engage in unregistered work, are of particular signiﬁcance. Thus, NOE can be reduced through, 
for instance, the introduction of a high revenue earning cost, which eﬀectively increases tax progression right at the beginning of 
the tax scale without increasing the burden imposed on employers hiring low-productivity workers. From the economic perspective, 
the above solution is more viable than some suggested measures which limit employers’ ability to adjust oﬀered wages to the actual 
employee productivity levels. Of course, one condition which must be met in order to implement the above solution is the public 
ﬁnance reform and – what comes with it – a ﬁscal consolidation. As argued above, the reform of public ﬁnance which would involve 
a reduction of social transfers directed to people in the economically productive age, would have a strong pro-employment eﬀect. If it 
was supported by concurrent changes in the tax system, its likely outcome would consist in the reduction of undeclared work and of 
NOE. Therefore, if the authorities implemented and pursued a coordinated macroeconomic and pro-development structural policy at 
the national level, it might be expected that both the number of people working in NOE as well as the output generated in the informal 
sector would be decreased without any loss in total output or employment.
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Appendix 1. Decomposition of changes in value added
This report provides a decomposition of deviation in value added per capita in the region from the national average value added for 
Poland into industry and services, where each of these sections includes a further division into employment (labour input), productivi-
ty and residual. For the economy we explain the value added index I
VA
, which can be expressed as follows:
 
where:
i – examined region
K – country where the region is located
VAP – value added per capita
VA – value added
P – population
ER – employment rate (in the overall population)
W – productivity (VA per worker)
In view of the above, the index value is simply a product of quotients of employment rates and productivity indicators. The result can 
be expressed as follows:
 
 
The above decomposition can be applied in analyses for the economy as a whole, without any division into sectors. For sector decom-
position, contributions of particular sectors need to be additionally weighted by the share of value added of a given sector s in the total 
national value added. Thus, the equation takes the following form:
 
In this report, the analysis is limited to two sectors – industry and services – due to the lack of reliable time series on employment in 
agriculture at the subregional level.
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121.7
130.8
187.4
133.6
188.2
111.9
230.0
177.9
130.3
139.3
166.4
160.4
165.5
160.5
155.4
132.2
155.3
171.8
192.6
126.2
179.9
144.4
197.3
190.0
186.9
130.1
145.9
186.2
217.2
160.4
172.5
160.0
157.7
217.2
211.2
172.0
150.2
148.0
187.2
135.6
167.4
163.5
175.2
184.3
202.1
166.9
167.0
163.1
132.1
144.6
162.7
142.8
153.0
136.8
143.7
150.0
169.5
157.5
166.4
167.0
134.9
160.7
172.2
163.0
188.9
160.4
164.5
134.1
151.4
159.7
161.9
126.8
161.8
154.0
161.2
147.0
135.7
160.9
176.0
172.3
180.3
124.1
148.0
168.0
126.0
145.9
176.8
139.2
177.1
166.5
149.5
170.8
131.6
158.5
154.7
153.0
130.2
141.8
175.4
141.8
172.8
129.0
176.7
162.1
153.6
152.2
168.1
164.3
146.5
165.1
165.2
150.4
179.7
169.3
174.6
134.1
164.8
156.2
172.8
149.5
173.3
147.2
157.3
164.1
155.8
158.0
176.1
168.8
170.5
155.0
180.7
172.0
133.4
152.9
181.1
140.2
178.6
167.4
159.5
176.0
154.3
164.6
161.9
158.9
82.5
100.3
87.7
101.1
95.1
88.8
110.7
93.7
89.3
89.0
94.5
93.9
90.8
87.1
92.5
92.4
80.3
96.9
106.3
93.7
92.2
101.4
87.5
102.8
92.7
92.2
95.6
89.9
90.8
86.4
91.8
111.5
107.6
120.7
92.9
101.8
91.6
92.7
84.3
94.3
116.4
128.6
102.3
99.7
94.0
98.8
96.7
95.8
bialskopodlaski 
białostocko-suwalski 
bielsko-bialski 
bydgoski 
centralny śląski 
chełmsko-zamojski 
ciechanowsko-płocki 
częstochowski 
elbląski 
ełcki 
Gdańsk-Gdynia-Sopot 
gdański 
gorzowski 
jeleniogórsko-wałbrzyski 
kaliski 
koniński 
koszaliński 
krakowsko-tarnowski 
Kraków
krośnieńsko-przemyski 
legnicki 
lubelski 
łomżyński 
łódzki 
Łódź
nowosądecki 
olsztyński 
opolski 
ostrołęcko-siedlecki 
pilski 
piotrkowsko-skierniewicki 
Poznań
poznański 
radomski 
rybnicko-jastrzębski 
rzeszowsko-tarnobrzeski 
słupski 
szczeciński 
świętokrzyski 
toruńsko-włocławski 
Warszawa
warszawski 
Wrocław
wrocławski 
zielonogórski 
Poland
Poland excluding Warsaw
Poland excluding cities
Table A.1.
 Change in productivity and employment in subregions in 2005 compared with 1995 (1995=100)
81.9
97.0
72.2
89.4
72.4
90.7
95.7
88.6
89.0
89.4
81.7
94.3
84.2
76.8
93.1
86.9
78.9
83.2
87.5
84.1
82.7
91.8
83.5
91.8
78.5
88.2
91.6
76.6
85.0
92.9
81.5
97.2
106.6
94.7
72.4
90.6
89.2
80.2
77.3
88.0
102.1
103.7
85.8
99.9
86.1
86.6
85.2
87.2
80.4
91.2
58.0
76.2
55.3
94.7
78.5
83.6
88.6
90.1
60.4
94.8
75.6
66.7
93.7
81.9
76.5
70.3
59.2
71.8
74.2
77.2
76.3
80.0
58.3
81.9
85.1
62.9
75.5
101.1
72.2
74.3
105.8
64.8
59.1
79.2
85.8
64.9
66.5
80.0
67.6
77.2
57.6
100.2
76.1
71.7
71.9
77.1
total industry services
employment
total industry services
productivity
Below-average changes are presented in grey colour.
Source: Own calculation based on CSO regional accounts.
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-20.6
-12.3
12.5
0.8
29.2
-19.9
-6.9
2.8
-8.0
-19.0
9.0
-11.8
-1.0
-2.2
-0.5
-0.8
-11.0
-3.9
17.9
-8.5
13.4
-8.3
-19.8
-5.1
7.5
-14.8
-8.9
0.8
-16.9
-7.1
-0.1
18.6
-1.0
-9.5
22.1
1.4
-7.5
-5.7
-3.8
-5.8
10.2
-5.1
7.5
-9.0
-2.7
-5.6
-4.8
5.5
4.5
0.2
1.6
11.4
-6.0
-0.3
-4.0
7.1
2.2
-4.6
-0.6
-9.8
0.0
-2.9
-3.9
0.8
-1.9
14.8
-2.1
-3.8
-11.1
-2.3
-0.3
-1.7
1.2
-12.5
-7.9
-0.5
9.6
-3.4
-10.0
0.0
-6.7
-9.2
-1.5
-1.0
0.4
11.1
6.5
2.5
-5.0
-6.3
3.1
1.6
1.8
0.1
0.2
-0.8
-2.1
-0.4
0.1
2.0
1.7
-0.7
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.8
0.4
0.4
0.4
5.3
0.5
2.0
1.5
-0.5
0.1
0.4
0.0
5.6
1.5
0.0
4.7
0.1
2.5
0.0
-0.3
1.8
0.2
0.1
-0.1
3.0
-0.9
0.5
1.2
0.5
-6.9
-2.7
-0.9
-4.4
5.4
-12.9
-14.8
-7.4
-10.5
-15.5
41.2
-18.4
1.6
-15.5
-13.3
-16.8
-2.5
-19.6
49.3
-11.9
-1.2
-2.2
-18.8
-15.7
24.5
-13.8
2.7
-8.8
-17.1
-10.5
-16.8
59.1
-16.9
-18.6
-10.4
-8.9
-6.4
-10.0
8.1
-8.5
92.0
-15.7
41.0
-22.0
-2.9
-0.5
-5.8
3.0
3.4
2.3
-3.0
-1.7
0.4
-10.3
-3.9
-0.6
-2.5
6.5
7.6
-9.6
-4.7
-2.9
-1.3
-6.6
-2.4
0.9
-12.3
-6.3
5.8
-2.1
-6.2
-8.3
1.1
4.6
-4.7
-8.5
-3.5
-5.3
-0.2
1.8
-13.2
9.3
14.9
-11.9
7.7
10.6
-1.9
2.8
-1.8
8.1
0.1
0.3
0.0
-0.2
0.2
0.6
0.4
0.0
1.7
1.0
-0.4
0.7
0.2
-1.9
2.1
1.3
0.1
0.4
-5.2
0.5
0.0
0.4
1.9
-1.5
-0.8
1.4
-0.4
-0.2
-1.3
0.8
2.3
-3.3
1.4
0.1
-0.3
1.9
-1.0
-2.4
-1.6
-1.1
15.6
0.5
1.9
0.6
-0.4
Table A.2. 
Decomposition of sources of variation in value added per inhabitant from national average - 1995 
bialskopodlaski 
białostocko-suwalski 
bielsko-bialski 
bydgoski 
centralny śląski 
chełmsko-zamojski 
ciechanowsko-płocki 
częstochowski 
elbląski 
ełcki 
Gdańsk-Gdynia-Sopot 
gdański 
gorzowski 
jeleniogórsko-wałbrzyski 
kaliski 
koniński 
koszaliński 
krakowsko-tarnowski 
Kraków
krośnieńsko-przemyski 
legnicki 
lubelski 
łomżyński 
łódzki 
Łódź
nowosądecki 
olsztyński 
opolski 
ostrołęcko-siedlecki 
pilski 
piotrkowsko-skierniewicki 
Poznań
poznański 
radomski 
rybnicko-jastrzębski 
rzeszowsko-tarnobrzeski 
słupski 
szczeciński 
świętokrzyski 
toruńsko-włocławski 
Warszawa
warszawski 
Wrocław
wrocławski 
zielonogórski 
total employment productivity
industry
residual
services
employment productivity
Source: Own calculations based on CSO regional accounts.
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-15.2
-4.4
1.8
2.9
13.7
-11.2
-2.8
8.6
-0.7
-11.6
1.3
-4.4
0.4
-2.5
8.9
3.6
-7.4
-4.6
5.8
-7.1
13.6
-4.9
-15.4
-0.6
0.8
-10.7
-2.8
-2.5
-13.0
4.4
0.6
17.7
11.4
-9.9
11.0
4.1
-1.3
-6.8
-5.3
-1.8
4.5
-4.4
-1.2
1.1
-0.6
-12.0
-10.0
9.0
-3.3
4.2
-9.6
25.2
-3.2
-7.1
-8.0
5.8
0.6
-4.1
-1.7
-9.8
-6.6
-4.5
-2.5
5.7
-9.0
15.9
-5.8
2.1
-6.2
1.7
-7.2
-5.2
4.8
-4.1
-7.6
0.6
6.4
-4.4
-1.3
8.5
-4.8
-10.2
-4.7
2.9
-5.7
9.5
4.7
3.8
-1.3
0.3
5.7
1.4
0.5
-0.3
1.8
3.4
-2.2
-0.9
0.2
2.9
0.2
-0.1
-0.1
0.1
-2.7
-0.7
1.0
0.4
1.0
2.0
6.8
0.9
-1.0
0.1
0.0
2.4
0.5
-0.4
1.7
-1.1
0.0
3.6
-1.6
0.4
2.9
-0.6
0.4
1.0
-0.5
0.3
1.4
-0.7
-0.1
0.0
0.0
-16.3
-1.9
-9.7
-3.0
6.5
-18.1
-9.1
-10.4
-16.8
-21.5
39.8
-24.9
-4.7
-20.8
-18.5
-21.9
-14.2
-23.6
59.9
-15.8
-4.6
-0.4
-25.6
-14.2
25.7
-20.9
0.8
-13.5
-22.2
-18.9
-21.3
82.9
-17.1
-8.6
-13.3
-8.9
-11.4
-13.3
-2.5
-12.2
122.3
-6.9
48.7
-25.1
-6.5
-11.8
-11.8
5.2
-3.4
0.1
-12.2
-8.1
-3.3
-7.4
-4.6
2.7
0.8
-4.0
9.4
-5.5
-3.4
9.2
-0.6
-4.9
-12.8
-2.1
-13.0
-5.6
-8.5
-0.9
-8.6
-8.1
-3.8
-5.5
-4.2
-2.9
1.8
2.8
-15.0
-2.7
-11.3
-5.9
9.6
-6.7
-0.9
21.0
1.2
-0.9
3.1
-4.2
2.8
0.3
-0.7
0.1
0.0
3.2
1.1
0.5
1.8
1.5
1.6
-0.3
0.3
-2.9
1.5
1.1
-1.9
0.2
-4.3
3.0
0.1
0.1
2.1
1.8
-0.3
2.6
-0.1
0.7
1.8
1.2
0.9
2.1
-0.7
1.9
0.5
1.5
1.0
-1.9
0.2
0.2
37.6
-0.1
-0.7
-1.2
0.4
Table A.3.
 Decomposition of sources of variation in value added per inhabitant from national average - 2004
bialskopodlaski 
białostocko-suwalski 
bielsko-bialski 
bydgoski 
centralny śląski 
chełmsko-zamojski 
ciechanowsko-płocki 
częstochowski 
elbląski 
ełcki 
Gdańsk-Gdynia-Sopot 
gdański 
gorzowski 
jeleniogórsko-wałbrzyski 
kaliski 
koniński 
koszaliński 
krakowsko-tarnowski 
Kraków
krośnieńsko-przemyski 
legnicki 
lubelski 
łomżyński 
łódzki 
Łódź
nowosądecki 
olsztyński 
opolski 
ostrołęcko-siedlecki 
pilski 
piotrkowsko-skierniewicki 
Poznań
poznański 
radomski 
rybnicko-jastrzębski 
rzeszowsko-tarnobrzeski 
słupski 
szczeciński 
świętokrzyski 
toruńsko-włocławski 
Warszawa
warszawski 
Wrocław
wrocławski 
zielonogórski 
total employment productivity
industry
residual
services
employment productivity
Source: Own calculations based on CSO regional accounts.
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Appendix 2. Methodological remarks on LFS data
In order to estimate the intensity of migration, one can use LFS data basing on the answers to questions about the place of residence 
one year before the survey. A migrant is then deﬁned as a person who lived in a diﬀerent district or voivodeship one year before the 
interview (the survey does not provide for a division at the poviat level). Thus, it is only possible to compare the intensity of migration 
in Poland with other countries at the NUTS-2 level .
When using LFS data one should take into account the fact that selection of quarterly samples is performed according to the rotation 
system so the probability of observing migrants in the subsamples might diﬀer. In the Polish survey, one quarter of the sample are ho-
useholds drawn for the ﬁrst time, one quarter – those which participated in the previous round of the survey (three months earlier), one 
quarter – those which participated in the preceding year, and one quarter – those which participated 15 months before the examined 
round (see sample rotation system, Economic Activity of the Population, CSO). This means that for half of the sample the probability 
that it includes migrants is lower (there might be migration which involved returning to the household after an absence of more than 
one year or which occured due to the rent or purchase of a ﬂat in the secondary market – whereas people who bought ﬂats in the new 
place of residence should by no means be included in the sample). Members of households which participate in the survey for the 
second time (three months after the ﬁrst round of interviews) are typically characterised by lower probability of migration than those 
which participate in the survey for the ﬁrst time. If we ignore the above problem, the estimation of the intensity of migration is biased 
downwards and the structure of migrant’s population is distorted. The LFS sample rotation systems in other countries (Eurostat 2003) 
indicate that in some countries one third (see France, Spain, Hungary, Greece) or one ﬁfth (see Great Britain, Slovakia, etc.) of the sample 
is characterised by lower probability of migration related to the purchase of a new ﬂat.
Bearing the above in mind, when comparing migration intensity internationally, one would have to use data from subsamples which 
participated in the survey for the ﬁrst time and calibrate weights depending on the rotation system and the number of such subsam-
ples in a given country. For a greater comparability of migration data, the deﬁnition of a household, the methodology of determining 
membership in a household and place of permanent residence as well as of collecting information about people living in collective 
households should also be standardised.
To some extent the comparability of migration data can be aﬀected by the accuracy of data on new ﬂats, because the sample is drawn 
based on them.. In Poland, many ﬂats are registered a few years after construction and therefore their occupiers can take part in the 
survey only a few years after the change of residence. 
Moreover, people from villages and small towns who study outside their place of residence and live in halls of residence are not in-
cluded in the LFS. At the same time - when they graduate and engage in work in the place of study, they are - according to the LFS 
methodology - classiﬁed as people who used to live in a given city for more than one year, i.e. they are not classiﬁed as migrants.
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Appendix 3. Methodological remarks on the migration model
Model 1: intensity of outmigration from regions
The dependent variable is the intensity of outmigration from particular poviats based on data from the National Population Census 
on internal migration (Internal population migration, CSO). The intensity of outmigration is calculated as a share of migrants who left 
a given poviat in the period 1989-2002 in its total population aged 18-59/64 in 2002. At this point, certain reservations concerning the 
analysis should be made: the above data are subject to an error resulting from the retrospective nature of the migration survey which 
recorded only the last migration. Moreover, the aggregation of data published by the CSO for the entire period 1989-2002 makes it 
impossible to establish a panel for poviats and diﬃcult to select explanatory variables (variables describing the situation in poviats are 
available for 1995-2004). An alternative solution is to use data at the voivodeship level which are disaggregated in time. However, ta-
king into consideration the strong auto-correlation of the basic variables (unemployment rates, wage levels, etc.) for particular poviats 
in time and the large diﬀerences between poviats within voivodeships, it seems better to estimate the model using the data aggrega-
ted in time but with little spatial aggregation.
In view of the above (greater “weight” of migration, which occurred at the end of the studied period and strong auto-correlation of 
explanatory variables) only the data from 2002 were taken into account. The model was reestimated using the data from 1999 – the 
direction of the interdependence relationship proved the same and only its strength was smaller.
The general formulation of the model is as follows:
                                  where:
M 
RI
    = migration intensity from particular poviats
X 
iI
     = attractiveness of other regions weighted by distance
The “Population Index” was used as a proxy. This index is calculated by multiplying the population in all potential destination poviats 
by the decay function, derived from the distance from the capitals of these poviats. In spatial mobility models, population of potential 
destination regions is often used as a measure of their attractiveness.
Z 
iI
     = vector of standardised variables describing the situation in region i
The aim of the study is to measure the impact of the labour market situation on the propensity to migrate to other regions and therefo-
re the set of explanatory variables includes the amount of wages and the ratio of the number of the unemployed to the number of job 
oﬀers. Attempts were made to include the unemployment rate as a measure of chances for ﬁnding employment, however, given the 
arguments presented by Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989), it seems that the relationship between the number of the unemployed and 
job oﬀers – irrespective of an imprecision of this statistics –reﬂects the situation in the region better ( what is more this variable was also 
used to create clusters in Part II). Statistics on the employment structure (shares of people working in agriculture and in services) at the 
poviat level were also used in the analysis. . In view of the possibility of migration being substituted by work commuting (see Rouven-
dal 1999), the variables such as number of rooms per capita and road density in poviats were included in the set of control variables 
(assuming that the greater the supply of ﬂats in a given region, the lesser the tendency of its inhabitants to migrate to the regions of 
their employment and the greater the tendency to commute – where the latter is further enhanced by greater road density). Explana-
tory variables (apart from the population index which is “weighted” for all potential destination regions) were standardised working on 
the assumption that it is not their absolute level but deviations from the average level for all regions that are of key importance.
The model can be formulated as follows
which after the linearization can be estimated by the Ordinary Least Square method:
M
ri
 = log Population Index
Values predicted by the basic model (which included four explanatory variables – logarithm of the population index and standardised 
values of the supply of ﬂats, number of the unemployed per job oﬀer and wages), are not very well adjusted to the observed values of 
the intensity of migration in particular poviats However, given the deﬁciencies of data used in the analysis, this result can be deemed 
acceptable (road density was also taken into account, which improved the quality of the adjustment but resulted in the collinearity 
between the population index and road density – in highly populated poviats road density is usually substantially greater. Hence, this 
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explanatory variable was abandoned). The model explains approx. 44% of dependent variable variation, which should be considered 
signiﬁcant given the results of the variation analysis.
The variable which exerts the largest inﬂuence on the outﬂow of migrants from a region is the value of the population index which in-
dicates the availability of other attractive regions. There is a strong negative correlation between the value of the population index and 
the intensity of migration which seems to be unintuitive but which can be explained by the results concerning the interdependence 
between population size, distance between regions and the intensity of work commuting. If a less developed region borders with an 
attractive region which attracts labour resources, workers may prefer commuting to migration given the distance is short. This is so 
especially when the choice between commuting and migration is additionally motivated by the situation in the real estate market. If 
ﬂat prices and rents are high in the potential migration destination region, the migration might not be cost-eﬀective even if the wages 
are relatively high. Because data on ﬂat prices or rents are not available at poviat level, we used statistics on the number of newly built 
rooms per capita . It turned out that large availability of accommodation encourages people to migrate. It must be speciﬁed that this 
variable may be endogenous, however, we did not ﬁnd any suitable instrument. What is more, it seems improbable that a small – com-
pared with the total population of a given region – group of work commuters should have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the situation in 
the poviat real estate market. Last but not least, the conclusion that the supply of ﬂats in the region of residence is a factor which aﬀects 
the choice between commuting and migration and which thus decreases the intensity of outmigration from regions located in the 
vicinity of attractive regions – is supported by the results of the model of work commuting.
 
Model 2: Destination choice model
The second model explains the allocation of people who decided to migrated in the period of 1989-2002 between particular regions. 
The general formulation of the model is as follows:
        where:
M
ij 
/ O
i
  - share of all migrants originating from the region i who lived in region j in 2002
d
ij
   - function of the distance between regions (reverse)
In view of the fact that the denominator in the equation on the right hand side is the same for each outﬂow region i , the equation can 
be transformed to the form which, upon the logarithmisation of both sides, can be estimated using the OLS method:
        where:
ms
ij
 - all migrants originating from the region i who lived in region j in 2002
k
i
 - attractiveness of destination regions weighted by distance
In view of the fact that the CSO data on ﬂows below ten people are not available, a tobit model was used and the natural logarithm 
of 10 was set as the lower limit value. The model is signiﬁcant, however, it explains only approx. 32 per cent of the variance in the mi-
gration ﬂows. All variables apart from the number of the unemployed per job oﬀer are statistically signiﬁcant and aﬀect the outcome 
variable in the expected direction.
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Appendix 4. World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index
This index allows to rank and rate the economies of 175 countries worldwide for their ease of doing business. Rankings of particular 
countries on the index are based on the arithmetic mean derived from their rankings in each of the ten examined areas. Country rank-
ings are expressed as percentiles within which the result for a given country falls.
The Ease of Doing Business Index is based on the following subindices:
• starting a business – records all procedures that are required for an entrepreneur to start up and operate a business; these 
include obtaining all necessary licences and permits and completing any required notiﬁcations, veriﬁcations or inscriptions for the 
company and employees with relevant authorities, costs of complying with the above procedures and minimum capital require-
ments;
• dealing with licenses – records all procedures required for a business in the construction industry to build a warehouse of
a given size (including time necessary to obtain all licences and permits, to receive all required inspections and to complete and submit 
the relevant documents); the index also records procedures for obtaining utility connections (water, electricity, etc.) and time necessary 
to obtain a permit for transferring or selling the said warehouse;
• employing workers – records activities that employers are obliged to perform when hiring or ﬁring employees, as well as 
costs relating to dismissals and rigidity of working hours;
• registering property – records all procedures necessary when a business purchases land and buildings to transfer the prop-
erty title from the seller to the buyer so that the buyer could use the property; all procedures are included irrespective of whether it is 
the responsibility of the seller or the buyer or must be completed by a third party on their behalf;
• getting credit – constructs measures of the legal rights of borrowers and lenders, describes how well bankruptcy and col-
lateral laws facilitate landing and indicates how to access credit information (loan terms and conditions and information about borrow-
ers) available through public and private credit registers;
• protecting investors – measures the strength of minority shareholder protection against directors’ misuse of corporate as-
sets for personal gain; the index distinguishes three dimensions of investor protection: transparency of transactions, directors’ liability 
for self-dealing (proﬁts derived from conﬁdential information) and shareholders’ ability to sue oﬃcers and directors for misconduct;
• paying taxes – records taxes which a medium-size company must pay or withhold in a given tax year, as well as to adminis-
trative burden in paying taxes with respect to all components of the tax burden (corporate income tax, social insurance contributions 
and other labour taxes, property taxes, property transfer – including sale – taxes, dividend tax, capital gains tax, ﬁnancial transactions 
tax, road taxes and waste collection taxes);
• trading across borders – compiles all procedural requirements for exporting and importing goods – from the contractual 
agreement between the seller and the buyer to the delivery of goods, along with time and cost necessary for completion;
• enforcing contracts – measures the eﬃcient of the judicial system in resolving commercial disputes;
• closing a business – studies the time, cost and outcomes of bankruptcy proceedings involving domestic entities.
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Appendix 5. Paying Taxes 
For each country included in the Ease of Doing Business Index, the Paying Taxes Index was estimated using a case study with a set of 
ﬁnancial statements and assumptions about transactions made over the year. Experts in each country calculate taxes to be paid in 
their jurisdictions. Moreover, information was gathered about the frequency of tax return ﬁlings, audits and other costs of compliance 
with tax obligations.
The index was computed for a business with certain set characteristics, identical for all countries. The business:
• is a limited liability, taxable company,
• started operation on 1 January 2004; at the same time the company purchased all the assets shown in its balance sheet and 
 hired all its workers,
• operates in the country’s most populous city,
• is 100 per cent domestically owned and has ﬁve owners, all of whom are natural persons,
• has a start-up capital of 102 times income per capita at the end of 2004,
• performs general industrial and commercial activities; speciﬁcally, it produces ceramic ﬂowerpots and sells them at retail,
• does not participate in foreign trade and does not handle products subject to a special tax regime (e.g. alcohol, tobacco),
• owns two plots of land, one building, machinery, oﬃce equipment, computers and one truck and leases another truck,
• does not qualify for investment incentives or any special beneﬁts apart from those related to the age or size of
 the company,
• had sixty employees – four managers (including one owner), eight assistants and forty-eight workers – all nationals,
• has a turnover of 1,050 times income per capita,
• makes loss in the ﬁrst year of operation,
• has the same gross margin (pre-tax) across all economies,
• distributes 50 per cent of its proﬁts as dividends to the owners at the end of the second year,
• sells one of its plots of land at a proﬁt during the second year.
Moreover, relevant assumptions were also made about taxes. All the taxes were paid in the second year of operation, i.e. in 2005. All the 
taxes paid over the year were taken into consideration, however, taxes with the same name and taxes collected by the same agency 
(though charged at diﬀerent rates) are counted as the same tax. The frequency of payment for taxes includes advance payments or 
withholding as well as regular payments or withholding.
The index consists of three elements: 
• tax payments (total number of taxes paid, method of payment, frequency of payment and number of agencies involved);
• time – recorded in hours per year – to collect all information necessary to compute the tax payable, to ﬁle a tax return and 
 to pay the amount due for three major types of taxes: corporate income tax, value added tax or sales tax and labour taxes, 
 including payroll taxes and social insurance contributions;
• total tax rate which measures the amount of taxes payable by the business in the second year of operation, expressed as 
 a share of commercial proﬁts (sales minus cost of goods sold, minus gross salaries, minus deductible provisions, etc. plus 
 capital gains from the sale of property).
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Appendix 6. Employing workers
This index measures the regulation of employment, speciﬁcally as it aﬀects the hiring and ﬁring of workers and the rigidity of working 
hours. To make the data comparable across countries, several assumptions about the worker and the business are used. The informa-
tion on employing workers is based on a detailed survey of applicable employment regulations that is completed by local law ﬁrms. 
Laws and regulations as well as secondary sources are reviewed to ensure accuracy. Conﬂicting answers are further checked against 
two additional employment regulation sources.
The index applies to a worker who:
• is a non-executive, full-time male employee who has worked in the same company for 20 years,
• earns a salary plus beneﬁts equal to the country’s average wage during the entire period of his employment,
• is a lawful citizen with a wife and 2 children,
• resides in the country’s most populous city,
• is not a member of a labour union, unless membership is mandatory.
The business which employs the worker:
• is a limited liability company,
• operates in the country’s most populous city,
• is 100 per cent domestically owned,
• operates in the manufacturing sector,
• has 201 employees,
• abides by every law and regulation but does not grant workers more beneﬁts than what is legally mandated.
The Employing Workers Index consists of three indices:
• the rigidity of employment index which is the average of three subindices: (i) diﬃculty of hiring index (i.e. whether term 
 contracts can be used only for temporary tasks, what is the maximum cumulative duration of term contracts, what is the 
 ratio of the minimum wage for a trainee or ﬁrst-time employee to the average value added per worker), (ii) rigidity of hours 
 index (i.e. whether night and weekend work is restricted, whether the workweek can consist of 5.5 days or 50 hours for two 
 months a year, what is the length of paid annual vacation), and (iii) diﬃculty of ﬁring index (i.e. whether redundancy is 
 disallowed as a basis for terminating employment relationship, whether the employer needs to notify a third party to terminate one 
 redundant worker or a group of at least 25 redundant workers, whether the employer needs approval from a third party to 
 terminate one redundant worker or a group of at least 25 workers, whether the law requires the employer to consider 
 reassignment or retraining options before redundancy termination, and whether priority rules apply for redundancies and 
 reemployment);
• he non-wage labour cost index which measures all social insurance payments and payroll taxes associated with hiring an 
 employee in ﬁscal year 2005, which are expressed as a percentage of the worker’s salary;
• the ﬁring cost index measures the cost of advance notice, severance payments and penalties due when terminating
 a redundant worker, expressed in weekly wages.
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Appendix 7. Rule of Law and Government Effectiveness
The Rule of Law Index and the Government Eﬀectiveness Index are two of six indices developed to measure governance in particular 
countries (Governance Indicators) and published by the World Bank. These indices are computed based on surveys and polls carried 
out by diﬀerent international institutions such as the World Bank, Gallup International, Heritage Foundation, Reporters Without Borders 
(for a detailed description of data sources see Kaufmann et al. (2006)). Data from particular sources are standardised and aggregated 
into indices using an unobserved components model (see Kaufman et al. (2004)). Higher values indicate greater governance.
The Rule of Law Index measures the extent of compliance with the rules of society and the inclination to abide by them. In particular, 
this index reﬂects the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
The Government Eﬀectiveness Index studies the quality of public service provision, the competence of civil servants and the inde-
pendence of the civil service from political pressures. Moreover, this index measures the quality of policy formulation and implementa-
tion, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies (see Kaufmann et al. (2006)).  
  
Appendix 8. Heritage Foundation Regulations Index
The Regulations Index constitutes one of measures used to compute the Index of Economic Freedom published by the Heritage 
Foundation. In accordance with the methodology applicable in 2003, the index could take discrete values within a 1-5 performance 
bracket. The lowest results mean that the regulatory burden in a given country is not signiﬁcant, regulations are transparent and they 
do not discriminate any particular type of business and that the scale of corruption is small. On the other hand, the highest index value 
characterised countries where government regulations hindered the ability to start new businesses, where corruption had grown to 
considerable proportions, regulations were non-transparent and selective.
Index values were computed for particular countries based on a set of quantifying variables, such as the extent of licence requirements 
when starting a business and the ease of obtaining licences, the scale of corruption, the extent of labour regulations as well as other 
regulations which are a burden on businesses. Data was derived, among others, from reports published by the Economist Intelligence 
Unit and from publications prepared by national governments. Relevant descriptions were ascribed to every index value. The condition 
for classifying in a given category was the fact of having most features identiﬁed with a given index level.
 
Appendix 9. Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index
The Corruption Perceptions Index is based on survey and questionnaire results as well as interviews carried out by international in-
stitutions. The 2003 value of the index was computed from 17 variables derived from 13 sources (including World Bank, EBRD, World 
Economic Forum). All sources used to compute the index referred to the same deﬁnition of corruption. Questions related to subjective 
perceptions of the frequency of corruption in the closest environment, in a given sector or on the national level. All sources provided 
a ranking of countries. The values were compiled and standardised with the use of statistical techniques so that results would remain 
between 0 and 10. Higher index values are typical for lower extent of corruption in a given country. 
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Appendix 10. Sample selection model
In the situation where the selection of observations to the sample is non-random, there may arise a problem of quality of parameter 
estimates. The estimated values may provide a distorted image of the direction and strength of the relationship between the explained 
variable and the explanatory variables. For instance, estimation of the traditional regression model which quantiﬁes the impact of sec-
ondary school performance on performance at the university level, may lead to the conclusion that there is no signiﬁcant relationship 
between these variables. However, in population, an evident relationship can be observed between educational achievements at 
particular steps of the education ladder. The lack of such correlation in the model results from the fact that the probability of going to 
university, which is practically tantamount with being included in the examined sample (not all people who enter universities actually 
graduate), depends on the secondary school performance. Good performance in secondary school increases the chances of being 
admitted to university and thus of completing university studies. Similarly, attempts at determining the impact of particular factors 
on the probability of shadow employment in the population may be distorted due to diﬀerent inclinatons to engage in hired work by 
members of diﬀerent social and economic groups.
Non-random sample selection makes the OLS estimator inconsitent. Let us assume that we are estimating parameters of the following 
equation: 
where sample selection is determined by the following equation: 
The value of the explanatory variable is observed when z
i
 > 0 . The correlation coeﬃcient between disturbance terms is      . The regres-
sion function in the observed sample takes the following form:
where     means a function of explanatory variables and selection equation parameters, and       means a standard deviation of the 
random disturbance      . Clearly the above equation diﬀers from the regression equation in the population which is as follows: 
Hence, the estimation of the above function on the observed sample gives rise to the speciﬁcation error. The       estimator is not con-
sistent in this case (see Greene (2000)). 
The most commonly used estimation method when dealing with non-random sample selection is Heckman’s two-step method (see 
Heckman (1979)). In the ﬁrst step, the probit model is estimated which describes sample selection and determines      values for par-
ticular observations. In the second step, it is the parameters of the main equation that are estimated and this equation also takes the 
form of probit regression.
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Appendix 11. Methodological remarks concerning the analysis of internal migration and work
  commuting
Internal migration
Model of individual determinants of internal migration was estimated using Polish LFS data. A migrant was deﬁned as a person who 
had lived in a diﬀerent district or voivodeship one year before the interview (LFS does not provide for a division at the poviat level). 
When using the LFS data to analyze migration, it should be borne in mind that due to the sample rotation system the probability of 
observing migrants in the subsamples might diﬀer. (See Appendix 2). Members of households which participate in the survey for the 
second time (three months after the ﬁrst round of interviews) are typically characterised by lower probability of migration than those 
which participate in the survey for the ﬁrst time. If we ignore the above problem, the estimation of the intensity of migration is biased 
downwards and the structure of migrant’s population is distorted. 
In order to eliminate the above-mentioned problem, in the logit model of migrations we used LFS data only from the ﬁrst quarters of 
2001-2005. In order to obtain a balanced sample, we included all the observations on migrants and we drew a subsample of people 
who did not changed their place of residence. The model was estimated using Maximum Likelihood Method on the subsample of 
4,284 observations.
Work commuting
Model of individual determinants of work commuting, was estimated using the data from the European Social Survey (ESS). The total 
ESS sample consisted of 45,000 observations, however, we only included people in the productive age, commuting to work and living 
in the EEA – hence, the analysis was based on 11,044 observations. The model was estimated using Maximum Likelihood Method.
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Abbreviations used in the report
APW – average production worker income
CEE – Central and Eastern Europe
CPI – consumer price index
CSO – Central Statistical Oﬃce
DEA MLSP – Department of Economic Analyses and Forecasts of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy
EBRD – European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EEA – European Economic Area
EMU – Economic and Monetary Union
EPL – employment protection legislation
ERM II – Exchange Rate Mechanism II
ESA – European System of Accounts
ESS – European Social Survey
EURES – European Employment Service
FDI – foreign direct investment
GGDC – Groningen Growth and Development Centre
HCPI – harmonised consumer price index
IBS – Institute for Structural Research
IDA – Industrial Development Agency
ILO – International Labour Organisation
IMF – International Monetary Fund
LFS – Labour Force Survey
MLSP – Ministry of Labour and Social Policy
NBP – National Bank of Poland
NMS – New Member States; admitted to the EU on 1 May 2004
NOE – non-observed economy
NPC – National Population Census
NUTS – Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics
OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PCA – Polish Classiﬁcation of Activities
PFS – public ﬁnance sector
PPS – purchasing power standard) 
RDB – Regional Data Bank
SAE – small area estimation 
SEZ – Special Economic Zone
SII – Social Insurance Institution
TFP – total factor productivity
TUS – Time Use Survey 
WRS – Worker Registration Scheme
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